Wilson v. Hinton et al
Filing
64
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 34 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; granting 42 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 2/15/2019. (JW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
HARRY LEE WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:17-cv-1045-J-34MCR
A. HINTON, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint (Doc. 34, Motion to Dismiss), filed March 5, 2018, and Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 42, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment)
filed July 2, 2018 (collectively “Motions”).1 In the Motions, Defendants, Jacksonville
Sheriff’s Officers A. Hinton, #73395, T.D. Yorton, #64405, T.L. Batrous, #7185, Sergeant
Batrous, and Detective Medlock (Defendants), seek dismissal of, or alternatively partial
summary judgment on the claims in Plaintiff Harry Lee Wilson’s pro se sworn Amended
Complaint (Doc. 30, Amended Complaint).2 Wilson has filed a response to both the
1
Defendants attached the following evidence in support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:
Doc. 42-1 (Wilson Deposition and Associated Exhibits); Doc. 42-2 at 1-21 (Wilson injury photos); Doc. 422 at 22-24 (Lost Wallet Report); Doc. 42-2 at 25–28 (JSO Internal Investigation Complaint Form); Doc. 422 at 29-30 – Doc. 42-2 at 1 (State Court Complaint); Doc. 42-3 at 2–31 (Wilson Medical Records); Doc. 424 (Hinton Declaration); Doc. 42-5 (Yorton Declaration); Doc. 42-6 (Batrous Declaration); Doc. 42-7 (Medlock
Declaration); Doc. 42-8 (Rogozinski Declaration and Associated Exhibits); Doc. 42-9 (Desire Deposition);
Doc. 42-10 (Miu Deposition and Associated Exhibits); Doc. 42-11 (Sampson Deposition and Associated
Exhibits); Doc. 42-12 (Wilson Arrest and Booking Report); Doc. 42-13 (Wilson Certified Judgment and
Sentence).
2
See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 Fed. Appx. 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) ("The factual
assertions that [Plaintiff] made in his amended complaint should [be] given the same weight as an affidavit,
because [Plaintiff] verified his complaint with an unsworn written declaration, made under penalty of perjury,
and his complaint meets Rule 56's requirements for affidavits and sworn declarations."). In citing to
Stallworth, the Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive
1
Motion to Dismiss, see Doc. 35 (Response to Motion to Dismiss), filed March 19, 2018,
and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 46 (Response to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment), filed Aug. 16, 2018. Therefore, the Motions are ripe for review.
I.
Standards of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set
forth in the complaint as true.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v.
Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex rel. Cannon
v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff
must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm.,
372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific
facts are not necessary,” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). The “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
authority.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally FED.
R.APP. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they
may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
2
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted);
see also BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts
will not prevent dismissal”) (citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine
whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
In this context, “pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, “‘this leniency does
not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov't of
Columbus, Ga., 438 Fed. Appx. 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v.
Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted),
overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th
Cir. 2010)).
With regard to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Rule 56, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), instructs that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). The record to be
3
considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A).3 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City
Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun
Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating
to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact
to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must
then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines
3
Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary-judgment
motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010 Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The language of
subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The amendments will not
affect continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.
Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[‘s] notes are not binding, they are highly
persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 Fed. Appx. 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law
construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable and applies here.
4
the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,
a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
II.
Background
Wilson brings this action against several Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO) police
officers alleging a variety of claims arising out of his arrest on June 30, 2017, in
Jacksonville, FL. Generally, Wilson alleges that in the course of his arrest, the Defendant
officers subjected him to excessive force, sexual abuse and harassment, failed to properly
administer Miranda4 warnings, illegally searched his car, and were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs. Following are the circumstances giving rise to his claims.5
On the evening of June 30, 2017, Defendants observed Wilson driving his vehicle
without his lights illuminated. Wilson Arrest and Booking Report at 4. An officer signaled
to Wilson that he should pull over, which he eventually did. Id.; Wilson Deposition at 18.
Upon stopping his vehicle, Wilson got out of his car and asked the officers why they
stopped him, arguing that they lacked probable cause to do so. Wilson Arrest and
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants state that
[f]or the purposes of this Motion, the Defendant Officers are accepting as true Plaintiff’s
version of events; however, the Defendant officers dispute many, if not all, of Plaintiff’s
allegations and reserve the right to contest those facts in other contexts. Furthermore,
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony is internally inconsistent as to how the events unfolded on
June 30, 2017. As a result, Defendants will present the facts that are most favorable to
the Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff contradicting his own testimony in this regard.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, n.2.
5
5
Booking Report at 4; Wilson Deposition at 13, 30. Wilson also refused to provide the
officers with his license or any form of identification. Wilson Arrest and Booking Report
at 4. One of the officers drew his gun and directed Wilson to return to his vehicle. Wilson
Deposition at 13. Wilson did so and closed the car door. The officer who had drawn his
gun then came to the driver’s side of the vehicle, opened the door, and pulled Wilson out
of the car, while still pointing his weapon at Wilson. Id. The officer then secured his
weapon and proceeded to try to place handcuffs on Wilson. Id. at 13, 26. As the officer
began this process, Wilson attempted to inform the officer that he was disabled and that
putting his hands behind his back would cause him pain, but that he could be handcuffed
with his hands in front of him. Id. at 13, 27, 29-30. The officer disregarded Wilson’s
statements, hit him two or three times in his chest and head, and threw Wilson onto the
hood of his car. Id. at 13, 27. In doing so, the two men fell to the ground. Id.
At this time the other officers at the scene also began to hit and beat Wilson. Id.
at 13, 29. Officer Yorton hit and kicked Wilson in his stomach and head, while Officer
Batrous6 kicked Wilson’s front teeth.7 Id. at 13, 29, 36. During this process, Wilson
continued to struggle against the officers, who in turn, struggled to place him in handcuffs.
Id. at 13, 27. Again, Wilson tried to communicate to the officers that putting his arms
behind his back would cause him pain. Id. In an effort to subdue Wilson so that the
officers could handcuff him, Officer Batrous placed Wilson in a chokehold which caused
6
In his complaint and subsequent filings, Wilson suggests that two of the officers involved in this action
both had the name Batrous. In response, Defendants state that “[c]ontrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, T.L.
Batrous and Sergeant Batrous are the same person.” Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, n.1.
7
In his Amended Complaint, Wilson alleges that Officer Batrous kicked out his front teeth. Amended
Complaint at 7. However, in his deposition testimony, Wilson clarified that several months after his arrest,
he lost a gold tooth that became loose after his encounter with the police. See Wilson Deposition and
Associated Exhibits at 36, 91-92, 244 (October 27, 2017 billing records from dentist).
6
Wilson to lose consciousness. Id. at 13, 35.8
During his deposition, Wilson testified that he believed that the officers likely
thought that he was resisting arrest. Id. at 30-31. In their declarations, the officers stated
that they did indeed believe that Wilson was resisting arrest, both while he was standing
by the side of his car, as well as once he was on the ground. See Yorton Declaration at
2-3; Batrous Declaration at 2-3; Medlock Declaration at 2. However, in his deposition,
Wilson testified that he was not resisting arrest, but rather, was merely resisting the pain
associated with having to place his arms behind his back. Wilson Deposition at 29, 30.
The record is not entirely clear as to what happened between the time Wilson lost
consciousness and when Defendants brought him to the police station.9 During his
deposition, Wilson testified that he was not sure how long he was unconscious, but
believed it may have been somewhere between three and five minutes.
Wilson
Deposition at 33.10 When he regained consciousness, he was handcuffed, his trousers
were at his knees, and he was covered in urine and feces. Id. at 13, 32, 52, 53-54. He
testified that his whole body was in pain and that his rectum felt uncomfortable. Id. at 5354. Wilson further testified that while he was handcuffed, the officers continued to kick
and beat him, then dragged him along the road to place him in their car. Id. at 13, 32, 57.
8
Wilson also testified that he surmised that one of the reasons the officers subjected him to force was that
they wanted to steal his wallet. Id. at 58-59. The outside of Wilson’s wallet looked like a hundred dollar
bill. Id. When folded and stored in his back pocket, he suggested that it looked like he had multiple hundred
dollar bills in his pocket, and that in arresting and assaulting Wilson, the officers were motivated by their
desire to steal what they perceived to be his extensive possession of cash. Id. The record indicates that
on June 29, 2017, the day before Wilson’s encounter with the Defendants, he filed a report with the JSO
reporting that his wallet had been stolen. See Lost Wallet Report. However, Wilson suggests that the
officers fabricated the June 29, 2017 Lost Wallet Report. Wilson Deposition at 67.
