Wilson v. Lamb et al
Filing
14
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; directing the Clerk to terminate Warden Lamb as a party to this action; directing Defendant Wilson to answer 1 the Complaint within twenty days of the date of the Order. Signed by Senior Judge Brian J. Davis on 1/29/2025. (KLC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
TAJHON WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:23-cv-1354-BJD-PDB
WARDEN TRAVIS LAMB and
OFFICER Z. WILSON,
Defendants.
__________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, Tajhon Wilson, an inmate of the Florida Department of
Corrections, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on a Complaint (Doc.
1; Compl.) for the violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two
individuals based on conduct that occurred at the Regional Medical Center
(“RMC”). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officer Wilson physically assaulted him
on January 6, 2023, while he was handcuffed and on his way to a mental health
examination. See Compl. at 6. Plaintiff contends Defendant Wilson broke his
jaw. Id. The next month, Plaintiff was transferred to a different correctional
institution, where he remained for about six months before returning to RMC.
Id. at 6–7.
Plaintiff alleges that, upon his return to RMC in August 2023, Defendant
Wilson began “retaliating [against him] . . . for reporting misconduct by
correctional officers” and “orchestrated a hit on [his] life . . . [by] pa[ying] a high
ranking gang member … to knock [him] out.” Id. at 7–8. Additionally, Plaintiff
alleges that, days before he submitted his Complaint, Defendant Warden Lamb
threatened to cut off all access to medical care, including cardiology, and
Plaintiff was “suffer[ing] from chest pains and heart complications” at the time.
Id. at 7.
In acknowledgement of his three-strikes status, Plaintiff contends he
included these latter allegations (regarding events that transpired when he
returned to RMC in August) to demonstrate he was in imminent danger of
serious physical injury when he filed his Complaint. See id. at 7–8. The Court
found his allegations sufficient to invoke the “imminent-danger” exception to
dismissal and permitted him to proceed as a pauper despite him being a threestrikes litigant. See Order (Doc. 5) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Prison
Litigation Reform Act). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive
damages for the injuries to his jaw and for an alleged denial of medical
treatment for his chest pains. See Compl. at 5.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9; Def. Mot.),
which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 12; Pl. Resp.).
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II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for a plaintiff’s “failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as
true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not
accept as true legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8(a) demands “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A
plaintiff should allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
III. Analysis
Defendants seek dismissal on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff is a
three-strikes litigant, and he did not sufficiently allege he was in imminent
danger of serious physical injury; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies for any purported claims other than the excessive
force claim against Defendant Wilson based on the alleged January 6, 2023
assault; (3) Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim against Defendant Lamb;
3
and (4) any claim for damages against the Warden in his official capacity is
barred under the Eleventh Amendment.1 See Def. Mot. at 1.
First, as to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s pauper status should
be revoked and the action dismissed because he is a three-strikes litigant, their
Motion will be denied. The Court previously concluded Plaintiff sufficiently
invoked the “imminent danger” exception to the three-strikes bar. See Order
(Doc. 5). In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wilson placed a hit on
his life upon his return to RMC, Defendant Wilson assaulted him again and
threatened to kill him, and Defendant Lamb threatened to withdraw all
medical care, including for chest pains he was experiencing when he filed his
Complaint. See Compl. at 7–8.
Next, as to exhaustion, Defendants concede Plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies for the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim
against Defendant Wilson arising out of the alleged events on January 23,
2023. See Def. Mot. at 14. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion will be denied as to
this argument as well.
1 Defendants incorrectly mention a “Defendant Ward” in the section of their
Motion invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Def. Mot. at 17–18. As Plaintiff
notes in his Response, no such Defendant is named in the Complaint. See Pl. Resp.
at 6. Plaintiff names Defendant Wilson solely in his individual capacity. See Compl.
at 2.
4
With respect to any purported claims Plaintiff seeks to raise against
Defendants Wilson or Lamb based on events that occurred after he returned to
RMC in August 2023, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief, or any
such claims are unrelated to the January 2023 incident, so whether he
exhausted any such claims is moot.2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under the color of state law deprived
him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law.
“[V]erbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.” Hernandez
v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim that his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth
Amendment, a prisoner must allege the defendant was deliberately indifferent
to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d
1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). Conditions of confinement are sufficiently serious
under the Eighth Amendment only if they are so extreme that they expose the
prisoner to “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or
safety.” Id. at 1289. Allegations of merely harsh conditions do not state a claim
under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
2 For instance, if Plaintiff intended to state a separate Eighth Amendment
claim against Defendant Wilson for “assault[ing him] again” on an unspecified date
after his return to RMC, not only are his allegations vague, but the two incidents are
not sufficiently related so as to be joined in the same action. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(2).
