Barcelona v. Rundle et al

Filing 12

ORDER denying 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Senior Judge Brian J. Davis on 8/29/2024. (KLC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JOEL BARCELONA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:24-cv-480-BJD-LLL

KATHERINE FERNANDEZ RUNDLE
and CENTURION,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action on about
May 13, 2024, by filing a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) against two Defendants: Katherine Fernandez Rundle,
the State Attorney for Miami-Dade County, Florida; and Centurion, the
medical service company under contract to provide medical care for inmates in
the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleged the
Office of the State Attorney “deprived [him] of access to Court for immediate
release,” and Centurion had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to
inmates’ medical needs by delaying treatment for his “life-threatening
medical” condition. See Doc. 1 at 5, 9.

With respect to the claim against Centurion, Plaintiff alleged he was
transported to a hospital in October 2022, where he was diagnosed with an
enlarged aorta aneurysm. Id. at 6. He documented the treatment he received
since the diagnosis, which included stress tests, ultrasounds, CAT scans, an
EKG, medications, and regular check-ups with a cardiologist every four
months. Id. at 6–7. He even acknowledged the cardiologist informed him on
December 21, 2023, that his aneurysm had reduced from 4.6 to 4.5 from the
medications, and the doctor “did not recommend a [surgical] repair.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff claimed, however, that he was “in need to spend time at the hospital
in order to survive.” Id. at 7.
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
because he is a three-strikes litigant and “his allegations [did] not warrant the
imminent danger exception to dismissal.” See Order (Doc. 3) at 3. He appealed
the dismissal order, but his appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. See
USCA Opinion (Doc. 10). Plaintiff now moves this Court to “reinstate” his case
(Doc. 11). He contends the Court erred in dismissing his complaint because he
alleged he was in imminent danger of irreparable harm. See Doc. 11 at 2.
The Court construes Plaintiff’s filing as a motion for reconsideration. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for [limited] reasons[, including] mistake, inadvertence,
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surprise, or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; or fraud.” (internal
numbering omitted)). Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60. In
dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court closely reviewed and considered his
allegations and determined he did not allege facts demonstrating that he was
“under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See Order (Doc. 3) at 2
(quoting § 1915(g)). Accepting as true that Plaintiff has an enlarged aorta
aneurysm, and further accepting such a condition constitutes a serious medical
need, Plaintiff himself acknowledged and documented in his complaint that his
condition has been diagnosed, treated, and regularly monitored by a
cardiologist. See Doc. 1 at 6–7.
Not only do Plaintiff’s own allegations belie his conclusory assertion that
Centurion has a custom or policy of deliberate indifference to medical needs,
they do not satisfy the imminent danger exception, which requires more than
an allegation that an inmate has a serious—even life threatening—medical
condition. See Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding
the plaintiff-inmate satisfied the imminent danger exception where he alleged
“a total withdrawal of treatment” for his serious medical conditions—HIV and
hepatitis); Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 874 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding the
three-strikes plaintiff could proceed under the imminent danger exception
where he alleged he was denied any medication or treatment for his hepatitis
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C condition, which caused cirrhosis to begin). See also Skillern v. Paul, 202 F.
App’x 343, 344 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A prisoner alleges imminent danger of
serious physical injury, when he alleges that a total withdrawal of treatment
for serious diseases, including human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) and
hepatitis, will cause him to suffer from severe ongoing complications, increased
susceptibility to various illnesses, and a rapid deterioration of his condition.”).
Plaintiff’s allegations come nowhere close to suggesting a “total
withdrawal of treatment.” See Brown, 387 F.3d at 1350. On the contrary, he
documents regular appointments with and treatment by a specialist who noted
his condition had shown improvement, not deterioration. As such, his
complaint was properly dismissed under § 1915(g), and his motion (Doc. 11) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of
August, 2024.

Jax-6
c:
Joel Barcelona, #M50331
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