Keaton v. Cartwright et al
Filing
73
ORDER granting 62 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff; terminate any pending motions; and close the case. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 1/27/2025. (JND)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ROBERT JAMES KEATON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:22-cv-311-MMH-LLL
JAMES CARTWRIGHT, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Robert James Keaton, an inmate of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights
Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding on an Amended
Complaint (Amended Complaint; Doc. 25), with exhibits (Docs. 25-1 through
25-8). Keaton names seven Defendants: (1) James B. Cartwright; (2) Anthony
L. Smith; (3) Ryan D. Mason; (4) Quinton M. Williams; (5) John M. Manning;
(6) Lyndell B. Hampton; and (7) Charles C. Bias. Amended Complaint at 2-3.
He asserts claims of excessive force and failure to intervene. See generally id.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion;
Doc. 62), with exhibits (Docs. 62-2 through 62-37).1 The Court advised Keaton
of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the
granting of a motion for summary judgment would represent a final
adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the
matter, and permitted him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Order
(Doc. 26); Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 63). Keaton filed a response in
opposition to the Motion (Response; Doc. 67), with exhibits (Doc. 67-1). He also
filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70),
arguing the Motion was untimely filed.2 Defendants’ Motion is ripe for review.
II. Keaton’s Allegations
In his Amended Complaint, Keaton alleges that in June 2018, he had
surgery on his left eye to repair a detached retina. Amended Complaint at 4.
1 In the Motion, Defendants also list “Armstrong” as being a Defendant (Motion
at 1), however, Keaton does not sue an “Armstrong” here.
2 The Court set the dispositive motion deadline as September 18, 2024. See
Order (Doc. 55). On September 18, 2024, Defendants filed a motion requesting
permission to file a summary judgment motion in excess of 25 pages. Doc. 57. The
Court granted the request on September 23, 2024. See Order (Doc. 58). That same
day, Defendants filed motions to seal exhibits (Docs. 59, 60), which the Court denied
as moot on September 27, 2024 (see Order (Doc. 61)). Defendants filed the Motion on
September 30, 2024. See Motion. While Defendants should have requested additional
time to file the Motion, considering the procedural posture of the case and the fact
that Defendants were filing motions related to their summary judgment Motion, the
Court will accept it as timely filed and deny Keaton’s Motion to Strike.
2
Following the surgery, officials transported him to Union Correctional
Institution to recover. Id. About a month after his transfer, on July 10, 2018,
Keaton attempted suicide by sharpening his glasses lens and consuming parts
of the glass. Id. During the attempt, officers used chemical agents to restrain
Keaton and eventually escorted him to a decontamination shower and medical
where a registered nurse administered an ETO (emergency treatment order)
shot to sedate Keaton. Id. at 5. After medical staff completed Keaton’s
evaluation and treatment, officials took Keaton to an isolation management
room where he slept. Id.
The next day, July 11, 2018, officers woke Keaton up and ordered him to
move his state-issued mattress from the floor to the bunk. Id. Keaton alleges
he followed these orders and immediately went back to sleep. Id. According to
Keaton, around 1:30 p.m. that day, while he was still asleep on his bunk,
Defendant Smith ordered Defendants Manning, Williams, Hampton, Bias, and
Cartwright to enter Keaton’s cell and perform a cell extraction. Id. During the
extraction, Manning, Williams, Hampton, Bias, and Cartwright “violently
punch[ed] [Keaton] in the head and facial area” while “repeatedly yelling for
[Keaton] to stop resisting.” Id. at 6. Keaton asserts he neither tried to resist
nor did he fail to follow Smith’s earlier orders to move his mattress off the floor,
which Defendants relied on to justify this use of force. Id. Once Keaton was
3
restrained, officers escorted him to medical for a post-use-of-force exam that
Keaton voluntarily refused. Id. at 6.
Officers then escorted Keaton back to his cell. Id. Once in his cell, Keaton
states he refused to “relinquish” his hands for removal of the restraints. Id. at
6-7. Defendant Smith gave Keaton a “final order” to allow removal of the
handcuffs and Keaton again refused. Id. at 7. According to Keaton, ten seconds
after the “final order,” Defendants Manning, Williams, Hampton, Bias, and
Cartwright again entered Keaton’s cell for a second “organized use of force.”
Id. Keaton contends he was not afforded the required three-minute window to
follow Smith’s “final order” before Defendants again used force. Id. He alleges
that during the second use of force, Manning, Williams, Hampton, Bias, and
Cartwright slammed his head against the floor, punched him in the face, and
stuck their fingers in his right eye, trying to gouge it out. Id.
Keaton asserts that Defendants Smith and Mason were present for both
cell extractions but did not intervene in or stop either use of excessive force. Id.
He also contends that Smith obstructed the camera’s view during the uses of
force. Id. Following the second use of force, medical staff examined Keaton’s
injuries and noted he sustained a swollen right eye and a bloody mouth. Id.
Keaton declared a medical emergency for his eye injury a few days later, and
after seeing an ophthalmologist, he learned an area of his repaired retina had
become re-detached. Id. at 8. Keaton was later diagnosed as blind in his left
4
eye. Id. at 9. He asserts Defendants’ actions violated his rights under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 3. As relief, Keaton requests compensatory and
punitive damages.3 Id. at 9.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a
motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 4 An
3 The Court dismissed Keaton’s requests for declaratory relief and monetary
damages against Defendants in their official capacities. See Order (Doc. 39).
4 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010
Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing
development of the decisional law construing and applying
these phrases.
5
issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,
93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Est. of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d
1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that
Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not
binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3
(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review
remains viable.
In citing to Campbell, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished
opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the
Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th
1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2
(“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited
as persuasive authority.”).
