Williams v. Hallaway et al
Filing
113
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 84 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 100 Defendant Brittany Rogers' Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this Order and make the appropriate notations on the docket. Notice due August 25, 2020. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 7/1/2020. (JW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
QUINCY A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:17-cv-959-J-34JRK
MICHAEL DWAYNE GALLOWAY,
et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Quincy A. Williams, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this
action on September 15, 2017, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc.
1). In the Complaint, Williams asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
following Defendants: (1) Michael Dwayne Galloway; (2) Brittany E. Rogers;1 (3) Warden
G. Drake; (4) Alexander McKenzie; 2 (5) Warden Christopher Hodgson; (6) Lester
Fernandez, Inspector General of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC); (7) Julie
Jones, former FDOC Secretary, in her individual capacity; and (8) Mark S. Inch, FDOC
1
2
See Order (Doc. 78) at 1 n.1; Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 61).
Williams identified the John Doe Defendant as Alexander McKenzie. See
Plaintiff’s Request for Process of Service (Doc. 59); Order (Doc. 60) at 2 n.1. The Court
dismissed Williams’ claims against Defendant McKenzie on March 25, 2020. See Order
(Doc. 92).
Secretary, in his official capacity.3 Williams asserts that Defendant Galloway violated his
First and Eighth Amendment rights when he sprayed Williams with chemical agents and
slammed him on the ground on June 1, 2016, as retaliation for Williams complaining about
Captain Swain. Additionally, he states that Defendant Rogers used excessive force
against him on June 1st. He also asserts that Defendants Jones, Fernandez, Drake, and
Hodgson failed to protect him when they knew he feared his life was in danger because
he had reported Captain Swain. He requests monetary damages and declaratory relief.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Inch, Jones, Fernandez, Galloway,
Hodgson, Hylda Rogers, and Drake’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Motion;
Doc. 84) and Defendant Brittany Rogers’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Rogers Motion; Doc. 100). They submitted exhibits in support of the Motions. See Def.
Exs., Docs. 84-1 through 84-10; 86-1; 100-1. 4 The Court advised Williams of the
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion
to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this
case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and gave him an
opportunity to respond to the Motions. See Order (Doc. 17); Summary Judgment Notices
(Docs. 85, 101). Williams filed responses in opposition to the Motions. See Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Response; Doc. 106); Opposition to
3
The Court substituted Mark S. Inch, the current FDOC Secretary, as the proper
party Defendant with respect to the official-capacity claim. See Order (Doc. 37). The Clerk
made the appropriate entries on the docket to reflect the substitution.
4
The Court cites to the document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s
Electronic Case Filing System.
2
Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Response II; Doc. 112). Defendants’
Motions are ripe for review.
II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
In his verified Complaint,5 Williams asserts that Captain Swain assaulted him on
October 1, 2015, at Columbia Correctional Institution Annex (CCIA). See Complaint at 8.
According to Williams, he filed a complaint in federal court,6 asserting that he feared his
life was in danger because Captain Swain and other officers threatened him. See id.
Williams states that the Court sent standing orders 7 to notify FDOC officials about
Williams’ assertions. See id. at 9. He avers that when he attempted suicide, the FDOC
transferred him for mental health treatment, but returned him to CCIA “without any
protection” in May 2016, at which time the Court sent another standing order to the
FDOC. 8 Id. According to Williams, he requested protection when the “transfer bus”
delivered him to CCIA, where he was placed in segregated confinement for disobeying
5
See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations
omitted) (“The factual assertions that [Plaintiff] made in his amended complaint should
have been given the same weight as an affidavit, because [Plaintiff] verified his complaint
with an unsworn written declaration, made under penalty of perjury, and his complaint
meets Rule 56’s requirements for affidavits and sworn declarations.”).
6
Williams filed a complaint on January 15, 2016. See Quincy A. Williams v. Shawn
Swain and Jason Reeder, Case No. 3:16-cv-45-J-34JRK. The parties reached a
settlement on June 11, 2019. See id., Doc. 107.
7
See Case No. 3:16-cv-45-J-34JRK, Standing Orders to Clerk to Notify Inspector
General of the Florida Department of Corrections and Warden of Affected Institution
Regarding Inmate Claim of Suicidal Intent or Other Imminent Physical Harm, Docs. 2, 15,
20, 31.
8
See Case No. 3:16-cv-45-J-34JRK, Standing Order, Doc. 15, filed May 16, 2016.
3
orders. Id. He states that Lieutenant Stephenson interviewed him, advised him that he
was “under protected management,” and provided information for the Inspector General’s
review. Id. He avers that, although he had advised FDOC officers that he needed
protection, the FDOC returned him to general population on June 1, 2016. See id.
