Downey v. Duval County Jail et al

Filing 22

ORDER denying as moot 16 motion for extension of time and dismissing case without prejudice. Directions to Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/12/2025. (BAJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
BRYAN DOWNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
J.M. PERKINS, et al.,

Case No. 3:24-cv-508-MMH-LLL

Defendant.
___________________________
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WTHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff, Bryan Downey, initiated this action by filing a pro se
Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). 1
Downey now proceeds as a pauper on an Amended Complaint (Amended
Complaint; Doc. 17). 2 He names six Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO)
employees as Defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1) Officer
J.M. Perkins; (2) Sergeant K.M. Clarida; (3) Officer D.L. Grady; (4) Sergeant
Cope; (5) Officer Farr; and (6) Officer Sullivan. Amended Complaint at 2-3, 12.
Downey alleges that on January 5, 2024, while he was being held at the
Duval County Jail Pretrial Detention Facility (PDF), Defendant Perkins gave
For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the
document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.
2 While Downey filed a motion for extension of time to file his Amended
Complaint (Doc. 16; Motion), that Motion is moot because he timely filed the
Amended Complaint.
1

him legal mail that had already been opened outside Downey’s presence. Id. at
13. Downey contends Perkins opened the mail before providing it to him and
shared its contents with his fellow officers “for strategic advantages” in
Downey’s then-pending state court prosecution on charges of battery on a law
enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence. Id. at 13-14. The
charges stem from an incident at the PDF on February 13, 2023, and led to an
unlawful use of force. Id. Downey further alleges that on January 5, 2024,
Defendant Grady conducted a cell search, which Defendant Clarida approved,
and removed Downey’s legal papers for his pending trial. Id. at 20-21.
Next, Downey alleges on April 15, 2024, Defendant Farr, Defendant
Sullivan, and Defendant Cope told him and his cellmate to “cuff up” and step
out of their cell at a time Downey had “all of his legal mail and trial strategy
about the February 13th 2023 incident spread out on his bunk” in preparation
for his trial the next day. Id. at 25. Downey suggests these three Defendants
conducted a cell search but spent “the next 15 to 20 minutes[] only reading the
plaintiff[’]s legal mail and trial strategy.” Id. Last, Downey asserts that on the
same day, Perkins read and uploaded some of Downey’s legal mail onto the
inmate tablet system, “making it available for any officer . . . to read.” Id. at
33.
Downey alleges these actions violated his right to privacy under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments and violated his constitutional right of access to
2

the courts. Id. at 3, 16, 22, 26-27, 33-34. Specifically, Downey suggests these
actions allowed officers to gleam information regarding his trial strategy for
his pending criminal case and caused the related officers to commit perjury.
Id. at 14, 15-16, 20, 25-26, 33. Downey also asserts that these actions were
taken to hinder any future civil rights action that Downey may pursue in
regard to the February 13, 2023 use of force. Id. at 14, 22, 27, 34. As relief,
Downey requests monetary damages, a declaratory judgment, fees and costs,
as well as the termination of each Defendant’s employment. Id. at 5.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should
only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,
or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims
3

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears
that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the
PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts. 3 Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under
Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show
“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

3 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
4

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306
n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”
the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to
include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
5

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration
omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations

contained

in

a

complaint

is

inapplicable

to

legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
In assessing the Amended Complaint, the Court must read Downey’s pro
se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.
v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

6

Liberally read, Downey’s Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible §
1983 claim. Initially, Downey has failed to state a claim against any Defendant
in his official capacity. “[W]hen an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or
her official capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action
against the entity to which an officer is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando,
931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, a suit against Defendants in their official capacities is equivalent to
suing JSO itself. However, a sheriff’s office or jail is not a legal entity subject
to suit under § 1983. Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x
696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of the sheriff’s office because that
entity did not have “the capacity to be sued”). 4 Accordingly, Downey has failed
to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacities.
Next, Downey has failed to adequately state a claim for denial of access
to the courts under the First Amendment. It is well-established that inmates
have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 821 (1977); see Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). To
state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege an actual

The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
4

7

injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1996); Barbour v. Haley, 471
F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be established by
demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were
frustrated or impeded by . . . an official’s action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225
(citations omitted). Therefore, “the plaintiff must identify within his complaint,
a ‘nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim.’” Id. at 1226 (citing Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Additionally, the plaintiff must show that
the underlying nonfrivolous claim was raised, or would have been raised, in
connection with a direct appeal, a collateral attack on his conviction, or a civil
rights action. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354–57; Cranford v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 398
F. App’x 540, 546–47 (11th Cir. 2010).
Here, Downey merely states Defendants intended to “hinder” any future
civil rights claim regarding the February 13, 2023 incident. This mere
“formulaic recitation” of this element of the cause of action is insufficient, and
Downey fails to allege sufficient facts to illustrate how the alleged actions
“hindered” a future civil rights claim. Downey’s only suggestion is that “officers
are well aware” that a conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer or
resisting arrest would bar him “from alleging Fourth Amendment violations
under HECK.” Id. at 15. However, this is an incorrect statement of the law.
See Dixon v. Hodges, 887 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A prisoner may be
punished for battery on a prison guard, and that prison guard may be held
8

