Miller v. Willis et al

Filing 107

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 98 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; referring the case to the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program. Signed by Senior Judge Brian J. Davis on 5/31/2024. (KLC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
WILLIS MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:21-cv-832-BJD-MCR

SGT. WILLIS, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, Willis Miller, an inmate of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDC), is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on an amended
complaint for the violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 12; Am.
Compl.) with exhibits (Docs. 1-2–1-13; Compl. Ex. 1–12). Plaintiff alleges
Defendants, five officers at Florida State Prison (FSP), used unnecessary force
against him on February 9, 2018, causing serious injuries that required
treatment at an outside hospital.1 See Am. Compl. at 10–12. He seeks damages,
including punitive, and injunctive relief. Id. at 13–14.

Plaintiff’s claims against a sixth Defendant, identified in the complaint as
“Bassermorn,” but later identified as “Bosserman,” were dismissed for Plaintiff’s
failure to timely serve this Defendant. See Order (Doc. 66). Defendant Walin is
identified by the last name “Gerow” in the amended complaint. Plaintiff later
corrected this Defendant’s name. See Order (Doc. 42).
1

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 98;
Def. Mot.) with an exhibit (Doc. 98-1; Def. Ex.). Plaintiff opposes the motion
(Doc. 99; Pl. Resp.) with his own exhibits (Docs. 99-1–99-10).2
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v.
Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A]
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate
of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

Plaintiff subsequently filed other documents, exhibits, and notices, without
seeking leave to supplement his response or without seeking any discernible relief
(Docs. 100, 103, 104, 105, 106). As such, the Court does not consider them but notes
that most documents filed in supplement to his response are duplicative of other
documents already on the docket or of facts and arguments already considered.
2

2

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on
a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving
party must point to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute
of material fact. Id. Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party opposing [the motion].” Haves v. City of Miami,
52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca
Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

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III. Facts
A. Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Allegations3
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the relevant events began
when Defendant Willis and another officer were escorting him from his cell to
a disciplinary report (DR) hearing. See Am. Compl. at 7. According to Plaintiff,
after he was fully shackled and removed from his cell, Defendant Willis began
“taunting” him, saying, “Yeah, I heard you were a ‘cho-mo’ [child molester], so
you better hope they throw your [DR] out, because if you stay on this wing,
we’re gonna have problems.” Id. Plaintiff admittedly stopped walking and sat
on the floor because he feared for his safety. Id. at 8. Defendant Willis and the
other officer then “started to ‘drag’ and ‘carry’ Plaintiff back to his assigned
cell,” without first contacting mental health, as Plaintiff claims is required
under the Florida Administrative Code (FAC) before an officer uses force on an
inmate with a mental health grade of S3. Id. at 8–9.4
Plaintiff further alleges that, after he was back inside his cell, Defendant
Willis “placed both knees on [his] back . . . and then proceeded to slap [him]
against his . . . face multiple times.” Id. at 9. Defendant Willis allegedly called

A plaintiff’s allegations in his verified complaint are to be given the same
weight as an affidavit. See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014).
3

Plaintiff also asserts Defendant Willis and the other officer violated other
provisions of the FAC when they “drag[ged]” him back to his cell. See Am. Compl. at
8–9.
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4

for assistance, and Defendants Dykes, Walin, Lavoie, and Halsey arrived but
instead of “interven[ing] [to] stop or prevent further injury,” they “began
punching repeat[ed]ly . . . Plaintiff’s upper body.” Id. at 10–11. Thereafter,
Defendant Willis allegedly “began kicking . . . Plaintiff . . . in the torso and
head area [and] then returned to punching [him] in the fac[e],” while the other
Defendants watched. Id. at 11.
Prison medical records reflect that Plaintiff suffered a hematoma to the
right side of his forehead, swelling around his left eye, and various lacerations
that caused “severe bleeding” and possibly needed sutures, necessitating a trip
to an outside hospital.5 See Compl. Ex. 5 at 2–3. At the hospital, Plaintiff
learned he also sustained a fractured nasal bone and fractured orbital floor.
See Compl. Ex. 3 at 2–3, 5. See also Compl. Ex. 7 at 4–5. Plaintiff provides
other medical and grievance records documenting or reporting additional
injuries he learned of after-the-fact, which he attributes to the February 9,
2018 use-of-force incident, including back pain, see Compl. Ex. 7 at 4; Compl.
Ex. 10 at 8–9, and pain and blurry vision in the left eye, see Compl. Ex. 8 at 2;
Compl. Ex. 10 at 11.

