Harris v. Florida Department of Corrections et al

Filing 28

ORDER granting in part 15 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's (1) claim about religious headgear against all Defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) claims for monetary damages against all Defendants in their official capacities; (3) claim about religious services against Defendants Lane and Wood and claim about religious diet against Defendant Lane for failure to state a claim; and (4) claims for compensatory damages; with directions to the Cle rk. In all other respects, the Motion is denied. This case will proceed on Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Wood for the denial of religious meals. Defendant Wood shall answer 1 the Complaint no later than December 27, 2024. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 11/26/2024. (SM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
RICHARD HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:23-cv-315-MMH-PDB

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Richard Harris, an inmate in the custody of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDC), initiated this action on March 15, 2023, 1 by
filing a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) 2 with
exhibits (Doc. 1-1). In the Complaint, he names three Defendants: (1) the FDC,
(2) Warden Lane, and (3) Chaplain W. Wood. See Complaint at 2–3. Harris
alleges that Defendants prevented him and other Hebrew Israelite inmates
from attending religious services, adhering to dietary restrictions on holy days,
and wearing religious headgear. See id. at 6–7. He raises claims under the

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).

2 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.

First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). See id. at 4.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See
Motion to Dismiss (Motion; Doc. 15). Harris filed a response in opposition to
the Motion. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants[’] Motion to Dismiss
Memorandum of Law Incorporated (Response; Doc. 16). Thus, the Motion is
ripe for review.
II. Harris’s Allegations 3
Harris asserts that Defendants violated his right to freely practice his
religion when they: (1) prevented him from attending Hebrew Israelite
services, (2) refused to accommodate his religious dietary restrictions on holy
days, and (3) restricted Hebrew Israelite inmates from wearing religious
diadems. See Complaint at 6–7. As to the first alleged violation, Harris
explains that Suwannee Correctional Institution (Suwannee CI) is a controlled
movement institution. Id. at 6. He alleges that if an inmate needs to move
around the compound, he must report to an officer at movement control. Id.
That officer will “check the day’s call-out, and then call the tower and have

In considering Defendants’ Motion, the Court must accept all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most
favorable to Harris, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
allegations. Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022). As such,
the facts recited here are drawn from the Complaint, and may well differ from those
that ultimately can be proved.
3

2

them [] unlock the gate needed for inmate’s passage.” Id. Harris asserts that
one of the two weekly services for Hebrew Israelite inmates is scheduled from
1:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.; however, Officer Allen at movement control would not
allow Harris and other Hebrew Israelite inmates “to go to their service until
after the feeding of the entire institution [for the lunch meal] was complete at
2:30–45 p.m.; even if the inmates were not eating the noon meal.” Id.
Harris further complains that Defendants have prevented him from
observing dietary restrictions on holy days. Id. According to Harris, it “is up to
the chaplin [sic] and or Senior Chaplin [sic] to ensure[] the food service staff
know the dates of the High Holy Days (Passover, Feast of Unleavened Bread,
etc.) and the dietary requirements of the inmates of that religion.” Id. He
contends that “[e]verytime a High Holy day (that) involved dietary
restriction/law came around, there was always an issue and or some reason for
the staff, chaplin [sic] and or security to not allow the Biblical law not [sic] to
be followed.” Id. In particular, Harris alleges that on April 2, 2022, he was
denied a meal during a holy day. Id.; see also Doc. 1-1 at 3. Harris asserts that
he submitted a formal grievance regarding the issue, which Warden Lane
approved. Complaint at 6.
Lastly, Harris contends that Defendants do not allow Hebrew Israelite
inmates to wear diadems pursuant to “the Nation of Yaweh’s [sic] religious
beliefs and practices.” Id. at 7. According to Harris, when he grieved the issue,
3

