Williams v. Reddish et al

Filing 74

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 59 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; striking 73 Plaintiff's Sur-Reply; referring the case to the Pro Bono Appointment Program; staying and administratively closing the case for 60 days; with directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 8/30/2024. (HM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ANDREW L. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:21-cv-792-MMH-MCR

BARRY V. REDDISH, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Andrew L. Williams, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action by filing a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1).1 He proceeds
on a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 34). In the Second Amended
Complaint, Williams asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
seven Defendants: Warden Barry V. Reddish and Florida State Prison (FSP)
Correctional Officers S. Thompson, Brian Scott, Jonathan Kyle Aikin,2

For all documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the document and
page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.
2 Williams referred to this Defendant as “Jonathan Kyle” throughout the
Second Amended Complaint, but after service of process, the Court granted
Williams’ request to correct this Defendant’s name to “Jonathan Kyle Aikin.” See
Order (Doc. 48).
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1

Mitchell Mason, Austin Merritt, and Kenneth Porr.3 See Second Amended
Complaint at 3-5. Williams contends Defendants violated his federal
constitutional rights in connection with a cell extraction and placement in
strip status while Williams was incarcerated at FSP. Id. at 9-22. Williams
also asserts violations of Florida state law against Officers Scott, Aikin,
Mason, Merritt and Porr, all of whom were members of FSP’s extraction
team. Id. at 9. As relief, Williams seeks injunctive relief, monetary damages,
and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 22-23.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 59; Motion) in support of which Defendants have submitted
exhibits (Docs. 59-1 to 59-15).4 In response, Williams filed a “Statement of
Disputed Factual Issues” (Doc. 67; Williams’ Statement) and a “Motion in
Opposition and Objection(s) to Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary
Judgment” (Doc. 68; Response) along with exhibits (Docs. 68-1 to 68-7)
including his own declaration under oath (Doc. 68-3; Williams’ Declaration).
Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 72; Reply) with an exhibit (Doc. 72-1). Williams
subsequently filed a “Reply and Objection(s) to Defendant’s [sic] Reply to
Williams sues Warden Reddish in his official capacity and all other
Defendants in their individual capacities. See Second Amended Complaint at 3-5.
4 The Court advised Williams of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion for summary judgment
would represent a final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent
litigation on the matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See
Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 60).
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2

Plaintiff’s Response(s) to Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment”
(Doc. 73; Sur-Reply). The Court will strike the unauthorized Sur-Reply
because Williams did not request leave to file it. See Local Rule 3.01(d),
United States District Court, Middle District of Florida (Local Rule(s)). The
Motion is ripe for review.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be
considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A).5 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable

Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010
Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect
continuing development of the decisional law construing
and applying these phrases.
Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not
5

3

jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson
City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v.
Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel.
Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d
590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879
n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of
review remains viable.
In citing to Campbell, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished
opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the
Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30
F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R.
36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be
cited as persuasive authority.”).
4

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court
“must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the
party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921
(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del
Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is
improper, however, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920
F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. Williams’ Allegations6
Williams alleges that in early 2018 he was housed in close management
(CM) at FSP.7 See Second Amended Complaint at 9. At the time, Officer
Thompson was responsible for managing and supervising all CM housing
units at FSP. Id. at 12. Williams alleges that on January 17, 2018, Officer
Thompson retaliated against him for submitting two grievances concerning
FSP mailroom staff by moving him to an unheated strip cell. Id. According to
The allegations recited here are drawn from the Second Amended
Complaint.
7 Williams is presently housed at Columbia Correctional Institution Annex.
See Corrections Offender Network, Florida Department of Corrections, available at
https://fdc.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx.
6

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Williams, the strip cell “was exposed to the outside, [and] had a cell
temperature between . . . 20°F and 40°F.” Id. While in the strip cell, Williams
alleges he was deprived of hygiene materials, eating utensils, bedding, all
clothing except boxer shorts, and his personal property. Id. at 12-13. Williams
contends he remained in the strip cell for seventy-two hours, or until January
20, 2018. Id. at 13. Williams alleges he submitted several grievances
regarding his placement in the strip cell, but FSP staff trashed the
grievances after notifying Officer Thompson of them. Id.
Next, Williams alleges that on February 9, 2018, Officer Thompson
directed FSP’s extraction team to take Williams “inside of cell B-1209 out of
the view of fixed video cameras, [ ] and to physically and sexually abuse [him]
inside of [the] cell.” Id. at 16. The FSP extraction team was comprised of
Officers Scott, Mason, Merritt, Aikin, and Porr. Id. Williams asserts he was
in full body restraints during the extraction, and did not physically or
verbally resist the extraction team when they transported him to cell B-1209.
Id. at 17. Once inside the cell, Williams contends the extraction team
slammed him into the metal bunk; Officer Scott pressed Williams’ head into
the bunk and poked his fingers repeatedly into Williams’ eyes; and other
extraction team member(s) penetrated Williams’ anus through his boxer
shorts and punched and squeezed Williams’ testicles. Id. at 17-18. The
extraction team then removed Williams’ restraints and left the cell. Id. at 19.
6

According to Williams, Officer Thompson stood at the entrance to cell B-1209
and “blocked the hand held video camera from being able to view and record
what occured [sic] inside of [the] cell.” Id. at 19-20.
Williams alleges he remained in cell B-1209 until March 6, 2018. Id. at
21. According to Williams, cell B-1209 had “fresh pepper spray all over the
floor, walls, bunk, locker, toilet & sink.” Id. at 20. Williams states he was only
provided boxer shorts to wear despite the cell window being stuck in an open
position with the temperatures going as low as 20°F. Id. at 14, 20. Williams
also alleges Officer Thompson informed him that his placement in cell B-1209
was intended to “punish [him] for submitting inmate grievances against
[Officer] Thompson and other correctional officers.” Id. at 14. Williams
asserts he sustained physical and mental injuries as a result of the February
9, 2018 cell extraction as well as his placement in strip status from January
17 - 20, 2018, and February 9, 2018, to March 6, 2018. Id. at 14-16, 21.
IV. Claims in the Second Amended Complaint
In the Second Amended Complaint, Williams asserts: (1) FSP’s
extraction team violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment when they used excessive force during the February

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9, 2018 cell extraction, id. at 8;8 (2) FSP’s extraction team violated Florida
state law when they committed battery, aggravated battery, and felony
battery during the cell extraction, id. at 9; (3) Officer Thompson violated his
Eighth Amendment rights when he failed to intervene and stop the
extraction team from using excessive force during the cell extraction, id. at 8;
(4) Officer Thompson violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment when he placed Williams in strip status in
January 2018 and after the cell extraction, id. at 7; (5) Officer Thompson
violated his First Amendment right when he retaliated against Williams for
filing grievances regarding the cell extraction and his placement in strip
status, id.; and (6) Warden Reddish violated his Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he failed to implement
measures to stop FSP correctional officers from committing “widespread
physical, mental, and sexual abuse of close management (CM) inmates,” id.
at 6-7.
V. Summary of the Parties’ Arguments
In the Motion, Defendants argue as a threshold matter that Williams
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Motion at 7-18.
Defendants also raise arguments as to the merits of Williams’ claims.
Williams alternatively asserts a failure to intervene claim under the Eighth
Amendment as to those extraction team member(s) who did not apply excessive
force during the cell extraction. See id. at 19.
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Specifically as to Williams’ Eighth Amendment claims based on the February
9, 2018 cell extraction, Defendants assert that a hand-held video recording of
the extraction contradicts Williams’ version of the facts, id. at 20-22, and
further, that Williams fails to state claims for excessive force or cruel and
unusual punishment, id. at 22-29. Insofar as Williams asserts Eighth
Amendment claims in connection with his placement in strip status,
Defendants contend that Williams has no constitutional right to a specific
classification or cell assignment within the prison system and that he fails to
state a claim for relief. Id. at 18-20, 27-29. And, as to Williams’ First
Amendment retaliation claim, Defendants maintain that Williams fails to
state a claim for relief. See id. at 29-33.
In addition, Defendants assert in the Motion that the undisputed
material facts establish the Correctional Officer Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity, and that Warden Reddish is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. Id. at 33-37. Finally, Defendants raise
three arguments challenging the relief Williams seeks, arguing that: (1)
Williams is not entitled to prospective injunctive relief; (2) Williams is not
entitled to compensatory damages because he did not suffer a physical injury;
and (3) Williams’ request for punitive damages is statutorily barred. Id. at
37-45.

