McCoy v. Department of Children and Families

Filing 3

ORDER dismissing without prejudice 1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari; denying 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and close the file. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 6/12/2017. (MHM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
CHARLES McCOY,
Petitioner,
Case No. 3:17-cv-660-J-34MCR
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES,
Respondent.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Charles McCoy’s Petition for Writ of
Certiorari (Doc. 1; Petition) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2; Motion), both
filed on June 9, 2017. In his Petition, McCoy seeks “certiorari review of the termination of
his parental rights” pursuant to “Rule 60(b)(1) and (3)” of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule(s)). See Petition at 1. According to McCoy, a state court in Duval County
terminated his parental rights in a decision issued on August 25, 2016. Id. at 2. Although
McCoy appealed this decision, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court’s ruling, and denied McCoy’s motion for a rehearing and written opinion. Id. As such,
McCoy initiated this action in which he seeks to have this Court review the decision
terminating his parental rights and “issu[e] an order directing the trial [court] and the
Respondent [the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF)] to give [McCoy] a
meaningful opportunity to complete a court ordered case plan with the goal of reuniting
[McCoy] with his children.” Id. at 23. In the Motion, McCoy asserts that DCF intends to
allow the adoption of his children, and seeks a “preliminary injunction prohibiting [DCF]

from proceeding with any adoption proceedings related to the minor children in this case.”
See Motion at 2-3.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore have an obligation to
inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d
1277, 1279 - 1280 (11th Cir. 2001). This obligation exists regardless of whether the parties
have challenged the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is
obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be
lacking.”). If at any time the Court determines it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, “the court
must dismiss the action.” See Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)).1
In the Petition, McCoy is asking this Court to review, overturn or interfere with a
state court judgment. However, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over such a request. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes
clear that federal district courts cannot review state court final judgments because that task
is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”
Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482).
Indeed, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “[i]t is well-settled that a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.” Dale v.

1

The Court notes that McCoy fails to allege any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case,
and the Court independently can discern none. Rather, McCoy appears to believe that this Court sits as an
appellate court over the Florida District Courts of Appeal. McCoy alleges that his Petition is permitted under
28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). See Petition at 1. However, 28 U.S.C. § 2101 governs petitions for writ of certiorari
before the United States Supreme Court. As such, the statute cited is not applicable to McCoy’s petition
before this Court, a United States District Court. Regardless, for the reasons set forth below, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider McCoy’s requests under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
2

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).

2 

Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997). Upon review of the Petition, it is apparent that
McCoy seeks to have his Petition serve as an appeal to this Court of the final decision of
the Florida state court regarding his parental rights, and asks this Court to overturn that
decision. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this request, the Court
determines that this action is due to be dismissed. Likewise, because the Court has no
subject matter jurisdiction to hear McCoy’s request, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
will be denied. In light of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED:
1. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
2. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any pending motions and
deadlines and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 12th day of June, 2017.

lc11
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Pro Se Parties

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