Logan v. Clemmons et al
Filing
63
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 54 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; granting the motion to the extent Plaintiff fails to state a failure-to-protect claim against Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Comerford, Morgan, Edward, and McGee, and Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy claim against Defendants Spreadly, Edward, and McGee; denying the motion to the extent Plaintiff states a plausible failure-to-intervene claim against Defendant Spreadly; directing Defendant Spreadly to answer the Complaint within twenty days of the date of this Order; directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 11/6/2019. (KLC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JAMES ALEXANDER LOGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:17-cv-765-J-39PDB
M.C. CLEMMONS et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, James Alexander Logan, is proceeding on a pro se
civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1; Compl.)
against
the
following
individuals
at
Suwannee
Correctional
Institution (SCI): M.C. Clemmons, Warden; F. W. Mock, Assistant
Warden; Melissa L. Comerford, Head of Classification; C. McGee,
Captain; D. Spreadly, Sergeant; C. Edward, Lieutenant; and C.
Morgan,
Sergeant.
See
Compl.
at
3,
5-6.
Plaintiff
alleges
Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him
from an inmate attack, failing to intervene during the attack, or
“by conspiring to help kill [him].” Id. at 7. Before the Court is
Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss (Doc. 54; Motion). Plaintiff
has responded (Doc. 55; Resp.). Accordingly, the motion is ripe
for this Court’s review.
II. Motion Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Additionally, the complaint
allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, --- F.3d ---,
No. 17-14525, 2019 WL 5304078, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2019).
When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must liberally construe
the allegations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). However,
“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”
which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678, 680. The plaintiff must allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) demands “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. As such, a plaintiff may not rely on “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Gill, 2019 WL 5304078, at *2 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678). Rather, the well-pled allegations must nudge the claim
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
2
at
570.
A
reasonable
plaintiff
should
expectation
that
allege
enough
discovery
facts
will
“to
reveal
raise
a
evidence”
supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 556.
III. Complaint Allegations1
Plaintiff claims Defendants failed to protect him when his
cellmate, a murderer and gang member, attacked him. Compl. at 7,
12.
Plaintiff
alleges
that,
on
December
15,
2016,
Defendant
Spreadly approached his cell to speak with his cellmate, inmate
Bank. Id. at 11. While Defendant Spreadly was at the cell, inmate
Bank punched Plaintiff in his face. Id. Defendant Spreadly walked
away “like he saw nothing.” Id. Plaintiff and inmate Bank then
started fighting. Inmate Bank began “telling inmates to call
[Defendant] Spreadly which inmates [were] blood game [sic] members
and that he need [sic] a knife.” Id. Defendant Spreadly returned
to the cell, apparently with gang member inmate Harris. Plaintiff
asked Defendant Spreadly to let him out of the cell, but Spreadly
refused to do so and again walked away, leaving inmate Harris at
the cell. Id.
After Spreadly left, inmate Harris slid a knife under the
cell door to inmate Bank, who used the knife to stab Plaintiff in
Plaintiff offers an exhibit in support of his Complaint
(Doc. 1-1). Under Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint exhibit “is part of the pleading for all
purposes.” See also Gill, 2019 WL 5304078, at *2 (recognizing a
district court may consider exhibits to a complaint when ruling on
a motion to dismiss). When the Court references Plaintiff’s
exhibit, it will cite it as “Compl. Ex.”
1
3
his chest, knee, and finger. Id. at 11-12. It is unclear whether
Defendant Spreadly saw inmate Harris slide the knife to inmate
Bank, or whether Defendant Spreadly knew inmate Harris had a knife.
However, Plaintiff alleges that, after the attack, inmate Harris,
in front of Defendant Spreadly, admitted to providing the knife to
inmate Bank. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spreadly was
deliberately indifferent to his safety by failing to intervene
during the attack. Id. at 9, 13.
No other Defendant was present during or witnessed the attack.
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Comerford, the head of classification,
and Defendant Morgan, the movement sergeant, inadequately screened
him and negligently placed him in a cell with inmate Bank, knowing
he was a murderer and gang member. Id. at 12, 13, 14.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Edward, and
McGee were deliberately indifferent to his safety by failing “to
take corrective action to have all dorms through[ly] search[ed]”
for weapons knowing that “inmates [had] been killing each other.”