9
Defendants do not seek summary judgment for any claims related to events which occurred during this
time period. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 5, n.5.
10
However, Wilson also postulates that perhaps he was unconscious for fifteen to thirty minutes. Wilson
Deposition at 33.
7
Doing so, they hit Wilson’s head on the side of the police car door, causing him to again
lose consciousness for a brief period of time. Id. at 32. He regained consciousness while
Defendants were transporting him to the police station. Id. at 34.
In his Amended Complaint, Wilson also alleges that during his encounter with the
officers, Detective Medlock failed to provide him with a Miranda warning upon his arrest,
and failed to stop the other officers in their abuse of Wilson. Amended Complaint at 6.
Wilson further alleges that Officer Medlock conducted an illegal search of his vehicle after
Wilson asked him not to do so. Id. at 8. The police report associated with Wilson’s arrest
confirms that upon arresting Wilson, Officer Medlock did search Wilson’s car and found
a crack pipe. Wilson Arrest and Booking Report at 4-5.
At the police station, the officers charged Wilson with resisting an officer without
violence, use or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, attaching license plate
or validation sticker not assigned, license not legible (faded/mutilated) or not
carried/exhibited on demand, and no lamps or illuminating devices. Id. at 2-4. During his
intake process, Wilson was bleeding from his mouth and head and an officer used a hand
towel to wipe the blood from his face. Amended Complaint at 7; Wilson Deposition at 13,
64. Wilson informed police staff that he was injured and needed to see a doctor. Wilson
Deposition at 64. However, he was left sitting for two hours with his hands cuffed behind
his back. Id. at 13, 64.
Wilson was eventually examined by Nurse Wilda Marie Desire. Desire Deposition
at 12. Nurse Desire testified that the purpose of the examination was to screen Wilson
upon his entry to jail and to “take [a] medical record of the patient to know what is wrong
– [and] if the patient [has] something wrong going on medically, . . . we can take care of
8
that patient.” Id. at 10-11. During her examination of Wilson, Nurse Desire asked him if
he had suffered any trauma within the last forty-eight hours and he answered “no.” Id. at
15-16. Wilson did report that he suffered from serious vision problems, in the form of
cataracts, id. at 16, and that he had a Valium prescription for insomnia. Id. at 18. He also
reported to Nurse Desire that “his hands are contracted and he is unable to make a fist,”
id. at 21, for which he took medication.
Wilson did not report to Nurse Desire that he had any pain in his shoulders, nor
did he complain of wrist pain. Id. at 22-24. He did not report any complaints of neck or
back pain, id. at 24, or that he had been rendered unconscious in the course of his arrest.
Id. at 24-25. Similarly, he did not mention that he had any loose teeth. Id. at 25-26.
Nurse Desire testified that if Wilson had a tooth knocked out or even loosened, he likely
would have been bleeding, and she would have sent him to the hospital. Id. at 26-27.
When Nurse Desire asked Wilson if he had ever been sexually abused, he answered in
the negative. Id. at 28. Therefore, based on Nurse Desire’s examination of Wilson, she
did not see any need to send him to the hospital for additional examination or treatment,
and cleared Wilson for admission into jail. Id. at 14, 33. Nurse Desire affirmed that if she
had observed signs that Wilson was in need of immediate medical attention, she would
have sent him to the hospital. Id. at 32, 33.
The next day, July 1, 2017, Wilson entered a plea of nolo contendre to the charge
of use or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, for which he received a
sentence of two days of jail time (representing the time he had already served) and six
months of probation.
Wilson Certified Judgment and Sentence at 2.
prosecuted for the other charges.
9
He was not
On the evening of July 2, 2017, Wilson went to a Jacksonville area hospital
emergency room. Miu Deposition at 8. He was initially examined by Dr. Matthew Kwan
Ho Miu. Wilson reported to the doctor that he had a past medical history of chronic back
pain. Id. He also reported that he
was arrested by the police and he was slammed on the floor because they
thought he was being noncompliant. He [said they] hit [his] head . . .
shoulders and arms, and [he] lost consciousness. He [said] that when he
woke up he was bruising [sic] and [had] abrasions as well as a headache.
He also [said] that when he woke up he [had] stool all over himself and
thinks that he was sexually assaulted by the police.
Id. at 12. According to Dr. Miu, Wilson did not present with nausea, vomiting, abdominal
pain, rectal pain, or anal discharge which might otherwise be associated with sexual
assault injuries. Id. at 14-15. During his examination of Wilson, Dr. Miu did not see any
physical evidence that Wilson had been choked. Id. at 24. Wilson did present mild
tenderness in his left shoulder, and mild swelling in his left forearm. Id. at 25. Otherwise,
the range of motion for his shoulders and his wrist was normal. Id. In examining Wilson,
Dr. Miu also observed that Wilson had superficial abrasions or scrapes on his left shoulder
and forehead. Id. at 28. Likewise, Dr. Miu saw mild swelling on Wilson’s forehead. Id.
However, after performing a CT scan on Wilson’s head, he saw no evidence that Wilson
suffered any bleeding in his brain or other brain trauma. Id. at 30–31. An X-ray of Wilson’s
left forearm and shoulders showed he suffered from arthritis, but otherwise, there was no
indication of soft tissue swelling in his arm or shoulders. Id. at 32-34. Wilson did not
complain to Dr. Miu of back pain, knee pain, or teeth pain as a result of his arrest by the
officers. Id. at 39-40. In the hospital report, Dr. Miu listed Wilson’s status as “good,”
which represents the best categorization of the condition of a patient. Id. at 36.
In light of Wilson’s report that he had been sexually assaulted, a sexual assault
10
nurse examiner, Nurse Andriece Sampson, also examined him. Sampson Deposition at
8-9. Wilson reported to Nurse Sampson that he had pain in his arm, neck, hands,
shoulder, and head. Id. at 11. In examining Wilson, Nurse Sampson noted that he had
abrasions on his left temple, id. at 15, his left shoulder and forearm, id. at 16, and bruises
and abrasions on his left knee. Id. However, Nurse Sampson did not observe any swollen
areas on Wilson. Id. at 18. Likewise, she did not observe any injuries to his anus or
rectum. Id. at 15.
In his deposition, Wilson reported that he suffered from a broad range of injuries
as a result of his arrest by the officers, some of which persisted several months after the
incident. Immediately after his encounter with the police, Wilson testified that he suffered
from a swollen neck, sore and swollen wrists, a knot on his head, a cut across his eye,
and bleeding from his head and shoulder. Wilson Deposition at 36-37, 76-78. He further
stated that his ongoing injuries include pain in his shoulder, knee pain, muscle spasms
and a limited range of motion in his neck, a scar on his shoulder, and limited strength and
dexterity in his hands. Id.
On July 26, 2017, Wilson submitted an internal investigation complaint of
unnecessary force to JSO regarding his June 30, 2017 encounter with the officers. See
JSO Internal Investigation Complaint; Wilson Deposition at 68.
In his internal
investigation complaint, Wilson alleged that the officers beat him, threw him to the ground,
and put him in a chokehold causing him to lose consciousness. JSO Internal Investigation
Complaint at 25, 27. He further asserted that during the altercation, he informed the
officers that he was unable to be handcuffed with his hands behind his back because he
was disabled. Id. at 26-27. He stated that once at the jail, he had to sit for two hours with
11
his hands still restrained behind his back which caused him much pain. Id. at 28; see
also Doc. 30-1 at 6-7 (JSO correspondence acknowledging Wilson’s complaint against
Defendants). Wilson did not include anything in this report regarding any injury to his
teeth, or that he suffered a sexual assault. Wilson Deposition at 71-72.
Wilson then initiated the instant action against Defendants in state court, and
Defendants removed it to this Court. See Doc. 2 (Complaint, filed Sept. 5, 2017); Doc. 1
(Notice of Removal, filed Sept. 5, 2017). Defendants immediately filed a motion to dismiss
the action, see Doc. 3, which the Court denied without prejudice. See Doc. 29 (Order
Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed Feb. 12, 2018). Doing so, the Court also struck Wilson’s
Complaint, and gave him leave to file an Amended Complaint, which he did. Id. Wilson’s
Amended Complaint serves as the operative complaint for this action. In his Amended
Complaint, Wilson asserts eleven different counts against the officers, which can be
grouped into five general categories: excessive force, sexual assault/harassment,
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, failure to provide Miranda warnings, and
illegal search.11
Defendants then filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, to which Wilson filed a response. Subsequently, Defendants filed their Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, to which Wilson also filed a timely response.