6
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d
590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must
view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38
F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however,
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th
Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. Summary of the Arguments
A. Defendants’ Arguments & Evidence
In their Motion, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary
judgment because during both uses of force, Defendants Cartwright, Manning,
Williams, Hampton, and Bias used no more force than necessary to overcome
Keaton’s non-compliance with orders, and as such, there was no reason for
Defendants Smith and Mason to intervene. Motion at 14-28. They also argue
they are entitled to qualified immunity; and they contend that to the extent
7
that Keaton’s excessive force claim proceeds, he is not entitled to recovery of
either compensatory or punitive damages. Id. at 29-34. In support of their
Motion, Defendants rely on the following evidence.5
In January 2017, First Coast Retina Center evaluated Keaton who
stated that he had been experiencing loss of vision in his left eye for over three
years and reported suffering an injury to the eye following a “lock in sock”
incident. Doc. 62-2 at 2. Doctors diagnosed him with “chronic retinal
detachment.” Id. In February 2018, an optometrist referred Keaton to a
specialist for possible eye surgery. Id. at 3. On June 4, 2018, Keaton underwent
surgery to repair a retinal detachment in his left eye. Doc. 62-19. On June 14,
2018, officials transferred Keaton to Union Correctional Institution. See
Amended Complaint at 4. That same day, Keaton was involved in an unrelated
use of force, after which medical did not conduct a post-use-of-force assessment
“due to [Keaton’s] disruptive behavior.” Doc. 62-20 at 1. Keaton was involved
in another unrelated use of force on June 24, 2018. Id. at 2-43.6
5 Defendants also provide extensive exhibits related to Keaton’s mental health
and medical history. See generally Docs. 62-2 through 62-19. Because not all of that
evidence is essential or necessary for the Court’s analysis and adjudication of the
issues here, the Court need not summarize those exhibits.
6 Defendants contend that Keaton was also involved in unrelated uses of force
on June 4, 2018, and June 27, 2018, see Motion at 7; but there is no record evidence
showing uses of force on those dates. See generally Doc. 62-20.
8
On July 10, 2018, while Defendant Cartwright operated the handheld
camera, officials used chemical agents on Keaton because he was creating a
disturbance on his wing and refusing all orders to cease his actions. Doc. 62-22
at 10. Following his decontamination shower, officials moved Keaton to
another cell. Doc. 62-21 at 19. Once inside, Keaton became upset, smeared
feces on himself and his cell window, broke his eyeglasses, and attempted to
cut his wrist while eating portions of the broken glass. Id. Officials used
another round of chemical agents on Keaton before restraining him. Id. During
his post-use-of-force exam, medical staff administered an ETO injection, which
he “tolerated well,” and placed him on self-harm observation (SHOS) status.7
Doc. 62-20 at 51. The two uses of force at issue in this action occurred on the
next day – July 11, 2018.
First Use of Force
An incident report completed by Caitlin McLaughlin explains that on
July 11, 2018:
Inmate Keaton . . ., who was currently on SHOS
status, had misused his state property by having his
mattress on the cell floor and refusing to place it back
on his bunk. Dr. Anthony ordered that the mattress be
removed. Inmate Keaton then refused all orders to
submit to restraints so that he could be removed [sic]
the cell and the mattress be confiscated. Authorization
7 In
his Response, Keaton clarifies that the July 10, 2018 events “are not
‘central’ to establishing” his claims, but merely provide background for the events of
July 11, 2018. Response at 7 n.5.
9
for the use of a cell extraction team was received. The
team entered the cell and applied restraints to inmate
Keaton, at which time all force ceased. Inmate Keaton
was escorted to medical where he refused an
assessment, however a visual assessment was
conducted and he was noted with no injuries. Inmate
Keaton was then returned to his assigned cell where
he refused all orders to relinquish the hand restraints.
An additional organized use of force, in which the
restraints were removed, was conducted later on in the
shift. . . .
Doc. 62-23 at 6-7.
Video evidence of the first use of force supports the facts laid out in the
incident report.8 See Def. Ex. O. At the beginning of the video, Defendant Smith
gives a lead-in statement explaining that Keaton’s state-issued mattress is on
his cell floor and he is refusing all orders to pick it up and submit to hand
restraint procedures, so officers can safely remove the mattress from his cell.
Smith reports that Defendant Mason and Mental Health Professional Garriga
attempted to counsel Keaton, who is classified as a psych-grade 1 inmate, but
their efforts failed to gain Keaton’s compliance. Smith explains that he notified
Colonel Jeffery Lindsey about the situation and Lindsey authorized the use of
a forced cell extraction. The cell extraction team then introduces themselves
as follows – #1 Defendant Manning, #2 Defendant Williams, #3 Defendant
Hampton, #4 Defendant Bias, and #5 Defendant Cartwright.
8 The video footage is on two DVDs, one depicting the first use of force (Def. Ex.
O) and one depicting the second use of force (Def. Ex. P.).
10
After introductions, Smith escorts the cell extraction team to Keaton’s
cell door where the team members line up. Before they enter, Smith gives
Keaton a final order to submit to restraint procedures, but Keaton does not
respond. At minute 4:41, Smith opens Keaton’s cell door and the extraction
team calmly but quickly enters. Keaton is lying face down on his bunk as the
team members surround him to apply restraints. Keaton slightly resists the
extraction team’s attempt to apply hand restraints. Smith issues a verbal order
for Keaton to stop resisting while one extraction team member orders Keaton
to “give [him] [his] hand.” Smith announces that leg irons have been applied at
minute 5:16 and that handcuffs have been applied at minute 5:28. The
extraction team then helps Keaton to his feet and Keaton begins calling the
officers vulgar and profane names. Keaton addresses the camera, yelling “I’d
like to advise that a few of these officers hit me in the back of the head.” Keaton
also mocks and taunts the cell extraction team’s use of force, saying they will
have to hit him harder next time if they want to knock him out. An extraction
team member then applies a spit shield to Keaton while Keaton continues to
yell profane words and complains that the restraints are too tight. The upper
part of Keaton’s face is visible above the spit shield and there are no apparent
bruises, scratches, or other signs that Keaton suffered any physical injuries.
