Beamon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al

Filing 15

ORDER denying 1 Petition and dismissing the action with prejudice, with directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/27/2024. (HM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
FLOYD BEAMON,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 3:20-cv-1118-MMH-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.
________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Floyd Beamon, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).1 In the Petition, Beamon challenges a 2009
state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for second-degree
murder with a firearm. He raises eight grounds for relief. See Petition at 1225. Respondents submitted a Response to the Petition (Response; Doc. 8).
They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 8-1 through 8-2. Beamon declined to
file a brief in reply. See Doc. 12. This action is ripe for review.

For all pleadings and exhibits filed in this case, the Court cites to the
document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.
1

1

II. Relevant Procedural History
On August 28, 2007, the State of Florida (State) charged Beamon by
information with the second-degree murder of his brother, Swindell Beamon,
with a firearm. See Doc. 8-1 at 42. At the conclusion of a trial, a jury found
Beamon guilty of the charged offense. Id. at 218-19. On December 18, 2009,
the trial court sentenced Beamon to a term of life imprisonment, with a
minimum mandatory term of twenty-five years. Id. at 223-28.
Beamon pursued a direct appeal raising five arguments: (1) the trial
court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence that he
allegedly “swerved his car towards [the victim] shortly before killing him”;2
(2) the trial court failed to conduct a proper Richardson3 inquiry upon
learning of a discovery violation; (3) the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a mistrial based on the discovery violation; (4) the trial court erred
in overruling his objection to impermissible hearsay testimony that the State
elicited during Officer Mark Muchowicz’s trial testimony; and (5) the
prosecutor’s remarks during opening and closing arguments constituted
fundamental error. Id. at 724-78. The First District Court of Appeal (First
DCA) per curiam affirmed Beamon’s conviction and sentence on May 12,
2011, id. at 859, and issued the mandate on May 31, 2011, id. at 862.

2
3

See Doc. 8-1 at 743.
Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
2

On July 6, 2011, Beamon filed a pro se motion to mitigate sentence
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. See Doc. 8-2 at 176-77.
Beamon filed a second Rule 3.800 motion on July 27, 2011. Id. at 179. The
trial court denied both motions. Id. at 179-80.
On April 4, 2012, Beamon filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). See Doc.
8-1 at 867-87. On September 28, 2017, the postconviction court granted
Beamon leave to amend his postconviction motion after finding all ten claims
for relief in the Rule 3.850 Motion were “insufficiently pled and . . . therefore
legally insufficient.” Id. at 892-900. On November 30, 2017, Beamon filed an
amended Rule 3.850 Motion in which he argued his trial counsel was
ineffective when she failed to: (1) investigate and raise a claim of self-defense;
(2) subpoena witnesses on Beamon’s behalf; (3) object to Rashawn Roberts’
trial testimony; (4) object to Frederick Holsey’s trial testimony; (5) object to
Katie Whitehurst’s testimony; (6) object to Officer Muchowicz’s testimony; (7)
prepare Beamon for trial; (8) file a motion to suppress all of the witnesses’
testimony; (9) impeach witnesses Roberts and Holsey; and (10) investigate
the victim’s background. Id. at 902-25. On January 9, 2018, the
postconviction court denied relief. Id. at 950-65. The First DCA per curiam
affirmed the denial of relief on May 8, 2019, and issued the mandate on
September 27, 2019. See Doc. 8-2 at 131, 144.
3

On February 21, 2020, Beamon filed a Rule 3.800 motion to correct
illegal sentence. See Doc. 8-2 at 191-208. Beamon filed another Rule 3.850
motion on April 24, 2020, which the postconviction court denied as untimely,
impermissibly successive, and frivolous on June 23, 2020. Id. at 210. Beamon
filed the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 28, 2020. See
Doc. 1.
III. One-Year Limitations Period
This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to
establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a
hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,
which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the
applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at
474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before
4

the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Beamon’s] claim[s]
without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala.
Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023). “‘The purpose of AEDPA
is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of
error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As
such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly
circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.’” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state
court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state
court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the
state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See
5

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s
adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United
States Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It
should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be
rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely
relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision,
such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the
higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d)
bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or
(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope
of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
6

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d
389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct
clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable
application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows
for relief only “if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]
Court on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court
has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id.
at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The
“unreasonable application” clause allows for relief
only “if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to
the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims
of
state
courts’
erroneous
factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield
v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because
the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571
U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen,
558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d
738 (2010)).