Chaplain Wood responded that diadems constitute a security risk. Id. at 6.
Harris asserts that “[w]hen evidence to refute the security risk was
presented[,] it became a[n] only during religious services attended by a sponsor
restriction.” Id. However, the Hebrew Israelite inmates at Suwannee CI “have
no civilian sponsors[] who attend [their] religious services.” Id. at 7. Harris
contends that other religious groups at Suwannee CI do not have such
restrictions on headgear. Id. at 6.
III. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual
allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see
also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.
2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,
the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
4

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual
content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and
original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court
must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,
therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve
as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in
5

order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,
1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132
F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as
recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).
IV. Summary of Defendants’ Arguments
In their Motion, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the claims against
them because: (1) Harris failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) they
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3) Warden Lane and Chaplain
Wood, as supervisory officials, are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(4) Warden Lane and Chaplain Wood are entitled to qualified immunity; and
(5) Harris is not entitled to monetary damages or injunctive relief. See
generally Motion.
V. Analysis
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
1. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) Exhaustion
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held the exhaustion of
administrative remedies by a prisoner is “a threshold matter” to be addressed
before considering the merits of a case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab.

6

Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012) 4 (noting that exhaustion is “a
‘threshold matter’ that we address before considering the merits of the case”)
(citation omitted). It is well settled that the PLRA requires an inmate wishing
to challenge prison conditions to first exhaust all available administrative
remedies before asserting any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). A prisoner such as Harris,
however, is not required to plead exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
216 (2007). Instead, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
“failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]” Id. Notably,
exhaustion of available administrative remedies is “a precondition to an
adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich,
530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not only is there an exhaustion
requirement, the PLRA “requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 93 (2006).
Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal
with parties who do not want to exhaust,
administrative law creates an incentive for these
parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to
do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full
opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative
law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of
The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
4

7

administrative remedies, which “means using all steps
that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so
that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”
Pozo,[ 5] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with
an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not
engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one
baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies
as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an
administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for
the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084
(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th
Cir. 2007)).
Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, Defendants bear “the burden of proving that [Harris] has failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Id. at 1082. In accordance with
Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a two-step process when
examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

5 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).

8

After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance
procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response
to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to
dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner’s failure to
exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner,
541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we
established a two-step process for resolving motions to
dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541
F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual
allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the
prisoner’s response and accept the prisoner’s view of
the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts
as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.
Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s
view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to
resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based
on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to
exhaust. Id. at 1082–83; see also id. at 1082
(explaining that defendants bear the burden of
showing a failure to exhaust).
Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).
At step two of the procedure established in Turner, the Court can consider facts
outside the pleadings as long as those facts do not decide the case and the
parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop the record. 6 Bryant, 530 F.3d
at 1376; see also Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 838–39 (11th Cir. 2020).

In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that a pro se
plaintiff must receive notice of his opportunity to develop the record on exhaustion.
See Kinard v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-10359, 2024 WL 4785003, at *7 (11th Cir.
Nov. 14, 2024) (per curiam). Here, the Court notified Harris that he had forty-five
days to respond to any motion to dismiss. See Order (Doc. 5) at 3. Harris responded
to the Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 15) and addressed the exhaustion argument by
relying on the grievance records that he attached to his Complaint. He does not
suggest that he requires additional discovery. As such, Harris has received notice and
an opportunity to develop the record on exhaustion.
6

9

In evaluating whether Harris has satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the
Court notes that the Eleventh Circuit has determined that a “prisoner need
not name any particular defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust
his claim.” Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1218 (11th
Cir. 2010).
2. Florida’s Prison Grievance Procedure
State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v.
Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218
(stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define
the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The FDC provides an internal grievance
procedure for its inmates. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001 through 33103.018. Generally, to properly exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner
must complete a three-step sequential process. First, an inmate must submit
an informal grievance at the institutional level to a designated staff member
responsible

for

the

specific

problem.

See

Fla.

Admin.

Code

R.

