Lecroix v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
19
OPINION AND ORDER: The Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 11/18/2020. (ADM)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
CHRISTINA RHIANNON LECROIX,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 3:19-cv-1312-J-MCR
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
______________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying her applications for a period of disability, disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Following an
administrative hearing held on November 14, 2018, the assigned Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled from October
21, 2015, the alleged disability onset date, through December 3, 2018, the date
of the decision. 2 (Tr. 20-34, 40-61.) Based on a review of the record, the briefs,
and the applicable law, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and
REMANDED.
1
The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 15.)
2
Plaintiff had to establish disability on or before December 31, 2020, her date
last insured, in order to be entitled to a period of disability and DIB. (Tr. 20.) The
relevant period for her SSI application is the month in which the application was filed
(May 2016) through the date of the ALJ’s decision (December 3, 2018). (Id.)
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I.
Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a
contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937
F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to
determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner=s factual findings).
II.
Discussion
A.
Issue on Appeal
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment is not supported by substantial evidence because, despite giving
2
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great weight to the opinions of the State agency consultants (Dr. Harris and Dr.
Bruno), the ALJ did not include their opined limitations to “non-confrontational
supervision and constructive criticism from supervisors” and to “cooperative, nonthreatening co-workers” in the RFC assessment and did not explain why these
limitations were excluded. (Doc. 17 at 6.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the RFC
assessment included some social limitations, such as “no exposure to the public
and only occasional collaboration with co-workers and supervisors” (Tr. 25), but
asserts that “the limitations opined by Drs. Harris and Bruno are more specific
and restrictive than included in the ALJ’s RFC finding, and there is no
explanation from the ALJ as to why they were omitted” (Doc. 17 at 7). Defendant
responds, inter alia, that “the ALJ substantially incorporated the opinions of [the]
State agency psychological consultants” into the RFC assessment “[b]y including
limitations to simple[,] routine tasks requiring no exposure to the public and only
occasional collaboration with coworkers and supervisors.” (Doc. 18 at 6.)
B.
Standard for Evaluating Opinion Evidence
The ALJ is required to consider all the evidence in the record when making
a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(3), 416.920(a)(3). With
regard to medical opinion evidence, “the ALJ must state with particularity the
weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). However, “the ALJ
may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.”
Wainwright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 06-15638, 2007 WL 708971, *2
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(11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2007) (per curiam); see also Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834,
835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (same).
“The ALJ is required to consider the opinions of non-examining [S]tate
agency medical and psychological consultants because they ‘are highly qualified
physicians and psychologists, who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation.’” Milner v. Barnhart, 275 F. App’x 947, 948 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam); see also SSR 96-6p 3 (stating that the ALJ must treat the findings of
State agency medical consultants as expert opinion evidence of non-examining
sources). While the ALJ is not bound by the findings of non-examining
physicians, the ALJ may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight
given to them in his decision. SSR 96-6p.
C.
Relevant Evidence of Record
On September 16, 2016, after a review of the medical records available as
of that date, Alan Harris, Ph.D. completed a Psychiatric Review Technique
(“PRT”) form, opining, inter alia, that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in
maintaining social functioning and in concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr.
70.) On the same day, Dr. Harris completed a Mental RFC Assessment, opining
that Plaintiff was moderately limited in the ability: to understand, remember, and
carry out detailed instructions; to maintain attention and concentration for
3
SSR 96-6p has been rescinded and replaced by SSR 17-2p effective March 27,
2017. However, because Plaintiff’s applications predated March 27, 2017, SSR 96-6p
was still in effect on the date of the ALJ’s decision.
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extended periods; to complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms and to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; to
interact appropriately with the general public; to accept instructions and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and to get along with coworkers or
peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (Tr. 75-76.) Dr.
Harris noted that Plaintiff “[m]ay not work effectively with the public” and her
“[r]elationships with supervisors and coworker[s] would be variable.” (Tr. 76.)
Dr. Harris provided the following additional explanation:
A.
The claimant appears capable of following routine, simple and
repetitive tasks. The claimant appears to be able to perform simple,
daily activities.
B.
Although deficits exist, the consensus of the data suggests
that the claimant appears capable of performing simple, repetitive
tasks with good understanding and persistence within given physical
limitations. Claimant should be capable of attention and
concentration for at least two hours at a time, and would require
reasonable, but not frequent breaks throughout the day. In addition,
the claimant is usually able to perform activities within a schedule,
maintain regular attendance, and to be punctual within customary
tolerances.
C.
Social Interaction:
The Claimant should be able to relate appropriately on a casual,
limited and non-confrontational basis with the general public[,] such
as when shopping. This person could accept nonconfrontational supervision and constructive criticism from
supervisors, and usually relate appropriately with cooperative,
non-threatening coworkers. Claimant is able to ask relevant
questions and request assistance when necessary and
demonstrates adequate hygiene.
D.
The Claimant would be able to adapt to an ordinary, routine
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work setting, respond appropriately to normal changes, avoid
hazards, and travel independently. [She] [w]ould be able to set
reasonable goals and independently initiate action to carry them out
with infrequent assistance and encouragement.