11
Many of the individual counts in Wilson’s Amended Complaint overlap or repeat one another. Liberally
construing his Amended Complaint, Tannenbaum, 148 F.3d at 1263, Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VIII, IX and X
relate, in part, to Wilson’s claims of excessive force against Defendants. See Amended Complaint at 5, 6,
7, 8. Counts III, VII, VIII, and X refer, in part, to his claims of sexual assault. Id. at 5, 7, 8. In Counts IV
and V, Wilson raises his Miranda warning claim. Id. at 6. Count IX of Wilson’s Amended Complaint
suggests his claim of deliberate indifference, id. at 7, and Count XI addresses his claim of illegal search.
Id. at 8.
The language in Wilson’s filings before the Court suggest that he is seeking to hold the Defendants
accountable under both state and federal law. Amended Complaint at 3, 9-10; see also Response to Motion
to Dismiss at 2; Response to Partial Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. However, Wilson does not
specifically reference any federal statutes or particular state laws under which his claims might arise.
12
III.
Arguments of the Parties
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants first assert that Wilson’s Amended
Complaint should be dismissed because it constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading.
Motion to Dismiss at 3-5. Next, Defendants argue that Wilson’s Amended Complaint fails
to state a claim for which relief may be granted under federal law.
In particular,
Defendants focus on Wilson’s claims of excessive force, failure to provide Miranda
warnings, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. at 5-8. They assert
that “Plaintiff has failed to allege any of the elements necessary to establish an excessive
force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a deliberate indifference claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, or any other Constitutional violation.” Id. at 8.12 As to Wilson’s
deliberate indifference claim and his Miranda violation claim, Defendants also assert that
they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 9–12. Finally, in addition to contending that
Wilson fails to state any claims under state law, id. at 9, Defendants argue that to the
extent Wilson’s Amended Complaint can be construed as alleging state law tort claims,
they are immune from suit pursuant to Florida Statute section 768.28(9)(a). Id. at 12.
In his Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Wilson largely reiterates the factual
allegations regarding his excessive force, sexual assault/harassment, deliberate
indifference, and Miranda claims. Additionally, Wilson alleges new facts stating that the
Defendants also stole his wallet during the course his arrest. Response to Motion to
Dismiss at 7. However, he does not respond directly to any of the legal arguments raised
by Defendants, nor do the cases and statutes he cites in his Response to the Motion to
12
The Defendants do not seek dismissal of Wilson’s claims of sexual assault, sexual harassment, see
Amended Complaint at 5, 7, 8 (Counts III, VII, VIII, and X), and illegal search of his vehicle, id. at 8 (Count
XI), for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
13
Dismiss appear to be responsive to those arguments. Id. at 5.
Defendants also seek entry of partial summary judgment on Wilson’s claims of
excessive force, deliberate indifference, and violation of Miranda.
In particular,
Defendants seek summary judgment as to Wilson’s claims of excessive force “prior to
Plaintiff being allegedly rendered unconscious during his arrest.”
Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 1. In this regard, Defendants assert that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on this aspect of Wilson’s excessive force claim. They also contend
they are protected by qualified immunity in regard to Wilson’s deliberate indifference
claim. Id. at 10-23. With regard to the Miranda claim, Defendants argue that there exists
no basis for such a claim. Id. at 23. Finally, based on assertions Wilson made during his
deposition – that Defendants subjected him to a false arrest – Defendants argue that to
the extent Wilson’s Amended Complaint can be construed as raising such a claim, it “fails
as a matter of law.” Id. Notably, with regard to Wilson’s claims that the officers used
excessive force against him after he lost consciousness, as well as subjected him to
sexual assault and harassment, Defendants assert that “there are disputed facts
concerning the events subsequent to Plaintiff losing consciousness which prevent
summary judgment on those claims.” Id. at 5 n.5. As such, Defendants only seek
summary judgment for the portion of Wilson’s excessive force claim which preceded him
losing consciousness, his claims of deliberate indifference, his Miranda claim, and any
claim of false arrest.13
In his Response to the Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Wilson again does
not address the legal arguments raised by Defendants. Instead, he mainly discusses
13
As in their Motion to Dismiss, nowhere in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment do Defendants
address Wilson’s allegation that they engaged in an illegal search of his vehicle.
14
matters of a potential settlement, and evidentiary issues. Response to Partial Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3 - 4. However, he does reiterate many of his claims and asserts
that the Defendants stole his wallet. Id. at 6. Additionally, and perhaps in response to
Defendants’ suggestion that he potentially raised a false arrest claim, Wilson asserts that
the Defendants illegally stopped his vehicle. Id. at 6, 7.
Having summarized the parties’ arguments, the Court now turns to the merits of
the Motions. “Because the arguments raised in these motions overlap in large part, the
Court will focus primarily on the motion[] for summary judgment, and only consider any
additional arguments raised in the motion[] to dismiss where necessary.” McGough v.
Marion County, No. 5:06-cv-364-Oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 2073907, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 14,
2008).
IV.
Discussion
a. Sufficiency of Wilson’s Amended Complaint
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Wilson’s Amended Complaint
does not comply with pleading standards laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
thereby warranting dismissal. Motion to Dismiss at 3-5. In particular, Defendants contend
that Wilson’s Amended Complaint does not provide a short and plain statement of the
claims against them as required by Rule 8(a)(2), and therefore constitutes a shotgun
pleading. Id. at 3-4; see also Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d
1313, 1320-1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing shotgun pleadings).
Additionally,
Defendants assert that Wilson’s Amended Complaint lumps the multiple defendants
together, making it difficult to “ascertain exactly what the plaintiff is claiming.” Motion to
Dismiss at 4; West Coast Roofing & Waterproofing, Inc. v. Johns Manville, Inc., 287 Fed.
15
Appx. 81, 86 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that in a case with multiple defendants, plaintiff
should avoid “lumping” multiple defendants together).
In challenging Wilson’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), Defendants
assert that Wilson’s Amended Complaint fails to give them “adequate notice of the federal
or state law claim[s] against them.” Motion to Dismiss at 3. Defendants’ argument in this
regard is somewhat undermined as their Motions reflect that they managed to sufficiently
decipher the Amended Complaint to respond with arguments for why Wilson has failed to
state claims upon which relief can be granted, and that the Defendants otherwise should
be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Motion to Dismiss at 5-12; Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 10-23.
The Court is also unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Wilson’s Amended
Complaint is inappropriate because he lumped multiple defendants together, making it
difficult for the Defendants and Court to determine “exactly what plaintiff is claiming.”
Motion to Dismiss at 4. In his Amended Complaint, Wilson identifies with particularity
certain individual defendants as committing the specific wrongs against him.
See
Amended Complaint at 5 (identifying defendant Hinton in Count I); id. (identifying
defendant Yorton in Count II); id. (identifying defendant Batrous in Count III); id. at 6
(identifying defendant Medlock in Count IV); id. at 7 (identifying defendant Batrous in
Count IX); id. at 8 (identifying defendant Medlock in Count XI). Wilson does generally
assert that the “defendants in this case all had a part [in the] incidents” associated with
the wrongs committed against him.
Amended Complaint at 5.
However, liberally
construing Wilson’s Amended Complaint, as the Court must, Tannenbaum, 148 F.3d at
1263, it cannot be said that it is “virtually impossible” for the individual Defendants to
16
determine which charges Wilson is bringing against each of them. See Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1325.
Without question, Wilson’s Amended Complaint is far from a model of clarity.
Indeed, it skirts closely along the boundary of impermissible categories of shotgun
pleadings identified by the Eleventh Circuit. See id. at 1321-1323 (describing categories
of shotgun pleadings). However, given the procedural posture of this case and the fact
that Defendants have been able to identify and respond to Wilson’s claims, the sanction
of dismissal is not warranted.
Thus the Court will turn to Defendants’ substantive
arguments for dismissal or partial summary judgment. Doing so, the Court will first
address Wilson’s federal claims and then turn to Defendants’ challenges to his state law
claims.
b. Federal Claims
i. Excessive Force Claim Up to the Point at Which Wilson Lost
Consciousness
In Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X, Wilson asserts federal excessive force
claims based on the force the officers used to effectuate his arrest.14 Defendants seek
summary judgment as to these claims, asserting that they are entitled to qualified
immunity for any excessive force claim Wilson has asserted against them based on
events up to the point Wilson lost consciousness. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
at 1-2.
