Logan v. Clemmons et al

Filing 81

ORDER denying 72 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; referring the case to the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program; directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 7/17/2020. (KLC)

Case 3:17-cv-00765-BJD-PDB Document 81 Filed 07/17/20 Page 1 of 14 PageID 545

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JAMES ALEXANDER LOGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:17-cv-765-J-39PDB

T. A. SPREADLY,1
Defendant.
______________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, James Alexander Logan, an inmate of the Florida
Department of Corrections, is proceeding pro se on a civil rights
complaint (Doc. 1; Compl.) against Defendant Sergeant T. Spradley.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spradley was deliberately indifferent
to his safety when Spradley saw his cellmate attack him on December
15, 2016, and failed to intervene. See Compl. at 9, 13.2 Before
the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72;

In his complaint, Plaintiff spells Defendant’s last name as
“Spreadly,” which is the spelling reflected on the Court’s docket.
As is evident from Defendant’s filings (Docs. 72, 72-1), his last
name is spelled “Spradley.” The Court will direct the Clerk to
update the docket accordingly.
1

Plaintiff’s allegations are fully summarized in this Court’s
order on Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Order (Doc. 63).
Plaintiff’s claims against the other Defendants have been
dismissed. Id.
2

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Motion), which Plaintiff opposes (Docs. 78, 79; Pl. Resp.) (Docs.
78-1, 78-2; Pl. Ex.).3
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93
F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville
Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere
scintilla

of

evidence

in

support

of

the

non-moving

party’s

position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,
1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that
there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at
trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th
Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on a motion for summary
judgment

may

include

“depositions,

documents,

electronically

On different dates, Plaintiff submitted duplicate copies of
his response with an exhibit.
3

2

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stored

information,

(including

those

affidavits

made

for

or

declarations,

purposes

of

the

stipulations

motion

only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own
affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox,
Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
On summary judgment, a party opposing the motion must point
to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of
material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Substantive law determines
the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477
U.S.

at

248.

appropriate,

a

In

determining

court

“must

whether

view

all

summary
evidence

judgment
and

make

is
all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.
1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del
Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

3

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III. Defendant’s Motion
Defendant Spradley argues the evidence shows the absence of
a

genuine

issue

of

material

fact

regarding

whether

he

was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s request for protection
(under

a

failure-to-protect

theory)

or

whether

he

failed

to

intervene during the attack (under a failure-to-intervene theory).
See Motion at 8, 10-11. Additionally, Defendant Spradley maintains
Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages must be
dismissed because he suffered only de minimis injuries. Id. at 1314. Finally, Defendant Spradley invokes qualified immunity. Id. at
15.
Defendant Spradley does not dispute Plaintiff was injured on
December 15, 2016. See Motion at 3. However, Defendant disputes
all other pertinent allegations, including that Plaintiff was
attacked by his cellmate, Inmate Banks.4 In his declaration (Doc.
72-1; Def. Ex. A), Defendant Spradley avers the facts relayed by
Plaintiff “are not true.” Def. Ex. A ¶ 3. In stark contrast to
Plaintiff’s

version

of

events,

Defendant

Spradley

says

the

following transpired on December 15, 2016:
I was on quad 4 of F dormitory cell front
F4208, where Inmate Logan . . . and Inmate
Banks . . . were housed. Inmate Banks and
Inmate Logan both told me they had issues and
could no longer be housed together. In
Plaintiff spells the inmate’s last name as “Bank.” See
Compl. at 11; Resp. at 2. According to prison documents, the
inmate’s last name is spelled “Banks.” Def. Ex. B at 1.
4