Id. at 8, 9, 10, 12. Plaintiff asserts he had been housed at SCI
for about two months when this attack occurred, and during that
time, there had been a similar incident in his dorm. According to
Plaintiff, in November 2016, an inmate stabbed and killed his
cellmate. Id. at 13. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Clemmons, Mock,
Edward, and McGee were aware of the November incident. Id. at 810; Compl. Ex. at 1.
4
Plaintiff further alleges Defendants Spreadly, Edward, and
McGee conspired to conceal the knife inmate Bank used to stab him
by failing to take photos of the knife. Compl. at 10, 12.
IV. Summary of the Arguments
Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Motion at 1. They assert Plaintiff fails to state a failure-toprotect
claim
under
the
Eighth
Amendment,
arguing
Plaintiff
provides only conclusions with no facts suggesting Defendants
could have foreseen the attack. Id. at 3-4. Defendants contend,
“Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants had prior knowledge
that his cell mate would assault him or that they would assault
each other.” Id. at 5. Defendants further argue Plaintiff fails to
state
a
conditions-of-confinement
claim
under
the
Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 7-8. Defendants maintain Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding his cell assignment with inmate Bank amount to no more
than a suggestion of negligence, not intentional conduct to subject
to him an unreasonable risk of serious harm. Id. at 7. Finally,
Defendants assert Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy claim
because
he
alleges
no
facts
showing
Defendants
“reached
an
understanding” to deny him his constitutional rights. Id. at 11.
In the alternative, Defendants argue the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine bars the claim. Id. at 12.2
2
claim
Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene
against Defendant Spreadly. Because Defendants seek
5
In response, Plaintiff argues his failure-to-protect claim is
sufficiently pled because he alleges Defendants were aware of the
incident that occurred in November 2016 at SCI, in which one inmate
(a convicted murderer) stabbed and killed his cellmate. Resp. at
1.
Plaintiff
“inadequate[]
says
the
screening
prior
by
inmate
death
classification
was
a
[officer
result
of
Defendant]
Comerford . . . and [Defendant] Morgan.” Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff
claims Defendants Clemmons and Mock were aware of the previous
murder and failed to take corrective action to ensure the dorms
were
being
properly
searched,
in
violation
of
Florida
Administrative Code provisions. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff also notes he alleges all Defendants knew his
cellmate, inmate Bank, was a murderer and gang member. Id. at 23. Plaintiff contends his allegations demonstrate “a history of
widespread abuse at [SCI],” referencing the November 2016 murder,
and
suggesting
other
inmate
attacks
occurred
in
the
months
following his attack. Id. at 3. With respect to the conspiracy
claim, Plaintiff states the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
does not apply because Defendants’ actions were criminal in nature.
Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff states Defendants Spreadly, Edward, and
McGee’s concerted efforts to conceal the knife prevented him from
pursuing criminal charges against inmate Bank. Id. at 4-5.
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint as a whole, however, the Court
is obliged to address this claim.
6
As
to
Defendant
Spreadly’s
actions,
Plaintiff
says
the
following, clarifying the allegations in his Complaint:
Defendant
Spreadly
was
present
at
Plaintiff[’s] cell front talking to inmate
[B]ank and watch[ed] inmate [B]ank assault[]
Plaintiff th[e]n walk off like he saw nothing
and came back with inmate [H]arris that[’]s
blood gang member and refused to let me out
[of] the cell but left and allowed inmate
[H]arris to slide a knife inside a brown RDP
bag under the cell door to his gang member
brother inmate [B]ank.
Id. at 3-4.
V. Analysis & Conclusions
A. Eighth Amendment
The
Eighth
Amendment
demands
prison
officials
“take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However, prison officials
are
obligated
to
ensure
“reasonable
safety;”
they
are
not
constitutionally liable for every inmate-on-inmate attack. Id. at
834,
844.
Instead,
it
is
“[a]
prison
official’s
‘deliberate
indifference’ to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate [that]
violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828. To state a deliberate
indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege three elements: “(1)
a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) a causal connection between the
defendants’ conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation.” Brooks v.
Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Caldwell v.
