Claridy Walker v. USA

Filing 38

ORDER granting 35 the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment; directing the Clerk to close the file. See Order for details. Signed by Senior Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 3/10/2025. (JCD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
KIMBERLY MICHELE CLARIDY
WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:23-cv-950-TJC-PDB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant United States’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 35).
I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff Kimberly Michele Claridy Walker was

arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
to

distribute

controlled

substances

in

violation

of

21

U.S.C. § 846.

(Doc. 35 ¶¶ 1–2). That same day, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) seized, among other items, four vehicles: (1) a 2015 BMW
5501, VIN WBAKN9C58FD960901; (2) a 2015 Lexus IS 250, VIN
JTHBF1D2XF5052478;

(3)

a

2013

Audi

ASL

Quattro,

VIN

WAURGAFD7DN001297; and (4) a 2020 Ryker Rally Edition motorcycle, VIN
3JB2GEG25LJ000932. Id. ¶ 2; id. at 1.

From April 13, 2021 to March 22, 2023, Walker was detained at the
Bradford County Jail in Starke, Florida. Id. ¶ 3. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983
and 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1621, on June 8, 2021, ATF sent Walker written notices
of the seizure and initiation of administrative forfeiture proceedings of the
vehicles via FedEx to a Jacksonville address attributed to Walker, and to the
jail’s P.O. box via certified mail. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 4–5; Doc. 35-1 at 6–9, 12–15). The
notice was delivered and signed for at the Jacksonville address on June 10,
2021, and delivered to the jail’s P.O. box on June 15, 2021. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 4–5;
Doc. 35-1 at 4–5,10–11). The notice was also published on the official
government website, www.forfeiture.gov, from May 10, 2021 through June 8,
2021. (Doc. 35 at 16). On August 18, 2021, after not receiving any properly
executed claim and after the time limit to file a claim expired, ATF
administratively forfeited the property to the United States. 1 Id. ¶ 6.
At Walker’s criminal change of plea hearing on February 23, 2022,
Walker admitted to the Government’s Notice of Maximum Penalty, Elements of
Offense, Personalization of Elements, and Factual Basis (Doc. 277, Case No.
3:21-cr-48) which included forfeiture of the vehicles. (Doc. 477 at 22–23, Case
No. 3:21-cr-48) (transcript of change of plea hearing). Nevertheless, Walker

1 According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Government notified

the Court that ATF completed the administrative forfeiture of the vehicles on
February 25, 2022. (Doc. 32 ¶ 7; Doc. 281, Case No. 3:21-cr-48).
2

later filed a pro se motion requesting the return of her property, including the
seized vehicles. (Doc. 490, Case No. 3:21-cr-48). The Magistrate Judge denied
Walker’s motion without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and under
18 U.S.C. § 983, the motion was transferred to a new civil case—this one—on
August 10, 2023. (Doc. 509, Case No. 3:21-cr-48).
With leave from the Court, Walker subsequently filed an amended
complaint on March 31, 2024. (Doc. 32). The amended complaint contains only
one count: a motion to set aside forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1). Walker
alleges (1) she did not receive actual written notice of the Government’s intent
to forfeit the vehicles, (2) that the Government knew or reasonably should have
known of her interest in the vehicles and failed to take reasonable steps to
provide her with notice of the Government’s intent to forfeit the vehicles, and
(3) she did not know or have reason to know of the seizure of the vehicles within
sufficient time to file a timely claim. (Doc. 32 ¶¶ 10–12).
To support its motion for summary judgment, the Government provides
declarations of the Division Operations Officer for the Asset Forfeiture Division
of the ATF (Doc. 35-1 at 1–3) and Administrative Lieutenant for the Bradford
County Sheriff’s Office, Corrections Division (Doc. 35-2), 2 a FedEx proof-of-

2 The Government submitted two declarations from the lieutenant: one in

its motion for summary judgment, and a supplemental declaration in its reply
to Walker’s response to the motion for summary judgment, which includes
copies of the Inmate Mail Policy, Inmate Rules, and Issued Property Report.
3

delivery and shipping label to the Jacksonville address signed for by a “B.
Williams” (Doc. 35-1 at 4–5), a USPS tracking confirmation page of the certified
mail to the jail’s P.O. box (id. at 10–11), the notices of seizure and initiation of
administrative forfeiture proceedings that were mailed in each of the FedEx
and USPS deliveries (id. at 6–9, 12–15), and declarations of the administrative
forfeiture of the vehicles (along with other seized items not in dispute) (id. at
16–18).
II.

