Armstrong v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Filing
12
ORDER denying 3 Amended Petition and dismissing case with prejudice; directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 2/5/2024. (JLD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
RAYTAURUS EMON ARMSTRONG,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 3:21-cv-294-TJC-JBT
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.
________________________________
I.
ORDER
Status
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
through counsel by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner is proceeding on an Amended Petition (Doc. 3), in
which he challenges a 2014 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Petitioner is serving
an 18-year term of incarceration as a habitual felony offender (HFO).
Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 6; Response) with exhibits (Docs. 6-1 to 613; Ex.). Petitioner filed a counseled Reply (Doc. 11). This case is ripe for
review.1
1
“In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need
for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318
II.
Standard Under AEDPA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure
that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.
(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See
Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation,
(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th
Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must
consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,
a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that
“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
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the federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as
alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or
argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears
repeating that even a strong case for relief does not
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mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than
mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at
75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper
deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations modified).
III.
Analysis
Petitioner raises one ground in the Amended Petition: “The sentencing
judge violated Armstrong’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine
any fact that increased the statutory maximum in his case.” Doc. 3 at 6 (some
capitalization and emphasis omitted). Petitioner contends that the sentencing
judge designated him as an HFO pursuant to Florida Statutes § 775.084, which
requires the sentencing court to find “dangerousness as a predicate requirement
to habitualization.” Doc. 3-1 at 1. According to Petitioner, because the question
of whether an enhanced sentence was necessary for the protection of the public
was not determined by a jury, his HFO sentence violates the Sixth Amendment
as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny.
See generally Reply.
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Respondents contend that the state court’s adjudication of this claim is
entitled to deference under AEDPA. See generally Response. Respondents
argue that “Florida’s HFO designation is based entirely on the existence of prior
convictions.” Id. at 12. And although the state sentencing judge made a “public
protection” finding, such finding was not required under the HFO statute and
“no impermissible judicial fact-finding took place.” Id. at 13. Respondents
explain:
Imposition of the HFO penalty under
§ 775.084(3), requires a two-part inquiry. First, the
court must determine if a defendant has the requisite
convictions to be classified an HFO, meaning if “[t]he
defendant has previously been convicted of any
combination of two or more felonies.” § 775.084(1), Fla.
Stat. (2012). If the defendant qualifies for an HFO
sentence, then the court must consider the second
inquiry, whether the court should use its discretion in
sentencing the defendant to the enhanced penalty.
§ 775.084(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). The state court can
impose a non-HFO sentence only if the court makes a
finding with written reasons that the defendant does
not pose a danger to the public.
Response at 14-15 (citations omitted).
Petitioner’s sentencing was bifurcated into two hearings in compliance
with Florida’s HFO statute. See Exs. B, C. During the first hearing, the
sentencing judge reviewed Petitioner’s prior convictions and determined that
“the state has demonstrated a predicate for habitual felony offender status”
based on Petitioner’s prior convictions. See Ex. B at 27. After hearing argument
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from counsel and from Petitioner at the second hearing, the trial court classified
Petitioner as an HFO, explaining, in part, as follows:
This crime, itself, is even more scary than your
record of seven or eight prior felony convictions. You
brought it on yourself, and you represented yourself
well and your attorney has represented you well, but
that doesn’t change the fact of how serious this case is.
Therefore, at this time your having been found
guilty by the jury I will adjudicate you guilty. Now, in
my discretion I may have already decided this back
during your last hearing. But today, if I were to
reconsider I would still make the decision. I do find
you are danger to the community, and it is
necessary for the protection of the public that
you be classified as a habitual felony offender,
and I do so classify you.
Ex. C at 36-37 (emphasis added).
Petitioner, through counsel, challenged the sentencing judge’s imposition
of his HFO sentence in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a). See Ex. J at 1-4. The state filed a response. See id. at 14852. The state court denied the claim:
In the instant Motion, Defendant asserts that he
was sentenced in error because the trial judge, and not
a jury, made the finding that the Defendant’s sentence
as a Habitual Felony Offender was necessary for the
protection of the public under § 775.084. Defendant
cites to the case of Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147 (Fla.
2008)[,] for the proposition that a jury finding was
required for Defendant’s Habitual Felony Offender
sentence to be imposed. However, this Court agrees
with the reasoning and assertion in the State’s
Response after a thorough and comprehensive legal
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analysis that “[A]s the Defendant was not sentenced
above a ‘statutory maximum’ in the instant case, but
was merely found to meet the recidivist requirements
outlined by the Habitual Felony Offender statute, no
upward departure occurred and, thus, no findings by a
jury were required.”