A force report provided by Defendants explains that Plaintiff was sent to an
outside hospital because the incident occurred at 5:30 a.m. when no doctor was on
duty. See Def. Ex. at 28.
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Plaintiff offers the affidavits of two inmates: Michael Love; and Bryant
Williams. See Compl. Ex. 4; Compl. Ex. 11. Inmate Love contends he
“witness[ed] . . . a[n] unn[ec]essary use of force” against Plaintiff on February
9, 2018. See Compl. Ex. 4 at 2. According to inmate Love, Defendant Dykes and
other unidentified officers “jumped on [Plaintiff] … in front of his cell.” Id. Love
contends the officers “beat” Plaintiff and tried to drag him inside his cell while
“he was unconscious.” Id. Inmate Bryant’s affidavit appears to address other
issues or incidents involving Plaintiff—he does not aver having witnessed the
incident that is the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint, nor does he say he has any
independent knowledge about the incident. See Compl. Ex. 11 at 2.
B. Defendants’ Position
Defendants provide use-of-force reports, which relay a narrative that
differs starkly from Plaintiff’s. See Def. Ex. at 2–3, 10–13. The only part of
Defendants’ narrative that aligns with Plaintiff’s is that Plaintiff sat on the
floor when Defendant Willis and another officer were escorting him to a DR
hearing. See id. at 2, 10, 12. Defendants Willis and Officer Jonathon Carnes
report that Plaintiff refused orders to stand and walk, so they “utilized [a] two
man carry technique [to] carr[y] [Plaintiff] back inside his [cell].” Id. at 10, 12.
They both report the following subsequent events, taken from Defendant
Willis’s force report:

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Upon entering the cell, [Plaintiff] spat on [Defendant
Willis] striking [him] in the upper torso area and then
head butted [Defendant Willis] in the lower left chin
area. [Defendant Willis] maintained [his] grasp of
[Plaintiff], and with the assistance of Officer Carnes …
forced [Plaintiff] face down to the cell floor. …
[Plaintiff] struck his forehead and the side of his face
on the floor. [Plaintiff] continued to be resistant by
twisting and contorting his body in an attempt to
break [Defendant Willis’s] grasp. Officer Carnes and
[Defendant Willis] released [their] grip of [Plaintiff]
and attempted to exit the cell. As [they] attempted to
exit the cell, [Plaintiff] jumped up from the cell floor
and charged at [Defendant Willis], and again head
butted [him] striking [him] in the facial area.
[Defendant Willis] redirected [Plaintiff] toward the
back of the cell and grasped him by his upper left arm
with both hands, and with the assistance of Officer
Carnes … forced [Plaintiff] to the bunk face down
landing between the cell wall and corner of the bunk.
… [Plaintiff] struck his forehead and mouth on the
edge of the bunk.
Id. at 10–13. Defendant Willis’s report notes that the “[i]ncident [was] captured
on fixed wing and/or handheld video,” but Defendants provide no video
evidence in support of their motion. See id. at 10. See also generally Def. Mot.
Other officers arrived after Plaintiff struck his face on the edge of his
bunk, at which time Defendant Willis and Officer Carnes were able to leave
the cell without using any additional force. See Def. Ex. at 11, 13. Defendants
Lavoie, Walin, and Dykes deny having witnessed the events that occurred
inside Plaintiff’s cell, and they deny having used force against Plaintiff other
than to assist him to a gurney to be taken to medical. See id. at 14, 16, 22.

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Defendant Dykes reports he “witnessed [Defendant] Willis and Officer
Jonathon Carnes utilize a two many carry to carry [Plaintiff] . . . to his assigned
cell . . . due to him refusing all orders to walk.” Id. at 22. Defendants Lavoie
and Walin report that they arrived after Defendant Willis and Officer Carnes
exited Plaintiff’s cell, when Plaintiff was “compl[ying]” with officers’ orders. Id.
at 14, 16. They report that Plaintiff “refused to stand and walk,” so they, along
with two other officers, “four man carried [Plaintiff] to the second floor
quarterdeck,” where a gurney was waiting to transport him to the medical unit.
Id.
C. Plaintiff’s Response6
Plaintiff contends in his response that all officers who completed a force
report are “telling a lie.” See Pl. Resp. at 6. He claims he “never refused to
comply with any officer[s’] order, and he repeats that he sat on the floor
initially because Defendant Willis threatened him. Id. at 7–9. He denies having
head-butted or spat on anyone. Id. at 9.
IV. Legal Analysis & Conclusions of Law
Defendants invoke qualified immunity, arguing the undisputed facts
show that officers were justified in using force to subdue Plaintiff because