Williams states that he requested protection that night, when he was placed into a holding
cell with three property bags that weighed about fifty pounds. See id. According to
Williams, he had stored his property in two tied-together pillowcases (that he carried
across his shoulder) and a wrapped-up sheet (that he held with his hands that were
restrained behind his back). See id.
Williams states that Defendants Galloway and Rogers (and an unknown sergeant)
escorted him at approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 1st. See id. at 10. According to
Williams, one officer held his left arm, another held his right arm, and a third officer
grasped his shoulder. See id. He states that they told him that the escort formation “was
to keep [him] from falling with all []his property.” Id. He asserts that, without any warning,
Defendant Galloway sprayed him with chemical agents in the face, and Galloway,
Rogers, and an unknown officer “dunked” and “slammed” him on the ground. Id. at 1011. According to Williams, Galloway stated, “this is from Captain Swain[,] keep your
mouth closed.” Id. at 10. He states that Galloway’s use of excessive force was a retaliatory
measure because Williams had complained about Captain Swain. See id. at 11. He
maintains that Galloway and Rogers “held” him on the ground, as the chemical agents
burned his face and eyes and his property bags (wrapped around his neck) choked him.
Id. at 10. Williams recounts that, as he gasped for air, Galloway told the cameraman not
4
to turn on the camera until the Captain arrived. See id. According to Williams, Defendants
Galloway and Rogers’ use of force was unnecessary because he neither argued, resisted,
nor disobeyed. See id. He maintains that Galloway wrote two false disciplinary reports
and that the report for use of force was overturned for insufficient evidence, and dismissed
on rehearing. See id. Williams avers that Defendants Jones, Fernandez, Drake, and
Hodgson failed to protect him when they knew that he feared his life was in danger due
to his complaints about Captain Swain. See id. at 11-12.
According to Williams, he suffered the following injuries as a result of Defendants
Galloway and Rogers’ use of excessive force: (1) a dislocated bicep; (2) aggravated back
and shoulder injuries; and (3) eye injuries resulting in the need for prescription eyeglasses
for distance. See id. at 10. He asserts that he has been treated with pain pills and steroid
shots to heal the bicep. See id. He states that the bicep injury has prevented him from
exercising, which caused severe weight loss (over fifty pounds) and muscle deterioration.
See id. He also maintains that he has had extensive mental health treatment. See id.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules(s)), “[t]he court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
5
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 9 An issue is
genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor
of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.
1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)).
“[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v.
Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to
the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to
be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then
go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a
9
Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee's note 2010 Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The amendments will not affect continuing
development of the decisional law construing and applying
these phrases.
Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not binding, they
are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013).
Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable.
6
genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines
the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a
court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however, if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
IV. Summary of the Arguments
In the Motions, Defendants maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
See Motion at 11-12; Rogers Motion at 9. Additionally, Defendants Inch, Jones,
Fernandez, Drake, and Hodgson assert that there are no genuine issues of material fact,
and therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment in their favor as to Williams’
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against them. See Motion at 7-9. They also
maintain that Williams is not entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because he has not alleged any physical injury resulting from
Defendants’ acts and/or omissions. See Motion at 9-11; Rogers Motion at 7-9.
Additionally, Defendants Fernandez and Jones assert that the Eleventh Amendment bars
7
Williams’ claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacities. See
Motion at 11. In his Responses, Williams maintains that Defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment in their favor because there remain genuine issues of material fact as
to his Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Response at 1-6; Response II at 1-5.
He also asserts that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Response at
15; Response II at 7. Additionally, Williams states that his physical injuries resulting from
Defendants’ actions and/or omissions are more than de minimis. See Response at 1214; Response II at 6-7.
V. Law
A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Use of Force
With respect to the appropriate analysis in an excessive use of force case, the
Eleventh Circuit has explained.
[O]ur core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In determining
whether force was applied maliciously and sadistically, we
look to five factors: “(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for
application of force; (3) the relationship between that need
and the amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent of the
threat to the safety of staff and inmates[, as reasonably
perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of facts
known to them]. . .” Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375
(11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).
McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App’x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “When
considering these factors, [courts] ‘give a wide range of deference to prison officials acting
to preserve discipline and security, including when considering decisions made at the
8
scene of a disturbance.’” Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (quoting Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007)).
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Indeed, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of
action.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). Notably, a lack of serious injury is relevant to the
excessive force inquiry. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 524 F. App’x 511, 513 (11th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (per curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court has explained:
“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that
may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have
been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.” Ibid.[ 10 ]
(quoting Whitley,[ 11 ] supra, at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078). The
extent of injury may also provide some indication of the
amount of force applied. . . . An inmate who complains of a
“‘push or shove’” that causes no discernible injury almost
certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Id., at 9
(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)).[12]
10
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
11
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
12
See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional
rights.”).