7

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for
prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a
state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in
existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one
to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s
claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be
evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §
2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest
8

court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim,
“state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s
established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a
state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438
(1971)). To provide the State with the necessary
“opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present” his
claim in each appropriate state court (including a
state supreme court with powers of discretionary
review), thereby alerting that court to the federal
nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115
S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845,
119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
9

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are
guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court
judgments are accorded the finality and respect
necessary to preserve the integrity of legal
proceedings within our system of federalism. These
rules include the doctrine of procedural default,
under which a federal court will not review the
merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that
a state court declined to hear because the prisoner
failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g.,
Coleman,[4] supra, at 747-748, 111 S. Ct. 2546;
Sykes,[5] supra, at 84-85, 97 S. Ct. 2497. A state
court’s invocation of a procedural rule to deny a
prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the
claims if, among other requisites, the state
procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to
support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120,
1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler,
558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617-18, 175 L.Ed.2d 417
(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted
claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A
prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted
claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice
from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501
U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults
may be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim
has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim
if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice
from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall,
4
5

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
10

592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish
cause,
the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that
prevented [him] from raising the claim and which
cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct.”
McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir.
1992) (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct.
2639).[6] Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner]
must show that “the errors at trial actually and
substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he
was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
6

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
11

innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’
of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally,
“‘[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable
evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559
(1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in
most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily
rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per
curiam) (first citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and then
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person
challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.
Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective
assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
12

counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104
S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s
errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of
any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test
before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part
Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a
court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet
the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d
1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 697.
13

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation
is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,
131 S. Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state
court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable
under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are
both highly deferential, and when the two apply in
tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and
quotation marks omitted). “The question is not
whether a federal court believes the state court’s
determination under the Strickland standard was
incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct.
1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quotation marks
omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that
counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”
then a federal court may not disturb a state-court
decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,
131 S. Ct. at 788.
Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the
deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds
another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision — when we
are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As
such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
14

VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One
As Ground One, Beamon argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion in limine to exclude any evidence “that [he] tried to hit [the victim]
with his car shortly before th[e] killing.” See Doc. 8-1 at 85, 173; Petition at
12. Beamon asserts the improper admission of this evidence violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Petition at 12. Beamon also contends his
counsel “prejudiced him” by not filing a motion to exclude Williams Rule
evidence.7 Id. In the Response, Respondents treat the latter argument as an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Response at 7-10, 31-36.
Insofar as Beamon argues the trial court erred in denying his motion in
limine, the record reflects that Beamon raised a substantially similar claim
on direct appeal. See Doc. 8-1 at 743-53. The State filed an answer brief, id.
at 800-05; Beamon filed a brief in reply, id. at 844-48; and the First DCA per
curiam affirmed Beamon’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion,
id. at 859. Initially, the Court determines that Beamon did not fairly present
the federal nature of this claim to the state court. In his briefing on direct
appeal, Beamon relied solely on Florida law to argue the trial court
erroneously denied the motion in limine. See Doc. 8-1 at 743-53. Beamon did
Under the Williams Rule, evidence of collateral crimes is admissible “[i]f
found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or
propensity.” Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1959).
7

15

not present any federal constitutional grounds in support of his claim.
Therefore, Beamon failed to alert the state court to the federal nature of his
claim, and in failing to do so, deprived the state court of a meaningful
opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Since future
attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is procedurally defaulted.
Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the default or actual prejudice
resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact
warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception. As such, Beamon’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his
motion in limine is due to be denied.
Nevertheless, even if Beamon fairly presented a federal claim on direct
appeal, he is not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State addressed
the claim on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 800-05; therefore, the appellate court may
have affirmed Beamon’s conviction based on the State’s argument. If the
appellate court addressed the merits of the claim, the state court’s
adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a review of the
record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, Beamon is
16

not entitled to relief on the basis of his claim that the trial court erred in
denying his motion in limine.
Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not
entitled to deference, the claim lacks merit. The Eleventh Circuit has
explained:
“As a general rule, a federal court in a habeas corpus case will
not review the trial court’s actions concerning the admissibility of
evidence.” Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237, 1238 (11th Cir.
1983). “However, where a state court’s ruling is claimed to have
deprived a defendant of his right to due process, a federal court
should then inquire only to determine whether the error was of
such magnitude as to deny fundamental fairness to the criminal
trial.” Id. (citations omitted).
Tidwell v. Butler, 415 F. App’x 979, 980 (11th Cir. 2011).8 Beamon’s
conclusory argument in Ground One is insufficient to establish that the trial
court erred in admitting the evidence at issue in the motion in limine, which
was Holsey’s testimony that he saw Beamon swerve his car towards the
victim as he drove up to the house and parked right before the shooting
occurred. See Doc. 8-1 at 427-28, 437. Significantly, Holsey testified that it
never appeared to him that Beamon “was trying to hit [the victim] with his
car.” Id. at 437, 440. Even assuming Holsey’s testimony was improperly
The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on
a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.
2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions
are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
8