The doctrine of “[q]ualified immunity protects from civil liability government officials
who perform discretionary functions if the conduct of the officials does not violate ‘clearly
14
In all of these counts Wilson asserts facts which in some manner allege the Defendants used force
against him in the course of the arrest and the injuries he suffered as a result.
17
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’”
Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As a result, this defense protects from suit “‘all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”15 Carr v. Tatangelo, 338
F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Indeed, as “‘government officials are not required to err on the side of caution,’ qualified
immunity is appropriate in close cases where a reasonable officer could have believed
that his actions were lawful.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1200 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)).
In order to be entitled to qualified immunity, the defendant must first establish that
his conduct was within the scope of his discretionary authority. See Webster v. Beary,
228 Fed. Appx. 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. Here,
neither party contends that the Defendants were acting outside the scope of their
discretionary authority when they arrested Wilson.16 Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (finding that
“there can be do doubt that the [officer] was acting in his discretionary capacity when he
arrested [the plaintiff]” even though the plaintiff asserted that the officer used excessive
force in effectuating the arrest). Therefore, the burden shifts to Wilson “to show that
15
In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court views the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to the extent supported by the record, and
then considers “the legal issue of whether the plaintiff’s ‘facts,’ if proven, show that the defendant violated
clearly established law.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2000); Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). As such, the facts recited in this Order are discussed in the light most
favorable to Wilson and may differ from the facts ultimately proved at trial. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1190.
16
“‘A government official acts within [her] discretionary authority if the actions were (1) undertaken pursuant
to the performance of [her] duties and (2) within the scope of [her] authority.’” Jones v. City of Atlanta, 192
Fed. Appx. 894, 897 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir.
1995)).
18
qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. To do so, Wilson must
establish two elements: (a) that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (b) the
right violated was clearly established. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Court may
consider these elements in whichever order it chooses, and qualified immunity will protect
the defendant if the plaintiff fails to establish either element. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009). Wilson is unable to meet his burden.
Addressing the first prong, the Court must determine whether, in the course of
arresting Wilson, Defendants subjected him to an unlawful use of force. In particular, the
Court must evaluate whether the officers used excessive force when they pulled him out
of his car, hit him in the face and chest, threw him on the hood of his car and then onto
the ground, punched and kicked him while he was on the ground, and then handcuffed
Wilson despite his protestations that he was disabled and that handcuffing him in such a
manner would cause him pain. In doing so, the Court heeds the Supreme Court’s
cautions that:
[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to
make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to
use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Because
the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application, however, its proper application
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . With respect to a claim of excessive force,
19
the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: Not every
push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). See also Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2011); Draper
v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2004); Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080,
1093-94 (11th Cir. 2003).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that as Defendants were arresting Wilson, the
use of some force was warranted. See Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 738, 739-40
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he law permits some use of force in any arrest.”). “A law enforcement
officer’s right to arrest necessarily carries with it the ability to use some force in making
the arrest.” Id. at 740. Even when a suspect is not actively resisting arrest or attempting
to flee, the police may use a “reasonable amount of force to subdue and secure” the
suspect.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. Indeed, even for “minor offenses, permissible force
includes physical restraint, use of handcuffs, and pushing into walls.” Brown, 608 F.3d at
740. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has found that an officer’s use of de minimis force to
effectuate a lawful arrest does not constitute excessive force. Taylor v. Taylor, 649 Fed.
Appx. 737, 746-47 (11th Cir. 2016) (threshold level of force necessary to make custodial
arrest insufficient to support a claim for excessive force); Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d
1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (application of de minimis force, without more, does not
support claim of excessive force); Woodruff v. City of Trussville, 434 Fed. Appx. 852, 855
(11th Cir. 2011) (de minimis force will not defeat an officer’s claim of qualified immunity);
20
Croom, 645 F.3d at 1252 (even where use of force may have been unnecessary, if de
minimis, force is not unlawful); Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257 (“the application of de minimis
force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force”); Hines v. Jefferson, No.
1:17-CV-3263-TWT, 2018 WL 4255860, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2018) (“de minimis force
. . . as a matter of law, does not constitute excessive force); Ainsworth v. City of Tampa,
No. 8:10-cv-293-T-23TGW, 2010 WL 2220247, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2010) (“the
application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim of excessive force”).
Moreover, absent some reason to find the officer knew a person was unusually
vulnerable, where the officer uses de minimis force, there is no constitutional violation,
even though the force may cause significant harm to the arrested individual. Rodriguez
v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (Rodriguez I). For example, in Taylor, in
the course of arresting the plaintiff, an officer “grabbed [her], slammed her into the side
of [a] patrol car, and handcuffed her.” Taylor, 649 Fed. Appx. at 741. The plaintiff
“suffered a spiral fracture in her right hand, multiple contusions to her right hand, forearm,
and right upper eyelid, and a chest wall contusion.” Id. Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the officer’s use of force was not excessive. Id. at 746. Similarly, in Ainsworth, the
plaintiff persistently refused to comply with the arresting officer’s directions to exit his
vehicle.
Ainsworth, 2010 WL 2220247 at *6.
In response to the plaintiff’s lack of
compliance, the arresting officer reached into the plaintiff’s vehicle, grabbed him, and
“yanked him violently from the vehicle before slamming [his] body into the ground.” Id. at
*1. The plaintiff suffered “serious permanent injuries . . . including . . . a severely herniated
disc . . . causing cervical radiculoapthy requiring two surgical discectomy surgeries and
injuries to the left shoulder including a torn labrum and rotator cuff requiring surgical
21
repair.” Id. at *2. Despite the plaintiff’s injuries, the court determined that the arresting
officer’s actions did not extend beyond de minimis force. Additionally, in Hernandez v.
City of Hoover, 212 Fed. Appx. 774, 774-75 (11th Cir. 2006), an officer’s use of force was
found to be de minimis when the officer kicked the plaintiff and struck his tibial nerve
causing a fractured ankle and torn ligament, where the plaintiff, after he was handcuffed,
refused to comply with the officer’s demands to sit down. Id. See also Woodruff, 434
Fed. Appx. at 855 (de minimis force when officer punched plaintiff in face, forcefully
removed him from car, and slammed him on the ground); Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1094 (de
minimis force when officer forced plaintiff to ground to place plaintiff in handcuffs); Nolin,
207 F.3d at 1255, 1257 (de minimis force when officer grabbed plaintiff “from behind by
the shoulder and wrist, threw him against a van three or four feet away, kneed him the
back and pushed his head into the side of the van, searched his groin area in an
uncomfortable manner, and handcuffed him”); Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456,
1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (force not unreasonable where officer slammed plaintiff against a
wall, “kicked his legs apart, required him to raise his arms above his head,” and caused
plaintiff to “experience[] pain from having to lift his arms since he had previously suffered
a stroke, and that he experienced pain in his arthritic knee from having his legs kicked
apart.”).
Important to the determination of whether any force used by an officer was
excessive, is the question of whether the arrestee complied with the officer’s commands,
or whether the arrestee resisted the officer’s attempts to effectuate the arrest. See
Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278 (officer’s use of taser against plaintiff reasonable where plaintiff
was “hostile, belligerent, and uncooperative” with officer in the course of the arrest);
22
Hines, 2018 WL 4255860 at *3 (officer’s use of chokehold was reasonable where plaintiff
admitted to resisting and struggling against officer); Crutcher v. Athens Police Dep’t, NO.
CV-10-S-1176-NE, 2014 WL 5521944, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 2014) (officer’s use of
chokehold that resulted in plaintiff losing consciousness not unreasonable where plaintiff
actively resisted arrest). With this background in place, and construing the facts and
making all reasonable inferences in Wilson’s favor, Haves, 52 F.3d at 921, Wilson cannot
show that the officers’ use of force against him, up until the point he lost consciousness,
was objectively unreasonable.
The facts demonstrate that from the outset of his encounter with the officers,
Wilson challenged their authority to arrest him,17 and physically resisted their efforts to
handcuff him. In his deposition testimony, Wilson stated that upon being stopped by the
police, “I got out of my vehicle and started towards him to see what was the problem
17
Scattered throughout Wilson’s deposition, as well as detailed in Wilson’s Arrest and Booking Report, is
evidence that Wilson challenged Defendants’ lawful ability to pull over his vehicle and arrest him. See
Wilson Arrest and Booking Report at 4; Wilson Deposition at 13, 30. From this, Defendants suggest that
perhaps Wilson has raised a claim of false arrest based on a lack of probable cause, and if so, they seek
summary judgment on such a claim. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 23-24. While it does appear
that at different times during his encounter with Defendants, and in the course of this litigation, Wilson
challenged Defendants’ authority to stop his vehicle, even the most liberal reading of his pro se Amended
Complaint cannot support a conclusion that Wilson has raised a claim of false arrest. Nothing in the
Amended Complaint suggests, in any manner, that Wilson asserted that Defendants lacked probable cause
to stop his vehicle or arrest him. Indeed, Wilson only referenced a claim of false arrest after Defendants
suggested he may have alleged such a claim. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 23-24;
Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6, 7, 8.