9
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly
correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate
who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability
to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has
the good fortune to escape without serious injury.
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38.
B. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). It is
“[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828 (citations omitted). The deliberate
indifference standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison official “was
subjectively aware” of a risk of harm; mere negligence is insufficient. Id. at 829, 835-36.
In a case where the prisoner-plaintiff repeatedly asked to be transferred because he was
concerned about a general lack of safety in his cell block, the Eleventh Circuit explained
the requirement of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm as follows:
To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must show “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2)
the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3)
causation.”[13]
The first element of deliberate indifference — whether
there was a substantial risk of serious harm — is assessed
objectively and requires the plaintiff to show “conditions that
were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious
injury to his future health or safety.”[14] The second element
— whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that
13
Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016).
14
Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307.
10
risk — has both a subjective and an objective component.
Subjectively, the “official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and . . . also draw the inference.”[15]
Objectively, the official must have responded to the known risk
in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she “knew of ways
to reduce the harm” but knowingly or recklessly declined to
act.[16] Finally, the plaintiff must show a “necessary causal
link” between the officer’s failure to act reasonably and the
plaintiff’s injury.[17]
Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added); Johnson v.
Bessemer, Ala., City of, 741 F. App’x 694, 698-99 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Proof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal more
than does proof of negligence: “To be deliberately indifferent
a prison official must know of and disregard ‘an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.’” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319-20 (emphasis
supplied) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114
S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).[18]
In other words, a plaintiff in [Williams]’ position must
show not only that there was a substantial risk of serious
harm, but also that [Defendants] “subjectively knew of the
substantial risk of serious harm and that [they] knowingly or
recklessly disregarded that risk.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).[ 19 ]
Whether prison officials had the requisite awareness of the
15
Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007).
16
Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620.
17
Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622-23.
18
Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.
19
Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
11
2005).
risk “is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual
ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a
factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981 (citation omitted).
At the same time, the deliberate indifference standard - and
the subjective awareness required by it - is far more onerous
than normal tort[-]based standards of conduct sounding in
negligence: “Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from
attack does not justify liability under [§] 1983.” Brown v.
Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
And[,] needless to say, to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, [a plaintiff] must adduce specific evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find in his favor; “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [his] position
will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. . . .
Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis deleted);
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that a plaintiff
who claims deliberate indifference must prove: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of
serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence”); Scott v. Miami Dade Cty., 657 F. App’x 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating
that “a plaintiff must allege facts that would allow a jury to conclude that: the defendant
actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm” (subjective
component), and “the defendant disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in
an objectively reasonable manner” (objective component)); Brown v. Hughes, 894 F. 2d
1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The known risk of injury must be a ‘strong likelihood, rather
than a mere possibility’ before a guard’s failure to act can constitute deliberate
indifference.”).
Prison officials may avoid Eighth Amendment liability in one of three ways: (1)
showing that they were not subjectively aware “of the underlying facts indicating a
12
sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger”; (2)
admitting awareness of “the underlying facts” of a substantial danger, but believing the
danger was “insubstantial or nonexistent”; or (3) claiming they responded reasonably to
a known substantial danger. Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617-18 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844) (internal quotations omitted).
C. Qualified Immunity
The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
The qualified-immunity defense reflects an effort to
balance “the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The
doctrine resolves this balance by protecting government
officials engaged in discretionary functions and sued in their
individual capacities unless they violate “clearly established
federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d
753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
As a result, qualified immunity shields from liability “all
but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating
the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2002). But the doctrine’s protections do not extend to one
who “knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first
demonstrate that he was acting within the scope of his or her
discretionary authority. Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109,
1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we have explained the term
“discretionary authority,” it “include[s] all actions of a
governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the
13
performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his
authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that
Defendant Officers satisfied this requirement, as they
engaged in all of the challenged actions while on duty as
police officers conducting investigative and seizure functions.
Because Defendant Officers have established that they
were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority,
the burden shifts to [plaintiff] to demonstrate that qualified
immunity is inappropriate. See id. To do that, [plaintiff] must
show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, the
facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated [plaintiff's]
constitutional right and that that right was “clearly established
... in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’
actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,
150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by
Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808. We may decide these
issues in either order, but, to survive a qualified immunity
defense, [the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings. Maddox,
727 F.3d at 1120-21 (citation omitted).
Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017). The Court has instructed:
Because § 1983 “requires proof of an affirmative causal
connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the
alleged constitutional deprivation,” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802
F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted),
each defendant is entitled to an independent qualified
immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and
omissions. So[,] we must be careful to evaluate a given
defendant’s qualified immunity claim, considering only the
actions and omissions in which that particular defendant
engaged.
Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).
14
VI. Analysis20
A. Defendant Hylda Rogers
In the Complaint, Williams asserts that Defendant Rogers violated his Eighth
Amendment right when she used excessive force against him on June 1, 2016. See
Complaint at 2, 10-11. On February 11, 2019, service of process was executed as to
Hylda Harley Rogers. See Return of Service (Doc. 34), filed February 19, 2019. On
October 23, 2019, Williams notified the Court that Hylda Harley Rogers “was the wrong
correctional officer,” and that “[t]he correct prison officer is Brittany E. Rogers.” Motion to
Process of Service (Williams’ Motion; Doc. 61) at 2. The Court directed service of process
on Brittany E. Rogers, and ordered the Clerk to change the docket to reflect Rogers’
proper name. See Order Redirecting Service of Process Upon Defendant Rogers (Doc.
78).On January 15, 2020, service of process was executed as to Brittany E. Rogers. See
Return of Service (Doc. 83), filed January 21, 2020.
In the Motion, Defendant Hylda Rogers asserts that she “was not a party to the
incident involving [Williams] on June 1, 2016. Motion at 5. In support of her position, she
submitted a Declaration. See Def. Ex., Declaration of Hylda Rogers, Doc. 84-2. She
states in pertinent part:
I am employed by the Department of Corrections as a
corrections officer.
I have been informed of allegations made by Inmate Quincy
Williams in Case No. 3:17-cv-959-J-MMH-JRK.
20
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thus, the facts
described in the Court’s analysis may differ from those that ultimately can be proved.
15
I was not involved in or a witness to any use of force with
Inmate Williams DC#340902 on June 1, 2016.
Id. (enumeration omitted and emphasis added). Williams does not oppose Hylda Rogers’
assertion that she was not involved in the June 1, 2016 incident. See Response;
Response II. As such, Defendants’ Motion as to Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim
against Hylda Rogers is due to be granted.
B. Eighth Amendment Excessive Use of Force
Williams asserts that Defendants Galloway and Brittany Rogers violated his Eighth
Amendment right when they used excessive force upon him on June 1, 2016. Defendants
Galloway and Rogers assert that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Williams’
Eighth Amendment claims against them. In support of their position, they submitted
exhibits, see Docs. 84-1 through 84-10; 86-1; 100-1, including their own Declarations,
see Declarations of Michael Galloway (Galloway Decl.), Doc. 84-1; Brittany Rogers (B.
Rogers Decl.), Doc. 100-1. In a Declaration, Defendant Galloway describes the
circumstances leading up to the June 1, 2016 incident involving Williams. He states in
pertinent part:
On June 1, 2016 at approximately 11:05 p.m., I was
assisting Officer McKenzie and Sergeant Brittany Rogers with
the escort of Inmate Williams, Quincy dc#340902. Inmate
Williams stated that the handcuffs were too tight. Sergeant
Rogers checked the handcuffs and informed Inmate Williams
that the hand restraints were not too tight. Inmate Williams
stated, “the fu[--]ing cuffs are too tight” and attempted to
snatch away from me. I ordered Inmate Williams to stop his
actions to which he refused and continued his disorderly
behavior.
Officer McKenzie broke the seal (seal #3033006) to
MK 4 chemical agent #75 Hip canister and administered a
16
continuous stream of chemical agents to the facial area of
Inmate Williams. The chemical agents had the desired effect.
Inmate Williams complied with all orders given, and all force
ceased. When the chemical agents took effect, Inmate
Williams fell to his knees.
Galloway Decl. (enumeration omitted). In a declaration, Brittany Rogers provided a similar
account of what transpired that night. See B. Rogers Decl.; see also Def. Ex., Doc. 84-6
at 3, MINS Incident Report (MINS Report).21 According to the MINS Report, the handheld
video footage captured Williams’ allegations of staff misconduct as follows: “They beat
me, they slammed me on the ground, and gassed me for no reason, I did not resist, this
is retaliation for a pending lawsuit against Captain Swain. All proper notifications were
made.” Def. Ex., Doc. 84-6 at 5 (capitalization omitted); see Doc. 84-7 at 3 (stating the
handheld video footage “does not contain any portion of the force used”); see also Doc.
84-7 at 4 (stating that none of the fixed wing videos show “any portion of the force used”).