The team then escorts Keaton to medical where Keaton immediately
11
announces that he is “refusing” medical attention. The extraction team then
walks Keaton back to the cell wing.
Once cell front, the cell extraction team removes Keaton’s leg restraints
and walks Keaton into his cell before exiting and shutting the cell door. The
team members then order Keaton to submit to the removal of his hand
restraints. Keaton begins yelling incoherent statements and can be seen
through the cell window taking his clothes off. Keaton then approaches the cell
window in an aggressive manner and screams at Defendant Mason as Mason
calmly asks Keaton to submit to removal of his hand restraints. Keaton then
threatens to “beat” the officers up and responds to all requests to comply by
saying “f*ck you.” The video of the first use of force then ends.
In another incident report, Officer McLaughlin states that Keaton
received a disciplinary report for his conduct following the return to his cell:
Following an organized cell extraction, inmate Keaton
. . . refused to relinquish the hand restraints when he
was returned to his assigned housing. Officer
Armstrong remained cell front when he observed
inmate Keaton threaten staff stating “the next person
to come inside my cell, I’m kicking!” Inmate Keaton
will be receiving a D.R. for 1-3, Spoken Threats.
Doc. 62-23 at 16.
In his deposition, Keaton testified that he was still “out cold” from the
effects of the ETO shot when officers woke him up and asked him to get his
mattress off the ground. Doc. 62-21 at 24. He stated that he told officers to
12
“leave [him] alone” before falling back asleep. Id. He asserted that he
eventually complied with their orders and picked up his mattress before
getting back into his bunk. Id. According to Keaton, after he fell back asleep,
officers came into his cell and began punching him in the face and head. Id. He
testified that he did not physically resist the cell extraction team’s efforts to
apply restraints. Id. at 31. But Keaton admitted that once restraints were
applied, he used profanity and mocked the officers’ use of force, telling one
extraction team member that “he hits like a female dog.” Id.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a review of
Defendants’ first use of force. See generally Doc. 62-23. The OIG concluded that
the first use of force complied with the FDOC’s rules and procedures, finding
that “[n]o further review [was] warranted . . . as the inmate’s allegations [were]
not supported by the evidence reviewed and therefore
[were] not
substantiated.” Id. at 5.
Second Use of Force
Another incident report describes the circumstances of the second use of
force:
Inmate Keaton . . . had been returned to his assigned
cell following an organized cell extraction when he
refused all orders to allow the hand restraints to be
removed . . . . Authorization was received to utilize a
cell extraction team to enter the cell and remove the
restraints. The team attempted to enter the cell,
however inmate Keaton pushed on the cell door in an
13
attempt to prevent the team from entering. Staff
forced their way into the cell and pinned inmate
Keaton to the cell floor, facedown. The hand restraints
were removed and all staff exited the cell at which
time all force ceased. Inmate Keaton received a cell
front post use of force physical and was noted with a
swollen right eye and minimal bleeding to the mouth.
Doc. 62-25 at 4-5.
The video of the second use of force begins with Defendant Smith’s leadin statement, during which he explains that Keaton is in his cell, has
possession of his hand restraints, and is refusing orders to relinquish the
restraints. See Def. Ex. P. Smith states that a mental health professional
counseled Keaton to no avail. He then contends that officers notified Warden
Anderson who authorized the use of force to remove the restraints from
Keaton’s cell. The cell extraction team members again introduce themselves as
follows – #1 Defendant Manning, #2 Defendant Williams, #3 Defendant
Hampton, #4 Defendant Bias, and #5 Defendant Cartwright. Smith and
Defendant Mason escort the extraction team to Keaton’s cell front. Smith
issues a final order for Keaton to relinquish his hand restraints and Keaton
does not respond.
Smith opens Keaton’s cell door at minute 7:14. Keaton can be seen
pushing the other side of the cell door in an attempt to keep it shut. Once the
extraction team members push inside the cell, they immediately pin Keaton to
the floor. The extraction team members then crowd around Keaton on the floor,
14
obscuring any view of Keaton and making it impossible to see any team
member’s individual movements. The extraction team members appear to
struggle with Keaton. It appears that Keaton is now completely naked as the
officers can be heard reminding the cameraman to not film nudity and the
cameraman focuses the camera on filming Keaton from the waist up. The
extraction team members order Keaton to “give [them] [his] hands,” Smith
orders Keaton to “stop resisting,” and Mason orders Keaton to “just lay there.”
In response, Keaton calls Mason “a b*tch.” At minute 8:58, Keaton screams
that he is not resisting. About 42 seconds later, at minute 9:40, the cell
extraction team members remove the hand restraints and pass the cuffs to
Smith who hands the cuffs to an officer outside the cell.
All movements indicating a physical struggle immediately stop and the
extraction team orders Keaton to stay on the ground before exiting the cell.
Keaton is seen lying on the ground and the shield is laying over Keaton’s back.