17

admitted, Beamon has not shown that the error was of such magnitude that
it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The evidence of guilt was
overwhelming. During the trial, Beamon’s mother testified that he told her
he was going to “stop all these M.F.’s” when he entered the house; when she
saw him moments later with the gun and asked him what he was going to do,
he replied, “I will kill the M.F.” See id. at 445-46. Beamon then left the house
and shot the victim in the front yard in the presence of their mother and two
other eyewitnesses, Roberts and Holsey. Id. at 404-06, 430-31, 448-49.
Roberts testified that after the shooting, he observed Beamon pulling on the
victim’s clothes as the victim gasped for air, and he also heard Beamon tell
the victim that he should have died. Id. at 407. Holsey observed Beamon
visibly upset and crying after the shooting, and he testified that Beamon told
him “I done messed up.” Id. at 433, 439. And Officer Muchowicz testified that
he saw Beamon trying to flee the scene when police and emergency
responders arrived. Id. at 455-57. In light of the overwhelming evidence of his
guilt, Beamon has not demonstrated that the admission of Holsey’s testimony
regarding the swerving incident deprived Beamon of due process or resulted
in a fundamentally unfair trial. Thus, Beamon is not entitled to federal
habeas relief on his claim that his motion in limine was erroneously denied.
To the extent Beamon raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to exclude Williams Rule evidence,
18

Beamon failed to properly exhaust this claim, and the claim is procedurally
defaulted. See Response at 9-10. According to Respondents, Beamon did not
present this claim on direct appeal or in his amended Rule 3.850 Motion, and
he cannot now present it in a Rule 3.850 motion because it would be
untimely. Id. Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the default or
actual prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify
any fact warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception. Therefore, to the extent Beamon asserts an ineffectiveness claim in
Ground One, it is due to be denied. Even if the Court were to assume that
Beamon exhausted this claim, his ineffectiveness claim would not be
meritorious. He has shown neither deficient performance nor resulting
prejudice. Accordingly, Beamon is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the
claims raised in Ground One.
B. Grounds Two and Three
As Ground Two, Beamon argues that the trial court failed to conduct a
proper Richardson9 inquiry upon learning of a discovery violation. See
Petition at 15. Relatedly, in Ground Three, Beamon contends the trial court
erroneously denied his motion for mistrial based on the discovery violation.
Id. at 17. In the Petition, Beamon failed to identify the specific trial
“A Richardson hearing is a proceeding under Florida law by which a
criminal defendant can challenge a discovery violation.” Taylor v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 64 F.4th 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023).
9

19

testimony at issue in Grounds Two and Three, but the record reflects that he
is referring to Officer Muchowicz’s testimony regarding a statement Beamon
made after he stopped Beamon’s vehicle from leaving the scene:
Q: Was [Beamon] acting a little suspicious to you as
well?
A: He was . . . I’m not sure it was the first time or the
second time when I told him that he was – I think it
was the second time. When I actually drew my
weapon and pointed at him and told him forcefully to
put the keys on the roof he articulated his
frustrations saying you’re going to have the whole
street blocked and I can’t get out and go anywhere or
something to that effect and I said you’re not going
anywhere right now.
Q: Okay. Eventually he puts the keys on the roof?
A: He puts the keys on the roof and when he did step
out of the car like I told him to –
Defense counsel: Objection, Your Honor. I apologize.
May we approach?
The Court: You may.
(Sidebar discussion with reporter present.)
Defense counsel: Your Honor, clearly a statement
that was just elicited from this officer about a
statement by Mr. Beamon is a defendant’s statement
that was never disclosed. It was never brought out
during deposition. It was never indicated in any
report and it was never disclosed by the state as a
statement ever made by Mr. Beamon. Clearly a
discovery violation.