9

In response, Williams argues that he exhausted all available
administrative remedies, that there are disputed issues of material fact, and
that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. See Response at 2-10; Williams’
Declaration; Williams’ Statement at 1-3. In their Reply, Defendants counter
that there are no genuine disputes of material fact. See Reply at 2-7.
VI. Analysis
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
1. PLRA Exhaustion
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held the exhaustion of
administrative remedies by a prisoner is “a threshold matter” to be addressed
before considering the merits of a case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab.
Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that exhaustion is a
“threshold matter” that must be addressed first) (citation omitted). It is well
settled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate
wishing to challenge prison conditions to first exhaust all available
administrative remedies before asserting any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). A
prisoner such as Williams, however, is not required to plead exhaustion. See
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under
10

the PLRA[.]” Id. Notably, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
“a precondition to an adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory under the
PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not only is there
an exhaustion requirement, the PLRA “requires proper exhaustion.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).
Because exhaustion requirements are designed to
deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,
administrative law creates an incentive for these
parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to
do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full
opportunity
to
adjudicate
their
claims.
Administrative law does this by requiring proper
exhaustion of administrative remedies, which “means
using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing
so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues
on the merits).” Pozo,[9] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis
in original).
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance
with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not
engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one
baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative
remedies as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an
administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use

9

Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).
11

for the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077,
1084 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23
(11th Cir. 2007)). In Ross, the Supreme Court identified three circumstances
in which an administrative remedy would be considered “not available.” Ross,
578 U.S. at 643. First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when
(despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as
a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide
any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. Next, “an administrative scheme might
be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id.
Finally, a remedy may be unavailable “when prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644.
Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, Defendants bear “the burden of proving that [Williams] has failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082.
When a defendant raises a failure-to-exhaust defense in a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must treat the exhaustion issue as though it
was raised in a motion to dismiss, because the determination of whether an
inmate exhausted his available administrative remedies is a matter of
abatement. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374-75; Wright v. Langford, 562 F. App’x
769, 775 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is a
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matter in abatement and not generally an adjudication on the merits, [thus]
an exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary
judgment; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as
such if, [as applicable here, it was] raised in a motion for summary
judgment.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In accordance with Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a
two-step process when examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance
procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In
response to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a
motion to dismiss and raise as a defense the
prisoner’s failure to exhaust these administrative
remedies. See Turner, 541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v.
Burnside we established a two-step process for
resolving motions to dismiss prisoner lawsuits for
failure to exhaust. 541 F.3d at 1082. First, district
courts look to the factual allegations in the motion to
dismiss and those in the prisoner’s response and
accept the prisoner’s view of the facts as true. The
court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the
prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id. Second, if
dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s view of
the facts, the court makes specific findings to resolve
disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those
findings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust.
Id. at 1082-83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining that
defendants bear the burden of showing a failure to
exhaust).

13

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).
At step two of the procedure established in Turner, the Court can consider
facts outside the pleadings as long as those facts do not decide the case and
the parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop the record. Bryant, 530
F.3d at 1376; see also Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 838-39 (11th Cir.
2020). In evaluating whether Williams has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement, the Court notes that the Eleventh Circuit has determined that
a “prisoner need not name any particular defendant in a grievance in order to
properly exhaust his claim.” Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d
1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
2. Florida’s Prison Grievance Procedure
State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche
v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at
218 (stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC) provides an internal grievance procedure for its inmates.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001 through 33-103.018. Generally, to
properly exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must complete a threestep sequential process. First, an inmate must submit an informal grievance
at the institutional level to a designated staff member responsible for the
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specific problem. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005. If the issue is not
resolved, the inmate must submit a formal grievance at the institutional
level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the matter is not resolved
through formal and informal grievances, the inmate must file an appeal to
the Office of the FDOC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007.
However, under certain specified circumstances, an inmate can bypass the
informal grievance stage and start with a formal grievance at the
institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1); 33-103.006(3). An
inmate can also completely bypass the institutional level and proceed directly
to the Office of the FDOC Secretary by filing a “direct grievance.” See Fla.
Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3). Emergency grievances and grievances of
reprisal are types of “direct grievances” that may be filed with the Office of
the FDOC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3)(a).
Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for
the submission of grievances. Informal grievances must be received within
twenty days from the date on which the grieved incident or action occurred.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(a). Formal grievances must be
received no later than fifteen days from the date of the response to the
informal grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(b). If an inmate is
permitted to bypass the informal grievance stage and begin with a formal
grievance at the institutional level, the formal grievance must be received no
15

later than fifteen days from the date on which the incident or action being
grieved occurred. Id. Grievance appeals to the Office of the FDOC Secretary
must be received within fifteen days from the date that the response to the
formal grievance is returned to the inmate. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33103.011(1)(c).
According to Rule 33-103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance,
direct grievance, or grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without
further processing if, following a review of the grievance, one or more . . .
conditions are found to exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule
provides an enumerated list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance
without a response on the merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(a)(y). A grievance can be returned without action if it: is untimely; “addresses
more than one issue or complaint”; is “so broad, general or vague in nature
that it cannot be clearly investigated, evaluated, and responded to”; is “not
written legibly and cannot be clearly understood”; is a supplement to a
previously-submitted grievance that has been accepted for review; does not
“provide a valid reason for by-passing the previous levels of review as
required or the reason provided is not acceptable”; or does not include the
required attachments. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1).

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3. Williams’ Exhaustion Efforts
a. Informal and Formal Grievances
Defendants have provided Williams’ grievance records in support of
their contention that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Grievance logs show that Williams submitted ten informal grievances
between January 22, 2018, and March 19, 2018. See Doc. 59-3 at 2.
Defendants submitted copies of two of his informal grievances.10 On February
14, 2018, Williams submitted an informal grievance (#205-1802-0436) to FSP
in which he stated:
The back window in my cell [B-1209] blasts out cold
air into my cell & I need a towel rack & toilet paper
holder.
The window isn’t closed or sealed @ the 2 window
panes @ the top & the toilet paper blows straight out
& where the window knob is supposed to be but isn’t
the wind blows hard. I know everybody says it isn’t
cold yet everybody has on jackets & the heater
doesn’t work either in these cells & [a]ll this concrete
& steel makes the temp extremely lower than in the
rest of the building or outside.

None of the parties contend that the remaining eight informal grievances
submitted during the time period at issue concern Williams’ claims in this case. See
Motion at 13; Williams’ Declaration at 4 (in his list of grievances, Williams did not
include any informal grievances). Of the ten informal grievances, the grievance log
shows that two were denied and one was returned without action. See Doc. 59-3 at
2. As to the seven approved informal grievances, two concerned clothing issues
(“wants a pair of socks” and “needs blues”); two concerned confiscation of personal
property (informal grievance #205-1802-0533 described above, and “off dc”); and
three concerned facility conditions (informal grievance #205-1802-0436 described
above, “desk hanging off wall,” and “leaking water in pipe”). Id.
10

17

Doc. 59-3 at 14. On February 23, 2018, FSP approved the informal grievance
with a note stating “replaced window knob[,] adjusted sides of window.” Id.
Next, on February 18, 2018, Williams submitted an informal grievance
(#205-1802-0533) to FSP, stating:
I’ve been off property restriction since 2/12/18 & still
haven’t received my property nor my property
receipt.
Doc. 59-3 at 17. On March 1, 2018, FSP approved the informal grievance,
stating: “A check of the property restriction bin will be done. If property
belonging to you is present, it will be returned.” Id.
As for formal grievances, the grievance log indicates that Williams
submitted eight formal grievances between January 22, 2018, and March 9,
2018. See Doc. 59-3 at 11. Five of the formal grievances were denied, and
three were returned without action. Id. Because the formal grievances log
contains no comments, it is not readily apparent whether any of these formal
grievances concerned Williams’ claims in this case. With their Motion,
Defendants submitted only one of the formal grievances. In that formal
grievance (#1802-205-296), Williams stated:
My property was taken from me when I was placed
on strip 2/9/18 on F-wing[.] I have not received my
property or even a property receipt as of yet & today
is 2/22/18[.] yall [sic] are denying me due process but
that’s nothing new for FSP security personnel.