4

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response, I ordered both [i]nmates to submit
to hand restraints to be reassigned to a new
housing location. I restrained both inmates
and removed Inmate Logan from the cell with
Inmate Banks and placed him in the holding
cell. Inmate Banks remained in the housing
cell. At this time, Inmate, [sic] Logan had no
visible injuries. Approximately 30 minutes
later, I returned to the holding cell and
Inmate Logan had spots of blood on his chest,
nose,
left
middle-finger,
and
he
was
complaining of his knee hurting. Inmate Logan
then made an allegation that Inmate Banks
assaulted him. Inmate Logan was seen by
medical with 2 1cm superficial lacerations to
his left knee, 1 cm laceration to his upper
left chest, 3cm laceration to his middle left
middle [sic] finger, and the bridge of his
nose was swollen. . . . [A]t no time during
this incident did I see the inmates exchanging
blows or fighting.
Id. Defendant Spradley wrote an incident report on December 15,
2016, relaying the facts as stated in his declaration (Doc. 72-2;
Def. Ex. B). The shift supervisor noted there were no witnesses to
the incident and Inmate Banks was “a confirmed member of the
security threat group known as ‘Gorilla Stone Ganstas.’” Def. Ex.
B at 1. The supervisor forwarded the incident report to the Office
of the Inspector General (IG) and placed Plaintiff on protective
management pending a review by the ICT (Institution Classification
Team). Id. A nurse evaluated Plaintiff, recorded his injuries, and
cleansed his lacerations. Id. at 2-3, 6.
Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance on December 19,
2016, reporting that Defendant Spradley ignored Inmate Banks’s
initial attack (a punch) and allowed another gang-member inmate to
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slide a knife under their shared-cell door to Inmate Banks (Doc.
72-3; Def. Ex. C). Plaintiff expressly requested video footage be
retained

pursuant

to

section

33-602.033

of

the

Florida

Administrative Code. Def. Ex. C at 3, 4. The Warden’s office
approved Plaintiff’s grievance and referred his complaint to the
IG’s office for “appropriate action.” Id. at 2. The response did
not address Plaintiff’s request to preserve video evidence.
IV. Analysis & Conclusions
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spradley was
deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s safety

for

Spradley’s

failure to protect Plaintiff and his failure to intervene when
Plaintiff’s cellmate attacked him. See Compl. at 9, 17. In his
response, Plaintiff clarifies that he does not proceed under a
failure-to-protect

theory

but

under

a

deliberate-indifference

theory. In fact, Plaintiff asserts he did not tell Defendant
Spradley he and Inmate Banks had issues, and he disputes that
Defendant Spradley moved him to a holding cell to separate the two
inmates. See Pl. Resp. at 5, 7; Pl. Ex. at 2-3.
A. Eighth Amendment Claim & Qualified Immunity
In

his

verified

complaint,5

Plaintiff

asserts

Defendant

Spradley saw Inmate Banks punch Plaintiff and then walked away

The factual assertions a plaintiff makes in a verified
complaint satisfy “Rule 56’s requirements for affidavits and sworn
declarations,” and are therefore given the same weight as factual
5

6

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from the cell where the two inmates were housed together. Compl.
at 11. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Spradley heard Inmate Banks
request a knife from another gang member, Inmate Harris. Id. at
11-12. Plaintiff does not make clear in his complaint whether
Defendant Spradley permitted Inmate Harris to pass the knife to
Inmate Banks or whether he witnessed the act. See id. However, in
his affidavit, which he provides with his response to Defendant’s
motion, Plaintiff clarifies that Defendant Spradley “was present”
when Inmate Harris slid the knife to Inmate Banks. Pl. Ex. at 4.
Defendant Spradley denies having seen the cellmates fighting
and maintains he separated the inmates before Plaintiff sustained
his

injuries.

Def.

Ex.

A

¶

3.

And,

he

argues,

Plaintiff’s

“speculation about what [he] saw” is not enough to withstand
summary judgment. Motion at 11. Defendant Spradley also says
Plaintiff’s
complaint,

grievance
and

conflicts

Spradley

faults

with

the

Plaintiff

allegations
for

using

in

his

imprecise

terminology in his complaint. For instance, Defendant Spradley
notes Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he asked Spradley to
“roll the door” when Inmate Banks started punching him, but
Plaintiff did not assert as much in his grievance written days
after

the

incident.