The last team member who exits removes the shield from the cell and closes
the cell door at minute 10:18. Officers immediately request that medical staff
evaluate Keaton. Keaton can be seen through the cell window. He is naked and
lying face down on the cell floor. Within seconds, the officer holding the
handheld camera backs away from the cell and a medical staff member is seen
approaching Keaton’s cell window. Officers ask Keaton to “cover” himself up
and address medical. Keaton complains about eye pain and screams “I can’t
15
see.” After documenting Keaton’s injuries, medical staff walks away, and the
camera again approaches Keaton’s cell window. Keaton is now standing and is
visibly crying, stating that he cannot see. Keaton addresses the camera,
screaming that he has “been punched 30 times” before pointing at the camera
and stating, “I’m going to kill one of you b*tches.” The video of the second use
of force then ends.
According to medical documents, during the post-use-of-force evaluation,
medical staff noted Keaton had a swollen right eye and a “bloody mouth [with]
minimal” bleeding. Doc. 62-25 at 16.
In his deposition, Keaton explained he refused to give up the handcuffs
because he was “in emotional distress” from the first use of force. Doc. 62-21 at
33-34. He admitted officers issued more than one order for him to return the
handcuffs, which he refused, and that he threatened to “beat one of their A
double S[s].” Id. at 34. Keaton also acknowledged that Smith issued a final
order to relinquish the hand restraints before breaching his cell. Id. at 37. He
conceded that he pushed the cell door “to stop them from coming in” when the
extraction team tried to enter. Id. at 37-38. When asked if he believed the
second use of force could have been avoided, Keaton responded that “[i]t
probably could have,” but he “wasn’t in [his] right state of mind at the time”
and had decided he was “not giving [them] anything.” Id. at 38-39.
16
According to Keaton, during the use of force, one officer “banged” his
head into the concrete and another “stuck their hand in [his] good eye” (right
eye). Id. at 39-40. Keaton stated that he then experienced swelling and “orbital
trauma” in his right eye, which eventually healed following medical treatment.
Id. at 42, 47, 55. He testified that he did not know that his left-eye retina had
become re-detached until he saw the ophthalmologist on August 2, 2018. Id. at
41, 45. Keaton also admitted that following the second use of force, the only
physical injuries he had at that time were the ones medical staff documented
during the post-use-of-force evaluation. Id. at 49. Keaton also explained that
he received “several” disciplinary reports (DR) following the July 11, 2018
events. Id. at 67. Regarding those DRs, he testified that he was guilty of some
of the charges because he “did make [ ] a spoken threat when [he] was in the
SHOS cell” and he “did refuse to give up the hand restraints, which is
disobeying an order.” Id. at 68.
The OIG reviewed the second use of force, found it complied with the
FDOC’s procedures, and closed the case. See generally Doc. 62-25.
Defendants’ Declarations
Each Defendant submitted a declaration describing his actions during
both uses of force. See Docs. 62-31, 62-32, 62-33, 62-34, 62-35, 62-36, 62-36, 6237. In his declaration, Smith states:
17
During each use of force incident, I provided a final
order and warned inmate Keaton that the cell
extraction team would enter the cell if he failed to
comply.
In both use of force incidents, I repeatedly ordered
inmate Keaton to stop resisting and comply with my
orders, however inmate Keaton failed to comply.
Doc. 62-31 (paragraph enumeration omitted). In his declaration, Mason
explains:
I attempted to de-escalate the situation by speaking
with inmate Keaton and attempted to persuade him to
comply with the orders given to submit to restraints
(first use of force incident) and relinquish his
handcuffs (second use of force).
In both use of force incidents, I observed inmate
Keaton physically resisting and not complying with
orders given.
Doc. 62-32 at 2 (paragraph enumeration omitted). Smith and Mason both
assert:
During the first cell extraction the objective was to
remove inmate Keaton’s mattress pursuant to an
order [from Dr. Anthony in medical.]
During the second cell extraction, the objective was to
restrain inmate Keaton to remove the handcuffs that
he previously refused to relinquish.
While supervising I observed the cell extraction team
use only the amount of force necessary to overcome
inmate Keaton’s physical resistance to orders given.
Docs. 62-31 at 2, 62-32 at 2-3 (paragraph enumeration omitted).
18
In their declarations, Bias, Cartwright, Hampton, Manning, and
Williams explain they were part of the cell extraction team involved in both
uses of force. Docs. 62-33, 62-34, 62-35, 62-36, 62-37. They then describe their
actions during the first use of force. Bias and Cartwright state:
[We] entered the cell and [Bias] grasped Mr. Keaton’s
[right leg] while [Cartwright] grabbed his [left leg]. It
was our responsibility to apply leg irons, and did so
despite Mr. Keaton’s physical resistance, jerking of his
limbs and his repeated failure to comply with [ ]
Smith’s orders.
Docs. 62-33, 62-34. Hampton states:
I entered the cell and grasped Mr. Keaton’s left arm
and forced it out from under his body where he
forcefully held it in resistance. I placed his arm behind
his back and once the team gained control of his
extremities, [ ] Williams placed the hand restraints on
him.
Doc. 62-35 at 2. Williams declares:
I entered the cell and placed both of my hands on Mr.
Keaton’s torso to pin him down to the cell bunk. Once
the team was able to gain control of his arms and place
them behind his back, I placed the hand restraints on
him.
Doc. 62-37 at 2. Manning explains:
I entered the cell and placed the security shield on
inmate Keaton’s back pinning him face down on his
bunk[.] I discarded the shield and grasped Mr.
Keaton’s right arm placing it behind his back despite
his physical resistance.
19
Once he was secured and lifted to his feet, I placed a
spit shield on him for precautionary measure based on
[Keaton’s] aggression, irritation, and previous history
of using his bodily fluids to thwart officer efforts to
secure him. At this point all force ceased and Mr.
Keaton was taken out of his cell for a medical
evaluation and to allow the removal of his mattress.
Doc. 62-36 at 2 (paragraph enumeration omitted).