18

Administrative relief: Send me my property or @
least for now send my property receipts.
Doc. 59-3 at 15. On February 28, 2018, FSP returned the formal grievance
without action, stating in pertinent part:
Your request for administrative remedy to this office
is in non-compliance with Chapter 33-103[.] [Y]ou
have not allowed adequate time for a response to be
given. This issue is currently pending disposition on
informal log # 205-1802-0533 received on 02/19/2018.
Your request for administrative remedy is being
returned without action.
Doc. 59-3 at 16. In his Declaration, Williams lists two other formal grievances
that he asserts involved the claims raised in this lawsuit, but offers no other
information regarding the content of those grievances. Williams’ Declaration
at 4.
b. Grievance Appeals
In support of their argument that Williams failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, Defendants also submitted the declaration of FDOC
Grievance Coordinator Rebecca Owens, see Doc. 59-7, and the declaration of
Alan McManus, Bureau Chief of FDOC’s Bureau of Policy Management and
Inmate Appeals, see Doc. 59-4. According to Owens, Williams submitted
twenty-one grievance appeals between January 31, 2018 and June 30, 2018.
See Doc. 59-7 at 3-7. McManus avers that eight of these grievance appeals

19

were related to the claims in this case. See Doc. 59-4 at 2. The eight grievance
appeals and the responses thereto are set forth below.
One of the grievance appeals addressed the February 9, 2018 cell
extraction. Specifically on February 18, 2018, Williams submitted a grievance
appeal (#18-6-08110) to the Office of the FDOC Secretary in which he stated:
“Grievance of Reprisal”
This direct grievance is bypassing all
institutional channels due to the fact that [I]’ve
already been retaliated upon for writing other
grievances dealing w/ the same people & I feel I will
be adversly [sic] affected again if I go to the
institution w/ this “Grievance of Reprisal.” Therefore
I submit this “Grievance of Reprisal” directly to the
Secretary of Fla. DOC per Ch. 33-103.
(In concise version) On 2/9/18 L.t t.
[T]hompson[11] came to the cell I was housed in
F1317s (@ Fla. State Prison) along w/ Sgt. Anderson
sometime in the morning & told me to give him my
shit – [a]ll my shit. I asked [Thompson] what did I do
& he then walk[ed] off w/ Sgt [A]nderson. [A] few
minutes pass & I start to get my stuff together for
property restriction. [Thompson] comes back w/ the
use of force camera & his gang, he then speaks to the
camera. I then strip down & cuff up & am immediatly
[sic] grabbed by 2 (two) people from the extraction
team[,] Sgt. [B]rian Scott being one, I don’t know the
other. (It should be duly noted Sgt. [B.] Scott &
[Thompson] placed me on strip in F-wing on 1/17/18
for writing grievances on the mail room). I was
immediatly [sic] taken to B(ravo) wing which is D/C
cell 1209 & as they violated & took me into the cell &
Because Williams refers to Thompson differently throughout his grievances
(i.e., “L.t. t. Thompson”, “L.t. Thompson”), the Court will use [Thompson] for ease of
reference.
11

20

slammed me on the bunk face down fully
restrained[.] Sgt. Scott put his hand on my head &
leaned all his weight down on my face & used his
thumb to poke me in my right eye & then push my
eye in & apply constant pressure saying “you still
haven’t learnt about writing grievances huh?”
Someone hit & then pulled on my scrotum sack when
they flip[ped] me over saying “we don’t like
grievances,” they flipped me back on my stomach &
someone put their hand in between my butt & said
“Just making sure you don’t have any contraband
hidden fagg.” All the while [Thompson] is blocking
the camera’s view which is a violation. They leave
out, close the door, remove the cuffs & nurse [D]anley
comes & looks @ me thru the window. I tell her I
want to call a P.R.E.A. & staff abuse & told her some
of what happened & told her look at my [r]ed
[s]wollen eye (right) & swollen left side of face. She
walked off. Nobody followed procedure. I was left in a
cell w/ nothing in it no hygien [sic] or anything the
toilet paper was thrown in the toilet by someone on
the team as they left out & everything I touched or
sat on burned from chemical agents in the cell &
[illegible] properly cleaned the day before & the back
window is broke. I suffered for 12 hrs & still haven’t
been seen by anyone @ all about nothing. All injuries
have cleared up now.
Doc. 59-4 at 8. On February 28, 2018, the Office of the FDOC Secretary
provided the following response:
Your request for administrative review has been
received, reviewed, and evaluated.
Record reflects that the Use of Force on 02/09/2018
was previously referred to the Office of the Inspector
General for review.

21

Your issue regarding placement on property
restriction is a separate issue and should be grieved
as such, also, being initiated at the appropriate level.
As this process was initiated prior to the receipt of
your appeal, your request for action by this office is
denied.
Id. at 9.
Dissatisfied with the above response, Williams submitted a grievance
appeal to address the FDOC Secretary’s handling of his grievance appeal
#18-6-08110. Specifically on March 26, 2018, Williams submitted a grievance
appeal (#18-6-14216) in which he stated:
Direct Grievance
No matter how many informal & formal
grievances us prisoners @ FSP turn in pertaining to
the grievance officers & warden trashing grievances
the institution &/or [T]allahassee has still not fixed
the situation. So per Ch. 33-103.011 because my
other grievance(s) haven’t been answered I now
proceed to the next level.
On or about 2/19/18 I submitted a grievance of
reprisal pertaining to 2/9/18 (see log# 18-6-08110)[.]
[I]n the body of this grievance I reported P.R.E.A.
claims & staff abuse claims, the two procedures for
both of these claims are similar because the[y] must
be reported immediately & investigated just as fast.
When I reported my claims to Nurse C. [D]anley on
2/9/18 through the door which was a [HIPPA (sic)
violation] I refuse to come out on that shift because
the ones who victimized me would have to escort me
again & I was in fear of my life & these things
happening again. I was supposed to be pulled out the
next day or by different staff members. Whoever read
& responded to log# 18-6-08110 was to immediately
22

report those claims & get me pulled out to medical &
have them document “All” injuries & what happened,
this wasn’t done violating P.R.E.A. 28 C.F.R. Part
115 & FDC Procedure 602.053. “All staff members,
contractors & volunteers are required BY LAW to
report any incident(s) or allegation(s) of sexual abuse,
sexual battery or sexual harassment immediately. . .
This includes knowledge of or the receipt of
information, written or verbal.” The same is for use of
force or abuse ([staff abuse]) per Ch. 33-601… None
of this was done & if it was[,] nobody has come to see
me & all of my physical visual injuries are clear but
not the ones you cannot see though. Anyhow
procedure, protocol & Chapter 33 F.A.C. was violated.
Doc. 59-4 at 20. On April 5, 2018, the Office of the FDOC Secretary returned
this grievance appeal because it addressed more than one issue or complaint.
Id. at 21. The response stated:
Your request for administrative appeal is in noncompliance with Chapter 33-103, Inmate Grievance
Procedure, which states, “each grievance must
address only one issue or complaint.” Your current
request for administrative appeal addresses more
than one issue and/or complaint.
You address the grievance process, complaints of
excessive force by staff and HIPAA violations. Your
allegation of excessive force was addressed in the
response to appeal # 18-608110 advising you that it
was previously reported to the Office of the Inspector
General. Once your allegation has been reported this
office is void of any further responsibility. You may
re-file your grievance process and HIPAA issue
separately at the appropriate level. Contact was
previously made with institution grievance staff who
denied trashing grievances and stated that they
process grievances that they receive.
23

Based on the foregoing information, your grievance
appeal is being returned.
Id.
Williams also submitted a grievance appeal regarding his placement in
strip status on January 17, 2018. Specifically, on February 14, 2018,
Williams submitted a grievance appeal (#18-6-08683) to the Office of the
FDOC Secretary, in which he stated:
I’ve been placing grievance after grievance pertaining
to cruel & unusual punishment[,] strip w/o nothing in
cell or on me except boxers in @ the institutional level
& they’ve never responded w/in the given time frame
let alone issued a receipt. So per Ch. 33-103 that
gives me the right to continue on to the next level if
no one answers, this is what im [sic] doing & that’s
the reason there’s no paper work attached . . . .
On 1/17/18 on F-Wing 1300 side approx. 1.45 p[m]
Sgt. [B]rian Scott (who was working as F-wing dorm
supervisor) came to the cell I was housed in F-1317s
w/ [Thompson] & both of them told me to pack my
s*** im [sic] going on property restriction, I asked
why & [Thompson] stated “you gone give me your
sh** or what?” I began handing my property out the
door, state property & personal property. I asked “do
I atleast get to keep a blanket because it’ll be in the
20s tonight & the window is open?” Sgt. Scott told
me: “think about writing the ladies in the mailroom
up again while you freeze your b****s off.”
[Thompson] told me im [sic] moving too slow & to cuff
up then he told Sgt. Scott to go call a bunch of people.
A bunch of people came they took me to the upstairs
1300 side shower & litterally [sic] stripped my cell of
everything that wasn’t cemented or bolted down i.e.
no toilet paper, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, wash
rag, asthma inhaler(s) nothing but me in my boxers.
24