20

State: Judge, if I could respond. This is the first time
I have ever heard of that. I was expecting him to be,
yeah, he was acting a little suspicious and didn’t put
the keys on the top of the roof immediately. I have
pretrialed him. I never heard him say that before. It’s
the first time I ever heard about it.
Doc. 8-1 at 460-62 (emphasis added). The record reflects that the trial court
granted defense counsel’s request to excuse the jury so that counsel could
question Officer Muchowicz further regarding the statement and whether
there were any additional statements that had not been disclosed. Id. at 462464. The trial court subsequently denied defense counsel’s motion for a
mistrial based on the statement, id. at 465, but issued a curative instruction
striking the statement, id. at 466-67.
Initially, the Court finds that Beamon did not fairly present the federal
nature of his claims in Grounds Two and Three to the state court. Beamon
raised substantially similar claims on direct appeal. See Doc. 8-1 at 754-66.
The State filed an answer brief addressing both claims, id. at 805-14; Beamon
filed a brief in reply, id. at 848-53; and the First DCA per curiam affirmed
Beamon’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion, id. at 859. The
record demonstrates that in his briefing on direct appeal, Beamon relied
solely on Florida law to argue both claims. Id. at 754-66, 848-53. Although he
contends in Grounds Two and Three of his federal Petition that his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, see Petition at 15, 17, he did
21

not identify any federal constitutional provisions or otherwise cite to any
federal authority in briefing these claims on direct appeal. Therefore,
Beamon failed to alert the state court to the federal nature of the claims, and
in failing to do so, deprived the state court of a meaningful opportunity to
review the claims. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Since future attempts to
exhaust the claims would be futile, the claims are procedurally defaulted.
Beamon has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice
to overcome his failure to exhaust. As such, relief on the claims in Grounds
Two and Three is due to be denied.
Nevertheless, even if Beamon had fairly presented the federal nature of
these claims in his direct appeal, he is still not entitled to relief. In its
appellate brief, the State addressed the claims on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 80514; therefore, the appellate court may have affirmed Beamon’s conviction
based on the State’s argument. If the appellate court addressed the merits of
the claims, the state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under
AEDPA. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court
concludes that the state court’s adjudication of these claims was not contrary
to clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

22

proceedings. Therefore, Beamon is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the
basis of these claims.
Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of these claims was
not entitled to deference, the claims lack merit. The record refutes Beamon’s
contention that there was a discovery violation. Although neither the
attorneys nor Officer Muchowicz recalled this at the time of trial, Officer
Muchowicz had in fact previously testified regarding the statement at issue
during a pretrial hearing on Beamon’s motion to suppress. See Doc. 8-1 at
273 (officer’s testimony that Beamon “was very agitated, irritated, saying I’m
just trying to leave, man, I’m just trying to drive around you.”). Moreover, the
record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the statement at issue was
cumulative of Officer Muchowicz’s earlier trial testimony that he observed
Beamon attempting to drive around the blockade and leave the scene after
the shooting. See id. at 465. Finally, even though the trial court found no
basis for granting a mistrial, it nevertheless granted defense counsel’s
request to strike the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it. Id. at
465-67; see Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating
that “jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions”). Thus, given the
record in this action, Beamon has failed to show that he is entitled to federal

23

habeas relief. Accordingly, relief on the claims raised in Grounds Two10 and
Three is due to be denied.
C. Ground Four
As Ground Four, Beamon argues that his Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when the trial court erroneously overruled his hearsay
objection to “Officer Muchowicz[] testifying as to what he was told by Officer
Deal.” See Petition at 20. Beamon raised a substantially similar claim on
direct appeal, see Doc. 8-1 at 766-69; the State filed an answer brief, id. at
814-19; Beamon filed a reply brief, id. at 853-56; and the First DCA per
curiam affirmed Beamon’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion,
id. at 859.
As in Grounds One through Three, the Court determines that Beamon
also did not fairly present the federal nature of his claim in Ground Four to

The Court notes that Respondents also briefed an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in response to Ground Two because Beamon argued as “supporting
facts” in Ground Two that his counsel “prejudiced him by failing to conduct a full
‘Richardson inquiry hearing[.]’” See Response at 13-14 (citing Petition at 15). From
the threadbare allegations in the Petition, it is not readily apparent that Beamon
intended to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground Two. To the
extent Beamon may have raised such a claim, the Court concludes that
Respondents are correct in their contention that the claim is unexhausted because
Beamon failed to raise it on direct appeal or in his amended Rule 3.850 Motion. See
id. Since future attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is procedurally
defaulted. Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the default or actual
prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact
warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.
Therefore, to the extent Beamon asserts an ineffectiveness claim in Ground Two, it
is due to be denied.
10