Defendants also described their actions during the second use of force.
According to Bias, Cartwright, Hampton, Manning, and Williams, following
the first cell extraction, Keaton “refused to give up his handcuffs and the team
was told a second cell extraction was authorized.” Docs. 62-33, 62-34, 62-35,
62-36, 62-37. They explained that “[d]uring the second cell extraction, Mr.
Keaton pushed his body up against the door from the inside, and the same cell
extraction team . . . forced the door and Mr. Keaton backwards to allow us to
enter the cell.” Docs. 62-33, 62-34, 62-35, 62-36, 62-37. Bias and Cartwright
stated that they both grabbed Keaton’s left arm while Williams removed the
hand restraints, and once the restraints were removed, they released their
grasp and ceased their force. Docs. 62-33, 62-34. Hampton and Williams
reported that they both grabbed Keaton’s right arm, and once in control,
Williams removed the restraints and they both released their grasps and all
force ceased. Docs. 62-35, 62-37. Manning explained:
I entered the cell and used the shield to create distance
between the team and inmate Keaton and force him to
the ground. I used the shield to pin Mr. Keaton’s torso
20
while the remaining team members struggled to gain
control of his extremities.
Once the hand restraints were removed, I used the
shield to pin Mr. Keaton to the floor to allow for the
cell extraction team to exit the cell safely. At this time
all force ceased.
Doc. 62-36 (paragraph enumeration omitted).
B. Keaton’s Arguments and Evidence
In opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Keaton argues that before the first
use of force, he complied with officers’ orders to pick his mattress up off the
floor and place it on the bunk. Response at 2. According to Keaton, because he
complied with the order, “there existed no reason to apply force.” Id. at 6.
Keaton also contends he never resisted officers during the first use of force,
and Defendants’ force was excessive because they violently punched Keaton in
the head and facial area. Id. He argues that the video evidence does not
contradict his allegations because Defendant Smith was obscuring the
handheld camera’s view when the cell extraction team members were punching
him. Id.
As to the second use of force, Keaton again argues that he never resisted
but the cell extraction team “with malicious and sadistic intent, began to slam
[his] head into the concrete floor, violently punch him in the head and facial
area, and stuck their finger into [his] right eye in an attempt to gouge it out of
the socket.” Id. at 4. Keaton asserts that the video evidence shows Defendants
21
slamming his head into the floor and you can hear Keaton state that he is “not
resisting.” Id. at 4 n.3. He also contends that Defendants’ intent to harm
Keaton can be inferred from the fact that they did not remove him from the
cell during the second use of force. Id. at 6. Keaton further asserts Defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity and he is entitled to recover
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 5.
Keaton provides the following exhibits to support his arguments: July
10, 2018 and July 11, 2018 emergency room records (Doc. 25-1, 25-2, 25-4); DR
log # 213-180517 charging Keaton with disobeying an order (Doc. 25-3); July
13, 2018 sick-call request and documents from the sick-call visit (Doc. 25-5);
documents from Keaton’s October 2018 vision assessment (Docs. 25-6, 25-7);
informal grievance (log # 213-1807-0226) (Doc. 25-8); Defendants’ response to
Keaton’s second request for admissions (Doc. 67-1 at 4-11); Defendants’
response to Keaton’s interrogatories (id. at 13-73); Defendants’ response and
objections to Keaton’s first request for admissions (id. at 75-81); Defendants
Cartwright and Smith’s admissions (id. at 83-95); medical documents from
Keaton’s June 6, 2018 visit with ophthalmologist Dr. Brooks (id. at 97-100);
medical documents from Keaton’s May 24, 2018 visit with Dr. Brooks (id. at
102-11); informal grievance (log # 23-807-0230) (id. at 114); October 10, 2024
acknowledgment form (id. at 116); and his own declaration (id. at 117).
22
In his declaration, Keaton contends he did not resist during either
incident; he never misused his mattress to block security from doing 15-minute
checks; no one intervened during the uses of force; excessive force was used on
him; these incidents have exacerbated his depression level; and Defendant
Smith made a false statement when he stated “DR log # 213-180529 was
written on 7/11/18 at 14:00.” Doc. 67-1 at 117.
V. Applicable Law
A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological
justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). However, it is
well understood that prison guards, who are charged with maintaining order
and security, may use force when necessary to bring unruly inmates into
compliance. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986); Williams v. Burton,
943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991).
In Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020), the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed “the principles applicable to Eighth Amendment
excessive-force” claims:
The Eighth Amendment, among other things,
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” qualifies under the Eighth Amendment as
23
proscribed “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has instructed that what rises to the
level of an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
differs based on the type of Eighth Amendment
violation alleged. Id.
. . . “[T]he core judicial inquiry” requires [the
Court] to consider “whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins,
559 U.S. at 37.[9] This standard requires a prisoner to
establish two elements – one subjective and one
objective: the official must have both “acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind” (the subjective
element), and the conduct must have been “objectively
harmful enough to establish a constitutional
violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.
With respect to the subjective element, “to have
a valid claim . . . the excessive force must have been
sadistically and maliciously applied for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280
F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Thomas v.
Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
As for the objective component of an excessiveforce violation, it focuses on whether the official’s
actions were “harmful enough,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8,
or “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991), to violate the Constitution. “Not every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. “The
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and
unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from
constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 37–38.
Instead, the Eighth Amendment prohibits force that
9 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam).
24
offends “contemporary standards of decency,”
regardless of whether “significant injury is evident,”
though the extent of injury may shed light on the
amount of force applied or “whether the use of force
could plausibly have been thought necessary.”
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37.
Id. at 1265–66 (internal citations cleaned up).