33-103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a formal
grievance at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the
matter is not resolved through formal and informal grievances, the inmate
must file an appeal to the Office of the FDC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code
R. 33-103.007. However, under certain specified circumstances, an inmate can
bypass the informal-grievance stage and start with a formal grievance at the
10

institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1); 33-103.006(3). Or
an inmate can completely bypass the institutional level and proceed directly to
the Office of the FDC Secretary by filing a “direct grievance.” See Fla. Admin.
Code R. 33-103.007(3). Emergency grievances and grievances of reprisal are
types of “direct grievances” that may be filed with the Office of the FDC
Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3)(a).
Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for
the submission of grievances. Informal grievances must be received within
twenty days from the date on which the grieved incident or action occurred.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(a). Formal grievances must be received
no later than fifteen days from the date of the response to the informal
grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(b). Similarly, grievance
appeals to the Office of the FDC Secretary must be received within fifteen days
from the date that the response to the formal grievance is returned to the
inmate. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(c). According to Rule
33-103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance, direct grievance, or
grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without further processing if,
following a review of the grievance, one or more . . . conditions are found to
exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule provides an enumerated
list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance without a response on the
merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(a)–(y). A grievance can be
11

returned without action if it: is untimely; “addresses more than one issue or
complaint”; is “so broad, general or vague in nature that it cannot be clearly
investigated, evaluated, and responded to”; is “not written legibly and cannot
be clearly understood”; is a supplement to a previously-submitted grievance
that has been accepted for review; does not “provide a valid reason for bypassing the previous levels of review as required or the reason provided is not
acceptable”; or does not include the required attachments. See Fla. Admin.
Code R. 33-103.014(1).
3. The Parties’ Positions Regarding Exhaustion
Defendants argue that Harris failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies for his claims regarding religious services and headgear. See Motion
at 7. As to Harris’s ability to attend religious services, Defendants assert that
although Harris “has an approved grievance related to this issue, [it] remains
unexhausted” because the issue as presented in the grievance “does not align
with the allegations in his Complaint.” Id. at 7–8. Defendants further contend
that Harris failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his religious
headgear claim because he filed neither a relevant grievance, nor a petition to
initiate rulemaking. See id. at 8.
In support of their failure to exhaust assertions, Defendants submit
declarations from Lawanda Sanders-Williams, FDC Operation Analyst; Teresa
Barrs, Senior Clerk at Suwannee CI; and Lauren Sanchez, FDC Paralegal
12

Specialist. See id. at 28–35. In her declaration, Sanders-Williams states that
between April 1, 2022, and March 15, 2023, Harris filed “no appeals of any kind
regarding the prevention of practicing his religion as outlined in his
complaint.” Id. at 29. Further, “Harris filed no appeals that could be placed
under the category of Religious Freedom or Religious Diet.” Id.
In Barrs’s declaration, she states that between April 1, 2022, and March
15, 2023, Harris had “one approved informal grievance related to Religious
Freedom and CO Allen.” Id. at 32. According to Barrs, Harris also had three
denied informal grievances: two related to religious freedom and one related to
religious diet. Id. “During that period, Inmate Harris filed one formal
grievance, appealing the denied grievance related to religious diet. This formal
grievance was approved.” Id. at 33. Lastly, in her declaration, Sanchez states
that Harris has no record of filing a petition to initiate rulemaking. Id. at 35.
In response, Harris contends that he exhausted available administrative
remedies for all his claims. See Response at 5–6. He asserts that he submitted
a formal grievance that “clearly state[d], in detail, how his religious freedom is
being prohibited. Including [sic] his right to wear religious headgear/diadem.”
Id. at 5. Suwannee CI approved this formal grievance. Id. Additionally, Harris
argues that a petition to initiate rulemaking is not a step required to exhaust
administrative remedies. Id.
With his Complaint, Harris includes records of his exhaustion efforts.
13