The use of force report states that Officer McKenzie used chemical agents to overcome
Williams’ resistance to a lawful command. See Def. Ex., Report of Force Used (Report),
Doc. 84-6 at 1. According to the Report, McKenzie used chemical agents against Williams
at 11:05 p.m.; Williams was compliant at 11:06 p.m.; Officer Michael Nelson activated the
handheld camera at 11:10 p.m.; and Williams showered at 11:12 p.m., had a medical
evaluation at 11:24 p.m., was issued clean clothing at 11:24 p.m., and was placed in a
secure decontaminated cell at 11:33 p.m. See id.
21
The abbreviation or acronym "MINS" is not defined in the documents provided
to the Court. Apparently, these reports are generated for the use of corrections officials
and the Inspector General's Office after a use of force upon an inmate or a battery upon
a correctional officer by an inmate.
17
Given the evidence submitted by Defendants Galloway and Rogers, the Court
finds that they have met their initial burden of showing, by reference to their Declarations
and FDOC incident and use of force reports, that McKenzie used chemical agents to bring
Williams into compliance with lawful orders. Thus, Williams is required to present
evidence to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. In a Declaration, he states in
pertinent part:
Sergeant Galloway told me go into the hold[ing] cell with my
property with me because of count time. After count was over,
I was removed from the holding cell with 3 bag[s] of property
two tied together pillow case[s] carried across by shou[l]der
and the other in a sheet I carr[ied] in my hands behind my
back in handcuff[s.] And as we w[ere] walking for no reason
at all one of the m[e]n [a] Sergeant sprayed me in the face,
and all three of them slam[med] me to the ground and
Sergeant Galloway sprayed again in the face and said this [is]
from Captain Swain, keep your mouth close[d]. [M]y eyes
w[ere] burning and I was choking from the gas and the pillow
cases wrap[ped] around my neck. The[n] Sergeant Galloway
told the cameraman not to start the recording yet[,] wait on the
Captain and he had his knee press[ed] hard into my upper
back. After removing the two pillow[]s from around my neck[,]
he allow[ed] the cameraman to start[] recording. [I]nstead of
medical[,] I was t[a]ken directly to confinement and put into
the shower. I explain[ed] to the Captain on [the] recorder that
I was being retaliated against for reporting w[hat] Captain
Swain had done to me.
....
I never resist[ed] any order giv[en] to me. Nor did I pull from
the officer holding me. I never said that I had any type of
problems with the handcuffs. I was only trying to carry my
property.
P. Exs., Declaration of Quincy Williams (Williams Decl.), Doc. 106-1 at 3-5; see
Declaration of Quincy Williams (Williams Decl. II), Doc. 112-3 at 2-7.
18
Given the differences in Williams’ and Defendants Galloway’s and Rogers’ sworn
recollections, there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether Galloway and
Rogers used excessive force upon Williams. As such, Defendants’ Motions as to Williams’
Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Galloway and Rogers are due to be
denied.
C. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect
Williams also asserts that Defendants Jones, Fernandez, Drake, and Hodgson
failed to protect him when they knew he feared his life was in danger because he had
reported Captain Swain. Defendants Jones (and Inch), Fernandez, Drake, and Hodgson
assert that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Williams’ Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claims against them. In support of their position, they submitted exhibits,
see Def. Exs., including the Declarations of Warden Drake (Drake Decl.), Doc. 86-1;
Warden Hodgson (Hodgson Decl.), Doc. 84-4; and Lester Fernandez (Fernandez Decl.),
Doc. 84-5.
Defendant Fernandez asserts that he was not employed at the Inspector General’s
Office on June 1, 2016, when the incident involving Williams occurred. See Motion at 45, 8. In his Declaration, he states in pertinent part:
I am employed by the State of Florida as Inspector General
for the Florida Department of Corrections.
I was employed in the Inspector General’s Office
beginning June 6, 2016.
I have reviewed the Complaint and allegations made by
Inmate Quincy Williams in Case No.[] 3:17-CV-959-MMHJRK. The events of this time occurred as follows[.]
19
During this period of time, I did not investigate a complaint by
an inmate named Inmate Quincy Williams, DC #340902. Nor
was I informed that Inmate Williams complained that he was
afraid for his life due to a Sergeant Swain.
Fernandez Decl. (enumeration omitted and emphasis added). Defendant Fernandez
maintains that he started his employment with the Inspector General’s Office on June 6,
2016, and therefore is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. See Motion at 8.
Williams fails to contest this assertion. Thus, Defendants’ Motion as to Williams’ Eighth
Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Fernandez is due to be granted.
Next, Defendant Hodgson maintains that he was not employed at Columbia
Correctional Institution on June 1, 2016, when the incident involving Williams happened.