24

the state court. The record demonstrates that in his briefing on direct appeal,
Beamon relied on Florida law in arguing that the trial court erroneously
overruled the hearsay objection. Id. at 766-69, 853-56. Further, Beamon
applied Florida law in his harmless error analysis of the claim. Id. Beamon
did not present any argument under the Fourteenth Amendment in support
of the claim in his direct appeal. Therefore, Beamon failed to alert the state
court to the federal nature of his claim, and in failing to do so, deprived the
state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin, 541
U.S. at 29. Since any future attempt to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is
procedurally defaulted. Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the
default or actual prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to
identify any fact warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage
of justice exception. As such, relief on the claim in Ground Four is due to be
denied.
Nevertheless, even if Beamon fairly presented a federal claim on direct
appeal, he is still not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State
addressed the claim in Ground Four on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 814-19;
therefore, the appellate court may have affirmed Beamon’s conviction based
on the State’s argument. If the appellate court addressed the merits of the
claim, the state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA.
After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that
25

the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly
established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Therefore, Beamon is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not
entitled to deference, Beamon still would not be entitled to federal habeas
relief. As stated earlier, “[a]s a general rule, a federal court in a habeas
corpus case will not review the trial court’s actions concerning the
admissibility of evidence.” Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237, 1238 (11th
Cir. 1983). “However, where a state court’s ruling is claimed to have deprived
a defendant of his right to due process, a federal court should then inquire
only to determine whether the error was of such magnitude as to deny
fundamental fairness to the criminal trial.” Id. (citations omitted). Here,
although Beamon failed to identify the alleged hearsay testimony in his
Petition, he identified the following testimony in his initial brief on direct
appeal:
After Officer Muchowicz testified that he moved
[Beamon] from [Beamon’s] vehicle to the back of his
own [police] vehicle, the prosecutor asked [Officer
Muchowicz] “–and at some point did Officer Deal
come up and explain to you that – not to release him
because they want to do some more –” At this point
defense counsel objected on the basis of hearsay and
26

the trial court overruled the objection. [Officer
Muchowicz] then testified that when he was putting
the handcuffs on [Beamon,] Officer Deal came
running up and “said emphatically don’t let him go,
don’t let him go.”
Doc. 8-1 at 766-67 (emphasis added); see also Doc. 8-1 at 467. Beamon fails to
show that this was improperly admitted hearsay testimony. But even if the
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, Beamon has not even suggested
how its admission rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Thus, Beamon is
not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in Ground Four.
D. Ground Five
As Ground Five, Beamon contends his counsel failed to object to the
prosecutor’s improper remarks during opening and closing arguments. See
Petition at 21. He asserts that the prosecutor’s comments “individually
and/or cumulatively” constituted fundamental error. Id. Beamon raised a
substantially similar claim on direct appeal, see Doc. 8-1 at 769-77; the State
filed an answer brief, id. at 820-35;11 and the First DCA per curiam affirmed
without a written opinion, id. at 859.
Upon review of the record, the Court again determines that Beamon
did not fairly present the federal nature of this claim to the state court. The
record demonstrates that in his initial brief on direct appeal, Beamon argued

Although Beamon filed a reply brief, he did not address this claim. See Doc.
8-1 at 856.
11

27

that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted fundamental error based upon
Florida law. Doc. 8-1 at 769-77. “[T]he fundamental error question is an issue
of state law, and state law is what the state courts say it is.” Pinkney v. Sec’y,
Dept. of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017). Beamon did not present
any federal constitutional grounds in support of this claim in his direct
appeal. Therefore, to the extent Beamon now raises a federal claim, the Court
finds he failed to fairly present the claim to the state court, which deprived
the state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin,
541 U.S. at 29. Since future attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile,
the claim is procedurally defaulted. Beamon has alleged neither cause and
prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome his failure to exhaust. As
such, the claim is procedurally barred.
Nevertheless, even if Beamon fairly presented a federal claim on direct
appeal, he is not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State addressed
this claim on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 820-35; therefore, the appellate court
may have affirmed Beamon’s conviction based on the State’s argument. If the
appellate court addressed the merits of the claim, the state court’s
adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a review of the
record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
28

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, Beamon is
not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not
entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. Attorneys are permitted
wide latitude in their opening and closing arguments, and the record reflects
that the trial judge instructed the jury that the attorneys’ arguments were
not evidence. See Doc. 8-1 at 382, 537; see Brown, 255 F.3d at 1280 (stating
that “jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions”). After reviewing
the record, viewing the prosecutor’s remarks in the context of the trial as a
whole, and assessing their “probable impact” on the jury, see United States v.
Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 849 (11th Cir. 2011), the Court is not convinced that the
remarks at issue likely resulted in a due process violation.12 As such, Beamon
is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in Ground Five.
E. Ground Six
As Ground Six, Beamon argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
when she advised him that his proposed witnesses would not help his defense
and were “not relevant to [his] case.” See Petition at 24. Beamon raised a
The reversal of a conviction is warranted only when improper comments by
a prosecutor have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)
(citation omitted); Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
12