The exhibits Plaintiff provides in support of his response are mostly
duplicative of many he filed with his amended complaint or of those Defendants
provide with their motion.
6

8

Plaintiff refused to comply with officers’ commands and attacked Defendant
Willis. See Def. Mot. at 1–3, 10–11, 21. They also assert Plaintiff’s request for
punitive damages is statutorily barred. Id. at 1, 11.
A. Qualified Immunity
Prison officials sued in their individual capacities are “entitled to
qualified immunity for [their] discretionary actions unless [they] violated
‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir.
2016) (quoting Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Qualified immunity allows government employees to exercise their official
duties without fear of facing personal liability. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944,
951 (11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine protects all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. In other
words, even if a prison official makes a decision that is later found to be
constitutionally deficient, the official is entitled to qualified immunity if the
decision was based on a reasonable misapprehension of the law. Taylor v.
Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198
(2004)).
Upon invoking qualified immunity, a defendant bears the initial burden
to demonstrate he was performing discretionary duties at the relevant times.
Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were acting
9

within the scope of their discretionary duties as corrections officers when the
incident occurred. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff, who must point to
facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate each Defendant violated a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. Id. (“Because §
1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s
acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation,’ each defendant is
entitled to an independent qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or
her actions and omissions.”).
The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological
justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). At the same
time, it is well understood that prison guards, who are charged with
maintaining order and protecting inmates and staff, may use force when
necessary. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); Williams v. Burton,
943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, courts must balance an
inmate’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment with a prison
official’s obligation to ensure a safe and secure institution. Ort, 813 F.2d at
321–22.
An inmate against whom force is used to restore order demonstrates an
Eighth Amendment violation “only if the measure taken ‘inflicted unnecessary
and wanton pain and suffering’ caused by force used ‘maliciously and
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sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575
(emphasis is original). Whether an officer used more force than necessary to
quell a disturbance or regain control of a prisoner requires courts to consider
various factors, including the need for force, the extent of force used in relation
to the prisoner’s conduct, the threat of harm the prisoner posed to staff and
inmates, whether the officer tried to “temper the severity of a forceful
response,” and the injuries inflicted. See id.; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (“Whitley
factors”). See also Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).
In considering the Whitley factors, courts should “give a wide range of
deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security.” Cockrell
v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has
stressed,
[C]ourts must determine whether the evidence goes
beyond a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a
particular use of force or the existence of arguably
superior alternatives. Unless it appears that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of
wantonness in the infliction of pain under the
standard we have described, the case should not go to
the jury.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. Nonetheless, if an officer reasonably uses force to
quell a disturbance, the force should cease once the behavior giving rise to the
need for force abates. Ort, 813 F.2d at 324. When an officer uses excessive force
against an inmate, officers who are present and can intervene but do not can
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be held liable. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir.
2007) (“The law of this circuit is that an officer who is present at the scene and
who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use
of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff complains that the following conduct
constituted excessive force: Defendant Willis (and another officer) carried or
dragged him to his cell after he sat on the floor; Defendant Willis placed both
knees on his back and slapped him in the face; and all Defendants “severely
beat[]” him while he was fully restrained inside his cell, including punching
him, kicking him, and stomping on him, or failed to intervene. See Am. Compl.
at 8–12. See also Compl. Ex. 4 at 2.
With respect to the first use-of-force involving only Defendant Willis (i.e.,
the two-man carry), the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff sat on the floor
when he was on his way to a DR hearing and that Defendant Willis and
another officer carried or “drag[ged]” him back to his cell. See Am. Compl. at 7;
Def. Ex. at 10, 12. Even though Plaintiff denies having disobeyed any officers’
orders, see Pl. Resp. at 7, he concedes that he sat on the floor instead of walking
to the DR hearing, see Am. Compl. at 7. Regardless of the reason Plaintiff
refused to walk and sat down instead, such conduct by a prisoner is
tantamount to disobeying a lawful order.
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Affording Defendant Willis “a wide range of deference” in maintaining
prison security, the Whitley factors balance in his favor based on this conduct:
there was a need to use some force given Plaintiff defied direct or indirect
orders to walk; the extent of force used was minimal and appeared to have been
tempered; objectively, Plaintiff’s conduct does not appear to have posed harm
to himself, staff, or other inmates, but the Court accepts that having a
disobedient inmate sitting on the floor of a prison wing could cause security
concerns; and Plaintiff sustained no injuries from the two-man carry.
Under the undisputed facts, the Court finds Defendant Willis’s use of a
two-many carry does not amount to excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, and he is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity on this portion
of the claim. This is so even if Defendant Willis violated provisions of the FAC.
See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995) (explaining that prison
regulations do not confer rights on inmates but guide corrections officials in
carrying out their duties); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002)
(“[Section] 1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights
‘secured’ elsewhere, i.e., rights independently ‘secured by the Constitution and
laws’ of the United States.”).
Although the Court finds Defendant Willis was justified in carrying
Plaintiff back to his cell, the parties tell sharply conflicting stories about what
happened thereafter. Through a verified amended complaint and at least one
13