7
Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014)). The
first element requires that a plaintiff allege he was exposed to
“conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834. The second element, commonly referred to as the
“subjective component,” requires a plaintiff to allege the prison
official subjectively was aware of a substantial risk of serious
harm but responded to the risk in an objectively unreasonable
manner. Id. at 828, 835-36.
Whether a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm
is evaluated under an objective standard: “The known risk of injury
must be a ‘strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility,’
before
a
guard’s
failure
to
act
can
constitute
deliberate
indifference.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Brown v. Hughes,
894
F.
2d
1533,
1537
(11th
Cir.
1990)).
A
jail
or
prison
environment necessarily carries some risk of violence. As such,
when a prisoner advances a deliberate indifference claim under a
theory that he was exposed to a generalized risk of harm from
inmate violence, he must do more than allege occasional or isolated
attacks have occurred. Purcell v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313,
1320 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, he must allege facts demonstrating
that “serious inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something
close to it.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1322).
8
In Marbury, the Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate, on summary judgment, that he was housed in a prison
“so beset by violence that confinement, by its nature, threatened
him with the substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1235. This
was so even in light of the plaintiff’s verified statements that
he had personally witnessed fifteen inmate stabbings, and prior to
the incident in which he was stabbed, he wrote letters to the
warden asking to be moved to a different dorm, which he described
as an “over-rated gang affiliated block.” Id. at 1231, 1234-35.
The court clarified, Eleventh Circuit precedent requires a
plaintiff who alleges a generalized risk of harm to “point[] to
specific features of a facility or its population rendering it
particularly
violent.”
Id.
at
1235.
For
example,
successful
plaintiffs have alleged or adduced evidence showing “pervasive
staffing and logistical issues rendering prison officials unable
to address near-constant violence, tensions
subsets
of
a
prison
population,
and
unique
between different
risks
posed
by
individual prisoners or groups of prisoners due to characteristics
like mental illness.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
A plaintiff’s allegations must demonstrate he is exposed to
“an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence” such that he faces
a “constant threat of violence.” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320 (quoting
Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973)). See also
Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014). In
9
Harrison, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish the
prison environment was one where “violence and terror reign[ed]”
because there were only four similar incidents over a three-year
period. 746 F.3d at 1300. The court reasoned, “the evidence of
inmate-on-inmate assault involving weapons does not . . . indicate
that inmates were ‘exposed to something even approaching the
constant
threat
of
violence’”
sufficient
to
trigger
Eighth
Amendment liability. Id. at 1299-1300 (quoting Purcell, 400 F.3d
at 1313).
i. Failure-to-Protect Claim Against Defendants Clemmons, Mock,
Comerford, Morgan, Edward, and McGee
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, he alleges
Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Comerford, Morgan, Edward, and McGee
knew of a dangerous prison condition (inmate-on-inmate violence),
allowed the condition to persist, and failed to protect him from
that dangerous condition.
See Compl. at 8-10, 12.
Under the
stringent Eleventh Circuit standard, Plaintiff fails to allege an
Eighth Amendment violation against these Defendants.
Plaintiff’s
only
factual
support
for
his
claim
is
that
Defendants knew his cellmate was a murderer and gang member and
the month before the attack, a similar inmate-on-inmate attack
occurred, resulting in an inmate’s death. Id. at 8-10, 13. Even
accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff fails to
allege
facts
permitting
the
reasonable
10
inference
he
faced
a
substantial risk of serious harm. See Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301.
Plaintiff does not allege a specific feature of the dorm rendered
it a particularly violent place such that he was exposed to the
constant threat of violence.
See
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235;
Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1300. For instance, he does not allege the
dorm was subject to overcrowding and insufficient staffing; he
does not allege there were known problems among different groups
of prisoners; and he does not allege there were “unique risks”
present in his dorm of which prison officials were aware. See
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235 (citing cases).
Rather, Plaintiff alleges a generalized, potential threat of
harm, which exists in any prison throughout the country. See
Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1323 (“In the jail setting, a risk of harm to
some degree always exists by the nature of its being a jail.”). A
prison official’s knowledge of a potential for harm, however, does
not expose him to liability under the Eighth Amendment. See also
Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301 (holding the plaintiff failed to allege
he faced a “strong likelihood of injury” where he asserted he
reported to prison officials the inmate in the next cell threatened
him, and the inmate was later able to carry out his threats when
all cell doors in the dorm randomly opened at the same time).