See generally Doc. 1-1. The Court summarizes those records here. On April 2,
2022, Harris submitted an informal grievance (log #231-2204-0039) regarding
the denial of meals on holy days. Doc. 1-1 at 3–4. Chaplain Wood returned the
grievance. Id. at 3. Harris then submitted a formal grievance (log #2204-231052), stating:
This is an appeal to grievance #231-2204-0039. The
response to my grievance was inadequate [and] my
grievance should have been approved. I’m grieving the
fact that the denial of my meal constituted me being
prohibited the freedom to exercise my religious beliefs.
It doesn’t matter if it happened willfully or
negligently, the fact remains it happened. Which is the
first reason my grievance should’ve been approved.
Secondly the response claims reason my grievance was
returned without action, is because the directions for
the Hebrew Israelite Passover [and] Religious Holy
Holidays was communicated to food service. It wasn’t
communicated to [sic] well; cause me [and] the other
Hebrew Israelites wouldn’t have been denied
breakfast meals without leaven (yeast). To further
prove this response was inadequate [and] just a means
to brush off me being denied the right to freely exercise
my right to practice my religious belief without
prohibition, is the fact that if it was communicated to
the food service, the same thing would not have
occurred against the last day of the feast of unleavened
bread. No other religious denominations are having
problems with the preparation of the meals for their
Holy Days, or the denial of wearing head gear. The
answer to my grievance is nothing more than an
attempt to discourage me from seeking relief against
my right to practice my religion without prohibition
being violated [and] bigotry to the utmost. Due to the
fact that Chaplain Woods [sic] does not expect me to
take this violation of my Constitutional Rights past
the F.D.O.C., he just basically brushed me off with a[n]
14

inadequate response to my valid allegations [and]
confirmed his deliberate indifference to the violation
of my Constitional [sic] Rights. Regardless of the
information provided herein, I’m only grieving one
issue; which is the denial of my Constitutional Right
to freely exercise my religious beliefs without being
prohibited, by the denying of my meal by F.D.O.C.
staff on 4/2/22. A copy of grievance #231-2204-0039 is
attached.
Id. at 5. A Suwannee CI official approved Harris’s formal grievance:
Investigation
following:

into

your

grievance

reveals

the

You were [on] the list for the Hebrew Israelite
Passover which began on April 02, 2022. You can
consider this grievance approved due to you being on
the list and not receiving your meal. You were also on
the Passover list for April 16, 2022. The chaplain said
he gave the list to foodservice of who the participants
were for both. You have not been discriminated
against. The list gets updated daily for transfers.
Id. at 6. Harris subsequently submitted an informal grievance (log #231-22040083) regarding the denial of meals on holy days and restrictions on religious
headgear, which a Suwannee CI official returned. Id. at 7–8.
On April 11, 2022, Harris submitted another informal grievance (log
#231-2204-0074):
On 4/11/22, between the times of 11:30 a.m.–12:30
a.m., as I was coming from my call-out at the law
library [and] attempting to go too [sic] my call-out to
the chapel to attend Hebrew Israelite service, Officer
Allen told me to take my a[**] to the dorm. When I told
him I’m on the call-out for Hebrew Israelite service, he
said not today. His actions violate my First
15

Amendment Right to freely exercise my religious
beliefs without being prohibited. Being that I recently
wrote a grievance on C.O. Allen for his excessive use
of profane [and] abusive language; I feel this
prohibiting of me freely practicing my religious belief
was done in retaliation. This officer’s actions violate
sub-sections of the 33rd chapter of F.S. 944, as well as
my first, eighth, [and] fourteenth amendment rights.
Regardless of the information provided herein, I’m
only grieving the one issue of being denied to freely
exercise my religious beliefs without being prohibited.
Doc. 1-1 at 2. A Suwannee CI official approved the grievance: “Officer Allen
was interviewed and advised that he has no knowledge of your accusations. All
staff will be reminded to ensure all inmates make their callouts in a timely
manner.” Id.
4. Turner Step One
Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court must review the
allegations in the Motion and Response and accept as true Harris’s allegations.
See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209. If Harris’s allegations in the Response show a
failure to exhaust, then dismissal would be appropriate. See id.
Accepting Harris’s view of the facts as true, the Court finds dismissal of
the claims against Defendants for lack of exhaustion is not warranted at the
first step of Turner. Thus, the Court proceeds to the second step of the two-part
process and considers Defendants’ arguments about exhaustion and makes
findings of fact.