See Motion at 5, 8. In a Declaration, he states in pertinent part:
I was a Warden at Jefferson Correctional Institution from
June 1, 2016 to June 30, 2016.
I have been informed of allegations made by Inmate Quincy
Williams in Case No. 3:17[-]cv-959-MMH-JRK. I have not had
contact with this inmate to my knowledge and was not aware
of the fact that this inmate alleged fear of any employee at
Columbia Annex in June of 2016.
I would have been unaware of anything relating to Inmate
Williams and Captain Swain prior to my arrival at
Columbia Correctional Institution in July 2016.
Hodgson Decl. (enumeration omitted and emphasis added). Defendant Hodgson
maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor because he arrived at
Columbia Correctional Institution in July 2016. See id. Williams fails to contest this
assertion. Thus, Defendants’ Motion as to Williams’ Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect
claim against Hodgson is due to be granted.
20
Defendant Drake maintains that Williams cannot prove that he knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to Williams’ health or safety. See Motion at 5, 8. In a
Declaration, Drake states in pertinent part:
I was the Warden at Columbia Correctional in June of 2016.
I have been informed of allegations made by Inmate Quincy
Williams in Case No. 3:17-cv-959-MMH-JRK. I have not had
contact with this inmate to my knowledge and was not aware
of that [sic] the fact that this inmate alleged fear of any
employee at this institution.
I was not aware that Inmate Williams was in fear of his life and
was being threatened for reporting Captain Swain for
allegedly assaulting him. Nor was I aware that Inmate
Williams was assaulted because he reported Captain Swain.
It is my understanding that force was used against this inmate
for failing to obey a lawful order.
Drake Decl. (enumeration omitted).
In his Response, Williams maintains that Drake knew he feared his life was in
danger because he had reported Captain Swain. See Response at 7-9. He states that
Drake had reviewed the use of force video footage showing Captain Swain’s assault on
him, and that Williams had sent several grievances “letting [Drake] know” about Captain
Swain’s threats. Id. at 7 (citing P. Ex. C, Grievances, Doc. 106-3 at 3, 6, 12, dated May
10th, 12th, 29th, 2016). Additionally, Williams maintains that the Court sent Drake three
“standing notices” in Case No. 3:16-cv-45-J-34JRK, Docs. 15, 20, 31, notifying Drake that
Williams feared his life was in danger. Id.; Williams Decl. II at 3 (stating the standing
orders notified the Warden, Inspector General, and Secretary “about what was happening
to [Williams]”). In his Declaration, Williams describes the circumstances leading up to the
June 1, 2016 incident. He states in pertinent part:
21
On October 1, 2015, while housed at Columbia
Correctional Institution Annex I was sexually and physically
assaulted by Captain Swain which result[ed] in several suicide
attempt[s] and inpatient mental treatment. D[ur]ing these
time[s] I requested protection at these other institution[s]
which approved the grievance and forwarded to the Inspector
General also on several differen[t] incidents. The Honorable
Court sent notices too due to fact I was being harass[ed] and
threaten[ed] for reporting Captain Swain. I cut my neck and
arm and went to extensive treatment at South Florida
Reception Center. I file[d] [a] request for protection there also,
and was advised that I would return after being discharged
from mental health.
[I]n May 2016[,] I return[ed] back to Columbia C.I.
Annex without any protection status. I immediately
request[ed] … protect[ion] right off the bus and resulted in
be[ing] place[d] in segregated confinement for disobeying [an]
order[.] False D.R. written saying I refused to go to my cell. I
again notified the courts who notified the institutional
Warden Drake who order[ed] the confinement lieutenant
[to] interview me concerning the court’s notice. I advised
him of the issue I was having and had with Swain and told
him I was in fear [h]e was going to have someone kill me.
He said he was sending the information to the Inspector
General and that I would remain in confinement until the
investigation was complete and less than a week I was
order[ed] to be released back into open population Sdorm. I ask[ed] to see the Lieutenant who was not
available at that time[.] So to keep from getting another false
D.R. write up[,] I went to the dorm when the shift change[d]
that night. Later I request[ed] … protection that I was in fear
for my life.
Williams Decl. at 2-3 (emphasis added). In his Complaint, Williams asserts that Lieutenant
Stephenson interviewed him about his assertions (that had prompted the Court to send
its May 2016 standing order), advised him that he was “under protected management,”
and provided information for the Inspector General’s review. Complaint at 9. Taking
Williams’ assertions as true, Drake neither responded to Williams’ assertions in an
22
unreasonable manner nor knowingly or recklessly disregarded an excessive risk to
Williams’ health or safety. As such, Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted as to
Williams’ Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Drake.