While the Court must liberally construe Wilson’s pro se Amended Complaint, Tannenbaum, 148
F.3d at 1263, the Court does not have the license to rewrite his pleadings. GJR Invs., Inc., 132 F.3d at
1369. Moreover, to the extent Wilson is attempting to further amend his Amended Complaint through
subsequent briefing, he cannot do so. See e.g., Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315
(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff could not raise a new claim in response to motion for summary
judgment that was not pled in the complaint); O'Brien v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1306
n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (court declined to recognize claim alleged in complaint); Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar
Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1253-54 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“A complaint cannot be amended merely
by raising new facts and theories in plaintiffs' opposition papers, and hence such new allegations and claims
should not be considered in resolving the motion for summary judgment.”) (quoting Southwick Clothing LLC
v. GFT (USA) Corp., No. 99-10452, 2004 WL 2914093 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2004)). Accordingly, the Court
will not devote any further discussion to a purported false arrest claim.
23
because I didn't have a probable cause of being stopped.” Wilson Deposition at 13, 30.
Similarly, in the Arrest and Booking Report, the officers reported that upon stopping
Wilson’s car, “the suspect started to exit the vehicle and became verbally abusive. As we
were attempting to give him verbal directions to stay in the car he yelled and said we had
no reason to stop him.” Wilson Arrest and Booking Report at 4. Wilson does not dispute
these reports. Moreover, as the officers were attempting to handcuff Wilson, Wilson
admitted that he resisted their efforts because of the pain he suffered in placing his hands
behind his back. Wilson Deposition at 13, 29-30, 30-31. Notably, in admitting that he
resisted the officers because of the pain he felt, Wilson acknowledged that it could have
looked to the officers like he was resisting arrest, rather than attempting to prevent
additional pain. Id. at 30-31. And in fact, the officers have declared that they did interpret
Wilson’s actions as resisting arrest. For example, Detective Medlock declared that upon
engaging with Wilson, Wilson “instantly became resistant to my requests and would not
follow directions. When I began to handcuff Mr. Wilson, he began to physically resist me
and tensed his body and arms in a way that would not allow me to handcuff his hands
behind his back.” Medlock Declaration at 2. Likewise, other officers at the scene declared
that they “observed Mr. Wilson resist Detective Medlock’s requests and commands.”
Yorton Declaration at 2; Batrous Declaration at 2. Additionally, Wilson pulled his arms
and hands away from the officers as they attempted to handcuff him. Yorton Declaration
at 2; Batrous Declaration at 2. Finally, once the officers had Wilson on the ground, he
“continued to physically resist arrest by consistently pulling [his] hands and arms from”
their grasp. Yorton Declaration at 3; Batrous Declaration at 3. It was only after the officers
24
placed Wilson in a chokehold and he lost consciousness that they were able to handcuff
him. Wilson Deposition at 13, 35.
Wilson’s case is similar to Woodruff, 434 Fed. Appx. at 855 (force de minimis when
officer punched plaintiff in face, forcefully removed him from car, and slammed him on the
ground), Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1255, 1257 (force de minimis when officer grabbed plaintiff
“from behind by the shoulder and wrist, threw him against a van three or four feet away,
kneed him the back and pushed his head into the side of the van, searched his groin area
in an uncomfortable manner, and handcuffed him”), and Jones 121 F.3d at 1460 (force
not unreasonable where officer slammed plaintiff against a wall, “kicked his legs apart,
required him to raise his arms above his head,” and caused plaintiff to “experience[] pain
from having to lift his arms since he had previously suffered a stroke, and that he
experienced pain in his arthritic knee from having his legs kicked apart.”). Indeed, like
the plaintiffs in Woodruff, Nolin, and Jones, Wilson alleges he was pulled from his car, hit
in the face and chest, thrown against his car and then onto the ground, punched and
kicked while he was on the ground, and then placed in a chokehold until he lost
consciousness. Notably, the facts here do not even implicate those cases in which an
officer’s use of force, while nonetheless causing significant injury to a plaintiff, was still
deemed by a court to be constitutionally reasonable.18 See e.g., Taylor, 649 Fed. Appx.
at 746; Ainsworth, 2010 WL 2220247 at *2, 6; Hernandez, 212 Fed. Appx. at 774.19
18
Although Wilson asserts that he suffered serious and ongoing injuries as a result of his encounter with
Defendants, Wilson Deposition at 36-37, 77-78, the undisputed medical evidence which includes testimony
of the doctors and medical reports associated with Wilson’s arrest, establish that his injuries were
superficial. See Miu Deposition at 25, 27-28; Sampson Deposition at 15, 16.
19
Wilson’s argument that he attempted to inform and convince the officers that placing him in handcuffs
behind his back would cause him pain does not salvage his claim. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that
a police officer need not credit everything a suspect tells him. See Marx v. Gumbinner,
905 F.2d 1503, 1507 n. 6 (11th Cir.1990). This idea is especially true when the officer is in
the process of handcuffing a suspect. As another federal court recently noted, statements
25
Importantly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wilson, it is undisputed
that until he was placed in the chokehold and lost consciousness, Wilson appeared to
Defendants to be actively resisting arrest. On these facts a reasonable officer could
certainly have concluded that the force used here was necessary to effectuate the arrest.
Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 852-53 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding use of deadly force
objectively reasonable where reasonable police officers possessing the same information
as the defendant officer would have thought such force was necessary). Accordingly,
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Wilson’s favor, Haves, 52 F.3d at 921,
Defendants’ use of force was not excessive, and therefore did not represent a
constitutional violation.
Moreover, even if the Court found otherwise, Wilson fails to point to facts
supporting a conclusion that Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right.
See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232. In this context, the Supreme Court has explained:
[f]or a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected
by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been
by suspects claiming (at the time of their arrest) to have pre-existing injuries are, “no doubt,
uttered by many suspects who, if given the choice, would prefer not to be handcuffed at all
and, if they must be restrained in that manner, would prefer that the handcuffs be in front.”
Caron v. Hester, No. CIV. 00–394–M, 2001 WL 1568761, at *8 (D.N.H. Nov.13, 2001).
Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (Rodriguez II). While Wilson may have suffered
pain from putting his hands behind his back based on some pre-existing injury, it was only as the officers
began to attempt to handcuff Wilson that he asserted he suffered from a disability preventing him from
being handcuffed from behind. Wilson Deposition at 13, 27, 29-30. Eleventh Circuit precedent suggests
that in such an instance, where an officer continues to handcuff a suspect, the force is not excessive. See
e.g., Rodriguez II, 294 F.3d at 1278, n.3 (“Perhaps, if Plaintiff, before the physical part of the arrest began,
had also told [the officer] that Plaintiff’s arm was injured, we would be more inclined to conclude that the
Constitution required [the officer] to credit that statement.”); Rodriguez I, 280 F.3d at 1341 (“What would
ordinarily be considered reasonable force does not become excessive force when the force aggravates
(however severely) a pre-existing condition the extent of which was unknown to the officer at the time.”);
Schultz v. Hall, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1229-30 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (no excessive force where officers could
not have reasonably known at time of handcuffing suspect that a previous injury would render suspect
unable to safely place arms behind her back, or where it was entirely reasonable for officers not to credit
suspect’s claims about her injury).
26
held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.”
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). For purposes of this analysis the critical question
is whether the state of the law gave the government actor “fair warning” that his alleged
treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350
(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741); see also Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1031 (“[F]air
and clear notice to government officials is the cornerstone of qualified immunity.”). The
Eleventh Circuit recognizes three sources of law that would provide a government official
adequate notice of statutory or constitutional rights: “specific statutory or constitutional
provisions; principles of law enunciated in relevant decisions; and factually similar cases
already decided by state and federal courts in the relevant jurisdiction.”
Harper v.
Lawrence County, Ala., 584 F.3d 1030, 1037 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Goebert v. Lee
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007)). Thus, where the words of the federal
statute or federal constitutional provision are specific enough “to establish clearly the law
applicable to particular conduct and circumstances,” then the plaintiff can overcome the
qualified immunity privilege, even in the absence of case law. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350.