Id. at 155.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed an appeal and an initial brief. Ex. K.
The state filed a notice that it would not file an answer brief. Ex. L. The First
District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s Rule 3.800(a) motion
and entered the following written opinion:
Appellant appeals the summary denial of his
postconviction motion brought under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm.
Armstrong was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a felon during a trial in which he stipulated
that he had a prior felony conviction. The trial court
sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment as a
habitual felony offender. We affirmed the judgment
and sentence on direct appeal, with the mandate
issuing on August 21, 2015. Armstrong v. State, 171
So. 3d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
In March 2019, Armstrong filed the instant
motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.800. He argued that his
eighteen-year habitual felony sentence was illegal
because it exceeded the statutory maximum of fifteen
years for a second-degree felony. Armstrong asserted
that the trial court’s decision to “depart from the
statutory maximum” was made as the result of a
“dangerousness finding required as a condition
predicate to habitualization . . . .” Appellant cited to
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and
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Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 2018), and
concluded that such a factual finding must be made by
a jury.
In January 2020, the lower court summarily
denied Appellant’s motion. The lower court agreed
with the State’s response that Brown was
distinguishable from the present case because Brown
concerned the application of section 775.082(10),
Florida Statutes (2015), which required a factual
finding that the defendant presented a “danger to the
public.” The present case concerned section 775.084,
Florida Statutes (2012). The lower court sentenced
Armstrong based on the recidivist requirements of the
statute which did not require a jury finding.
The trial court here was correct. The lower court
was authorized to impose the enhanced punishment of
up to thirty years imprisonment, twice the statutory
maximum, because of Armstrong’s prior felony
convictions—not because of any judicial fact-finding.
See § 775.084(1)(a), (4)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (2012).
Recidivist-sentencing enhancement based on prior
felony convictions do not require findings of fact. See
Hunter v. State, 174 So. 3d 1011, 1016-17 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2015) (holding that state was not required to
prove enhancement factors to jury prior to trial court’s
imposition of habitual violent felony offender
enhancement); see McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476
(Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a jury did not need
to determine whether defendant had the requisite
predicate convictions for habitual felony sentence).
Thus, Armstrong’s sentence does not violate the Sixth
Amendment’s right to trial by jury, as the trial court
correctly ruled.
Ex. M.
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Under Apprendi,
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“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
Florida’s HFO designation is based entirely on a defendant’s prior felony
convictions. See Fla. Stat. § 775.084(1)(a). Once the court determines the
existence of a defendant’s prior qualifying convictions and finds the defendant
to be an HFO,
the court must sentence the defendant as a habitual
felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender,
subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section
unless the court finds that such sentence is not
necessary for the protection of the public. If the court
finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the
public to sentence the defendant as a habitual felony
offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court
shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of
orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the
court within 7 days after the date of sentencing.
Fla. Stat. § 775.084(3)(a)(6) (2012). Thus, the sentencing court can impose an
HFO sentence if it finds that the defendant has prior qualifying felony
convictions. If the court determines it to be unnecessary for the protection of the
public to sentence the defendant as an HFO, the court must provide written
reasons explaining its decision.
Here, the sentencing judge’s finding that he was classifying Petitioner as
an HFO for the protection of the public was unnecessary and not required by
the statute. However, imposition of an HFO sentence was proper under the
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statute in light of Petitioner’s prior convictions—convictions which the
sentencing judge extensively reviewed and specifically found qualified
Petitioner for an HFO sentence. See Dinkens v. State, 976 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla.
1st DCA 2008) (“[T]he habitual felony offender statute is based solely on prior
convictions and therefore does not require a jury determination pursuant to
Apprendi.”). Apprendi does not apply to increases in a sentence due to
recidivism. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-90 (recognizing recidivism as a
traditional basis for a sentencing court’s increase in an offender’s sentence); see
also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1998) (holding
that a defendant’s prior conviction is merely a “sentencing factor” that does not
have to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). And
Florida courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that an HFO sentence
must be made by a jury. See Lyons v. State, 292 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)
(citing cases). Upon thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the state
court’s adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the state court’s
adjudication based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the
evidence presented in the state court proceedings. As such, Ground One is
denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
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1.
The Amended Petition (Doc. 3) is DENIED, and this case is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
2.
If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.
Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not
warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any
motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such
termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.2
3.
The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 5th day of
February, 2024.
JAX-3 1/31
c:
Raytaurus Emon Armstrong, #130068
Counsel of Record
The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration
of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
2
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