29

substantially similar claim in grounds one and two of his amended Rule 3.850
Motion. See Doc. 8-1 at 905-12. The postconviction court denied relief, stating
in pertinent part:
Neither the evidence presented at trial, nor the
evidence Defendant alleges should have been
presented, would have provided a legal basis for a
self-defense claim. Counsel deposed the State’s
witnesses as well as the witnesses Defendant
requested that she call. Counsel, however, did not
believe there was any evidence supporting a claim of
self-defense. Defendant’s witnesses would have
testified as to threats or acts of violence done by the
victim toward Defendant and his mother, but counsel
did not believe such evidence would be either
relevant or admissible absent evidence that the
victim had done some specific act warranting the use
of deadly force by Defendant immediately prior to the
shooting. Counsel was correct:
It has been recognized that when the
defense of self-defense is raised, evidence of the
victim’s reputation may be admissible to show
his propensity for violence and the likelihood
that the victim was the aggressor, while
evidence of prior specific acts of violence may be
admissible to show the reasonableness of the
defendant’s apprehension at the time of the
slaying. But a prerequisite to the introduction
of such evidence is the laying of a “proper
predicate . . . by the showing of some overt act
by the deceased at or about the time of the
slaying that reasonably indicated a need for
action by the defendant in self-defense.”
Quintana v. State, 452 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA
1984) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Savage v. State, 99 So. 3d 1001, 1003
(Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Defendant argued with the
30

victim in their driveway, walked inside, picked up a
handgun, walked back outside, and shot the victim
multiple times. Nothing in the record established a
legal justification for these actions. Quintana, 452 So.
2d at 100.
Further, counsel’s strategic decision not to call
a witness after investigating the witness’s testimony
is “generally not subject to postconviction attack
under Strickland.” Mendoza v. State, 81 So. 3d 579,
580-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). After reviewing the
witnesses’ potential testimony, counsel reasonably
determined that their testimony would not help the
defense. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to
relief on Ground One.
...
In Ground Two, Defendant alleges counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and call multiple
witnesses. Specifically, Defendant complains that
counsel was deficient for not presenting the
testimony of witnesses who would have testified as to
the victim’s behavior when he was either high or
drunk. Defendant claims prejudice because there is a
reasonable probability the result of his trial would
have been different had the jury heard this
testimony.
A defendant must specifically allege the
following when claiming counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate a witness: (1) the witness’s
identity; (2) the substance of the witness’s expected
testimony; (3) how the omission of the witness’s
testimony prejudiced the defendant; and (4) that the
witness was available to testify at trial. E.g. Brown v.
State, 962 So. 2d 355, 355-56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
(citing Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla.
2004)).
In ruling on Ground One, this Court found that
counsel investigated these witnesses and correctly
determined that they would have provided no
relevant,
admissible
testimony.
Accordingly,
Defendant is not entitled to relief on Ground Two.
31

Mendoza, 81 So. 3d at 581 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690).
Id. at 952-53 (record citations omitted). The First DCA affirmed the denial of
relief without a written opinion. See Doc. 8-2 at 131.
To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Beamon is not
entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of this
claim is not entitled to deference, the claim is too speculative to warrant
federal habeas relief. In the Petition, Beamon neither identifies the proposed
witnesses nor sets forth the substance of the expected testimony that he
contends would have aided his defense. See Shaw v. United States, 729 F.
App’x 757, 759 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has]
stated that complaints about uncalled witnesses are not favored, because the
presentation of testimony involves trial strategy and ‘allegations of what a
32

witness would have testified are largely speculative.’” (quoting Buckelew v.
United States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978))); Streeter v. United States,
335 F. App’x 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In a habeas petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel, mere speculation that missing witnesses
would have been helpful is insufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden of
proof.” (citing Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1187)). Further, although Beamon
maintains that his proposed defense witnesses would have testified
favorably, he provides no evidence to support his belief. See United States v.
Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Evidence about the testimony of a
putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony
by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the
testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will not
sustain an ineffective assistance claim.”).
Ultimately, “[w]hich witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is
the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever,
second guess.” Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 936 F.3d 1322, 1340 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Counsel’s strategic decisions “are entitled to a ‘strong presumption’ of
reasonableness.” Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S.Ct. 2405, 2410 (2021) (quoting
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104). Here, the record reflects that after the State rested,
the trial court had a lengthy exchange with Beamon and his counsel
33

