Isles v. Doe 1 et al
Filing
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ORDER dismissing the case without prejudice; directing the Clerk to send Plaintiff a Civil Rights Complaint Form, enter judgment dismissing the case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 5/22/2018. (KLC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
SAMUEL M. ISLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:18-cv-632-J-32JRK
JOHN DOE 1, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 11, 2018, by filing a pro se Civil Rights
Complaint (Doc. 1) (Complaint) arising out of events that occurred at Columbia
Correctional Institution (CCI) in July and August, 2017. Plaintiff has not paid the
filing fee or moved to proceed as a pauper. See docket. In the Complaint, Plaintiff
names as Defendants eight John Does, all of whom he sues in their individual
capacities for the recovery of damages. See Complaint at 1, 8-9. He identifies the John
Does as follows: (1) John Doe 1, the Warden of CCI; (2) John Does 2 and 3, “Captains”;
(3) John Does 4 and 5, “Sergeants”; and (4) John Does 6, 7 and 8, “Corrections Officers.”
See Complaint at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts the John Doe Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
at 5. Plaintiff also attempts to assert a state tort claim and a conspiracy claim. Id. at
6, 9-10.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to dismiss a
complaint or any portion of a complaint if the court determines that the action is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted,” § 1915A mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d
1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, a court
must liberally construe the plaintiff’s allegations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). However,
the duty of a court to construe pro se pleadings liberally does not require the court to
serve as “de facto counsel” for the plaintiff. Freeman v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 679 F.
App’x 982, 982 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. Of Escambia, 132 F.3d
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff’s claims against the Warden of CCI (John Doe 1) are due to be
dismissed under this Court’s screening obligation pursuant to the PLRA because
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against him. To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation
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occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir.
2015). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal
right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against a defendant. Plaintiff has
asserted no allegations connecting the Warden to any wrongdoing or a denial of his
constitutional rights. See Complaint at 5-8. Rather, Plaintiff appears to name the
Warden only in his role as a supervisor of the other John Doe defendants.
“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Supervisor liability arises
only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising
official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265,
1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Reid
v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 486 F. App'x 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of a defendant sued “only in his supervisory capacity” because the
plaintiff asserted no allegations that the defendant participated in the action or that
he was causally responsible for any violations). Plaintiff does not allege that the
Warden personally participated in the alleged violations, or created or ratified a policy
that resulted in the violation of his rights. See Complaint at 5-8. Because Plaintiff does
not state a claim against the Warden, the Court will dismiss him from this action.
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Because the only remaining Defendants are unidentified John Does, the entire
action is due to be dismissed as well. The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that
“fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court,” unless a plaintiff describes
a John Doe defendant with such particularity that he or she can be identified and
served. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming
dismissal of a John Doe defendant where the plaintiff’s complaint failed to identify or
describe the individual “guard” allegedly involved); Williams v. DeKalb Cty. Jail, 638
F. App’x 976, 976-77 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A fictitious name . . . , when the real defendant
cannot be readily identified for service, is insufficient to sustain a cause of action.”).
Cf. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.6, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding the district
court erred in denying a motion to join a John Doe defendant because the plaintiff
described the individual with sufficient clarity and precision such that the inclusion
of his name would have been “surplusage”). Plaintiff’s designation of John Doe
Defendants 2 through 8 simply by a title held by numerous other individuals at the
prison fails to provide the specificity required to avoid the fictitious-party pleading
rule.1 Therefore, the remaining John Doe Defendants are due to be dismissed,
resulting in a dismissal of the action as a whole.
Plaintiff has not only failed to provide any description, beyond a generic title, for
these John Doe Defendants, he has not provided any supporting documents, such as
grievances or disciplinary reports, that would indicate the specific individuals involved
in the relevant incidents.
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Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. If Plaintiff is able to identify
any of the relevant Defendants, he may file a new case using the approved Civil Rights
Complaint Form. The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a Civil Rights Complaint Form.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice,
terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 21st day of May, 2018.
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge
Jax-6
c:
Samuel Isles
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