Additionally, Defendants Jones and Inch maintain that Williams cannot prove that
they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Williams’ health or safety. See Motion
at 5, 8.22 In his Declaration, Williams states that the “Secretary” knew he feared his life
was in danger because the Court sent “several standing orders” in Case No. 3:16-cv-45J-34JRK. Williams Decl. II at 3. Notably, the Clerk sent the May 16, 2016 standing order
to the Inspector General’s Office (Interim Inspector General Sumpter) and Warden Drake,
not the FDOC Secretary’s Office. See Case No. 3:16-cv-45-J-34JRK, “Standing Order to
Clerk to Notify Inspector General of the Florida Department of Corrections and Warden
of Affected Institution Regarding Inmate Claim of Suicidal Intent or Other Imminent
Physical Harm,” Doc.15, filed May 16, 2016. Additionally, Defendant Inch was appointed
to serve as the FDOC Secretary in January 2019, and therefore was not in a position
where he could have known about Williams’ concerns relating to Captain Swain in 2016.
See http://dc.state.fl.us/secretary.html; Order (Doc. 37); Motion to Substitute (Doc. 33).
22
Williams sued Julie Jones, as FDOC Secretary in her individual and official
capacities, asserting that she violated his Eighth Amendment right when she failed to
protect him. See Complaint at 3, 11. The Court substituted Mark Inch, the current FDOC
Secretary, as the proper party Defendant, with respect to the official-capacity claim. See
Order (Doc. 37) (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1)).
23
As such, Defendants’ Motion as to Williams’ Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims
against Defendants Jones and Inch are due to be granted.23
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not
commit any federal statutory or constitutional violation. See Motion at 11-12; Rogers
Motion at 9. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, Defendants may claim they are
entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages in their individual capacities. It is
undisputed that Defendants were engaged in discretionary functions during the events at
issue. To defeat qualified immunity with respect to these Defendants, Williams must show
both that Defendants committed a constitutional violation, and that the constitutional right
violated was clearly established. As the Eleventh Circuit has instructed, in determining
the applicability of qualified immunity, the Court must “parse” the actions each Defendant
undertook, and “address the evidence as it pertains solely to him [or her].” Alcocer, 906
F.3d at 952.
Upon review, Defendants Fernandez, Hodgson, Drake, and Jones are entitled to
qualified immunity from monetary damages in their individual capacities as to Williams’
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against them. As to Williams’ Eighth
Amendment excessive-use-of-force claims against Defendants Galloway and Brittany
23
The Court need not address Defendants Fernandez and Jones’ assertion that
the Eleventh Amendment bars Williams’ claims for monetary damages against them in
their official capacities. See Motion at 11; see also Complaint at 3.
24
Rogers, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. As such, Defendants’ Motions as to
their assertion of qualified immunity are due to be granted in part and denied in part.
E. Physical Injury Requirement
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
Next, the Court turns to Defendants’ assertion that Williams is not entitled to
compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because he has not
alleged any physical injuries that are more than de minimis, resulting from Defendants’
acts and/or omissions. See Motion at 9-11; Rogers Motion at 7-9. In support of their
position, Defendants submitted Williams’ Inmate Sick-Call Request (Request), dated
June 5, 2016. See Def. Ex., 84-10 at 1. In the Request, Williams complained about a
pulled muscle, back pain, right eye and neck soreness, and blurred vision. See id.
Williams stated that the back pain was “ongoing,” but the other problems started June 1,
2016. Id.
In Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the availability of compensatory and punitive damages as well as
nominal damages in suits brought by prisoners under § 1983. The Eleventh Circuit stated:
[Plaintiff]’s claim, however, is further governed by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 [(PLRA)], Pub.L. No. 104B134,
§§ 802B10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1366B77 (1996). The PLRA
places substantial restrictions on the judicial relief that
prisoners can seek, with the goal of “reduc[ing] the number of
frivolous cases filed by imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to
lose and excessive amounts of free time with which to pursue
their complaints.” AlBAmin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1195
(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528,
531 (11th Cir. 2002)). The section of the Act at issue here, 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e), reads this way:
25
No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury or the commission of
a sexual act....
This Court has held that § 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil
actions, including constitutional claims brought under § 1983.
See Harris v. Garner (Harris II), 216 F.3d 970, 984B85 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc)....
In this case, [Plaintiff] did not allege any physical injury
. . . . Nevertheless, he sought “compensatory . . . punitive, and
nominal damages” from [Defendant]. Under the statute and
our caselaw, an incarcerated plaintiff cannot recover
either compensatory or punitive damages for
constitutional violations unless he can demonstrate a
(more than de minimis) physical injury. See Al-Amin, 637
F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d
1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc
granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999),
opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970. However,
we have never had the opportunity in a published opinion to
settle the availability of nominal damages under the PLRA.