regarding two individuals Beamon wanted to call as defense witnesses. See
Doc. 8-1 at 487-93. Beamon told the court that he expected both individuals
to testify regarding past violence and threats by the victim towards Beamon
and their mother. Id. at 488. But counsel explained that even if the
individuals testified as Beamon expected, their testimony would not be
admissible or relevant to his defense:
[T]here is no evidence here that would justify a selfdefense claim. The witnesses that he has referred to
have evidence of prior disputes between the victim
and [Defendant], between victim and his mother.
Nothing relevant to an actual self-defense claim on
the day of the shooting. Therefore, their testimony
would not be relevant in this trial and that’s what . . .
I have explained to him. . . . Even if I called these
witnesses I believe the [S]tate would initially object
and their testimony would probably have been
proffered and Your Honor would not allow it because
it’s not relevant to the claim at issue here.
Id. at 489. On this record, it was a reasonable trial strategy for counsel to
choose not to call the two witnesses. Beamon has failed to show that no
competent attorney would have taken the action that his counsel chose. See
Goff v. United States, 693 F. App’x 854, 855 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The choice not
to call either of them as witnesses was not patently unreasonable that no
competent lawyer would have chosen it, and was the epitome of a strategic
decision.”). Moreover, Beamon has failed to make any showing to suggest a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if his
34

proposed witnesses had been called to testify. As such, Beamon has failed to
demonstrate deficient performance or resulting prejudice. Therefore, the
claim in Ground Six is due to be denied.
F. Ground Seven
As Ground Seven, Beamon argues his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the trial testimony of State witness Katie Whitehurst, the
mother of both the victim and Beamon. See Petition at 24. Beamon raised a
substantially similar claim in ground five of his amended Rule 3.850 Motion.
See Doc. 8-1 at 915-16. The postconviction court denied relief on the claim,
stating in pertinent part:
In Ground Five, Defendant alleges counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of
Katie Whitehurst. Specifically, Defendant alleges
counsel was deficient for not objecting when
Whitehurst became emotional and confused during
her testimony. Defendant does not allege how
counsel’s failure to object prejudiced him, so his claim
is insufficient as pled. Smith, 998 So. 2d at 694
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
This Court has broad discretion to manage the
courtroom in the event that a witness becomes
emotional while testifying. Thomas v. State, 748 So.
2d 970, 980-81 (Fla. 1999) (citations omitted). When
Whitehurst struggled during her testimony, this
Court stopped the proceedings, had the jury removed
from the courtroom, and did not resume the trial
until Whitehurst regained her composure. These
actions sufficiently calmed the situation.
Defendant also alleges counsel should have
objected to Whitehurst’s testimony based upon her
confusion. However, even had counsel somehow
35

impeached Whitehurst or emphasized her confusion
on the witness stand, both Roberts and Holsey
corroborated the substantive portions of her
testimony, and Officer Muchowicz testified that
Defendant attempted to flee the scene of the shooting
by driving over his neighbor’s lawns after emergency
vehicles blocked the road. In light of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt presented by the
State, any tangential issues regarding Whitehurst’s
composure or confusion did not affect the ultimate
outcome of Defendant’s trial. Hernandez v. State, 180
So. 3d 978, 989-90 (Fla. 2015); see also Mack v. State,
21 So. 3d 105, 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Accordingly,
Defendant is not entitled to relief on Ground Five.
Id. at 957-58 (record citations omitted). The First DCA affirmed the denial of
relief without a written opinion. See Doc. 8-2 at 131.
To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Beamon is not
entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of this
claim is not entitled to deference, the claim is conclusory and too speculative
36

to warrant federal habeas relief. In the Petition, Beamon does not identify
any specific portion of Whitehurst’s testimony to which he believes his
counsel should have objected. See Petition at 24. And although Beamon
alleges that Whitehurst made a “bias[ed] statement,” he does not identify the
statement. Id.
The Court notes that in his amended Rule 3.850 Motion, Beamon
argued the exchange quoted below from Whitehurst’s testimony showed bias:
Q: Where did you follow [Beamon]?
A: All the way past the two cars in the driveway to
the gate. When I got to the gate he already had
pointed the gun and shot him three times. My baby
fell in the ditch and knocked his shoes off and when
the people got there to pick him up they throwed him
up there on the stretcher like he was a piece of dead
meat.
See Doc. 8-1 at 447-48; see id. at 916 (asserting that Whitehurst made a
biased statement when she said “they throw my baby”). Whether this specific
testimony was inadmissible is a matter of state evidentiary rules and does
not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. As such, Beamon has
not

established

deficient

performance.

