Jones v. Armor Healthcare et al

Filing 3

ORDER dismissing the case without prejudice; directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 9/24/2024. (SM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
RONNIE JEROME JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:24-cv-350-MMH-LLL

ARMOR HEALTHCARE and
LINDA HEILMAN,
Defendants.
_________________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff Ronnie Jerome Jones, a detainee at the Baker County Detention
Center, initiated this action on April 8, 2024, by filing a pro se Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights (Docs. 1, 1-1 through 1-3) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
the Complaint, Jones names Armor Healthcare and ARNP Linda Heilman as
Defendants. Doc. 1 at 2. Jones alleges that on January 25, 2023, he injured his
leg while playing basketball at Baker County Detention Center. Docs. 1 at 5;
1-1 at 1. He asserts that an officer took him, by wheelchair, to medical where
staff performed an x-ray of his leg. Doc. 1-1 at 1. According to Jones, Nurse
Craven then informed him that medical records showed he had fibrodysplasia
and as a result “the provider” would not transport him to the hospital. Id.

The next day, Jones explained to ARNP Heilman that he could not walk;
however, she responded that he had pulled a muscle and had not sustained a
fracture because an x-ray would have detected it. Id. Jones asserts that on
February 3, 2023, he received a CT scan at an outside medical facility which
showed he had a fractured femur. Id. at 2. Jones contends Defendants engaged
in “malpractice and negligence.” Doc. 1 at 3. As relief, he requests punitive
damages. Id. at 5.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 1 See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should
only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,
or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

1

Jones requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 2).

2

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims
‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears
that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the
PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts. 2 Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under
Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show
“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
2

3

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306
n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”
the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to
include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
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A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration
omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations

contained

in

a

complaint

is

inapplicable

to

legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Jones’s pro se
allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.
5

v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).
The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must
provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must
‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must
satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s
conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834).
As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison
officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display
‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.
Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has
described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence
standard” in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference
to that serious medical need. See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d
1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had subjective knowledge of a
6

risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than
gross negligence.”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Wade v. McDade,
106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective
recklessness” standard as used in criminal law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253.
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:
First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered
a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently
serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].
Second, . . . that the defendant acted with
“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”
id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the
defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his
own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm
to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if
the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to
inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if
he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.
Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted). 3

The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to
the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit
deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue
to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).
3

7

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard
sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Indeed, the law is
well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of
corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in
Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or
substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). The
Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a
constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his
own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well
established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute
deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.
2007) 4 (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether
governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or
forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and
therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
4

8

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted).
Jones’s Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to the Court’s
screening obligation. First, the only allegations with respect to ARNP Heilman
are that she erroneously diagnosed Jones as having a pulled muscle, even
though he had a fractured femur. See Doc. 1-1 at 1–2. Accepting these
allegations as true, ARNP Heilman’s misdiagnosis constitutes, at most,
negligence, which “does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Matthews v. Palte,
282 F. App’x 770, 771 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding prisoner’s
complaint that his psoriasis was misdiagnosed as spider bites and mistreated
with steroid creams did not state a claim of deliberate indifference because it
involved no more than medical negligence). Indeed, only a few days later, an
outside medical facility performed a CT scan on Jones and determined he had
a fractured femur. Doc. 1-1 at 2. And Jones does not allege that he failed to
receive medical treatment following the corrected diagnosis. Therefore, the
claim against ARNP Heilman is due to be dismissed.
Jones’s claim against Armor Healthcare also fails. Armor Healthcare
contracts with the Baker County Detention Center to provide medical services
to detainees. Where a claim of deliberate medical indifference is brought
against a private contractor based on its functional equivalence to a
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government entity, liability under § 1983 cannot be based on a theory of
respondeat superior. Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the entity “had a
‘policy or custom’ of deliberate indifference that led to the violation of his
constitutional right.” Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978)). Here, Jones does not allege Armor Healthcare’s custom or policy
led to the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, his allegations
are insufficient to maintain a claim against Armor Healthcare and are due to
be dismissed.
Therefore, it is now ORDERED:
1.

This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of
September, 2024.

Jax-9 9/20
c:
Ronnie Jerome Jones, #20001665
10