In this type of “obvious clarity” case “the words of the federal statute or federal
constitutional provision may be so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not
needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful.” Id.
Alternatively, where the conduct alleged is not so egregious as to violate a
statutory or constitutional right on its face, courts look to case law to determine whether
the law is “clearly established.” Id. at 1351. If the case law contains “some broad
statements of principle” which are “not tied to particularized facts,” then it may be sufficient
27
to clearly establish the law applicable in the future to different facts. Id. However, to
provide officials with sufficient warning, the case law must establish a principle with such
“obvious clarity” that “every objectively reasonable government official facing the
circumstances would know that the official's conduct did violate federal law when the
official acted.” Id. Last, in the absence of broad statements of principle, precedent can
clearly establish the applicable law where “the circumstances facing a government official
are not fairly distinguishable, that is, are materially similar,” to the particularized facts of
prior case law. Id. at 1352. Such precedent must be found in decisions from the Supreme
Court, the controlling circuit court of appeals, or the pertinent state supreme court. Id. at
1351. Although such a case “on all fours” with materially identical facts is not required to
establish “fair warning” to government officials, see Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252,
1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the impact of Hope on Eleventh Circuit precedent),
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate,” see Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at
341)).
Here, Wilson has not demonstrated to the Court that Defendants would have had
fair warning that their use of force on a non-compliant Wilson was unlawful. He has not
presented the Court with any case materially similar to the facts of the instant controversy
in which the conduct was found to violate constitutional norms. To the contrary, as
discussed, the facts of Wilson’s encounter are similar to the facts present in decisions
from the Eleventh Circuit where the defendants’ actions were found not to violate the
Constitution. See Woodruff, 434 Fed. Appx. at 855; Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1255, 1257; Jones
121 F.3d at 1460. Indeed, given the similarity of Wilson’s case to Woodruff, Nolin, and
28
Jones, Wilson “cannot show that a broader, clearly established principle applies with
‘obvious clarity’ to the particular factual situation faced by [Defendants], or that the
conduct at issue so obviously violated the Constitution that existing case law is
unnecessary.” Taylor, 649 Fed. Appx. at 747.
Accordingly, to the extent Defendants seek summary judgment on Wilson’s claims
that they used excessive force in arresting him, up to the point that Wilson lost
consciousness, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, summary judgment
is due to be entered in favor of Defendants on Wilson’s claim of excessive force, as
embodied in Counts I, II, VI and IX. Likewise, partial summary judgment is due to be
entered in favor of Defendants on Wilson’s excessive force claims as identified in Counts
III, IV, VIII and X, up to the point at which he lost consciousness.
ii. Deliberate Indifference Claim
Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Wilson’s
claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.20
Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 21-23. Because it is undisputed that Defendants were acting in
the scope of their discretionary authority when they arrested Wilson and took him to the
police station for booking, the Court considers whether Wilson raises a genuine issue of
fact on the question of whether Defendants violated a constitutional right and whether
that right was clearly established. Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232.
Wilson contends that after arresting and handcuffing him, Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
In particular, he asserts that
Defendants left him sitting at the police station for two hours with blood on his face; his
20
This claim is found in Count IX of Wilson’s Amended Complaint.
29
hands cuffed behind his back, despite his assertions that he was disabled; in pain; and
without regard to his need to see a doctor. Amended Complaint at 7; Wilson Deposition
at 64; JSO Internal Investigation Complaint at 29.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that
[d]eliberate indifference to a detainee's serious medical needs requires 1)
an objectively serious medical need and 2) a defendant who acted with
deliberate indifference to that need. A “serious medical need” is one that
is diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious
that a lay person would recognize the need for medical treatment. For
liability, the defendant must 1) have subjective knowledge of a risk of
serious harm, 2) disregard that risk, and 3) display conduct beyond gross
negligence.
Deliberate indifference may result not only from failure to provide
medical care at all, but also from excessive delay: Even where medical
care is ultimately provided, a [government actor] may nonetheless act with
deliberate indifference by delaying the treatment of serious medical needs.
Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations and
citations omitted). Construing the facts and making all reasonable inferences in Wilson’s
favor, Haves, 52 F.3d at 921, Wilson fails to present evidence supporting a possible
conclusion that he suffered from a serious medical need, or that the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to any such need. As such, no genuine issue for trial is present
on his claim of deliberate indifference.
First, neither Wilson’s allegations, nor the facts before the Court on the
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, support an inference that Wilson
suffered from a serious medical need. In his Amended Complaint, Wilson alleges that
while at the police station, he “had blood running from [his] mouth and head [and that] the
officer at the police station clean[ed] the blood from [his] face with [a] hand tower [sic].”
Amended Complaint at 7. Wilson attached to his Amended Complaint his submission to
the JSO Internal Complaint Division regarding his encounter with the officers.
30
Handwritten Internal Complaint to JSO at 8-10 (Doc. 30-1); see also JSO Internal
Investigation Complaint Form. There he related that when the Defendants took him to
the police station he sat “down outside on a steel bench for about two hours with his hand
cuff[ed] behine [sic] [his] back and legs cuff[ed] as well [and] having much pain in hands
and head and back & neck.” Handwritten Internal Complaint to JSO at 10. Likewise, in
his deposition, Wilson reported that upon arriving at the police station, he had a cut across
his eye and a knot on his head, and that he was bleeding from his shoulder and down his
face. Wilson Deposition at 36-37. More particularly, he stated:
I was sitting outside on the bench with my hand[s] cuffed, my hands swollen
up, my shirt dripping in water because I’d been perspiring. It was all wet
with blood. And I was sitting there with my head down and asking them –
trying to holler out to get some help so I could go see the doctor because I
was in so much pain.
Id. at 64.
At most therefore, Wilson claims to have suffered from cuts on his face and
shoulder, the blood from which was easily wiped away by an officer. Additionally, he
suffered pain from being handcuffed. None of these injuries however, are sufficient to
support a finding that Wilson presented an objectively serious medical need for which
Wilson would have been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or a medical
condition so obvious that a lay person would recognize the need for medical treatment.
Pourmoghani-Esfahani, 625 F.3d at 1317. See also e.g. Fernandez v. Metro Dade Police
Dep’t, 397 Fed. Appx. 507, 512-14 (11th Cir. 2010) (limited bleeding, bruising, pain,
disorientation, and blood clogs in nose do not constitute serious medical need); Burley v.
Upton, 257 Fed. Appx. 207, 210 (11th Cir. 2007) (back pain does not constitute a serious
medical need); Price v. Stewart, No. 3:12-cv-49, 2014 WL 1158870, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Mar.
31
21, 2014) (no serious medical need where plaintiff suffered from a small knot on head
along with bruises and abrasions); Mladek v. Day, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1305-06 (M.D.
Ga. 2003) (sore wrists from handcuffs do not constitute serious medical need).
Moreover, when Wilson was examined by medical personnel as part of the intake
process at the jail, as well as when he sought follow up medical treatment at the hospital,
none of the medical professionals found him to be suffering from a condition requiring
treatment.21 During the intake process at the jail, Wilson did not report to the nurse that
he was suffering from any pain in his shoulders, wrists, neck or back. Desire Deposition
at 22-24. Nor did he mention that he had any loose teeth as a result of his encounter with
the officers. Id. at 25-26. As noted earlier, Nurse Desire testified that she would have
sent Wilson to the hospital if he was missing a tooth or was bleeding, but he presented
with neither condition. Id. at 26-27. Additionally, Nurse Desire testified that nothing from
her examination of Wilson indicated he needed further examination or treatment, and
therefore there was no need to send him to the hospital. Id. at 14, 33.
Likewise, the doctor and nurse who examined Wilson when he went to the
emergency room two days after his encounter with Defendants, did not find him to have
suffered from any significant injuries requiring treatment. Dr. Miu, the emergency room
physician, reported that Wilson did not complain of back pain, knee pain, or teeth pain as
21
In this regard, the Court
may consider the medical evaluation and treatment [Wilson] subsequently received. We
recognize that hindsight is, as they say, twenty-twenty. Nonetheless, the purpose of
seeking medical treatment is often to discover what has gone wrong with one's body. That
determination, admittedly after the fact, can shed light on how wrong something went and
when it went wrong. Therefore, judges having to make legal determinations as to whether
someone manifested an objectively serious medical need at a certain point in time may
properly consider a physician's subsequent evaluation and treatment.
Fernandez, 397 Fed. Appx. at 513 n.7 (collecting cases).