Even accepting as true Defendants were aware of the stabbing
incident that happened the month before Plaintiff was stabbed, one
prior similar incident does not demonstrate Plaintiff’s dorm was
11
a place where “violence and terror reign[ed].” See Harrison, 746
F.3d at 1298, 1300.3 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts
demonstrating the objective component of a deliberate indifference
claim.
Even if Plaintiff had alleged an objectively substantial risk
of serious harm, he fails to allege facts demonstrating Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to that risk. The subjective prong
of a deliberate indifference claim requires a plaintiff to allege
a prison official “actually (subjectively) knows that an inmate is
facing a substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregards that
known
risk
by
failing
to
respond
to
it
in
an
(objectively)
reasonable manner.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508
F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,
844).
To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must do more
than allege a prison official had a “generalized awareness” of a
particular inmate’s propensity for violence. See, e.g., Carter v.
Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding the
Plaintiff vaguely references subsequent incidents as well.
See Compl. at 13. However, instances of inmate violence that
occurred after Plaintiff’s injury are not indicative of whether
Defendants knew Plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of
serious harm yet disregarded that risk. See Estate of Owens v. GEO
Grp., Inc., 660 F. App’x 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
essential timeframe under analysis is restricted to the time period
before the injury has occurred.”) (emphasis in original).
3
12
plaintiff
failed
particularized
to
threat
demonstrate
even
though
the
the
defendants
defendants
knew
of
knew
a
the
aggressor was a “problem inmate” and had been roaming the cell he
shared with the plaintiff like a “caged animal”); Johnson v. Boyd,
701 F. App’x 841, 845 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of the
plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim because he simply alleged his
cellmate who attacked him had a “well documented propensity for
violence” of which the defendants were aware, but he did not allege
the defendants “foresaw or knew of a specific risk” the cellmate
posed).
Even when a plaintiff vaguely reports he fears his cellmate
or asks to be moved, he fails to state a claim unless he provides
details to substantiate his fears. See, e.g., Winstead v. Williams,
750 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint where he alleged he reported to prison
officials, before the attack, that he had been having unspecified
“problems” and “trouble” with his cellmate); McBride v. Rivers,
170 F. App’x 648, 655 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the defendant was
not subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm even though the
plaintiff asked not to be placed in a cell with the inmate who
later attacked him because the plaintiff “did not identify a
specific prior incident, from which the defendant could infer that
a substantial risk existed”).
13
Additionally, a plaintiff must do more than allege a prison
official should have known of an inmate’s propensity for violence
or his likelihood of harming another inmate based on the inmate’s
past conduct. See Owens, 660 F. App’x at 771 (noting constructive
knowledge is not the standard). See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838
(“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,
cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”).
Similarly, allegations suggesting a prison official was negligent
or violated internal procedures do not suffice. Id. at 828, 838.
See also Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013)
(“Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does
not justify liability under [§] 1983.”) (alteration in original)
(quoting Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Edward, and
McGee were deliberately indifferent for failing to “thorough[ly]
search for weapons,” and Defendants Comerford and Morgan were
deliberately indifferent for putting him in a cell with a murderer
and gang member.
See Compl. at 8-10, 13-14. Accepting
these
allegations as true, Plaintiff alleges no more than Defendants’
“generalized awareness” of a potential for harm. Even if Defendants
knew inmate Bank was a murderer and gang member or had a history
of violence at the prison, Plaintiff alleges no facts permitting
the
reasonable
inference
Defendants
14
had
knowledge
of
a
particularized threat of harm to Plaintiff. See Carter, 352 F.3d
at 1349; Johnson, 701 F. App’x at 845.
Significantly,
Plaintiff
does
not
allege
inmate
Bank
previously harmed or threatened him or any other inmate. Plaintiff
also does not allege Defendants “foresaw or knew of a specific
risk” inmate Bank posed to Plaintiff and, with that knowledge,
ignored the risk. See Johnson, 701 F. App’x at 845. Plaintiff does
not even allege he reported a fear of his cellmate prior to the
attack.