witness statement, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Willis, Dykes, Walin, Lavoie,
and Halsey gratuitously beat or “jumped” him or watched him being beaten
without intervening. On the other hand, Defendants claim Plaintiff spat on
and twice head-butted Defendant Willis, which prompted a reactionary use-offorce by Defendant Willis that was not witnessed by any other Defendant.
When two parties’ stories conflict, neither of which is blatantly
contradicted by indisputable evidence, a district court may not make credibility
determinations in favor of one party over the other. See Sears v. Roberts, 922
F.3d 1199, 1206, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s entry
of summary judgment in favor of the officer-defendants because the officers’
documentary evidence, including disciplinary reports and affidavits, consisted
of “various forms of their own testimony,” which directly contradicted
Plaintiff’s sworn allegations). Defendants offer no indisputable evidence, such
as video footage, that blatantly contradicts Plaintiff’s account of the incident,
which the Court must accept as true. See Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918,
921 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining a district court considering a motion for
summary judgment “must view all evidence and make all reasonable
inferences” in the non-movant’s favor). The record presents “a classic swearing
match, which is the stuff of which jury trials are made.” Sears, 922 F.3d at
1208 (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir.
2013)).
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Because Plaintiff asserts facts that, accepted as true, amount to an
Eighth Amendment violation under clearly established law, Defendants are
not entitled to qualified immunity. See Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310
(11th Cir. 2008) (“‘[T]here is no room for qualified immunity’ in . . . excessive
force cases because they require a subjective element that is ‘so extreme’ that
no reasonable person could believe that his actions were lawful.” (quoting
Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002))), overruled in
part on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th
Cir. 2010). See also Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1302, 1304–05 (holding the district
court properly denied qualified immunity to officers who collectively
participated in or witnessed “a severe beating [administered for] no other
purpose than [to] inflict[] pain”).
B. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) precludes an award of
punitive damages. See Def. Mot. at 11–12. Their argument, however, is
unconvincing. On the one hand, they assert, “Punitive damages are statutorily
barred,” citing § 3626(a)(1)(A), but on the other hand, they concede that “[§]
3626(a)(1)(A) applies to punitive damages” and that the Eleventh Circuit has
not interpreted this section to “bar punitive damages.” See id. at 11, 12, 14–15
(emphasis added) (citing Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1325–26 (11th

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Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 395 (2015)).7
Neither the statutory text nor the Eleventh Circuit’s Johnson opinion
supports Defendants’ argument. The relevant statutory provision does not bar
any relief but rather sets forth strict parameters under which prospective relief
may be awarded in a prison conditions civil rights case. It provides:
(1) Prospective relief. – (A) Prospective relief in any
civil action with respect to prison conditions shall
extend no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff
or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,
and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct
the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public
safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit held that punitive
damages constitute “prospective relief” and, as such, any punitive damages
award must satisfy the strict parameters delineated in § 3626(a)(1)(A). See 280
F.3d at 1325 (“Because Congress has provided that punitive damages are
prospective relief, we must give the requirements of § 3626(a)(1)(A) some

Defendants state in a footnote that they raise the argument “to preserve the
issue for appellate review.” See Def. Mot. at 14 n.1.
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meaning in the context of punitive damages.”). Finding Defendants’ argument
unconvincing, their motion will be denied with respect to this argument.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Defendants’

motion

for

summary

judgment

(Doc.

98)

is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED only to
the extent that Defendant Willis is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim
that he used excessive force when he two-man carried Plaintiff to his cell for
Plaintiff’s refusal to walk. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
2.

This case is in a posture to proceed to settlement conference and,

if settlement negotiations fail, to trial. The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to
the appointment of counsel to assist him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v.
Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, this case is REFERRED
to the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program so the
designated deputy clerk of the Court may seek counsel to represent Plaintiff.
The Court encourages the parties to attempt to settle the case privately in the
meantime. If settlement negotiations are successful, the parties shall
immediately notify the Court.

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DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 31st day of May
2024.

Jax-6
c:
Willis Miller
Counsel of Record

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