That night it was so extremely cold because the
exhaust fans were on full blast too. I tried to fit
myself inside of my foot locker. The temperature was
a record for Fla 22° w/ a wind chill factor of 16! My
finger nails & toe nails were blue & I was litterally
[sic] crying because it was so cold! I asked for a
blanket one time but once this new officer [saw] I
didn’t have a mattress or anything else he kept going.
Sgt. Scott & [Thompson] caused me unnecessarry
[sic] pain and suffering @ the same time violating the
8th United States Constitutional Amendment to be
free from cruel & unusual punishment. Both of these
were done w/ malicious indifference & with malicious
intent to cause pain & suffering.
Doc. 59-4 at 10. On March 1, 2018, the Office of the FDOC Secretary returned
this grievance appeal without action because (1) Williams did not “first
submit [a] grievance at the appropriate level at the institution” or provide a
valid reason for not doing so, and (2) the grievance appeal addressed more
than one issue. Id. at 11.
Three of Williams’ other eight grievance appeals concerned allegations
of retaliation. In grievance appeal #18-6-08999, dated February 22, 2018,
Williams stated:
This Grievance of Reprisal is a [d]irect [g]rievance to
the Secretary due to the adverse affects [sic] all other
grievances have been met with per Ch. 33-103[.] I am
bypassing all institutional channels do [sic] to the
nature of this grievance & the [r]eprisal I’ve been
receiving from the same person.
On 2/19/18 I turned in a grievance of [r]eprisal on
[Thompson] & Sgt. [B.] Scott[.] [L]ater on that same
exact day this same [Thompson] placed me on strip
25

again. This same [Thompson] has placed me on strip
3 times in 33 days & has orchestrated the writing of 5
DRs & all of the strips. If nobody can see his direct
involvment [sic] then they’re blind, he not only has
the grievance people take the grievances & give them
to him but he tells them which ones to destroy or has
others do it for him. Since I’ve been grieving both
security personnel [I]’ve gotten no response to those
grievances & no receipts. Just retaliation in the form
of strip/DRs. But this person in [T]allahasee doesn’t
accept anything as retaliation or anything else this C.
[N]eel.
Doc. 59-4 at 12. In grievance appeal #18-6-10631, dated February 27, 2018,
Williams stated:
This “Grievance of Reprisal” is in accord w/ Ch. 33103…& per Ch. 33-103…I bypass all institutional
channel(s) & I file directly w/ the Secretary of FDOC
due to the [FACT] (alteration in original) that every
time I grieve the people [I’]m grieving [Thompson]
comes & places me on strip (personal & state
property restriction) & threatend [sic] w/ bodily harm
e.g. 2/9/18 [Thompson] & Sgt. [B]rian Scott retaliated
on me for grieving them for retaliating on me &
writing the mail room ladies up by placing me on
strip in F-Wing & immediately moving me to B-wing
(B1209) where the team (including Sgt. [B]rian Scott)
committed cruel & unusual punishment & sexual
misconduct while [Thompson] block[ed] use of force
camera w/ his back. I was not permitted out of my
cell until my injuries healed, yet, they’re constantly
placing me on strip so [I’]m still not allow[ed] out of
my cell. They don’t even answer my sick calls &
they’re destroying my personal property.
ARGUMENT (“STATEMENT OF FACTS”)
On 2/19/18 [Thompson] placed me on strip again for
the grievances I placed in that morning telling me “I
know of every grievance you put in that box, it was
26

[no] help, give me all your stuff.” I was on strip all
the way up till 2/26/18 when [Thompson] took my
mattress, I already didn’t have anything but my matt
from 2/19/18 when he placed me on strip[.] So this
time he placed me on straight metal & concrete
which is damaging my hip bones & something in my
right bicep & neck; causing me unnecessary pain &
suffering. Everyday I asked about my bedroll &
clothes but was ignored by [Thompson] from the 19 of
Feb till the 26 of Feb. Also, the prolonging of my strip
status is/was not justified penologically @ all just
pure retaliation.
Id. at 16. And, in grievance appeal #18-6-10629, dated March 4, 2018,
Williams stated:
This Grievance of Reprisal is in accordance w/ Ch. 33103 . . . & per Ch. 33-103. . . I bypass all institutional
channel(s) & I file directly [to the] Secretary of FDOC
due to the [Fact] (alteration in original) that every
time I grieve [Thompson] or a situation he created[,]
he comes & places me on strip[,] threatens me w/
bodily harm.
On the 19th of February, I was retaliated on by
[Thompson] fo[r] filing grievance(s) on him (Since Jan
17, 2018 for placing me on strip in 22° weather in
nothing but boxers for grieving the ladies in the
mailroom) by him placing me on strip. He left me w/
only a mattress in my [cell] & me in boxers (nothing
else), I was suppose[d] to come off of str[ip] in 72 hrs
but was left on strip until 2/26/18 when he did not
[give] me my bedroll, clothes & property back but he
came & took my matt [sic] leaving me on metal &
concrete torturing me because [I]’ve told[.] [T]he
outside back window does not close all the way so
cold air comes in[.] On Thursday March 1, 2018 I was
given a partial bed roll & some clo[thes] but no
mattress. As of the writing of this grievance I still
don’t have a matt [sic], I am being retaliated on &
27

tortured the treatment that is b[eing] dealt is cruel &
unusual punishment & violates my federally
protected right to be free from such punishment. This
retaliation w/ such treatment has b[een] ongoing
since Jan. 17, 2018 & has yet to cease. The institution
(FSP) is throwing away all my grievances dealing
with anything pertaining to retaliation, strip, stolen
property, sexual misconduct, staff abuse, etc…if it
deals with [Thompson] & Sgt. [B]rian Scott the
grievances are never seen again by me. But the
retaliation comes w/out a doubt.
Id. at 14. In response to the above three grievance appeals, the Office of the
FDOC Secretary did not accept them as grievances of reprisal, and instead
returned them without action because Williams did not “first submit [a]
grievance at the appropriate level at the institution” or provide a valid reason
for not doing so. Id. at 13, 15, 19.
Lastly, two of Williams’ grievance appeals concerned Williams’
allegations of widespread abuse of CM inmates and FSP’s handling of
grievances. First, on March 19, 2018, Williams submitted a grievance appeal
(#18-6-15170) in which he stated:
I am proceeding to the next level of the grievance
process w/out any attachment(s) due to the [FACT]
(alteration in original) that I’ve been placing
grievance after grievance into the grievance box
pertaining to the widespread systematic abuse of CM
inmates by security personnel @ FSP since January
2018[,] but they ([administration]) keeps trashing
them. Therefore per Ch. 33-103.011(4) I am
proceeding to the next level, the time allotted to
respond has expired, I didn’t sign for a(n) extension &
28

no response has come. I now proceed to the next step
as permitted by the FAC aforementioned.
Since 1/1/1/18[,] I Andrew L. Williams have
personally witnessed & have also been personally
subjected to the widespread systematic physical,
mental & sexual abuse of us CM inmates by security
personnel & the hits sent by contracted personnel
such as mental health, medical, mailroom &
classification. This abuse is a constant daily evil that
occurs @ Fla. State prison w/ no remorse or recourse
for the wrongs done to us, which is repugnant to the
conscience of humankind. All of the personnel
mentioned maliciously & sadistically subjects us to
cruel & unusual punishment w/ the sole purpose &
intent of inflicting physical & mental pain &
suffering unnecessarily w/ out any penological
justification nor in good faith effort to restore
discipline. I’ve been victimized by this widespread
abuse in all ways but never received any help @ all
nor treatment. Just retaliation (more abuse & threats
of more bodily harm).
Administrative Remedy: I’ve been trying to get the
institution to hold the video and audio for (1/17/18
approx 1 p for F-wing 1300 side) (2/9/18 F-wing 1300
side approx. 8:45 a, 2/9/18 B-wing approx. 9:30 a 2nd
floor) (2/19/18 B-wing 2nd floor approx. 1 p) (2/26/18
Bwing approx. 1:15 2nd floor) (2/24/18 Bwing 2nd
floor approx 5:45 p) per procedure 602.033(4) for
future litigation purposes & I ask the same here as
well as these problems be corrected.
Doc. 59-4 at 24. On April 12, 2018, the Office of the FDOC Secretary returned
the grievance appeal without action for failing to submit the grievance at the
appropriate level. Id. at 25. The response stated:
Your request for administrative appeal is in noncompliance with the Rules of the Department of
29