Indeed,
Plaintiff
concedes
in
a
grievance
he
filed
following the incident that he never requested protection. See
Compl. Ex. at 5, 7. Plaintiff states, “at no time” did he request
protection because he “[did not] need . . . protection.” Id. at 5.
Plaintiff continued, he only needed “for DOC officials to do
[their] duty.” Id. If allegations of reporting vague threats or
generalized fear of one’s cellmate are not enough to satisfy the
subjective knowledge prong, then Plaintiff’s allegations must fail
as well. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349; Winstead, 750 F. App’x at
851; McBride, 170 F. App’x at 655.
Accepting as true Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Edward, and
McGee failed to ensure the dorms were thoroughly searched for
weapons, any such failure, to the extent attributable to them,
amounts
to
a
“dereliction
of
duty,”
which
equates
to
mere
negligence, not deliberate indifference. See Goodman, 718 F.3d at
1332–33. In Goodman, the court held the plaintiff failed to present
15
evidence the defendant prison guards had subjective knowledge he
was in serious danger from his cellmate even though one guard left
her post for extended periods of time, the guards failed to conduct
required head counts and cell checks, and the guards disengaged
emergency call buttons without investigating why the buttons had
been activated. Id. The court noted the failure to follow safety
protocols “is negligence of the purest form.” Id. at 1332. See
also Losey v. Warden, 521 F. App’x 717, 720 (11th Cir. 2013)
(“[F]ailure to follow procedures does not, by itself, rise to the
level of deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a
form of negligence.”) (quoting Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254,
1259 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Similarly,
assuming
Defendants
Comerford
and
Morgan
“inadequately screen[ed]” Plaintiff such that he should not have
been placed in a cell with inmate Bank, their oversight is not
actionable
under
§
1983
as
deliberate
indifference.
See
id.
Plaintiff himself provides evidence that prison officials assigned
him
to
a
cell
with
inmate
Bank
after
“a
complete
housing
compatibility review.” See Compl. Ex. at 6. Assuming any error in
the compatibility review is attributable to Defendants Comerford
and Morgan, the error amounts to mere negligence.
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Clemmons,
Mock, Edward, and McGee are premised on their supervisory roles,
not on their direct, personal participation in any wrongdoing,
16
Plaintiff’s claims similarly fail. Plaintiff alleges Defendants
Clemmons and Mock “fail[ed] to take corrective action to have all
dorm(s) through[ly] search[ed] for knife(s) [sic] and weapon(s) …
knowing the high risk of danger.” Compl. at 8. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Edward “fail[ed] to take corrective action to have his
dorm F thorough[ly] search[ed],” and Defendant McGee “fail[ed] to
take corrective action to have all [close management] unit(s)
dorm(s) [sic] thorough[ly] search[ed].” Id. at 9, 10 (emphasis
added).
“It is well established . . . that supervisory officials are
not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their
subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior.” Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). When a prisoner seeks
to hold a supervisory official responsible for an inmate attack,
the prisoner must demonstrate a causal connection between the
supervisor’s actions or inactions and the alleged constitutional
violation. See Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1298.
A causal connection may be established “when a history of
widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the
need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.”
Id. (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360). Only constitutional
violations that are “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued
duration”
constitute
violations
17
of
“widespread
abuse.”
Id.
(quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Isolated occurrences do not suffice. Id.
While
Plaintiff
contends
Defendants
failed
to
correct
a
“history of widespread abuse at [SCI],” see Resp. at 3, he alleges
only
one
prior,
similar
inmate-on-inmate
attack
having
had
occurred. See Compl. at 13. One instance of a prior, similar
incident does not constitute abuse that is “obvious, flagrant,
rampant and of continued duration” to satisfy the rigorous standard
for supervisory liability. See Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1298. See
also Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1051-52 (11th Cir.
2014) (holding one prior, similar instance of inmate violence
resulting in death, while tragic, was an “isolated incident” and
not “evidence of widespread and flagrant abuse sufficient to alert
[the supervisory defendant] to a substantial risk of serious
harm”).