16

5. Turner Step Two
As dismissal would not be appropriate based on the allegations in the
Motion and Response, the Court next turns to the second prong of the Turner
analysis. First, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their
burden of establishing that Harris did not properly exhaust administrative
remedies for his claim about religious services. See Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082
(“The defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies.”). Indeed, Harris asserts in the
relevant informal grievance (log #231-2204-0074) that Officer Allen prevented
him from attending religious services and Officer Allen’s actions denied him
the right to freely exercise his religion. See Doc. 1-1 at 2. Although Harris’s
allegations in the informal grievance differ slightly from the allegations in his
Complaint, the grievance is sufficient to put the FDC on notice of the issue in
contention and to allow the FDC an opportunity to investigate the matter. See
Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287 (quotations and citation omitted) (alterations in
original). Accordingly, Harris exhausted his administrative remedies for this
claim.
However, as to Harris’s claim about religious headgear, the Court finds
that he failed to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies. To
properly exhaust administrative remedies, “prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the [prison’s] applicable
17

procedural rules.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quotation marks omitted). The FDC’s
rules provide that informal and formal grievances must be legible, include
accurately stated facts, and address only one issue or complaint; however, it
does not include any requirements regarding the level of detail required for
grievances. Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(2)(b)2; 33-103.006(2)(d)–(f). Where
a prison’s grievance procedure does not require a certain level of specificity, “a
grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which
redress is sought.” Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002), overruled
in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563
(2007); see Harvard v. Inch, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1244 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
The approved formal grievance (log #2204-231-052) that Harris
references in the Response did not sufficiently alert prison officials to his claim
regarding religious headgear. Instead, the thrust of the grievance is the denial
of meals on holy days. See Doc. 1-1 at 5 (“I’m grieving the fact that the denial
of my meal constituted me being prohibited the freedom to exercise [his]
religious beliefs.”). Harris only briefly references his concern about the
restriction on diadems. Id. (“No other religious denominations are having
problems with the preparation of the meals for their Holy Days or the denial
of wearing headgear.”). Notably, the institutional response reflects that prison
officials did not consider Harris’s formal grievance to be a complaint about
religious headgear, but rather understood it to be a grievance challenging the
18

denial of his meals. See id. at 6 (“You can consider this grievance approved due
to you being on the list and not receiving your meal.”). As such, the formal
grievance did not suffice to alert officials to the religious headgear claim that
Harris raises in the Complaint. See Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287.
Harris’s informal grievance (log #231-2204-0083) about religious
headgear also was insufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies. Harris
concedes that he did not appeal the denial of this informal grievance. See
Complaint at 7. In failing to do so, he did not complete the requisite steps to
exhaust as determined by state law. See Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1211
(recognizing that the FDOC uses a three-step process for inmate grievances
that includes an informal grievance, formal grievance, and appeal). To the
extent Harris argues administrative remedies were unavailable to him because
of threats from staff, the Court is not persuaded because his allegations are
vague and conclusory. See Complaint at 7 (“[P]laintiff was threatened with
physical abuse by staff if he continued seeking to exhaust administrative
remedies on issues involving staff.”); see also Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085 (holding
that a prison official’s threats of retaliation can render grievance process
unavailable if: “(1) the threat actually did deter the plaintiff inmate from
lodging a grievance or pursuing a particular part of the process; and (2) the
threat is one that would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and
fortitude” from participating in the process). Therefore, Harris’s religious
19

headgear claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. 7
However, his religious services claim is properly exhausted, and the
Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied in this regard.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants contend they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
to the extent Harris seeks monetary damages against them in their official
capacities. See Motion at 14–15. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. It is well-settled that, in the absence of consent, “a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Eleventh
Amendment also prohibits suits against state officials where the state is the
real party in interest, such that a plaintiff could not sue to have a state officer
pay funds directly from the state treasury for the wrongful acts of the state.
Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). In