Courts consider five distinct factors when determining whether an officer
applied force maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm:
(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of
force; (3) the relationship between that need and the
amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent
of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the
basis of facts known to them.
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley, 475
U.S. at 321; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Notably, a lack of serious injury, while not
dispositive, is relevant to the inquiry:
“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one
factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could
plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular
situation.” Ibid.[10] (quoting Whitley, supra, at 321,
106 S. Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide
some indication of the amount of force applied. . . . An
inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’” that
causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to
state a valid excessive force claim. Id. at 9 (quoting
10 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
25
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)).[11]
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly
correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.
An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does
not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim
merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38. Nevertheless, a prisoner’s injuries or lack thereof
may be “evidence of the kind or degree of force that was used by [an] officer.”
Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 700 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Crocker v.
Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021)).
In considering the Whitley factors, courts must “give a ‘wide range of
deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’
including when considering ‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’”
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.
Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)). Moreover, corrections officials
are not required to “convince every inmate that their orders are reasonable and
well-thought out,” and “[c]ertainly . . . are not required to do so where an
inmate repeatedly fails to follow those orders.” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307. As
such, “courts must determine whether the evidence goes beyond a mere dispute
11 See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s
constitutional rights.”).
26
over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably
superior alternatives.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. A case should not go to the
jury “[u]nless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction
of pain.” Id.
B. Failure to Intervene
The law is well-established that a corrections officer has a duty to
intervene when he witnesses a fellow officer’s use of excessive force against an
inmate and is in a position to intervene. See Helm v. Rainbow City, Ala., 989
F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208
F.3d 919, 924-27 (11th Cir. 2000)). “Of course, there also must be an underlying
constitutional violation. Plainly, an officer cannot be liable for failing to stop or
intervene when there was no constitutional violation being committed.”
Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
Notably, a failure-to-intervene claim is “wholly dependent on the underlying
excessive force claim.” Id.
C. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects from civil liability government officials
who perform discretionary functions if the conduct of the officials does not
violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255
27
(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As a
result, the qualified immunity defense protects from suit “‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Carr v. Tatangelo, 338
F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Indeed, as “‘government
officials are not required to err on the side of caution,’ qualified immunity is
appropriate in close cases where a reasonable officer could have believed that
his actions were lawful.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1200 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, an official bears the initial burden
of establishing that his conduct fell within his discretionary authority. See
Webster v. Beary, 228 F. App’x 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant does
so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
not appropriate using the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In accordance with Saucier, the
Court must ask whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff “show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Id.; see also
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260,
1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). The
court must also ask whether the right allegedly violated was clearly
established at the time of the violation. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier, 533
U.S. at 201; Scott, 550 U.S. at 377; Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th
28
1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e ask two questions: (1) whether the facts that
a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,
and (2) if so, whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of
the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court
may consider these questions in whichever order it chooses, and qualified
immunity will protect the defendant if the answer to either question is “no.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009); Underwood, 11 F.4th at
1328.
Also, “[b]ecause § 1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative causal connection
between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional
deprivation,’ each defendant is typically entitled to an independent qualifiedimmunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.” Alcocer v.
Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802
F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). However, in this case, while Keaton alleges
that Defendants Cartwright, Williams, Manning, Hampton, and Bias
collectively used excessive force, he does not know which of those Defendants
punched him and/or stuck their finger in his right eye or if Defendants Smith
and/or Mason were in a position to intervene in both uses of force. See Doc. 6221 at 39. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “that a plaintiff is not required
to specifically identify which particular officer used excessive force (and which
officers failed to intervene) in order to overcome summary judgment.” Hunter
29
v. Leeds, City of, 941 F.3d 1265, 1282 n.19 (11th Cir. 2019). “Were this the law,
all that police officers would have to do to use excessive force on an arrestee
without fear of consequence would be to put a bag over the arrestee’s head and
administer the beating in silence.” Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340,
1342 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Alexandre v. Ortiz, 789 F. App’x 169, 176 (11th
Cir. 2019). Because the evidence here does not illuminate which Defendant or
Defendants participated in the alleged punching and eye gouging or the extent
of their participation in the alleged conduct, the Court is unable to individually
analyze the actions of each Defendant. See Velazquez, 484 F.3d at 1342
(rejecting the defendants’ argument that “because [the plaintiff] did not see
who beat him, if anyone did, there would be no evidence at trial from which a
jury might assign liability for the beating”). As such, the Court’s analysis
applies equally to all Defendants.
VI. Analysis12
Keaton contends that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment by twice using excessive force (Defendants Cartwright, Williams,
Manning, Hampton, and Bias) and failing to intervene during those uses of
12 In determining whether a Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the
Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to Keaton to the extent supported by the record and then
considers “the legal issue of whether [those] ‘facts’, if proven, show that the defendant
violated clearly established law.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919,
925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000); Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8. The facts viewed in this manner
may differ from those that ultimately can be proved.
30
excessive force (Defendants Smith and Mason). Amended Complaint at 3.
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity on Keaton’s claims.
Keaton does not dispute that Defendants were acting within their
discretionary authority at the relevant times. Thus, the burden shifts to
Keaton to show that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
A. First Use of Force
Keaton argues that the first use of force constituted excessive force
because “there existed no reason to apply force” after he complied with the
order to place his mattress on his bunk. Response at 6. And, according to him,
even if he never complied with orders to pick up his mattress, Defendants’
actions of “punching him repeatedly in the head and facial area while [he]
offer[ed] no resistance was excessive.” Id. Defendants argue that Keaton’s
failure to comply with orders to submit to restraints for the removal of his
mattress necessitated their organized use of force. Motion at 15. They also
contend that during the cell extraction, they used minimal force to apply
restraints and remove Keaton from his cell, allowing for his mattress to be
successfully removed. Id. at 15-16.