Id.

at

18.

Additionally,

Spradley

says

Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because he does not overtly

statements made in an affidavit. Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x
948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014).
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say that Inmate Banks “took the knife and stabbed [Plaintiff].”
Id. at 18-19. Rather, Defendant points out, Plaintiff alleges
another

gang

“[Plaintiff’s]

member,
cell

Inmate

door”

Harris,

and

he

was

slid

a

stabbed.

knife
Compl.

under
at

12

(emphasis added).
As Defendant’s attorney surely is aware, this Court must
liberally construe Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). And the Court must credit Plaintiff’s
sworn allegations. See Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th
Cir. 2019) (“[S]tatements in [a plaintiff’s] verified complaint,
sworn response to [a] motion for summary judgment, and sworn
affidavit

attached

to

that

response

should

[be]

treated

as

testimony by the district court.”). While Plaintiff’s filings are
not

sophisticated,

allegations

are

precise,

clear

and

or

grammatically

consistent:

he

perfect,

alleges

his

Defendant

Spradley walked away when Inmate Banks started punching him inside
their shared cell, and Defendant Spradley actively or passively
permitted another inmate, a known gang member, to pass a knife to
Inmate Banks, which Inmate Banks then used to stab Plaintiff.
Plaintiff uses the imprecise passive voice (“was stabbed”), but
reading this allegation in context, it is apparent Plaintiff
alleges Inmate Banks stabbed him using the knife Inmate Harris
provided

to

him.

Additionally,
8

Plaintiff

clarifies

in

his

Case 3:17-cv-00765-BJD-PDB Document 81 Filed 07/17/20 Page 9 of 14 PageID 553

affidavit that “Inmate Harris slid[] the knife to his blood gang
member brother Bank[s].” Pl Ex. at 4.
That Defendant Spradley denies Plaintiff’s allegations does
not permit the Court to discredit Plaintiff’s version of events.
When two parties’ stories conflict, neither of which is blatantly
contradicted by indisputable evidence, a district court may not
make credibility determinations in favor of one party over the
other.6 See Sears, 922 F.3d at 1208 (holding summary judgment in
favor of the corrections officers was not proper because each
side’s version of events was different, meaning there remained a
genuine

dispute

of

material

fact).

There

is

no

indisputable

evidence contradicting Plaintiff’s story. What the parties submit
to

the

Court

is

a

quintessential

“he-said,

he-said,”

which

precludes the entry of summary judgment. See id.
Accepting
Spradley

as

watched

true

Plaintiff’s

Inmate

Banks

assertions
spontaneously

that
and

Defendant
without

provocation start punching Plaintiff but declined to intervene,
and that Defendant Spradley was aware another gang-member inmate
armed Inmate Banks with a knife, Plaintiff provides enough evidence
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact whether Defendant
Spradley was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

Additionally, Plaintiff cannot be penalized for lacking
concrete, indisputable evidence given his timely request that
video footage be preserved was not honored.
6

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serious harm.7 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)
(“[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners.”). And because this
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
incident,

Defendant

Spradley

is

not

entitled

to

qualified

immunity.
B. Injuries
Defendant
compensatory

Spradley

and

asserts

punitive

damages

Plaintiff’s
must

be

request

dismissed

for

because

Plaintiff did not sustain a constitutional injury during the attack
on December 15, 2016. Motion at 12-13.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a
plaintiff

seeking

damages

demonstrate

the

conduct

he

alleges

violated his constitutional rights caused a physical injury. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner

confined

in

a

jail,

prison,

or

other

correctional

facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury.”).
The PLRA does not define “physical injury,” but the Eleventh
Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply

Even if Defendant Spradley did not know Inmate Harris passed
a knife to Inmate Banks, Plaintiff alleges facts that, if true,
would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude Spradley was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety when he ignored
Inmate Banks’s initial attack on Plaintiff.
7