Conclusion: . . . [The medical evidence of record] and functional
evidence indicates that the claimant’s mental impairments appear to
impose some work related limitations, but do not preclude all work.
The claimant is able to meet the mental demands of a simple
vocation on a sustained basis with limited social demands, despite
the limitations resulting from any impairment.
(Id. (emphasis added).)
On December 1, 2016, based on a review of the available records, Julie
Bruno, Psy.D. completed a PRT, essentially confirming Dr. Harris’s PRT. (Tr.
108-10.) On the same day, Dr. Bruno also completed a Mental RFC
Assessment, adopting in full Dr. Harris’s opinions. (Tr. 114-16.)
D.
The ALJ’s Decision
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, 4 the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: affective disorder, anxiety-related
disorders, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, neuropathy, and unspecified
arthropathy. (Tr. 22.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 23.)
Then, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had
4
The Commissioner employs a five-step process in determining disability. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
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the RFC to perform light work, except she was “limited to performing simple[,]
routine tasks that require no exposure to the public and only occasional
collaboration with co-workers and supervisors.” 5 (Tr. 25.) In making these
findings, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s complaints, the medical evidence, and the
opinions of record. (Tr. 25-32.) The ALJ addressed the opinions of Dr. Harris
and Dr. Bruno as follows:
The [S]tate agency psychological consultants who reviewed the
record opined that the claimant’s affective and anxiety disorders
cause moderate functional limitations in social functioning and
maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. The [S]tate agency
consultant found the claimant capable of following routine, simple
and repetitive tasks and meet[ing] the mental demands of a simple
vocation on a sustained basis with limited social demands (Exhibit
1A/5A). The [ALJ] agrees and gives great weight here. The record
documents that the claimant’s symptoms have been well managed
with medication management. Mental status evaluations have been
generally stable and within normal limits, except for changes in her
mood and/or affect. . . . Overall, the record supports the [S]tate
agency assessment.
(Tr. 30-31.)
Then, after determining that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past
relevant work, at the fifth and final step of the sequential evaluation process, the
ALJ found that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as a route clerk, an egg candler, and
an assembler of electrical accessories. (Tr. 32-33.) All of these representative
5
The RFC also limited Plaintiff to “no exposure to concentrated fumes, gases,
poorly ventilated areas, and/or hazards” and to working “in a setting that allows for her
to change positions hourly and perform job duties from either a seated or standing
position.” (Tr. 25.)
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occupations are light jobs with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) rating of
2. (Tr. 33.)
E.
Analysis
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred when she failed to
explain why she did not credit all of the State agency consultants’ opinions in
arriving at Plaintiff’s RFC. The State agency consultants opined, inter alia, that
Plaintiff “could accept non-confrontational supervision and constructive criticism
from supervisors, and usually relate appropriately with cooperative, nonthreatening coworkers.” (Tr. 76, 116.) Despite giving great weight to the
consultants’ opinions, the ALJ did not include these particular limitations in the
RFC assessment and did not provide any explanation for this failure.
Although the ALJ restricted Plaintiff “to performing simple[,] routine tasks
that require no exposure to the public and only occasional collaboration with coworkers and supervisors” (Tr. 25), this restriction did not account for the
consultants’ restrictions to “non-confrontational supervision,” “constructive
criticism from supervisors,” and “cooperative, non-threatening coworkers” (Tr. 76,
116). This is significant because the Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified that
limitations to working with supervisors who are non-confrontational and offer
constructive criticism “can’t [be] guarantee[d] . . . because [there are] different
supervisors. Some have skills. Some don’t.” (Tr. 59.) At the same time, as
Plaintiff points out, the basic, mental demands of competitive, unskilled work
include the ability to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual
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work situations on a sustained basis. (Doc. 17 at 7 (citing SSR 85-15).)
Responding appropriately to others includes the ability to: (1) accept instructions
and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and (2) get along with
coworkers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral
extremes. POMS DI 25020.010. “A substantial loss of ability to meet any of the[]
basic work-related activities would severely limit the potential occupational base,”
which, “in turn would justify a finding of disability because even favorable age,
education, or work experience will not offset such a severely limited occupational
base.” SSR 85-15. Based on the foregoing, this case will be reversed and
remanded with instructions to the ALJ to reconsider the opinions of Dr. Harris
and Dr. Bruno, explain what weight they are being accorded, and the reasons
therefor. If the ALJ rejects any portion of these opinions, she must explain her
reasons for doing so.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1.
The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), with instructions to the ALJ to:
(a) reconsider the opinions of Dr. Harris and Dr. Bruno, explain what weight they
are being accorded, and the reasons therefor; (b) reconsider the RFC
assessment, if necessary; and (c) conduct any further proceedings deemed
appropriate.
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly,
terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
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3.
In the event that benefits are awarded on remand, any § 406(b) or §
1383(d)(2) fee application shall be filed within the parameters set forth by the
Order entered in In re: Procedures for Applying for Attorney’s Fees Under 42
U.S.C. §§ 406(b) & 1383(d)(2), Case No.: 6:12-mc-124-Orl-22 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
13, 2012). This Order does not extend the time limits for filing a motion for
attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on November 18, 2020.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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