Because the Court has determined that Harris did not exhaust his
administrative remedies using the FDC’s three-step grievance process, the Court will
not address Defendants’ argument regarding Harris’ failure to submit a petition to
initiate rulemaking.
7

20

Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), the
Eleventh Circuit noted:
It is clear that Congress did not intend to abrogate a
state’s eleventh amendment immunity in section 1983
damage suits. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340–45,
99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144–45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979).
Furthermore, after reviewing specific provisions of the
Florida statutes, we recently concluded that Florida's
limited waiver of sovereign immunity was not
intended to encompass section 1983 suits for damages.
See Gamble,[ 8] 779 F.2d at 1513–20.
Accordingly, in Zatler, the court found that the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections was immune from suit in his official capacity. Id.
Here, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit to the extent Harris seeks monetary
damages from Defendants in their official capacities. Therefore, Defendants’
Motion is due to be granted on that basis.
C. Supervisory Liability
Defendants argue that Harris has failed to allege Warden Lane and
Chaplain Wood personally participated in the underlying constitutional
violations, and therefore, Harris has not pled facts sufficient to establish
supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Motion at 16. The Eleventh
Circuit has held that “[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory
officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their

8 Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Serv., 779 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1986).

21

subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone
v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish
individual liability for supervisory conduct, a plaintiff must show “that the
supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that
a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged
constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th
Cir. 2014). According to the Eleventh Circuit,
The necessary causal connection can be established
when a history of widespread abuse puts the
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct
the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.
Alternatively, the causal connection may be
established when a supervisor’s custom or policy . . .
result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights or when facts support an inference that the
supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully
or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully
and failed to stop them from doing so.
Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. However, “[t]he deprivations that constitute
widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious,
flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
Viewing Harris’s allegations in the light most favorable to him and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court finds that Harris has
22

not alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show that Warden Lane was personally
involved in, or otherwise causally connected to, any alleged violation of his
federal statutory or constitutional rights. Harris alleges only that Warden
Lane approved his formal grievance about the denial of meals on holy days.
See Complaint at 6. However, addressing one grievance, without more, does
not render a supervisor liable for the underlying constitutional violation. See
Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-FtM-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) 9 (unpublished) (“[F]iling a grievance with a supervisory
person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even when the
grievance is denied.” (collecting cases)). 10 Nor does Harris’s grievance, by itself,
establish the type of widespread abuse sufficient to put a supervisor on notice
of the need to correct an alleged deprivation. Therefore, the claims against
Warden Lane are due to be dismissed on this basis.

The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).
10 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized circumstances in which a defendant’s
failure to act in response to an inmate’s grievances amounts to a constitutional
violation. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding
that a defendant’s failure to act in response to an inmate’s written complaint
amounted to deliberate indifference and the delay attributable to the defendant’s
deliberate indifference may have caused the inmate’s injury). However, Harris fails
to state such a claim here. Indeed, the record reflects that Warden Lane took action
in response to Harris’s grievance by investigating and approving it. See Doc. 1-1 at 6.
9

23

As to Chaplain Wood, Harris asserts that he is responsible for
“ensur[ing] the food service staff know the dates of the High Holy Days . . . and
the dietary requirements of the inmates of [the Hebrew Israelite] religion.”
Complaint at 6. And, he alleges that during Passover and the Feast of
Unleavened Bread, he did not receive the meals that conformed with his
religious dietary restrictions because Chaplain Wood failed to convey the
requisite information to food service staff. See id. at 6; Doc. 1-1 at 3–8. Liberally
construing Harris’s allegations, the Court finds Harris has sufficiently pled a
First Amendment claim regarding his failure to receive his religious meals
against Chaplain Wood in his supervisory capacity. Nevertheless, because
Harris presents no facts connecting Chaplain Wood to his complaints about
interference with his attendance at religious services, any claim against
Chaplain Wood on that basis is due to be dismissed.
D. Qualified Immunity
Next, Defendants assert that Warden Lane and Chaplain Wood are
entitled to qualified immunity. See Motion at 17–19. The Court notes that
although “the defense of qualified immunity is typically addressed at the
summary judgment stage of a case, it may be . . . raised and considered on a
motion to dismiss.” St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.
2002). “Generally speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of
24