Further,

Beamon

has

not

demonstrated a reasonable probability that “the result of the proceeding
would have been different” if his counsel had objected to the above testimony.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. Accordingly, Beamon is not entitled to federal
habeas relief on the claim raised in Ground Seven.
37

G. Ground Eight
As Ground Eight, Beamon argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to prepare him for trial. See Petition at 24. He appears to contend
that counsel did not have sufficient time to investigate and prepare for trial
because counsel assumed representation “only two or three months” before
the trial date. Id.
Beamon raised a substantially similar claim in his amended Rule 3.850
Motion. See Doc. 8-1 at 919. The postconviction court denied relief on the
claim, stating in pertinent part:
In Ground Seven, Defendant alleges counsel
was ineffective for failing to properly prepare
Defendant for trial. Specifically, Defendant complains
that counsel only had two to four months to prepare
for trial. Defendant claims prejudice because counsel
did not have time to investigate a defense.
Standing alone, allegations that counsel did not
have time to adequately prepare for trial are
insufficient to state a claim for postconviction relief.
State v. Barton, 194 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 1967). A
defendant must specifically allege how the lack of
time led counsel to perform deficiently and how this
deficiency ultimately prejudiced the defendant. Id.
Citing Harris v. Cotton, 365 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2004),
Defendant alleges time constraints led his attorney to
ignore information Defendant provided her about the
victim. However, Harris involved a specific allegation
of deficiency and a specific allegation of prejudice. Id.
at 556-57. In that case, the defendant alleged his
attorney had failed to obtain a coroner’s report
showing the victim had been under the influence of
alcohol and cocaine at the time of his death, and, but
for counsel’s failure to obtain that report, the jury
38

would have heard medical evidence supporting the
defendant’s claim that the victim had been
irrationally aggressive just before the shooting. Id.
In the instant Motions, Defendant fails to make
such an allegation, claiming only that he told counsel
the victim would become belligerent and aggressive
when intoxicated. He does not point to any specific
evidence counsel failed to raise or any defense
precluded by the period of time between counsel
coming onto the case and the beginning of trial.
Defendant alleges counsel’s lack of time “eliminated”
potential witnesses for the defense, but he in no way
alleges who those witnesses were or what their
testimony would have been. Accordingly, this claim is
insufficient as pled and Defendant is not entitled to
relief. Pelham, 737 So. 2d at 573. Further, this Court
has already found that counsel did not err by
choosing not to argue self-defense.
Id. at 960-62. The First DCA affirmed the denial of relief without a written
opinion. See Doc. 8-2 at 131.
To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Beamon is not
entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
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Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of this
claim is not entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. There is a
strong presumption in favor of an attorney’s competence when evaluating the
performance prong of the Strickland ineffectiveness inquiry. See Anderson v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 752 F.3d 881, 904 (11th Cir. 2014). The inquiry is
“whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions
were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Notably, the test for ineffectiveness is neither
whether counsel could have done more nor whether the best criminal defense
attorneys might have done more; in retrospect, one may always identify
shortcomings. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating
that “perfection is not the standard of effective assistance”) (quotations
omitted). Instead, the test is whether what counsel did was within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Ward, 592 F.3d at 1164
(quotations and citation omitted); Dingle v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 480 F.3d
1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The question is whether some reasonable
lawyer at the trial could have acted as defense counsel acted in the trial at
issue and not what ‘most good lawyers’ would have done.”) (citation omitted).
Here, Beamon does not identify what, if any, shortcomings existed in
his trial counsel’s preparation for trial. Nor does he assert how his counsel’s
representation would have been different if counsel had more time to prepare
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for trial. Beamon’s conclusory claim is insufficient and fails to demonstrate
that counsel acted outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.
See Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that a
petitioner’s “unsupported allegations” that are “conclusory in nature and
lacking factual substantiation” cannot sustain an ineffective assistance
claim). Accordingly, Beamon is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the
claim raised in Ground Eight.
VII. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If Beamon seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the
undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The
Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Beamon “must demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the
issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

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Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims
on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has
rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.
Upon consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate
of appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Petition

and dismissing this case with prejudice.
3.

If Beamon appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court denies a

certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined that a
certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from
the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that

42

may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the
motion.
4.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 27th day of
March, 2024.

Jax-10 2/29
C:
Floyd Beamon, #J40455
Counsel of record

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