For the above reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim
against Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Comerford, Morgan, Edward, and
McGee, and they are due to be dismissed from this action.
ii. Failure-to-Intervene Claim Against Defendant Spreadly
A prison official who observes a constitutional violation has
an obligation to intervene if he is in a position to do so. See
Terry v. Bailey, 376 F. App’x 894, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998)). See also
Johnson v. Boyd, 701 F. App’x 841, 846 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A]n
18
officer has a duty to intervene if he observes a constitutional
violation and is in a position to intervene.”).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spreadly failed to intervene when
Defendant Spreadly saw inmate Bank punch Plaintiff in the face and
then walked away. See Compl. at 9, 11. Plaintiff also alleges
Defendant Spreadly “came again [to his cell] with inmate Harris
[who is a] blood [gang] member.” Id. at 11. When Plaintiff asked
Defendant Spreadly to open the cell door so he could escape from
inmate Bank, Defendant Spreadly refused and walked away, leaving
inmate Harris at the cell front. Id. Inmate Harris then passed
inmate Bank a knife, which he used to stab Plaintiff. Id.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff states
a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Spreadly. See
Johnson, 701 F. App’x at 846 (holding the plaintiff stated a claim
where he alleged the defendant officers watched an inmate attack
him but failed to intervene); Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F. App’x 945,
948 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding the plaintiff stated a failure-tointervene claim when he alleged the defendant prison guard observed
the
attack
but
took
no
action).
Plaintiff
alleges
Defendant
Spreadly was in a position to intervene, but he failed or refused
to do so. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Spreadly observed the initial
attack and took no action to separate the inmates to prevent
further harm to Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations
permit the inference Defendant Spreadly allowed a known gang member
19
(inmate Harris) to pass a knife to inmate Bank by walking away
from the cell while the gang member remained. As such, Plaintiff’s
failure-to-intervene
claim
against
Defendant
Spreadly
will
proceed.
B. Conspiracy Claim Against Defendants Spreadly, Edward, and
McGee
“A plaintiff claiming a § 1983 conspiracy must prove the
defendants ‘reached an understanding’ to violate the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d
1240, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he linchpin for conspiracy is
agreement, which presupposes communication.” Bailey v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs of Alachua Cty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir.
1992). As with any claim for the violation of a constitutional
right, a conspiracy claim under § 1983 must be based on more than
vague and conclusory accusations. Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 578 F. App’x 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). “It is not enough to simply aver in the complaint
that a conspiracy existed.” Id. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
Here, Plaintiff does no more than allege the existence of a
conspiracy with no supporting facts. Plaintiff’s claim primarily
rests on allegations that Defendants failed to take photos of the
knife inmate Bank used to stab him. Plaintiff states Defendants
20
Spreadly, Edward, and McGee’s “action[s] in failing to take photos
of the knife they found was [sic] done with a knowing intent of
conspiring to conceal the physical evidence Plaintiff was stab
[sic] with.” Compl. at 10. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants
Edward and Spreadly claimed they found a knife on quad three in an
RDP bag, but they “fail[ed] to take photos of th[e] knife.” Id. at
12-13. Failing to take photos of the weapon inmate Bank used to
attack Plaintiff does not implicate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Moreover, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to have
inmate Bank criminally prosecuted.
In section V of the civil rights complaint form (“Statement
of
Claim”),
Plaintiff
states
in
a
conclusory
manner
that
“Defendant(s) . . . conspire[ed] to help kill [him].” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff does not state which Defendants conspired to do so.
Moreover, as Plaintiff describes the incident, only Defendant
Spreadly was present during the attack. Plaintiff alleges no facts
to suggest Defendant Spreadly reached an agreement with any other
Defendant to allow the attack to occur or to conceal evidence of
the attack. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is due
to be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent
21
Plaintiff
fails
to
state
a
failure-to-protect
claim
against
Defendants Clemmons, Mock, Comerford, Morgan, Edward, and McGee,
and Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy claim against Defendants
Spreadly, Edward, and McGee. The Motion is DENIED to the extent
Plaintiff states a plausible failure-to-intervene claim against
Defendant Spreadly.
2.
The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Clemmons,
Mock, Comerford, Morgan, Edward, and McGee as parties to this
action
3.
Defendant Spreadly must answer the Complaint within
twenty days of the date of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 6th day of
November, 2019.
Jax-6
c:
James Alexander Logan, #Y00683
Counsel of Record
22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?