10

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de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole,
225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Harris
v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)). Bruising and
scrapes fall into the category of de minimis injuries. Id. Accord
Mann v. McNeil, 360 F. App’x 31, 32 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding vague
back injuries and scrapes amounted to de minimis injuries).
On

the

other

hand,

a

prisoner

need

not

demonstrate

a

permanent, long-lasting injury to satisfy the PLRA’s “physical
injury” requirement. Thompson v. Smith, 805 F. App’x 893, 903 (11th
Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit recently pronounced that, in
accordance

with

Eighth

Amendment

jurisprudence,

“routine

discomfort[s] associated with confinement” are not the kinds of
“injuries”

for

which

compensatory

and

punitive

damages

are

recoverable, but the PLRA “was not intended to allow only those
prisoner-plaintiffs

with

severe

physical

injuries

to

recover

[such] damages.” Id. at 904. The court clarified that to constitute
a “physical injury” under the PLRA, a prisoner’s condition need
not be so severe as to require “professional medical attention.”
Id. at 904. Rather, temporary injuries, such as the temporary
effects of pepper spray, may satisfy the PLRA’s standard. Id. at
904-05 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment
as to damages because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
the prisoner-plaintiff suffered more than de minimis injuries from

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being

pepper

sprayed

sadistically

and

without

penological

justification).
Defendant Spradley argues Plaintiff provides no proof of a
physical injury and implies Plaintiff’s assertions are merely
conclusory and “blatantly contradicted” by medical records. Motion
at 13. Defendant’s position is confusing given the exhibits he
himself provides confirm Plaintiff sustained injuries on December
15, 2016, following an inmate altercation. Immediately after the
incident, a nurse documented multiple lacerations and a swollen
nose. See Def. Ex. B at 2, 6. The lacerations required cleaning
and bandaging. Id. at 3. Additionally, according to post-incident
medical

records,

Plaintiff

reported

left

shoulder

pain

and

received treatment for a suspected dislocated left shoulder, which
he attributed to the December 15, 2016 incident. Def. Ex. D-3 at
3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 35. See also Pl. Ex. at 4. The prison doctor found
Plaintiff’s complaints serious enough to warrant an x-ray, and
Plaintiff’s shoulder was immobilized. Def. Ex. D-3 at 8. The xray results showed Plaintiff did not sustain a fracture and had no
malalignment or dislocation at the time. Id. at 31, 32, 34.
The Court is not inclined to conclude as a matter of law that
multiple

lacerations,

a

nose

injury,

and

a

shoulder

injury

requiring an x-ray are de minimis injuries under the PLRA. While
Plaintiff did not sustain broken bones or require stitches, he
sustained more than scrapes and bruises. The evidence is enough to
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permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude Plaintiff’s injuries
meet the “more-than-de-mimimis” threshold. Accordingly, Defendant
Spradley fails to

carry his burden on summary judgment, and

Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages is not
barred as a matter of law under the PLRA.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Spradley is not
entitled to summary judgment. This case is in a posture to proceed
to settlement conference and trial. As such, and because of the
troubling, alleged

spoliation-of-evidence issue the Court has

addressed previously, see Orders (Docs. 69, 77), the Court finds
Plaintiff is entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320
(11th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court will refer this case to the
Jacksonville

Division

Civil

Pro

Bono

Appointment

Program.

If

counsel is appointed to represent Plaintiff, the Court will afford
counsel an opportunity to file a motion to reopen discovery for a
limited period if counsel deems it necessary.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72) is

DENIED.
2.

This case is referred to the Jacksonville Division Civil

Pro Bono Appointment Program so the designated deputy clerk of
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the Court may seek counsel to represent Plaintiff.
3.

The Clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect

the correct spelling of Defendant Spradley’s last name.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of
July 2020.

Jax-6
c:
James Alexander Logan
Counsel of Record

14