32
a result of his arrest. Miu Deposition at 39-40. Wilson did have mild tenderness in his
left shoulder and mild swelling in his left forearm, but otherwise, the range of motion for
his shoulder and wrists was normal. Id. at 25. Wilson had some superficial abrasions
and scrapes on his left shoulder and forehead, where he also had mild swelling. Id. at
28. However, X-rays showed that Wilson suffered from arthritis in his forearm and
shoulders, but that there was no indication of soft tissue swelling in these areas. Id. at
32-34. Finally, the sexual assault nurse examiner noted that Wilson had abrasions on his
left temple, Sampson Deposition at 15, his left shoulder and forearm, id. at 16, and bruises
and abrasions on his left knee. Id. However, despite Wilson’s complaints to her that he
had pain in his arms, neck, hands, shoulder and head, id. at 11, the nurse did not observe
any swollen areas on Wilson. Id. at 18.
All of these reports reflect that none of the medical professionals who examined
Wilson immediately after, and within two days, of his encounter with the Defendants
determined that he needed further medical treatment. Accordingly, the medical evidence
and record before the Court establish that Wilson’s complaints and injuries arising out of
his arrest did not present a serious medical need. Fernandez, 397 Fed. Appx. at 513;
Johnson v. Ft. Pierce Police Dep’t, 849 F. Supp. 1543, 1551-52 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Even if the Court were to find there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to the
question of whether Wilson suffered from a serious medical need, the record does not
support even an inference that any of Defendants was subjectively aware of a serious
medical need. Pourmoghani-Esfahani, 625 F.3d at 1317. In this regard, Wilson suggests
that because he was forced to wait for two hours with his hands cuffed behind his back
prior to receiving any medical treatment, the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
33
his medical needs. Amended Complaint at 7; JSO Internal Investigation Complaint Form
at 28; Wilson Deposition at 64. See also Pourmoghani-Esfahani, 625 F.3d at 1317
(deliberate indifference can arise from excessive delay in providing needed medical
treatment). Wilson’s argument fails.
The second element of a deliberate indifference claim is commonly referred to as
the “subjective component” of such a claim, and requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant “subjectively” was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511
U.S. 825, 828, 835-36 (1970). The subjective knowledge component is a difficult standard
for a plaintiff to satisfy: establishing mere negligence is not sufficient. Id. To satisfy the
subjective component, “a [p]laintiff must prove three things: (1) subjective knowledge of
a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]
negligence.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Nam Dang by and through Vina
Dang v. Sheriff Seminole Cty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussing
subjective component in context of serious medical needs).
Notably, collective
knowledge will not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. Rather the knowledge
of each defendant must be evaluated based on what that defendant actually knew. Id.
An officer disregards a serious medical need by more than gross negligence, when
the officer knows that an individual is in serious need of medical care and fails or refuses
to obtain medical treatment. Id. “Thus, ‘knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of
circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs is essential to a finding of
deliberate indifference.’” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1191 (11th
34
Cir. 1994) abrogated in part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n.9
(2002) (quoting Horn ex rel. Parks v. Madison Cty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir.
1994)); see also Estate of Bearden v. Anglin, 543 Fed. Appx. 918, 921 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting same). Indeed, proof that the defendant “should have perceived the risk but did
not is insufficient.” Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999); Kruse v.
Williams, 592 Fed. Appx. 848, 856 (11th Cir. 2014) (same).
The Eleventh Circuit has found that summary judgment should be granted for the
defendant unless the plaintiff presents some evidence of the official’s subjective
knowledge, even if only circumstantial. Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1364; see also McElligot
v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). Additionally, in the context of a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
[a] district court should grant summary judgment when, after an adequate
time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an essential element of that party's case.
[A court resolves] all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff,
and then determine[s] the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law under that version of the facts. If the
evidence could not lead a rational fact-finder to find for the nonmoving party,
and where the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing to
demonstrate an element essential to that party's case, on which that party
bears the burden of proof at trial, then no genuine issue of material fact
exists, and summary judgment should be granted. Finally, genuine disputes
are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the non-movant. For factual issues to be considered genuine,
they must have a real basis in the record.
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations
omitted).
Here, the Court first notes that to the extent that Wilson’s bleeding constituted a
serious medical need, by his own admission, an officer tended to his bleeding by wiping
the blood away. Amended Complaint at 7. Thus, the evidence shows that to the extent
35
an officer was aware of Wilson’s medical need, he responded to it, undermining any claim
of deliberate indifference.
Moreover, Wilson has not presented the Court with any
evidence to permit an inference that any of the officers possessed subjective knowledge
of a serious medical need when they forced Wilson to sit with his hands cuffed behind his
back for two hours. At most, the undisputed evidence before the Court indicates that
Wilson sat at the police station with his hands cuffed behind his back for two hours, and
that Wilson tried to call out for help “so that [he] could go see the doctor because [he] was
in so much pain.” Wilson Deposition at 13, 64; JSO Internal Investigation Complaint Form
at 28. This evidence is insufficient to support even an inference that the officers were
actually and subjectively aware that Wilson was in serious need of medical care, and
subsequently disregarded that need. Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1372-73 (affirming summary
judgment where plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of defendants’ subjective
knowledge to raise a jury question); Hill, 40 F.3d at 1190-21 (noting that knowledge of a
serious medical need is essential to a claim of deliberate indifference); see also Daniels
v. Jacobs, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2018 WL 4998130, at *8-9 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (affirming
summary judgment where the record showed at most the defendant “should” have been
aware of the serious medical need, but finding that no reasonable jury could conclude the
defendants actually had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need); Mitchell v.
McKeithen, 672 Fed. Appx. 900, 903 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[n]o liability arises . . .
for an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that [she] should have perceived but
did not,” and affirming summary judgment where there was no evidence the defendant
was actually subjectively aware of the risk).
36
Finally, the officers’ two hour delay in attending to Wilson’s medical needs does
did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. In evaluating a claim that a defendant
delayed medical treatment to a plaintiff, courts have “consistently considered: (1) the
seriousness of the medical need; (2) whether the delay worsened the medical condition;
and (3) the reason for the delay.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. Notably, while a few hours
delay “for emergency needs such as broken bones and bleeding cuts may constitute
deliberate indifference[,] [d]elayed treatment for injuries that are of a lesser degree of
immediacy than broken bones and bleeding cuts, but that are obvious serious medical
needs, may also give rise to constitutional claims.” Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388,
393–94 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, a plaintiff
who complains “that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must
place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the
delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188. Wilson has not provided
the Court with any medical evidence from which the Court could infer that the officers,
when they delayed providing Wilson with medical treatment for two hours, disregarded
his risk of serious harm by engaging in conduct beyond that of gross negligence. See
Pourmoghani-Esfahani, 625 F.3d at 1317. See also Jackson v. Capraun, 534 Fed. Appx.
854, 857 (11th Cir. 2013) (delay during which officer filled out arrest report and helped in
arrest of two other individuals prior to providing medical treatment to arrestee did not
constitute deliberate indifference); Goree v. City of Atlanta, 276 Fed. Appx. 919, 921-22
(11th Cir. 2008) (delay of an hour and twenty minutes prior to providing medical care was
not deliberately indifferent); Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007)
(two hour delay prior to giving arrestee stiches was lawful delay); Kane v. Hargis, 987
37
F.2d 1005, 1008-09 (4th Cir. 1993) (four hour delay before treatment did not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference). Accordingly, even if Wilson did suffer from a serious
medical need, there is no evidence before the Court supporting an inference that the
defendant officers were subjectively aware that Wilson suffered from a substantial risk of
serious harm, or that they disregarded the risk of that harm by making him wait for two
hours with his hands cuffed behind his back prior to his examination by the intake nurse
at the jail.
Even if the Court were to conclude otherwise, Wilson has not presented the Court
with any Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit case law establishing that Defendants had
adequate notice that their actions were unlawful and therefore violated Wilson’s clearly
established constitutional rights. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Kingsland, 382 F.3d at
1232. To the contrary, and as discussed above, the circumstances of Wilson’s encounter
with Defendants and his subsequent treatment at the jail, fits easily within Eleventh Circuit
precedent holding that an officer’s actions were constitutional. See e.g., Fernandez, 397
Fed. Appx. at 512-14 (no serious medical need where defendant presented with limited
bleeding, bruising, pain, disorientation, and blood clogs in nose); Burley, 257 Fed. Appx.
at 210 (back pain does not rise to level of serious medical need). See also Youmans v.