Corrections, Chapter 33-103, Inmate Grievance
Procedure. The rule requires that you first submit
your grievance at the appropriate level at the
institution. You have not done so or you have not
provided this office with a copy of that grievance, nor
have you provided a valid or acceptable reason for not
following the rules.
When making allegations of staff misconduct, provide
all pertinent information such as names, dates,
times, places and specific details.
Contact was made with institution grievance staff
who denied disposing of grievances and stated that
they process grievances that they receive. Our
records reflect that all formal grievances received
from you involving complaints against staff have
been responded to and returned to you.
Upon receipt of this response, if you are within the
allowable time frames for processing a grievance, you
may resubmit your grievance at your current location
in compliance with Chapter 33-103, Inmate
Grievance Procedure.
Based on the foregoing information, your appeal is
returned without action.
Id. Second, on March 25, 2018, Williams submitted a grievance appeal (#18-614218) in which he stated:
Direct Grievance
There is widespread physical, mental and sexual
abuse of close management inmates by correctional
officers of ALL ranks @ . . . FSP; and FSP Warden
B.V. Reddish has failed and continues to fail to
remedy that abuse, or has failed to implement
reasonable penological measures to stop that abuse.
As a result, FSP correctional officers physically,
30

mentally and sexually abused me during a series of
recent events that just ended in March 2018.
NOTE: I submitted several informal and formal
grievances regarding the above to the FSP grievance
collector, however, the grievance officers . . . say that
they never received those grievance[s]. The fact of the
matter is that [the grievance officers] have a custom
to trash grievances alleging abuse by correctional
officers. I need help. My physical and mental wellbeing continue to be @ risk of further abuse.
Id. at 22. On April 5, 2018, the Office of the FDOC Secretary returned this
grievance appeal for addressing more than one issue. Id. at 23. The response
stated:
Your request for administrative appeal is in noncompliance with Chapter 33-103, Inmate Grievance
Procedure, which states, “each grievance must
address only one issue or complaint.” Your current
request for administrative appeal addresses more
than one issue and/or complaint.
Your issues involve complaints against staff and the
grievance process. Each issue should be addressed
separately and should be initiated at the informal
level. Contact was previously made with institution
grievance staff who denied trashing grievances and
stated that they process grievances that they receive.
A review of your grievance record does not refute
their statement.
When making allegations of staff misconduct, provide
all pertinent information such as names, dates,
times, places and specific details.
Based on the foregoing information, your grievance
appeal is being returned.
31

Id.
The Court notes that Williams lists four other grievance appeals (#186-05582, #18-6-07520, #18-6-08682, and #18-6-06575) that he maintains are
also relevant to this lawsuit. See Williams’ Declaration at 4. Williams does
not, however, provide any details regarding the content of these grievances.
4. Turner Step One
Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court must review the
allegations in the Motion and Response and accept as true Williams’
allegations. See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209. If Williams’ allegations show a
failure to exhaust, then dismissal would be appropriate. Id.
Williams asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedies by
submitting several grievances regarding the claims at issue in this lawsuit.
See Williams’ Declaration at 4, 9. Williams also alleges that FSP staff
obstructed the grievance process by “trashing [his] filed grievances after
informing []Defendant S. Thompson,” thereby rendering the grievance
process unavailable to him. Id. at 5; see also Response at 3 (alleging that FSP
officials have been “destroying grievances pertaining to staff abuse, sexual
misconduct, and other serious grievances while allowing petty grievances to
be processed . . ., creating a situation where exhaustion of the grievance
process is nigh impossible and/or otherwise impeded[.]”). Accepting Williams’
view of the facts as true, the Court cannot dismiss his claims at the first step
32

of the Turner analysis. See Jackson v. Griffin, 762 F. App’x 744, 746 (11th
Cir. 2019) (holding disputes about availability of administrative remedies are
questions of fact that can bar dismissal at Turner’s first step).
5. Turner Step Two
As dismissal would not be appropriate based on Williams’ allegations,
the Court will proceed to Turner’s second step and make specific findings to
resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion. Here, the Court
initially finds that Williams exhausted his administrative remedies as to his
claims concerning the use of force during the February 9, 2018 cell extraction.
As to these claims, the grievance records establish that Williams bypassed
the institutional level and proceeded directly to the Office of the FDOC
Secretary by submitting grievance appeal #18-6-08110. See Doc. 59-4 at 8.
Although the FDOC Secretary denied this grievance appeal, the FDOC
Secretary’s response expressly stated that the “Use of Force on 02/09/2018”
had been referred to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Id. at 9.
Thereafter, in response to a subsequent grievance appeal (#18-6-14216), the
FDOC Secretary confirmed that Williams was not required to do anything
further to grieve these claims:
Your allegation of excessive force was addressed in
the response to appeal # 18-608110 advising you that
it was previously reported to the Office of the
Inspector General. Once your allegation has been
33

reported this
responsibility.

office

is

void

of

any

further

Id. at 21. Because Williams’ allegations regarding the use of force during the
cell extraction were referred to the OIG, the Court concludes that Williams
sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as to those claims.12 See
Hersh v. Scott, No. 3:22-cv-408-BJD-LLL, 2023 WL 2242551, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 27, 2023) (“[W]hen a prisoner files a grievance before filing a federal
action and, in response to that grievance, is informed that his allegations
have been reported for investigation—to the IG’s Office or another
authority—then, regardless of whether the responding official ‘denies’ or
‘approves’ the grievance, the prisoner may be deemed to have exhausted his
administrative remedies under the PLRA.”); Lanier v. Smith, No. 3:08-cv833-J-12JRK, 2009 WL 1758904, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 19, 2009) (exhaustion
requirement satisfied where the plaintiff was informed in three grievance
responses that the matter had been referred to the OIG for review and
consideration).13

In their Motion, Defendants seemingly acknowledge that Williams satisfied
his exhaustion obligation as to his allegations concerning the cell extraction. See
Motion at 14 (“The answer [Williams] received [to grievance appeal #18-6-08110]
was only to the extent that it addressed his allegations of excessive use of force and
was done so out of an abundance of caution to ensure that the allegation had been
referred to the Office of the Inspector General.”); id. at 17 (“[Williams] had no
approved informal or formal grievances and no approved or denied grievance
appeals concerning the claims in his complaint, except for excessive use of force.”).
13 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
12

34

As for Williams’ claims based on his placement on property restriction,
his allegations of retaliation, and his allegations concerning widespread
abuse of CM inmates, the Court finds these claims are unexhausted because
Williams did not comply with the FDOC’s sequential three-step grievance
process as to them. See Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1211 (recognizing that the
FDOC uses a three-step sequential process for inmate grievances that
includes an informal grievance, formal grievance, and appeal); Bryant, 530
F.3d at 1378 (“To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the
PLRA, prisoners must ‘properly take each step within the administrative
process.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir.
2005)). The record before the Court contains no evidence that Williams
submitted any informal grievances regarding his placement on property
restriction/strip status (either in January 2018 or after the cell extraction),
his allegations of retaliation, or his allegations concerning widespread abuse
of CM inmates. See Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2017)
(finding plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust were insufficient because he failed to file
an informal grievance and therefore, “did not comply with the sequential
three-step grievance procedure”). And although Williams attempted to bypass
the institutional level and submit grievance appeals regarding these claims,
Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).
35

his grievance appeals were either denied or returned without action due to
Williams’ failure to comply with FDOC’s procedural requirements. “Proper
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Two of Williams’ grievance
appeals (#18-6-14216 and #18-6-14218) were returned for addressing more
than one issue and/or complaint. See Doc. 59-4 at 21, 23. Another five
grievance appeals (#18-6-15170, #18-6-08683, #18-6-08999, #18-6-10629, and
#18-6-10631) were returned because Williams did not first submit a grievance
at the appropriate level at the institution or provide a valid reason for not
doing so. Id. at 11, 13, 15, 19, 25. And in Williams’ eighth grievance appeal
(#18-6-08110), while his use of force allegations were referred to the OIG, the
FDOC Secretary stated that Williams’ remaining allegations in the appeal,
which concerned his placement on property restriction, were a “separate
issue” that needed to “be grieved as such . . . and initiated at the appropriate
level.” Id. at 9. Because Williams did not complete the FDOC’s sequential
grievance process and because his grievance appeals did not comply with the
FDOC’s grievance procedures, the Court finds that Williams did not exhaust
his claims based on his placement on property restriction, retaliation, or
widespread abuse of CM inmates. See Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157-58
(“[U]nless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the