5
Temporary strip status amounts to merely harsh conditions of
confinement, not those that are sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th
Cir. 2016) (“Confinement without clothing (other than boxers), bedding, or
hygienic materials for 72 hours during the months of April and August in
Florida is not the type of extreme prison condition[] that create[s] a substantial
risk of serious harm.”); O’Connor v. Kelley, 644 F. App’x 928, 932 (11th Cir.
2016) (holding the prisoner failed to state the conditions of his confinement
were cruel and unusual when he was placed on strip status for weeks).
A prison official may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of
vicarious liability. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir.
2010). See also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is
axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more
than a theory of respondeat superior.”). A claim against a supervisor arises
only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the
supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.
Absent personal participation in a constitutional violation, the requisite
causal connection “can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts
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the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.” See id.; Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. A plaintiff
relying on the “history of widespread abuse” theory must demonstrate the past
deprivations were “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration,” such
that the supervising official was on notice of the need to take corrective action.
See Crawford, 906 F.2d at 671. “A single incident of a constitutional violation
is insufficient to prove a policy or custom . . . .” Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643
F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lamb threatened to arrange for officers to
refuse Plaintiff his medical appointments and thereafter ordered that he be
placed on strip status. See Compl. at 8. He claims such conduct “illustrates a
continuum of supervisory indifference to long standing . . . mistreatment.” Id.;
see also Pl. Resp. at 5. Plaintiff explains in his Complaint that he included
these allegations to overcome the three-strikes bar, and the Court construes
them through that lens. In other words, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s
allegations as an attempt to assert a separate Eighth Amendment claim
against Defendant Lamb. However, to the extent that is what Plaintiff
intended, his allegations are insufficient. Plaintiff does not allege Warden
Lamb successfully prevented him from receiving medical care for a serious
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medical need, and threats alone do not violate the Constitution. See Compl. at
8.3
Additionally, accepting as true that Defendant Lamb placed Plaintiff on
property restriction, Plaintiff does not allege “that he was deprived of the
‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ or that the conditions of his
confinement posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his future health
or safety.” See O’Connor, 644 F. App’x at 932 (quoting Crosby, 379 F.3d at
1289). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Lamb is
premised solely on Lamb’s supervisory position as Warden and knowledge of
Defendant Wilson’s alleged assaults on Plaintiff, his claim fails because he
alleges no facts showing a causal connection between Defendant Lamb’s
actions or inactions and a constitutional deprivation.
It appears Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate a causal connection by
alleging that Defendant Lamb knew of a “history of widespread abuse” or a
need for “training” but failed to take appropriate action. See Compl. at 7–8.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the causal
3 Moreover, even if Plaintiff could plausibly state a claim against Defendant
Lamb for denying him medical attention for a serious medical need, any such claim
is unrelated to the excessive force claim against Defendant Wilson and, therefore,
may not be pursued in the same Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). If Plaintiff
wants to pursue a claim against Defendant Lamb for a denial of medical care, he may
initiate a separate action by filing a new complaint.
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connection necessary to proceed on a claim against a supervisor under § 1983.
He does not allege Defendant Lamb was aware of prior, similar constitutional
deprivations occurring with such regularity that they could be described as
“obvious, flagrant, rampant, [or] of continued duration.” See Crawford, 906
F.2d at 671. He also does not allege facts demonstrating “the need for more or
different training [was] obvious.” See Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d
1390, 1397–98 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Failure to train can amount to deliberate
indifference when the need for more or different training is obvious, such as
when there exists a history of abuse by subordinates that has put
the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures, and when the
failure to train is likely to result in the violation of a constitutional right.”
(internal citations omitted)). Rather, in his Complaint, Plaintiff focuses solely
on his own experiences, which do not demonstrate Defendant Lamb was on
notice of a “history of widespread abuse.” See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312
(reasoning that the plaintiff’s evidence of “a single incident of unconstitutional
activity,” and reliance on “his experience alone” was insufficient to establish
the correctional facility had a custom or practice “that was persistent or
widespread”).
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Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent any purported
claims against Defendant Lamb in his individual or official capacity are
dismissed without prejudice. The Motion is otherwise DENIED.
2.
Defendant Wilson must answer the Complaint (Doc. 1) within
twenty days of the date of this Order.
3.
The Clerk shall terminate Defendant Warden Lamb as a party
to this action.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of
January 2025.
Jax-6
c:
Tajhon Wilson
Counsel of Record
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