T.A. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010) (not clearly established that four hour
delay in providing medical treatment constituted deliberate indifference without
determining whether delay was a constitutional violation); Goree, 276 Fed. Appx. at 92122 (hour and twenty minutes delay in providing medical care was not deliberately
indifferent); Andujar, 486 F.3d at 1204 (no deliberate indifference where there was a two
hour delay prior to giving arrestee stiches). Nor has Wilson pointed to a “broader, clearly
38
established principle [that] applies with ‘obvious clarity’ to the particular factual situation
faced by [Defendants], or that the conduct at issue so obviously violated the Constitution
that existing case law is unnecessary.” Taylor, 649 Fed. Appx. at 747.
As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Wilson’s claim of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Therefore, summary judgment is
due to be granted in favor of Defendants on Count IX of Wilson’s Amended Complaint, to
the extent it raises a deliberate indifference claim.
iii. Miranda Warning Violation Claim
Defendants also move for summary judgment on Wilson’s claim against the
officers for failing to provide him with sufficient Miranda22 warnings. See Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 23. Wilson’s Miranda claims are set forth in Counts IV and V of
his Amended Complaint. He alleges that Detective Medlock “did not read the plaintiff his
memorandum rights . . . civil rights,” Amended Complaint at 6, and further references
“Miranda Rights” and the Fifth Amendment. Id. Defendants assert that Wilson’s “claim
that the Defendant Officers did not follow Miranda and properly read Plaintiff his Fifth
Amendment rights does” not “give rise to a viable claim for a civil rights violation” and thus
summary judgment in their favor is warranted. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
23.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003),
precludes Wilson’s claim. In Chavez, the Supreme Court ruled that an officer’s failure to
provide an arrestee with Miranda warnings does not violate the U.S. Constitution and
cannot be grounds for a federal civil rights action. Id. at 772. Moreover, “the absence of
22
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39
a ‘criminal case’ in which [an arrestee] was compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself
defeats” any form of a Fifth Amendment claim. Id. at 772-73. See also Jones v. Cannon,
174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
Accepting Wilson’s contention that the Defendants did not provide him with
Miranda warnings upon his arrest, his claim nevertheless fails.
Wilson was never
compelled to testify against himself. Rather, he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the
charge of use, or possession with an intent to use drug paraphernalia. Wilson Certified
Judgment and Sentence at 2. As such, Wilson’s claim against the Defendants for failure
to provide him with Miranda warnings fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, summary
judgment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants on Wilson’s Miranda claim in Counts
IV and V of the Amended Complaint.
c. State law tort claims
To the extent that Wilson’s claims against Defendants arise under state law,
Defendants seek dismissal of all such claims on the grounds of statutory immunity.
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 9, 12.
Defendants assert that
Wilson’s Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts or associated state law under
which Defendants may be liable. Id. at 9. They also argue that regardless of any state
law claims Wilson may have brought against them, they are entitled to immunity under
Florida Statute section 768.28(9)(a). Id. at 12.
Throughout Wilson’s pleadings, although not specifically within his Amended
Complaint, Wilson uses language which suggests that in addition to his federal claims
against Defendants, he is also seeking to hold them liable under Florida law. See e.g.,
Response to Motion to Dismiss at 2 (referencing claims against defendants “under federal
40
and state law”); id. at 5 (citing Florida case law and statutes); Response to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 3 (referencing claims against defendants “under federal
and state law”). Moreover, taking the facts alleged in Wilson’s Amended Complaint as
true, and drawing all inferences in his favor, Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Omar, 334 F.3d
at 1247, one could construe several of Wilson’s claims against Defendants as presenting
state law tort claims. For example, his excessive force and deliberate indifference claims
could present assault, battery or negligence claims. See e.g., Johnson v. Dixon, No.
3:14-cv-cv-579-J-39PBD, 2015 WL 12851563, at *22-23 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2015)
(recognizing prisoner’s battery claims against prison officials); Graddy v. City of Tampa,
No. 8:12-cv-1882-T-24 EAJ, 2014 WL 272777, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2014) (state
based claim against officers for failing to provide appropriate care to prisoners framed as
negligence action); FLA. STAT. ANN. at § 784.011 (defining assault); id. at § 784.021
(defining aggravated assault); id. at § 784.03 (defining battery; felony battery); id. at §
784.045 (defining aggravated battery).23
However, even if the Court were to construe Wilson’s Amended Complaint as
presenting state law claims, Florida law provides immunity to state employees
for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission
of action in the scope of his or her employment of function, unless such
officer[s] . . . acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in any manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
23
Wilson also argues that Defendants stole his wallet, see e.g., Response to Motion to Dismiss at 7;
Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6. However, Wilson’s Amended Complaint does not
suggest in any manner that the Defendants stole his wallet. Rather, he only references this potential claim
in his responses to Defendants’ Motions. See Response to Motion to Dismiss at 7; Response to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 6. While the Court must liberally construe Wilson’s pro se Amended
Complaint, Tannenbaum, 148 F.3d at 1263, it will not rewrite his pleadings nor permit him to add new claims
through his subsequent filings before this Court. See generally Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1315 (plaintiff cannot
raise new claim in subsequent pleadings); GJR Invs., Inc., 132 F.3d at 1369 (court will not rewrite pleadings
for pro se plaintiff). As such, the Court does not consider this claim.
41
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9)(a). Accordingly,
in order for a plaintiff to succeed in piercing the statutory immunity defense,
he must make a good faith allegation in the complaint that the public office
official either acted outside the scope of his employment or in bad faith. The
statute places an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to satisfy this pleading
requirement. This duty cannot be satisfied by mere conclusory allegations.
Without support, the complaint must fail.
Brown v. McKinnon, 964 So.2d 173, 175 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Courts construing the bad faith prong of section 768.28 use the actual malice standard,
Parker v. State Bd. of Regents ex rel. Fla. State Univ., 724 So.2d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA
1998), which means the conduct must be committed with “ill will, hatred, spite, [or] an evil
intent.” Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 368–69 (Fla. 2002). Conduct meeting the wanton
and willful standard is defined as “worse than gross negligence,” Sierra v. Associated
Marine Insts., Inc., 850 So.2d 582, 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and “more reprehensible and
unacceptable than mere intentional conduct.” Richardson v. City of Pompano Beach, 511
So.2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). See also Kastritis v. City of Daytona Beach
Shores, 835 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (defining these standards).
Additionally, courts are reluctant to strip officers of their immunity under section
768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes. As such, a threadbare recital that a defendant “acted
maliciously and in bad faith is conclusory” and insufficient. Brivik v. Law, 545 Fed. Appx.
804, 807 (11th Cir. 2013).
In this regard, Wilson’s Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations that
Defendants acted with “ill will, hatred, spite, [or] an evil intent,” Reed, 837 So.2d at 36869, or any facts suggesting that Defendants “acted maliciously and in bad faith.” Brivik,
545 Fed. Appx. at 807. Accordingly, to the extent that Wilson’s claims of excessive force
42
or deliberate indifference could support claims under state law, they are due to be
dismissed.
V.
Conclusion
In summary, what remains before the Court from Wilson’s eleven count Amended
Complaint are Counts III, IV, VII, VIII, and X, to the extent that these counts assert federal
§ 1983 claims based on events which occurred after Wilson lost consciousness in the
course of being arrested by the Defendants.
Likewise, Count XI, which addresses
Wilson’s claim that the Defendants illegally searched his car, remains pending. Although
many of Defendants’ arguments in their Motion to Dismiss and their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment overlapped with one another, the Court grants in full the Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, those arguments in Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss which duplicate the arguments raised in the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment are denied as moot. In respect to Defendants’ argument in the Motion to
Dismiss regarding any state law claims Wilson may have raised, the Motion to Dismiss is
granted. Otherwise, all other remaining arguments in the Motion to Dismiss are denied,
including Defendants’ argument that Wilson’s Amended Complaint be dismissed as a
shotgun complaint.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, it is ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 34), is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
a. The Motion to Dismiss is granted in part to the extent that any state law
claims raised are dismissed.
b. The Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot as to any arguments raised
43
in Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
c. The Motion to Dismiss is denied as to any remaining arguments.
2) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) is GRANTED.
a. Judgment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants as to the claims in
Counts I, II, V, VI and IX, in their entirety.
b. Partial Judgment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants as to the
portion of the claims in Counts III, IV, VIII, and X based on any force
used by Defendants up to the point Wilson lost consciousness.
3) The Court will defer entry of Judgment until the conclusion of the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 15th day of February, 2019.
lc26
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Pro Se Parties
44
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