36

rules the state has established for that process, exhaustion has not occurred.”
(quoting Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023)).
To the extent that Williams suggests any failure to exhaust should be
excused because the grievance process was unavailable to him, that
argument fails. “While the burden is on the defendant to show an available
administrative remedy, once that burden has been met, the burden of going
forward shifts to the plaintiff, who, pursuant to Turner, must demonstrate
that the grievance procedure was ‘subjectively’ and ‘objectively’ unavailable
to him.” Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2020)
(citing Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085); id. at 1356 n.14 (“But once the [prison
official] has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative
remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were
unavailable to him.” (quoting Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d
Cir. 2018))). Here, Williams asserts grievance officials at FSP thwarted his
grievance efforts by destroying his grievances. See Response at 3. This selfserving and unsupported assertion, however, is belied by Williams’ history of
filing grievances. During the time period at issue, Williams submitted thirtynine grievances. See Docs. 59-4 and 59-7. All of these grievances produced
responses. Id. Williams’ abundant grievance record during the relevant time
period undercuts his assertion that his efforts were thwarted by prison
officials. See Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding
37

the district court properly considered the plaintiff’s history of filing
grievances “as evidence that the defendants did not make administrative
remedies unavailable to him or lose or destroy his grievances.”). Williams
therefore fails to demonstrate that the grievance process was unavailable to
him.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Motion is due to
be granted to the extent Williams failed to exhaust: (1) his Eighth
Amendment claim against Officer Thompson for placing Williams on strip
status from January 17 - 20, 2018, and after the cell extraction from
February 9, 2018, to March 6, 2018; (2) his First Amendment retaliation
claim against Officer Thompson; and (3) his Eighth Amendment claim
against Warden Reddish. These claims are dismissed without prejudice and
the Clerk is directed to terminate Warden Reddish as a Defendant. In light of
Warden Reddish’s dismissal, Williams’ request for injunctive relief—which he
sought solely against Warden Reddish—is due to be dismissed as moot.
Williams may proceed on his exhausted claims, which are:
(1) FSP’s extraction team violated Williams’ Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they used excessive force
during the cell extraction, or alternatively, when they failed to intervene and
stop other team members from using force during the extraction;

38

(2) FSP’s extraction team violated Florida state law when they
committed battery, aggravated battery, and felony battery during the cell
extraction; and
(3) Officer Thompson violated Williams’ Eighth Amendment rights
when he failed to intervene and stop the extraction team from using excessive
force during the cell extraction.
The Court will now turn to Defendants’ remaining arguments in their
Motion regarding Williams’ exhausted Eighth Amendment claims.
B. Merits of Exhausted Eighth Amendment Claims14
1. Applicable Law
In Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020), the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed “the principles applicable to Eighth Amendment
excessive-force and sexual-assault” claims. In doing so, the Court instructed:
The Eighth Amendment, among other things,
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” qualifies under the Eighth Amendment as
proscribed “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117
L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has instructed that what rises to the level of an
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” differs
In their Motion, Defendants do not separately address the merits of
Williams’ state law claims for battery, aggravated battery, and felony battery. As
such, the Court’s merits analysis is limited to the exhausted Eighth Amendment
claims.
14

39

based on the type of Eighth Amendment violation
alleged. Id.
Since [the plaintiff] asserts excessive-force and
sexual-assault claims, “the core judicial inquiry”
requires [the Court] to consider “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175
(citation and quotation marks omitted).[15] This
standard requires a prisoner to establish two
elements – one subjective and one objective: the
official must have both “acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind” (the subjective element), and
the conduct must have been “objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995 (cleaned up).
With respect to the subjective element, “to have
a valid claim on the merits of excessive force in
violation of [the Eighth Amendment], the excessive
force must have been sadistically and maliciously
applied for the very purpose of causing harm.”
Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir.
2002); see also Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288,
1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
As for the objective component of an excessiveforce violation, it focuses on whether the official’s
actions were “harmful enough,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at
8, 112 S.Ct. 995, or “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d
271 (1991), to violate the Constitution. “Not every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130
S.Ct. 1175. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes
from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of
physical force, provided that the use of force is not of
15

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam).
40

a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at
37-38, 130 S.Ct. 1175. Instead, the Eighth
Amendment
prohibits
force
that
offends
“contemporary standards of decency,” regardless of
whether “significant injury is evident,” though the
extent of injury may shed light on the amount of force
applied or “whether the use of force could plausibly
have been thought necessary.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at
37, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Id. at 1265-66; see also McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App’x 903, 905 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam). In determining whether an officer’s use of force was
applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm, courts
consider five distinct factors:
(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of
force; (3) the relationship between that need and the
amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent
of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on
the basis of facts known to them.
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). When considering
these factors, courts must “give a ‘wide range of deference to prison officials
acting to preserve discipline and security,’ including when considering
‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d
1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533
(11th Cir. 1990)).
41

Notably, a lack of serious injury, while not dispositive, is relevant to the
inquiry. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (per curiam); Smith v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 524 F. App’x 511, 513 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The
United States Supreme Court has explained:
“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one
factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force
could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a
particular situation.” Ibid.[16] (quoting Whitley,
supra, at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury
may also provide some indication of the amount of
force applied. . . . An inmate who complains of a
“‘push or shove’” that causes no discernible injury
almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force
claim. Id. at 9 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).[17]
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly
correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.
An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does
not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim
merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
A plaintiff who suffers only de minimis injury does
not necessarily lack a claim for excessive force under
§ 1983. Stephens,[18] 852 F.3d at 1328 n.33; Saunders
v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014).
However, the resulting injuries can be evidence of the
kind or degree of force that was used by the officer.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may
later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s
constitutional rights.”).
18 Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2017).
16
17

42

See Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir.
2021).
Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 700 (11th Cir. 2021).
Even if not actively involved in a use of force, “an officer can be liable
for failing to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.” Priester v.
City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 924 (11th Cir. 2000); Ensley v.
Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407-08 (11th Cir. 1998). This liability, however, only
arises when the officer is able to intervene and fails to do so. See Keating v.
City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 764 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Fils v. City of
Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1290 n.21 (11th Cir. 2011); Brown v. City of
Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 740 n.25 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Because the relevant
events happened so quickly, the record does not reflect any point at which
[the officer] could have intervened to prevent [another officer’s] use of
excessive force. . . .”).
2. Analysis
Defendants argue in their Motion that they are entitled to summary
judgment because (1) a hand-held video recording of the extraction
contradicts Williams’ version of the facts, see Motion at 20-29, (2) the
undisputed facts establish that they did not apply excessive force during the
extraction, id. at 22-29, and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity, id. at
33-36. In support of these arguments, Defendants submitted Williams’
43

deposition, the hand-held video recording of the cell extraction, Williams’
disciplinary reports, and the declaration of FSP Assistant Warden William
Bennett. See Doc. 59-1 (Williams’ Deposition); see also Docs. 59-2, 59-6. In
response, Williams has submitted the Williams’ Statement and the Williams’
Declaration.
In his deposition, Williams testified as follows regarding the cell
extraction:
[The extraction team took] me into the cell,
which again they were not supposed to enter the cell
at the same time that I was in there, and [Defendant]
Thompson blocked the camera with his back.
They was [sic] punching me, punching me in
my testicles, punching me in my stomach, grabbing
my testicles, punching me, pulling, twisting,
punching. One of them stuck their finger in my anus
through the boxers. [Defendant] Scott was sticking
his finger in my eye trying to press it all the way in.
He did that to both eyes. I was on my stomach while
he was doing all of that. [Defendant] Scott was
pushing his finger in my eye. Whenever he was at the
top, he was at my head, he was pushing his finger in
my eye and putting his body weight behind it. Then
when they get me on my back they were still doing
the same thing. [Defendant] Scott went for my right
eye when I was on my stomach, and then when they
took me to my back he went to my left eye.
And while they was [sic] doing that they got the
shackles on [me], the waist chain [on me]. Then they
backed out with me on my stomach and they closed
the door. [After that] [t]hey told me to come to the
door and give them the restraints and that’s what I
did.