DISCUSSION
a. Legal Standard
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and a party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824,
828–29 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 64 F.4th 1166,
1168 (11th Cir. 2023). “[M]ere existence of some alleged factual dispute between

See (Doc. 35-2; Doc. 37-1). The Court rejects Walker’s Best Evidence Rule
argument (Doc. 36 at 4) but, in an abundance of caution, does not rely on any
evidence provided in the Government’s reply (including the written mail policy
itself) (Doc. 37). Rather, the Court relies on the lieutenant’s first declaration
and the statements related to the mail rules at the Bradford County Jail. Any
references to the lieutenant’s declaration throughout this Order are references
to the lieutenant’s declaration attached to the motion for summary judgment.
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the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute of fact
is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Guevara, 127 F.4th at 829 (citing Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1253
(11th Cir. 2022)). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
While Walker, as the movant under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1), bears the
burden to show that the Government failed to take reasonable steps to provide
her notice, the Government’s motion for summary judgment is before the Court;
thus, the Government must show the absence of a genuine material fact in
dispute. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,
168 (2002) (“The Government here carried its burden of showing the following
procedures had been used to give notice.”).
b. Analysis
Walker brings this suit under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000. (Doc. 32). 3 Under this statute,
any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil
forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does not
3 With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court’s review “is limited

to determining whether the agency followed the proper procedural safeguards”
in forfeiting Walker’s property. See Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417
F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005).
5

receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a declaration of
forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest in the property,
which motion shall be granted if-- the Government knew, or
reasonably should have known, of the moving party’s
interest and failed to take reasonable steps to provide such
party with notice; and the moving party did not know or
have reason to know of the seizure within sufficient time to
file a timely claim.
18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1) (emphasis added).
While Walker’s amended complaint alleges that the Government failed to
satisfy the statutory requirements in their entirety, discussed supra, the
Government argues it took reasonable steps to provide Walker with notice
because (1) it mailed the notice via certified mail to the P.O. box of Walker’s
place of incarceration (which was delivered) (Doc. 35 at 15–19) and (2) the jail’s
procedures for delivering mail were reasonably calculated to notify Walker (id.
at 19–21). Walker argues that the Government’s actions were not reasonably
calculated to give notice; therefore, the Court should either deny the motion for
summary judgment and grant judgment in Walker’s favor or permit the case to
proceed on the regular case management track to develop evidence to support
her case. See generally (Doc. 36).
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the United States and the States from depriving any person of property
without “due process of law.” Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167. Individuals whose
property interests are at stake are entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be

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heard.” Id. (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
48 (1993)). The Supreme Court reiterated in Dusenbery that to pass
constitutional muster, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 534 U.S. at 167–68
(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
The record shows the steps the Government took to provide Walker with
notice. The ATF officer, who supervised forfeiture activities within the agency
during the period of the vehicles’ seizure and forfeiture, states in her declaration
that the notices were delivered to Walker via certified mail at the jail’s P.O. box,
via FedEx to her home, and published online. (Doc. 35-1 ¶¶ 6–7).
The Bradford County Jail lieutenant’s declaration states she is familiar
with the practices and procedures used in distributing mail to inmates in June
2021, and this knowledge comes from training and job experience. (Doc. 35-2
¶ 3). Per the lieutenant, the jail staff regularly collected mail from the jail’s P.O.
box and would distribute inmate mail that passed inspection, processing mail
“without unnecessary delay.” Id. ¶¶ 16–18. 4

4 The lieutenant’s declaration states that jail staff picked up the mail from

the jail’s P.O. box Monday through Saturday, and mail was delivered to the
inmates Monday through Saturday, except for holidays when the post office was
closed. (Doc. 35-2 ¶ 16–17). The Court notes Walker’s contention that the mail
was not picked up as frequently as stated in the motion for summary judgment.
However, there is no genuine dispute that the notice via certified mail was
7

While other types of mail needed to comply with specific requirements (id.
¶¶ 6–7), because ATF is a government agency and the notice included a return
address from ATF, the notice sent via certified mail would have been treated as
legal and privileged mail. Id. ¶ 23. Such mail was to be delivered to the inmate
unopened and uninspected unless there was suspicion that it contained
contraband or did not fit the criteria for legal and privileged mail. Id. ¶ 8. If
there was any doubt as to the legitimacy of the return address, that information
was verified. Id. ¶ 9. If contraband was suspected, the policy required that mail
be opened in the inmate’s presence and inspected, but not read, beyond checking
the letterhead and signature. Id. The lieutenant’s declaration also states that
while there were no records of incoming mail to the jail in June 2021
specifically, Walker’s file has no records indicating that any mail was returned,
confiscated, reported for suspected contraband or for a need to inspect
privileged mail, or not accepted by Walker. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.
Even putting the delivery to Walker’s residence and the Government’s
affirmation of the published notices online aside, when considering that the
notice sent via certified mail was confirmed as being successfully delivered to
the mailing address of the jail (the place Walker was actually located) where
there were policies in place to see that she received it, the Government took the
delivered to the jail’s P.O. box on June 15, 2021 and the vehicles were not
forfeited until August 18, 2021.
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necessary reasonable steps to provide Walker with notice in accordance with
due process.
Walker argues that the Government failed to show that she received
actual notice. But actual notice is not the standard. See Jones v. Flowers, 547
U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (“Due Process does not require that a property owner
receive actual notice before the Government may take his property.”) (citing
Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170). While there were other alternatives to notify
Walker of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings—including, as suggested by
Walker, providing supplemental notice to her criminal attorneys—the
Government is not required to make “heroic efforts.” Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at
170. The Government’s steps to notify Walker of the proposed forfeitures were
constitutionally

adequate;

the

Government’s

actions

were

reasonably

calculated to notify Walker of the seizures and forfeiture proceedings. The
Government is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED
Defendant United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is
GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of the United States
and against the Plaintiff, and is DIRECTED to close the file.

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DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, the 10th day of March,
2025.

jcd
Copies:
Counsel of record

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