We do today, and we hold that nothing in § 1997e(e) prevents
a prisoner from recovering nominal damages for a
constitutional violation without a showing of physical injury.
Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307-08 (emphasis added).
To satisfy § 1997e(e), a prisoner must assert physical injury that is more than de
minimis, but the injury does not need to be significant. See Thompson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Dixon v. Toole, 225 F.
App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007). Despite § 1997e(e)’s limitation, successful constitutional
claimants who lack a physical injury may still recover nominal damages. See Hughes v.
Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Nominal damages are appropriate if a plaintiff
establishes a violation of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual
26
injury sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages.”). Further, the Eleventh Circuit
has instructed courts to dismiss an inmate’s compensatory and punitive damages claims
under § 1997e(e) without prejudice to allow an inmate to refile when and if the inmate is
released. See Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 980 (11th Cir. 2000).
Here, Williams asserts physical injuries that are greater than de minimis. The
injuries Williams complains about are allegedly the result of Defendants Galloway and
Rogers’ use of excessive force. See Response at 12-14; Response II at 6-7. He describes
injuries of the type for which a free world person would seek professional medical care as
opposed to home treatments. See id. In a Declaration, he states in pertinent part:
I was seen by [an] unknown male nurse who said he will put
me in to see mental health and wash your eye out and never
examin[ed] me. My eyes w[ere] still hurting and I had blurred
vision for several week[s]. I we[nt] to sick call[,] had to be
treated for worsening my back injury and eyes which I was
order[ed eye drops and put in to see the doctor. Also[,] my
bice[p] was pulled, dislocated and swollen[.] I could not use[]
that arm at all for weeks, because I was unable to workout
(exercise). Body los[t] weight and muscle mass, my shoulder
was injur[]ed also. I was taking pain pills and was order[ed] a
steroid shot to help heal my bicep injury a year later for this
injury and also advised that my arm will not fully heal without
reconstructive surgery or [I] may re[-]rupture my arm again.
I’m unable to even do push up[s] or any kind of muscle
building exercise with that arm, which resulted from carrying
all that property and being slam[med] down.
Williams Decl. at 4-5; see Williams Decl. II at 6-7; see also Complaint at 10, ¶¶ 25-26.
Williams’ alleged injuries, described as eye injuries, aggravated back and shoulder
injuries, and a dislocated bicep leading to months of medical treatment, cross §
1997e(e)’s de minimis threshold. See Thompson, 551 F. App’x at 557 n.3 (describing an
approach of asking whether the injury would require a free world person to visit an
27
emergency room or doctor) (citing Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(“A physical injury is an observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment
by a medical care professional. It is not a sore muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an
abrasion, a bruise, etc., which lasts even up to two or three weeks.”)). Thus, Defendants’
Motions are due to be denied to the extent that the Court finds Williams’ request for
compensatory and punitive damages is not precluded under § 1997e(e) because he
alleges that he suffered physical injuries that are greater than de minimis.
In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants Inch, Jones, Fernandez, Galloway, Hodgson, Hylda Rogers,
and Drake’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 84) is GRANTED as to: (1)
Williams’ Eighth Amendment excessive-use-of-force claim against Hylda Rogers; (2)
Williams’ Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Julie Jones, Mark Inch,
Lester Fernandez, Christopher Hodgson, and G. Drake; and (3) Defendants Fernandez,
Hodgson, Drake, Hylda Rogers, and Jones’ assertions of qualified immunity as to
Williams’ Eighth Amendment claims against them. Otherwise, the Motion is DENIED.
2.
Defendant Brittany Rogers’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 100) is DENIED.
3.
The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Hylda Rogers, Julie
Jones, Lester Fernandez, Christopher Hodgson, and G. Drake and make the appropriate
notations on the docket.
28
4.
The parties must confer in good faith to discuss the issues and the
possibility of settlement as to Williams’ remaining claims.24 No later than August 25,
2020, the parties must notify the Court whether they are able to reach a settlement. If the
parties are unable to settle the case privately among themselves, they must notify the
Court if they wish to have the case referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for a
settlement conference. Otherwise, the Court will enter a case management order, set a
trial date, and direct the parties to begin trial preparations.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 1st day of July, 2020.
sc 6/25
c:
Quincy A. Williams, FDOC #340902
Counsel of Record
24
The remaining claims are Williams’: (1) First and Eighth Amendment claims
against Defendant Galloway; (2) Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Brittany
Rogers; and (3) request for declaratory relief against Defendant Inch.
29
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