a clearly established constitutional right.’” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304,
1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337). The Eleventh
Circuit has stated:
The qualified-immunity defense reflects an
effort to balance “the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009). The doctrine resolves this balance by
protecting
government
officials
engaged
in
discretionary functions and sued in their individual
capacities unless they violate “clearly established
federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. City
of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
As a result, qualified immunity shields from
liability “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). But the
doctrine’s protections do not extend to one who “knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
To invoke qualified immunity, a public official
must first demonstrate that he was acting within the
scope of his or her discretionary authority. Maddox v.
Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we
have explained the term “discretionary authority,” it
“include[s] all actions of a governmental official that
(1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of
his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his
authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th
25

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it
is clear that Defendant Officers satisfied this
requirement, as they engaged in all of the challenged
actions while on duty as police officers conducting
investigative and seizure functions.
Because Defendant Officers have established
that they were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to [the
plaintiff] to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
inappropriate. See id. To do that, [the plaintiff] must
show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
him, the facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers
violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional right and that that
right was “clearly established . . . in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’
actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on
other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808.
We may decide these issues in either order, but, to
survive a qualified-immunity defense, [the plaintiff]
must satisfy both showings. Maddox, 727 F.3d at
1120–21 (citation omitted).
Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850–51 (11th Cir. 2017); see King v. Pridmore,
961 F.3d 1135, 1142 (11th Cir. 2020).
Defendants argue that Chaplain Wood is entitled to qualified immunity
because “his actions were reasonable within the scope of his duties.” Motion at
19. According to Defendants, “[s]taff was counseled to allow [Harris] to
participate in religious services and religious food services and [Harris] was
added to the list for holiday food services.” Id. In response, Harris contends

26

that Chaplain Wood is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Response at
2–4.
Accepting Harris’s allegations with respect to Chaplain Wood, the Court
finds that Harris has alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible First
Amendment claim against him. According to Harris, Chaplain Wood was
responsible for advising food service staff of religious holidays and dietary
requirements. Complaint at 6. However, Harris alleges that he was not
provided an appropriate meal on Passover because food service staff stated,
“Passover doesn’t start until 15th which is the date of the Messanic [sic] Jews’
Passover,” not Hebrew Israelite Passover. Doc. 1-1 at 3.

And even after

Chaplain Wood allegedly corrected the issue, Harris again was denied an
appropriate meal on “the last day of the feast of unleavened bread.” Id. at 5.
Because Harris has stated a plausible First Amendment claim against
Chaplain Wood, the Chaplain is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage
of the litigation. 11

11 Harris’s assertion that Chaplain Wood violated his federal constitutional and

statutory rights when he denied Harris religious meals on holy days is the only
remaining claim in this action. As such, the Court does not consider Defendants’
arguments with respect to Warden Lane or Harris’s claims about religious services
and headgear.
27

E. Compensatory Damages
Defendants assert that Harris is not entitled to compensatory damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because he has not alleged any physical injuries
that are more than de minimis. See Motion at 19–21. At issue is 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e), which reads:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury or
the commission of a sexual act . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1977e(e). To satisfy § 1997e(e), a prisoner must assert physical
injury that is more than de minimis. However, the injury does not need to be
significant. See Thompson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555, 557
(11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Taking Harris’s allegations as true, he is not entitled to seek
compensatory damages because he fails to assert any physical injury that
resulted from Chaplain Wood’s actions and/or omissions. See generally
Complaint. Harris’s assertions, without any allegations of physical injury
resulting from Chaplain Wood’s actions or omissions, fail to satisfy § 1997e(e)’s
injury requirement. See Thompson, 551 F. App’x at 557 n.3. Thus, Defendants’
Motion is due to be granted to the extent that the Court finds Harris’s request
for compensatory damages from Chaplain Wood is precluded under § 1997e(e).