Upon review of the evidence, the Court concludes that Keaton fails to
establish that Defendants’ first use of force violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. After applying the Whitley factors to the summary judgment record
here, the undisputed evidence reveals no genuine issue of material fact about
31
whether Defendants applied force in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline. First, there is no evidence that the first use of force caused Keaton
to sustain any physical injuries. Indeed, during his deposition, Keaton testified
that the only physical injuries he suffered following the July 11, 2018 events
were those that were sustained and documented following the second use of
force. Doc. 62-21 at 19.
Second, Defendants reasonably perceived that force was needed because
the video evidence clearly depicts that he refused to comply with all lawful
orders to submit to hand restraints so that his mattress could be safely
removed from his cell.13 Third, the force used was minimal – Defendants
efficiently and calmly restrained Keaton and escorted him out of his cell within
60 seconds. They then calmly walked him down the hallway as Keaton’s verbal
statements became more aggressive and derogatory. Keaton alleges that
Defendants punched him in the back of the head during this use of force, and
while he admits that the punches are not visible on the videorecording, he
argues that Defendant Smith intentionally obscured the camera’s view of the
punches. Response at 2. But while the view is somewhat obstructed at times,
13 Keaton argues that force was unnecessary because he eventually moved his
mattress off the floor. However, because he intentionally failed to timely comply with
that order, officers then ordered Keaton to submit to restraints so that they could
remove the mattress from his cell. Keaton’s repeated refusal to follow those
subsequent orders and allow officers to remove the mattress led to the authorization
of Defendants’ first use of force.
32
the cell extraction team members are largely visible, and no punching-like
movements are seen and Keaton’s lack of injuries and vehement refusal to see
medical after the use of force undermine his assertions. Also, Keaton’s
statements mocking Defendants’ use of force and encouraging them to hit him
harder next time contradict any inference that Defendants applied force solely
to inflict pain. Further, Defendants’ application of a spit shield did not amount
to excessive force. Rule 33-602.028(3)(b)2, Florida Administrative Code,
authorizes the spontaneous use of a spit shield when, following the use of force,
an inmate is on any confinement status, has a documented threat of using
bodily fluids, and is exhibiting aggressive behavior. See Doc. 62-27. Here,
Keaton was on SHOS status, had a documented history of smearing feces on
himself and his cell, and was using aggressive and profane language following
the use of force.
Fourth, Defendants made several efforts to temper the severity of the
forceful response. Keaton testified that he ignored initial orders to get his
mattress off the floor, telling Defendant Smith to “leave [him] alone.” Although
Keaton eventually moved his mattress, Keaton’s repeated refusal to timely
adhere to that order escalated the situation and resulted in Defendants
ordering him to submit to restraints for the removal of his mattress, which
Keaton again repeatedly refused. Defendant Mason and Mental Health
Professional Garriga also attempted to counsel Keaton to no avail. And only
33
after Keaton refused Defendant Smith’s final order did Defendants resort to
physical force to restrain Keaton. Lastly, considering how long Keaton
continued to resist Defendants’ orders to get his mattress off the ground and
then submit to restraints for the removal of his mattress, it was reasonable for
Defendants to consider Keaton a threat to safety.
In sum, the undisputed evidence reveals no genuine issue of material
fact about whether Defendants Manning, Williams, Hampton, Bias, and
Cartwright’s first use of force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline. They applied force to quell Keaton’s refusal to comply with
orders and did not do so under malicious or sadistic motives. Likewise, because
the Court finds that the use of force was reasonable, Keaton’s failure to
intervene claims against Defendants Smith and Mason must also fail. As such,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Keaton’s excessive force
claim and failure to intervene claim related to the first use of force.
B. Second Use of Force
Keaton argues that during the second use of force, once the extraction
team was inside his cell, Defendants forced him to the ground and “with
malicious and sadistic intent, began to slam [his] head into the concrete floor,
violently punch him in the head and facial area, and stuck their finger into his
right eye in an attempt to gouge it out of the socket.” Response at 4. He asserts
he never resisted, and Defendants never extracted him from the cell even
34
though that was the purpose of the cell extraction team’s force. Id. Defendants
argue that because Keaton failed to comply with orders to relinquish his hand
restraints, Defendants were forced to enter his cell to obtain the handcuffs.
Motion at 21. They contend that Keaton resisted their efforts and once they
were able to safely restrain him and remove the cuffs, all force ceased. Id.
Upon review of the evidence and affording Defendants “a wide range of
deference” in maintaining prison security, the Court concludes that the
undisputed evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact as to the second
use of force. First, as to the extent of Keaton’s injuries, in his Amended
Complaint, Keaton complained of a swollen right eye with orbital trauma, a
bloody mouth, and a re-detachment of his left retina, resulting in permanent
blindness in his left eye. Amended Complaint at 9. However, the record
evidence does not support an inference that the second use of force resulted in
the re-detachment of Keaton’s left-eye retina. The medical records show that
the only injuries medical staff documented during Keaton’s post-use-of-force
exam were a swollen right eye and a bloody mouth with minimal bleeding. On
July 13, 2018, Keaton submitted a sick-call request, in which he only
complained of right-eye pain. Doc. 25-5. When medical staff examined him in
sick call on July 18, 2018, Keaton reported that “somebody punched [him] in
the” right eye. Doc. 62-28 at 2. Medical then noted that no blood was observed
and recorded his visual acuity as 20/15 in his right eye and 20/40 in his left
35
eye. Id. In his deposition, Keaton acknowledged that the only injuries he
sustained during the second use of force were the documented right-eye injury
and a bloody mouth. Doc. 62-21 at 49. Keaton maintained that he never
experienced blindness in his right eye but that the swelling made it difficult
for him to open the right eye. Id. at 54. He explained that after his July 13,
2018 sick-call request, medical staff examined his right eye and prescribed him
eye drops. Id. at 49-50. And he testified that he did not know that his left-eye
retina had re-detached until his August 2, 2018 follow-up appointment with
the ophthalmologist. Id. at 50. According to the medical notes from his August
2, 2018 ophthalmology visit, Keaton reported that he had been experiencing
vision issues in his right and left eyes for “about 2 months” prior, which is
before the July 11, 2018 uses of force. Doc. 62-29. Dr. Brooks noted Keaton’s
“left eye remain[ed] stable under silicone oil . . . [and] there [was] still an area
that [was] detached inferiorly with some elevation seen . . . [with] [n]o further
treatment [] required at th[at] time.” Id. at 2. Keaton testified that by the time
he saw the ophthalmologist on August 2, 2018, the swelling in his right eye
had resolved and he could see out of that eye again. Id. at 51. While the
evidence shows that Keaton’s left-eye retina re-detached at some point before
August 2, 2018, there is no evidence to suggest that it re-detached during or as
a result of the second use of force.
