Walker v. Bailey et al

Filing 61

ORDER granting 56 motion to the extent that the Court accepts Plaintiff's motion for rehearing as timely filed; and denying 57 motion for rehearing. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 9/24/2024. (JND)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
TYRONE ANTWAN WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:23-cv-511-MMH-MCR
SEAN BAILEY, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________
ORDER
On March 13, 2024, the Court entered an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants’ Bailey, Randall, Durborow, Perkins, Crow, and
Lizenbee’s Motion to Dismiss; and granting Defendant Walden’s Motion to
Dismiss. See Doc. 54 (Order). Now before the Court is Plaintiff Tyrone Antwan
Walker’s Motion for Rehearing. See Doc. 57 (Motion). Defendants Bailey,
Randall, Durborow, Perkins, Crow, and Lizenbee filed a Response opposing the
Motion. See Doc. 58 (Response).
In his Motion, Walker asks the Court to reconsider its Order to the extent
that the Court dismissed his retaliation and excessive force claims against
Perkins and Lizenbee, as well as his deliberate indifference claim against
Walden. See generally Motion. According to Walker, he alleged a plausible
retaliation claim because he asserted Perkins and Lizenbee searched his cell

after Walker’s family called the facility to report staff abuse. Id. at 6. He also
contends the Court should have inferred from his allegations that Perkins and
Lizenbee participated in the use of excessive force because he asserted that
they are senior officers who exited his cell immediately before the use of force
and likely heard Walker’s cries for help. Id. at 3. As to his claim against
Walden, Walker argues he stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim
because he alleged Walden “lied on the post use of force paperwork,” which
delayed medical treatment for his eye. Id. at 4.
To the extent that Walker seeks reconsideration under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e), Rule 59(e) affords the Court discretion to reconsider an
order. See Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 (11th Cir. 2000); O’Neal v.
Kennamer, 958 F.3d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992). “The only grounds for
granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors
of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations
and citation omitted). This Court has interpreted those parameters to include
“(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Lamar
Advert. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, Fla., 189 F.R.D. 480, 489 (M.D. Fla.
1999). For example, reconsideration may be appropriate where “the Court has
patently misunderstood a party.” O’Neill v. The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 243
F.R.D. 469, 483 (S.D. Fla. 2006). Rule 59(e) cannot be used “to relitigate old
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matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408
F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). Indeed, permitting a party to raise new
arguments on a motion for reconsideration “essentially affords a litigant ‘two
bites at the apple.’” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc.,
763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Mincey, 206 F.3d at 1137 n.69
(citation omitted); Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“[A] motion to reconsider should not be used by the parties to set forth new
theories of law.”). Moreover, “[w]hen evaluating a motion to reconsider, a court
should proceed cautiously, realizing that ‘in the interest of finality and
conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration of a previous order is
an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.’” United States v. Bailey,
288 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citation omitted).
Walker has not asserted viable grounds to warrant reconsideration. In
its Order, the Court found that Walker’s allegations neither sufficiently
showed that his family’s reports of staff abuse subjectively motivated Lizenbee
and Perkins to retaliate, nor demonstrated that Lizenbee and Perkins’s seniorofficer status and mere proximity to Walker’s cell made them liable for another
officer’s alleged use of force. See generally Order. Likewise, the Court
considered Walker’s allegation that Walden “lied” about his eye injury on the
post-use-of-force paperwork, but found that Walker’s own statements showed
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he did not complain of eye pain until he submitted a sick call request the day
after Walden’s post-use-of-force exam. Order at 30. Thus, the Court finds that
Walker’s assertions do not support reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Rather,
he simply disagrees with the Court’s ruling and wants a favorable ruling, but
not for any basis which might fall under Rule 59(e). Accordingly, the Motion is
denied.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED:
1.

Walker’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for

Rehearing (Doc. 56) is GRANTED to the extent that the Court accepts
Walker’s Motion for Rehearing (Doc. 57) as timely filed.
2.

Walker’s Motion for Rehearing (Doc. 57) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of
September, 2024.

Jax-7
C:
Tyrone Antwan Walker, #B04225
Counsel of record

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