Dyal v. Jones et al

Filing 26

ORDER denying as moot 20 Motion to Dismiss; granting Plaintiff's request to dismiss his injunctive-relief application in his Third Amended Complaint; directing Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Third Amended Complaint by November 26, 2018. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 10/22/2018. (BL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER D. DYAL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:17-cv-933-J-34JBT

PINKSTON AND CARTER,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Christopher D. Dyal, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action on August 15, 2017, by filing a Civil
Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
He filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) on October 16, 2017, a
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) on December 19, 2017, and a
Third Amended Complaint (TAC; Doc. 15) on March 2, 2018. In the
TAC, Dyal names Patrick Carter and Truman Pinkston, supervisors of
the wastewater treatment (WWT) plant at Florida State Prison (FSP).
He asserts that the Defendants violated his federal constitutional

rights when they failed to protect him from harmful health risks at
the WWT plant from May through June 2016. As relief, he requests
declaratory

and

injunctive

relief

as

well

as

compensatory,

punitive, and nominal damages.
Before the Court is Defendants Carter and Pinkston's Motion to
Dismiss (Motion; Doc. 20), filed May 14, 2018. The Court advised
Dyal that granting a motion to dismiss would be an adjudication of
the case that could foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter,
and gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Order
(Doc. 16). Dyal filed a response in opposition to the Motion. See
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Response; Doc. 23). Accordingly,
this matter is ripe for review.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's
World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In
addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir.
2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d
1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while
"[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should "'give

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the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough
facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations
omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
"conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal")
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply
"are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must
determine

whether

the

complaint

contains

"sufficient

factual

matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

3

570). And, while "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore,
be liberally construed," Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), "'this leniency does not give the
court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.'" Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App'x
837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)1 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of
Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal
citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized
in Randall, 610 F.3d at 706).
III. Discussion
Dyal asserts that, on multiple occasions from May 2016 through
June 2016, Defendants forced him to rake and shovel waste, and
carry garbage cans filled with waste up twenty to thirty steps to
dump the contents into a dumpster. See TAC at 12, 14. He states
that Defendants equipped him with only rubber boots and gloves. See
id.

He

avers

that

Defendants

should

have

provided

him

with

additional protective equipment, such as a face mask and eye and
clothing protection. See id. He declares that he suffered with

1

"Although an unpublished opinion is not binding
is persuasive authority." United States v. Futrell, 209
1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed.
32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not
binding precedent, but they may be cited as
authority.").
4

. . . , it
F.3d 1286,
R. App. P.
considered
persuasive

face, mouth, neck, and arm sores, and has permanent facial and
bodily scarring.
First, Defendants maintain that they are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Motion at 3-4. Dyal asserts that he sues
Defendants in their individual capacities, not official capacities.
See Response at 1-2. In the TAC, Dyal listed the Defendants, and
checked the boxes indicating that he sues them in their individual
capacities, not official capacities. See TAC at 2. Therefore,
Defendants' Motion is due to be denied as moot as to Dyal's claims
for monetary damages from them in their official capacities.
Next, Defendants assert that Dyal's claim for injunctive
relief should be dismissed as moot because "there are no continuing
constitutional infringements on his rights," and therefore, "a
protective injunction is unwarranted." Motion at 6. Dyal does not
oppose Defendants' assertion, and asks that the Court dismiss his
injunctive-relief request without prejudice since he no longer
resides at FSP and "it is impossible to have contact with the
Defendants."

Response

at

2.2

Accordingly,

Dyal's

request

to

voluntarily dismiss his injunctive-relief application in the TAC
will be granted, and Defendants' Motion is due to be denied as moot
as to their request to dismiss Dyal's prayer for injunctive relief.

2

Dyal maintains that he is entitled to declaratory relief.
See Response at 1, 3.
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In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Defendants Carter and Pinkston's Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

20) is DENIED as moot.
2.

Plaintiff's

request

to dismiss his injunctive-relief

application in the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is GRANTED.
3.

Defendants, no later than November 26, 2018, must answer

or otherwise respond to the Third Amended Complaint.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 22nd day of
October, 2018.

sc 10/22
c:
Christopher D. Dyal, FDOC # 958733
Counsel of Record

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