36
Second, there was a need for force because Keaton refused to comply with
lawful orders to relinquish his hand restraints. The video evidence shows that
after the removal of his leg restraints, Defendants shut the cell door and
ordered Keaton to submit to removal of his handcuffs. In response, Keaton
yelled incoherent things to the extraction team, took his clothes off, and
approached the cell window in an aggressive manner before screaming at
Defendant Mason as Mason calmly asked Keaton to submit to the removal of
his hand restraints. Keaton then threatened to “beat” the officers up and
responded to all requests to comply by saying “f*ck you.”
Third, the amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstances.
Keaton testified that he refused to give up the cuffs and told Defendants to
“come and get [him]” while threatening to “beat one of their A double S[s].” He
admitted that when the cell extraction team tried to open his cell door, he
actively pushed the door to stop them from coming in. As mentioned, once the
cell extraction team entered the cell, the video evidence does not show the
individual, specific movements of Keaton or the cell extraction team members.
While there seems to be a physical struggle, no punching movements can been
seen and there is no footage of an extraction team member sticking his finger
in Keaton’s right eye. Rather, the only things discernable from the recording
are Keaton’s initial physical resistance to the cell door opening and the officers’
repeated orders directing Keaton to “stop resisting.” In any event, “[a]lthough
37
[the Court] cannot pinpoint with precision the amount of force used by
[Defendants], the fact that there was no more than minimal injury, that some
amount of force was justified under the circumstances, and that the force was
used for a legitimate security purpose persuades [the Court] that the evidence
in this case raises only a ‘mere dispute over the reasonableness of the
particular use of force’ and could not support ‘a reliable inference of
wantonness in the infliction of pain.’” Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1189-90
(11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). Indeed, about two minutes
and thirty seconds after Defendants enter the cell, they successfully remove
the hand restraints and begin calmly exiting the cell. At that time, all physical
force had ceased, and Keaton remained on the floor with the shield over his
body until the last team member exited. The officers then immediately
summoned medical staff to examine Keaton cell front. See Cockrell v. Sparks,
510 F.3d 1307,1312 (11th Cir. 2007) (evidence that officers immediately
requested medical assistance for an injured inmate was strong evidence that
there was no malicious or sadistic purpose in the use of force).
Fourth, before resorting to force, Defendants made several efforts to
temper their response. They issued numerous verbal orders and attempted to
counsel Keaton, but Keaton continued to refuse to comply and became
increasingly disrespectful and aggressive. Keaton testified that the second use
of force could have been avoided if he complied with orders to relinquish his
38
handcuffs, but he “wasn’t in [his] right state of mind at the time” and had
concluded that he was “not giving [Defendants] anything.” Doc. 62-21 at 38-39.
Because of Keaton’s unrelenting misconduct, officers contacted Warden
Anderson who authorized the use of force to remove the restraints.
Finally, given how long Keaton continued to resist orders and his
growing aggression, it was reasonable for Defendants to consider him a threat
to safety. Defendants knew Keaton was a psych-1 inmate on SHOS status
because of events that occurred the day before. They knew he first refused
orders to submit to restraints for the removal of his mattress, which resulted
in the first use of force. And they knew that upon his return to his cell, he had
refused all orders to relinquish his handcuffs. Keaton had progressively
become more hostile toward Defendants and threatened to harm officers before
the second use of force. Keaton, by his own admission, had no intent on
relinquishing the handcuffs or otherwise “giving [Defendants] anything” they
requested. After Defendants finally removed the cuffs, the video evidence
shows that Keaton’s threats only became worse as he told officers, “I’m going
to kill one of you b*tches.”
On this record, the Court finds Keaton does not present evidence
establishing a genuine issue of material fact on his claim that Defendants
Manning, Williams, Hampton, Bias, or Cartwright used excessive force during
their removal of his hand restraints. If this case proceeded to trial, Keaton
39
would have only his own testimony that one unidentified member of the cell
extraction team stuck their finger in his right eye solely to inflict pain. But “a
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Herrington, 381 F.3d
1243 at 1247. Likewise, because the Court finds that the use of force was
reasonable, Keaton’s failure to intervene claims against Defendants Smith and
Mason must also fail. As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
on Keaton’s excessive force claim and failure to intervene claim related to the
second use of force.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
Keaton’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 70) is DENIED.
2.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 62) is
GRANTED.
40
3.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and
against Keaton; terminate any pending motions; and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 27th day of
January, 2025.
Jax-7
C:
Robert James Keaton, #R38757
Counsel of record
41
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