liable for using excessive force on the prisoner in subduing him; both may be
true.”); Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding an excessive
force claim “does not necessarily negate an element of the underlying charge
of resisting arrest with violence”). Accordingly, Downey has failed to plausibly
allege Defendants’ conduct resulted in an actual injury, and thus has failed to
state a denial of access-to-courts claim.
As to Downey’s claim that Defendants’ actions violated his right to
privacy, he similarly fails to state a claim for relief. The Fourth Amendment
ensures “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.
IV. While prisoners do not “shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate,”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995), “imprisonment carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights,” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 524 (1984). For instance, the Supreme Court has held that cell searches
do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)
(“No one can doubt that [cell] searches represent an appropriate security
measure.”). Additionally, prisoners have no expectation of privacy in their
personal effects. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines
of the prison cell.”).

9

Notably, several courts have extended the Hudson reasoning to the
context of inmate mail. See, e.g., Robinson v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 851
F. App’x 289, 293 (3d Cir. 2021) (relying on Hudson, finding the plaintiffinmate had “no reasonable expectation of privacy to trigger Fourth
Amendment protections” with respect to the processing of non-privileged mail);
see also Marigny v. Hopkins Cnty. Jail Admin., No. 4:21-cv-P10-JHM, 2021
WL 4554493, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2021) (“[S]everal courts have held that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and/or seizure of legal mail.”
(citing cases)). 5 As such, a prisoner’s claim of interference with his mail, legal
or otherwise, is more properly analyzed under the First Amendment. Indeed,
“[m]ail is one medium of free speech, and the right to send and receive mail
exists under the First Amendment.” See Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333
(11th Cir. 2008). While prison officials may adopt policies regarding inmate
mail, policies that implicate an inmate’s First Amendment right must be
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safely, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Regardless, isolated incidents of interference with an
inmate’s incoming mail generally will not establish a constitutional violation.

The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union
Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court
would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision
would have significant persuasive effects.”).
5

10

See O’Connor v. Carnahan, No. 3:09-cv-224-WS/EMT, 2014 WL 293457, at *6
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2014) (citing Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir.
2003)); see also Pro v. Bandy, Case No. 2:08-cv-0175-RWS, 2008 WL 4445080,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2008) (stating that “allegations of sporadic
interference with incoming mail are insufficient to state a First Amendment
claim”); Dees v. Lamar, No. 2:20-cv-1326-LSC-GMB, 2021 WL 1953137, at *10
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2021), rep. & recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1661195
(Apr. 28, 2021) (dismissing the plaintiff’s First Amendment mail interference
claim where he alleged the defendants, on one occasion, delayed delivering his
mail containing a money order). Instead, a plaintiff can show mail tampering
violated his First Amendment rights where there was a “pattern or practice”
of such tampering or where prison officials “regularly and unjustifiably
interfered with” the plaintiff’s legal mail. See Davis, 320 F.3d at 351.
Here, Downey describes isolated incidents that occurred on two different
days separated by three months and involving different types of allegations
against different actors. These disjointed and dissimilar incidents do not show
either a pattern or practice of mail tampering or that officials “regularly and
unjustifiably interfered with” Downey’s legal mail. Because Downey fails to
allege facts that, accepted as true, permit the reasonable inference his
constitutional rights were violated, he has failed to state a claim in this regard.

11

Last, the Court notes that Downey is not entitled to certain relief sought.
To the extent Downey requests that the Court order prison officials to enforce
disciplinary actions against any Defendant, courts generally will not interfere
with matters of prison or jail administration. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547–48
(“[T]he operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the
Legislative and Executive Branches . . . not the Judicial.”). Federal courts do
not have the power to order officials to take certain disciplinary actions against
their employees. See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1543 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a court’s requirement of a state official to discipline its
correctional officers was an “inappropriate use of the court’s equity powers.”);
see also Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (“We all
understand, of course, that federal courts have no authority to address state
officials out of office or to fire state employees or to take over the performance
of their functions.”), rev’d in part on other grounds by Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781 (1978).
As such, Downey has failed to state any viable claim, and this case is due
to be dismissed without prejudice to Downey’s right to refile his claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 with sufficient factual allegations to support a claim against
a proper defendant if he elects to do so.
Accordingly, it is

12

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

Downey’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 16) is hereby

DENIED as MOOT.
2.

This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

3.

The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 12th day of
March, 2025.

JaxP-12
C:

Bryan Downey, #Y72316

13