44

See Williams’ Deposition at 15-16. In the Williams’ Declaration, Williams
provides additional detail regarding the cell extraction.19 Specifically,
Williams states that the cell extraction occurred after prison officials made
the decision to place him on property restriction for a false reason that his
cell was in disarray. See Williams’ Declaration at 7. After he packed his
personal property, Williams asserts that FSP staff placed him in full body
restraints consisting of “leg irons/black box/waist chain” near the shower
unit. Id. The FSP extraction team then escorted Williams to cell B-1209 in
the bravo housing wing at FSP. Id. Upon arriving at cell B-1209, Williams
asserts that Defendant Thompson ordered the extraction team to take
Williams inside the cell while Williams was still in full body restraints. Id.
Williams alleges that he was aware of a history of FSP staff abusing inmates
“while inside of [extraction] cell[s] off camera,” and he therefore verbally
refused to go inside the cell and held on to the door handle. Id. Williams
states the extraction team then “yanked” him inside the cell; Defendant Scott
“placed all his body weight on [Williams’] head with his [r]ight hand and
repeatedly used his thumb to poke and push [Williams’] right eye . . . [and]
when [Williams] was turned on his back, [Scott] then rotated to the left eye
as well”; other extraction team members punched and grabbed his “[b]ody

Williams states that he filed the Declaration under penalty of perjury in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See Williams’ Declaration at 1.
19

45

area/private area/neck/face”; and one of the extraction team members
“tampered with [Williams’] anus by ramming his finger in [Williams’] anus
through his boxers” and squeezed and pulled on Williams’ testicles. Id. at 7-8.
Williams states the extraction team removed his shackles and waist chain
before they left the cell. Id. at 8. Williams alleges he immediately yelled
“PREA and staff abuse” after the extraction team left the cell. Id. According
to Williams, a nurse responded to the housing wing and questioned Williams
at the cell front. Id. Williams refused to exit the cell to go to medical for an
assessment because he knew he would be escorted “by the same [defendants]
who violated [his] rights.” Id.
Turning to the evidence submitted by Defendants, a disciplinary report
dated February 9, 2018, states in pertinent part that:
[Williams] is being charged with 6-1: “Disobeying
Verbal or Written Order - Any Order Given to an
Inmate or Inmates by a Staff Member or Other
Authorized Person”, Rule of Prohibited Conduct 33601.314, FAC. At approximately 7:00am on Friday,
February 9, 2018, while assigned as a Foxtrot Wing
housing officer, I was conducting a security check and
ordered all inmates on all 3 floors to bring their cells
into compliance in accord[ance] with the Close
Management housing rules. At approximately
7:30am, while conducting formal count procedures
with Sergeant R. Anderson, I again ordered all
inmates to bring their cells into compliance, at which
time Inmate Williams refused. I contacted
Lieutenant S. Thompson. Upon his arrival,
Lieutenant Thompson observed Inmate Williams’ cell
and ordered him to bring his cell into compliance at
46

which time he refused. The duty Warden, Colonel M.
Honour was contacted and authorized Inmate
Williams to be placed on 72-hr property restriction.
The shift OIC was notified and advised me to follow
through with this formal disciplinary report as
provided in section 33-601.303, FAC.
Doc. 59-2 at 4 (cleaned up).
In his declaration, Bennett states in relevant part that on February 9,
2018, Williams received “disciplinary [c]onfinement [for] Disobeying Verbal
or Written Order, . . . Given [t]o an Inmate or Inmates by [a] Staff Member . .
., [in] violation of F.A.C., Rule of Prohibited Conduct 33-601.314.” Doc. 59-6 at
4-5. Bennett states that as a result, Williams was transferred from cell
“F1317S to B1209” and placed on 72-hour property restriction. Id. at 5.
The hand-held video recording begins at 9:33 a.m. in front of cell F1317, with an officer, who does not identify himself, providing a historical
statement of the situation. The officer states that Williams refused to comply
with directives to make his bed and fix his cell, that the officer himself
witnessed the cell in disarray, and that Colonel Honour authorized the use of
FSP’s extraction team. Williams is verbally combative with the officer,
cussing at the officer at times, but otherwise complies with the officer’s
directives to remove his clothing, except for his boxers, and to submit to
restraints. At approximately 9:37 a.m., another unidentified officer removes
Williams from cell F-1317 and walks him to the end of the cell block where
47

FSP’s extraction team is waiting to escort Williams to cell B-1209. Williams is
in leg shackles, handcuffs, and waist restraints. Two members of FSP’s
extraction team take Williams by each arm and escort him downstairs and
down a hallway to the cell block where cell B-1209 is located. Although not
visible in the recording, following behind them are the other three members
of the extraction team.
At timestamp 10:44 in the video, the extraction team reaches the front
of cell B-1209 with Williams. The extraction team member who is holding on
to Williams’ left arm attempts to pull Williams inside the cell. Williams says
something to the officers, at which point commands can be heard telling the
extraction team to “pull him in there.” Williams momentarily holds on to the
cell door with one hand to stop the two extraction team members from pulling
him inside the cell. Within ten seconds, the two extraction team members
have Williams inside the cell and he is seen semi-kneeling on the bunk. A
directive is given to “lay [Williams] down and take the leg irons off,” at which
point the remaining three extraction team members enter the cell. Williams
is pushed face-down on the bunk, and four extraction team members are
shown holding Williams down as the fifth member stands on top of the bunk
to remove the leg restraints. Williams is told “to quit tensing up.” After the
leg restraints are removed, FSP staff outside the cell hand keys to the
extraction team to remove Williams’ waist restraints. After the waist
48

restraints are removed, the extraction team members use a shield and exit
the cell. The entire encounter inside cell B-1209 lasts approximately two
minutes. Williams then complies with orders to come to the cell door so that
his handcuffs can be removed. Williams’ cuffs are removed at approximately
9:45 a.m. Williams states he has a PREA complaint, and a nurse approaches
his cell door minutes later. Williams refuses to leave his cell so that he can be
escorted to medical for an assessment.
Defendants are correct that generally “[w]here [a] video obviously
contradicts [a plaintiff’s] version of the facts, we accept the video’s depiction
instead of [the [p]laintiff’s account.” Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d
1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81
(2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on
a motion for summary judgment.”). But that is not the situation presented in
this case. Upon review of the video, the Court finds Defendants’ assertion
that the hand-held video recording clearly contradicts Williams’ version of the
facts to be unavailing. While the video reflects that the encounter is relatively
brief and does not appear to be violent, the recording does not foreclose
Williams’ version of the facts. The view into cell B-1209 is obstructed at times
by the extraction team members’ bodies. Indeed, due to the position of the
49

extraction team members in relation to Williams’ body on the bunk, the video
does not allow a viewer to see where some of the Defendants’ hands are or
what they are doing. Notably for much of the encounter, the viewer cannot
see Williams’ face – where he claims a defendant poked fingers in his eyes
nor can the viewer see his rear – where he alleges that he was sexually
assaulted. And because the hand-held camera remains outside cell B-1209
throughout the entire encounter, the Court cannot discern what some of the
extraction team members are doing to subdue Williams. Additionally, at
various points in the recording, the fifth extraction team member (who
removed the leg restraints) stands on top of or in front of the bunk, such that
the camera’s view of Williams’ body is entirely blocked. Indeed, only
Williams’ feet are clearly visible at some points in the recording. In short, the
video recording does not constitute indisputable evidence that contradicts
Williams’ account of what occurred inside the cell.
Thus, there remain genuine disputes of material fact as to whether
Williams resisted the extraction team’s efforts during the encounter, and
what, if any, force the extraction team applied to subdue Williams. There are
also disputed issues of fact regarding whether Defendant Thompson was in a
position to intervene.20 Accepting Williams’ version of the events as true,

Indeed, because the extraction team members and Defendant Thompson
failed to identify themselves on camera, the Court cannot rely on the video
20

50

which the Court must at this juncture, the Court concludes that Defendants
are not entitled to summary judgment on Williams’ exhausted Eighth
Amendment claims. See Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1263 (“Summary judgment is
not a time for fact-finding; that task is reserved for trial. Rather, on summary
judgment, the district court must accept as fact all allegations the nonmoving party makes, provided they are sufficiently supported by evidence of
record. So when competing narratives emerge on key events, courts are not at
liberty to pick which side they think is more credible. Indeed, if the only issue
is one of credibility, the issue is factual, and a court cannot grant summary
judgment.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As to Defendants’ qualified immunity argument, because Williams
asserts facts that, accepted as true, would amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation under clearly established law, Defendants also are not entitled to
the benefit of qualified immunity.21 See Dobbins v. Giles, 451 F. App’x 849,
851 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that when a plaintiff asserting an excessive
force claim “has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment demonstrating that the officer used force
recording to ascertain Defendant Thompson’s location during the encounter.
21 In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,
courts view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff to the extent supported by the record, and then consider “the legal issue of
whether the plaintiff’s ‘facts,’ if proven, show that the defendant violated clearly
established law.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir.
2000); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007).
51