28

F. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that Harris’s request for punitive damages must be
dismissed because punitive damages are statutorily barred in any civil action
with respect to prison conditions. See Motion at 21–24. The Court has
repeatedly rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., Walker v. Bailey, No. 3:23CV-511-MMH-MCR, 2024 WL 3520868, at *8–9 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2024);
Santiago v. Walden, No. 3:23-CV-741-MMH-JBT, 2024 WL 2895319, at *8–9
(M.D. Fla. June 10, 2024). For the reasons detailed in the prior decisions cited
here, the Court again declines to find that Harris’s request for punitive
damages is statutorily barred. Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied as to this
issue.
G. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Defendants asks the Court to dismiss Harris’s request for declaratory
and injunctive relief because in his Complaint, Harris does not include any
specific facts indicating a current or future threat of actual injury. See Motion
at 24–25. Harris seemingly responds that the alleged constitutional violations
set forth in the Complaint continue to occur. See Response at 4.
“‘[T]o demonstrate that a case or controversy exists to meet the Article
III standing requirement when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial
likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.’” Worthy v. City of Phenix
29

City, 930 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir.
1999)). “Logically, ‘a prospective remedy will provide no relief for an injury that
is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past.’” Church v. City of Huntsville,
30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Am. Postal Workers Union v.
Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir. 1992)). Here, Harris is still incarcerated
at Suwannee CI. And in the Complaint, Harris asserts that the alleged
violations continue to occur. See Complaint at 7 (“These unconstitutional
actions are still taking place.”). Although Harris’s prayer for relief asks the
Court to declare Chaplain Wood violated Harris’s federal constitutional and
statutory rights, the Complaint and Response show that he is seeking a
prospective declaration that Chaplain Wood’s conduct violates his rights. As
such, Harris’s claim for prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief against
Chaplain Wood is properly before the Court.
VI. Sua Sponte Frivolity Review
The Court is obligated to conduct an independent frivolity review of
Harris’s claims involving the FDC. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires
the Court to dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the action
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). State and governmental entities that are considered
30

“arms of the state” are not “persons” subject to monetary liability within the
meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70
(1989). The FDC is an arm of the executive branch of state government, see
Fla. Stat. § 20.315, and thus is not a person for purposes of § 1983 litigation,
see Gardner v. Riska, 444 F. App’x 353, 355 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
plaintiff’s claim for damages against the FDC, a state agency, was frivolous
because state agencies are not persons subject to monetary liability under §
1983). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Harris’s claims against the FDC as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:
1.

Defendants FDC, Lane, and Wood’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) is

GRANTED in part as to Harris’ (1) claim about religious headgear against
all Defendants because Harris failed to exhaust his administrative remedies;
(2) claims for monetary damages against all Defendants in their official
capacities; (3) claim about religious services against Defendants Lane and
Wood and claim about religious diet against Defendant Lane for failure to state
a claim; and (4) claims for compensatory damages. Therefore, Harris’s claim
about religious headgear against all Defendants is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Harris’s claim about
religious services against Defendants Lane and Wood, as well as his claim
about religious diet against Defendant Lane are DISMISSED with
31

prejudice for failure to state a claim. In all other respects, the Motion (Doc.
15) is DENIED.
2.

Harris’s claims against Defendant FDC are DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b).
3.

The Clerk shall terminate FDC and Lane as Defendants in this

4.

This case will proceed on Harris’s claim against Defendant

case.

Wood for the denial of religious meals. Defendant Wood shall answer the
Complaint (Doc. 1) no later than December 27, 2024. Upon the filing of the
answer, the Court, by separate Order, will set deadlines for discovery and the
filing of dispositive motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 26th day of
November, 2024.

Jax-9 10/25
c:
Richard Harris, #L24755
Counsel of record

32