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, he has necessarily established the
two prongs required to defeat a defense of qualified immunity”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1266 (holding that forceful
digital penetration of the prisoner’s anus clearly met the objective and
subjective components of an Eighth Amendment claim); DeJesus v. Lewis, 14
F.4th 1182, 1196 n.2, 1197 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting that “clothed sexualized
touching” may also qualify as a sexual assault in violation of the Eighth
Amendment).22 Thus, Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied as to the
exhausted Eighth Amendment claims.
C. De Minimis Injury
Next, Defendants argue that Williams is not entitled to compensatory
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because he cannot demonstrate that he
suffered more than de minimis physical injuries resulting from Defendants’
alleged actions during the cell extraction. See Motion at 39-42. Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” To satisfy § 1997e(e), a
Because only some “clothed sexualized touching” qualifies as a sexual
assault in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a fact-finder must evaluate on a
case-by-case basis whether such allegations constitute a sexual assault in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. See DeJesus, 14 F.4th at 1196 n.12, 1197. In this case,
such a determination is not possible at the summary judgment stage in light of the
disputed issues of material fact.
22

52

prisoner must assert a physical injury that is more than de minimis. Brooks
v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015). Alternatively, a prisoner
may bring an action for mental or emotional injury with a prior showing of
the commission of a “sexual act” as defined in § 2246. Section 2246(2)(D)
defines a “sexual act” to include “the penetration, however slight, of the anal
or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person . . . .” In addition, in cases where a prisoner alleges a
sexual assault by a prison official, the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
In order for a prisoner to meet his burden on all
elements of his Eighth Amendment claim, . . . he
need only show that the prison official committed a
sexual assault. This means that the finders of fact
need not consider the amount of force applied, the
extent of the injury inflicted, or any effort the official
made to temper the severity of the force used.
Requiring a jury to make findings about the amount
of force or the extent of the injury in cases involving
sexual assault improperly suggests that some forms
of sexual assault may be de minimis and thus do not
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1259; see also id. at
1272 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (“[P]hysical sexual
assaults by correctional officers of inmates violate the
Eighth Amendment because no matter how difficult
the inmate is, the official is never justified in
punishing him in this manner.”).
DeJesus, 14th F.4th at 1197.

53

Here, as discussed above, the video evidence does not foreclose
Williams’ assertion that an extraction team member sexually assaulted him
during the cell extraction by penetrating his anus through his clothing. See
Williams’ Deposition at 15 (testifying that the extraction team members
punched and grabbed his testicles, and that “[o]ne of them stuck their finger
in my anus through the boxers”); Williams’ Declaration at 8 (asserting that
one of the extraction team members “tampered with [Williams’] anus by
ramming his finger in [Williams’] anus through his boxers”). In addition,
Williams presents evidence that he suffered other physical and mental
injuries as a result of the cell extraction. See Williams’ Deposition at 16
(testifying that he suffered injuries to his lower back, eyes, waist, hands,
arms, and anus); id. at 27 (testifying that his pre-existing mental injuries
were exacerbated). Defendants attempt to refute Williams’ allegations by
supplying his medical records, see Docs. 59-8 to 59-15, as well as the
declaration of legal nurse consultant Kellie Caswell, see Doc. 59-8 at 2-4.
However, in doing so, they only confirm the existence of issues of fact to be
resolved by a jury.
Upon review of the record, the Court concludes there are disputed
issues for trial as to whether Williams suffered physical injuries that are
more than de minimis. Additionally, if Williams is able to establish at trial
that an extraction team member sexually assaulted him during the
54

extraction, he may be able to recover compensatory damages for mental or
emotional injuries regardless of whether he sustained physical injuries. As
such, the Motion is due to be denied to the extent that the Court finds
Williams’ request for compensatory damages is not precluded under §
1997e(e).
D. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that Williams’ request for punitive damages must be
dismissed because it is statutorily barred. See Motion at 43-45. According to
Defendants, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) precludes punitive damages in all civil
rights cases because such damages constitute “prospective relief.” Id. at 43.
In support of their contention, Defendants argue punitive damages “are never
necessary to correct a violation of a [f]ederal right.” Id. They also contend that
even if an award of punitive damages is necessary to correct such a legal
violation, that award could not satisfy the PLRA’s “stringent limitations” as
the relief is neither “narrowly drawn” nor “the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the [f]ederal right.” Id. at 44. In response,
Williams

argues that

punitive

damages are

warranted

to

“punish

[D]efendants for their conduct and deter them . . . from committing similar
acts in the future.” Response at 7.
Section 3626(a)(1)(A) provides:

55

(1) Prospective relief. – (A) Prospective relief in any
civil action with respect to prison conditions shall
extend no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff
or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,
and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct
the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public
safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Defendants are correct that punitive damages are
considered “prospective relief” under § 3626. See Johnson v. Breeden, 280
F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding “punitive damages are prospective
relief”), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 395 (2015). But Defendants’ argument that punitive damages, as
“prospective relief” under § 3626, are precluded in prisoner civil rights actions
is misguided. Defendants cite Johnson in support of their argument; but in
Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit did not hold that punitive damages were
unavailable under § 3626 for § 1983 cases. Instead, in Johnson, the Eleventh
Circuit clarified, in the context of a § 1983 civil rights case, that §
3626(a)(1)(A) merely provides the framework for awarding punitive damages.
280 F.3d at 1325. It explained “a punitive damages award must be no larger
than reasonably necessary to deter the kind of violations of the federal right
that occurred in the case . . . [and] that such awards should be imposed
56

against no more defendants than necessary to serve that deterrent function
and that they are the least intrusive way of doing so.” Id.
While the Court is unaware of an Eleventh Circuit case that has
addressed Defendants’ specific argument here, the Court cannot disregard
the Eleventh Circuit’s long-standing recognition that punitive damages are
available in prisoner civil rights actions. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages for § 1983
claims without a physical injury requirement. Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d
1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2021). And it has held “[p]unitive damages are
appropriate in § 1983 cases ‘where a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil
intent or involves callous or reckless indifference to federally protected
rights.” Barnett v. MacArthur, 715 F. App’x 894, 905 (11th Cir. 2017). In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instructions on § 1983
damages include an instruction on awarding punitive damages. See Eleventh
Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil Cases, Civil Rights—42 U.S.C. § 1983
Claims—Damages § 5.13.
The Court also finds persuasive other district court decisions explicitly
finding that § 3626(a)(1)(A) does not preclude an award of punitive damages
in prisoner civil cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Semple, No. 3:16-cv-376, 2018 WL
4308564, at *14 (D. Conn. Sept. 10, 2018) (collecting cases); Douglas v.
Byunghak Jin, No. 11-0350, 2014 WL 1117934, at *4-5 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 20,
57

2014) (reasoning that if Congress “intended to abolish punitive damages in
all prisoner litigation under the PLRA, it would have done so directly, and in
much plainer terms”). Thus, the Court finds that § 3626 does not preclude a
request for punitive damages in this § 1983 action, and the Motion is due to
be denied on this issue.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Williams’ “Reply and Objection(s) to Defendant’s Reply to

Plaintiff’s Response(s) to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc.
73) is STRICKEN.
2.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED to the
extent Williams failed to exhaust his: (1) Eighth Amendment claim against
Officer Thompson for placing Williams on strip status between January 17th
to 20th, 2018, and February 9, 2018, to March 6, 2018; (2) First Amendment
retaliation claim against Officer Thompson; and (3) Eighth Amendment claim
against Warden Reddish. These claims are dismissed without prejudice.
In addition, Williams’ request for injunctive relief is dismissed as moot. In
all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.
3.

The Clerk is directed to terminate Warden Reddish as a

Defendant in this case.
58

4.

This case is in a posture to proceed to a settlement conference

and, if settlement negotiations fail, to trial. At this stage of the proceedings,
the Court finds Williams is entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist
him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th
Cir. 1999). Thus, this case is REFERRED to the Jacksonville Division Civil
Pro Bono Appointment Program so the designated deputy clerk of the Court
may seek counsel to represent Williams. Due to the limited resources of the
program, the process of finding counsel may take some time. Therefore, the
Clerk is directed to stay and administratively close this case for sixty (60)
days, to allow the Court time to find a lawyer to represent Williams.
5.

The parties may engage in settlement negotiations while the case

is stayed and administratively closed, if they choose to do so. If settlement
negotiations are successful, the parties shall immediately notify the Court.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of
August, 2024.

Jax-10 08/20
C:
Andrew L. Williams, #E24132
Counsel of record
59