Dixon v. Warden, FCC Coleman - USP I
OPINION AND ORDER denying 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 2/17/2014. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
WILMER DIXON, III,
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN-USP I,
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon review of Petitioner
Wilmer Dixon’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28
consisting inter alia of inmate grievances and responses thereto.
supporting “exhibits” and “attachments” (Doc. #7-1, hereinafter “Exh.”
Respondent’s exhibits and attachments include: SENTRY
Certification of Records from Julie A. Roland, who is a Management
Analyst at the Designation and Sentence Computation Center (Exh. 2);
Judgment in Case Number 05-64 SEC J in the United States District
Information Inmate Data Sheet dated March 24, 2011 (Att. 2); Petition
for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision in Violation of
Supervised Release for Case Number 2:05-cr-64-1J, in the United States
District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (Att. 3); Warrant for
Arrest in Case Number CR05-064J, from the United States District
Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (Att. 4); Booking Inquiry and
docket information for Orleans Parish Criminal District Court and
Parish Jail (Att. 5); U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Prisons Memorandum from Deena Harris, who is the Classification
Computation Technician (Att. 6); Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum
in Case Number 05-64 from the United States District Court, Eastern
Revocation of Supervised Release) in Case Number 05-cr-64, in the
United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (Att. 8),
Statement 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual (CCCA of 1984), pp. 114 (Att. 10); and, Public Information Inmate Data Sheet as of March
Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. #8).
This matter is ripe for review.
The Petition raises one ground for relief challenging the Bureau
Specifically, Petitioner argues that the BOP
failed to give him approximately 60 days of prior custody credits
(from July 22, 2009 through September 21, 2009) toward his federal
Id. at 3.
Petitioner acknowledges that the BOP gave him
credit from September 21, 2009 through December 6, 2009, but argues
that instead of the start date of September 21, 2009, the start date
should have been July 22, 2009.
Id. at 3.
Petitioner argues that the
start date should have been July 22, 2009 (instead of September)
because the 60 days “was credited to a Probationary Sentence that was
of no benefit.” Id. at 3.
In Response, Respondent argues that the BOP properly calculated
Respondent explains that the
State of Louisiana, New Orleans Parish Criminal District Court,
sentenced Petitioner to 60-days with credit for “time served” from
July 22, 2009 through September 19, 2009.
Id. at 3 (citing Exh. 2 at
Thus, Respondent maintains that Petitioner is not entitled to
credit from July 22, 2009 through September 19, 2009, because this
time was already credited toward the aforementioned State of Louisiana
Id. at 5.
To use this credit again would amount to an
inappropriate “double credit.”
Respondent further argues that
Petitioner’s assertions that he was granted probation on this State
sentence is inaccurate.
Petitioner initiated this action as a federal inmate confined at
the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida.1
Petition; Exh. 1.
Since Petitioner initiated this action his location has
changed, and he was moved to the Volunteers of America Residential
Reentry Center. See docket. However, mail recently sent from the
Court was returned as undeliverable.
Thus, it appears
Petitioner has failed to keep the Court apprised of his mailing
address. Failure to keep the Court apprised of a mailing address,
is also grounds for dismissal.
In relevant part, on August 17, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to
a 46-month term of confinement and 3-year supervised release following
his conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Exh. 2, ¶4.
The BOP prepared a sentence computation for Petitioner
based on a 46-month term of imprisonment beginning August 17, 2005,
with prior custody (jail) credit from January 8, 2005 through August
Based on this calculation, and with additional credits
earned against his sentence for good conduct, Petitioner was released
from the BOP on June 3, 2008.
Exh. 2, ¶ 5.
On March 25, 2009, Petitioner’s federal probation officer filed
a petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana advising that Petitioner had violated the terms
of his supervised release due to a physical altercation with his exgirlfriend on March 18, 2009. New Orleans Police Department responded
to the reported incident, at which time the Petitioner fled the scene.
A state warrant issued for Petitioner’s arrest related to these acts
of domestic violence.
Exh. 2, ¶ 6.
On March 30, 2009, a federal warrant was issued for Petitioner’s
arrest for Violation of Supervised Release.
Exh. 2, ¶ 7.
On July 22,
2009, Petitioner was arrested by the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office
on the outstanding warrant for simple battery.
Exh. 2, ¶ 8.
On November 2, 2009, while Petitioner was in state custody, the
federal warrant was executed, and he was borrowed from the custody of
state authorities pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad
Exh. 2, ¶¶9-10.
On December 7, 2009, Petitioner was
Because it was believed that state authorities
maintained primary jurisdiction over the Petitioner, he would have
been appropriately returned to state custody following sentencing, as
indicated in the Order dated October 29, 2009.
Exh. 2, ¶ 11.
However, it was subsequently discovered that Petitioner had already
been sentenced on September 22, 2009, in the State of Louisiana,
incarceration, with credit for “time served” for his state offense of
Specifically, the State of Louisiana awarded the
Petitioner with 60-days of jail time credit toward his state term for
time spent in state custody, reflecting the time spent in custody
between July 22, 2009 and September 19, 2009.
see also Att. 5 at 25-27.
Exh. 2 at ¶ 13;
Thus, at the time of his federal sentence,
Petitioner was exclusively in federal custody because he had already
satisfied his state term and was no longer in the primary custody of
Exh. 2, ¶ 12.
Because Petitioner was in federal custody exclusively, he was
designated to a federal correctional facility to commence service of
his supervised release violation.
His federal sentence was computed
as commencing on December 7, 2009, the date it was imposed.
calculating his federal sentence, the BOP provided Petitioner with 81
days of prior custody credit towards his federal sentence, reflecting
the time spent in custody between September 20, 2009 through December
6, 2009, as he had not received credit for time against his state
Exh. 2, ¶ 15.
Based on this calculation coupled with his
good conduct time, Petitioner’s scheduled release date was June 14,
Petitioner initiated this federal action on March 28, 2011.
As relief, Petitioner requests that the Court award
him jail credit from July 22, 2009.
Petition at 5.
Petitioner properly filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 seeking credit for time served.
F.2d 987, 990 (11th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Williams, 425
The law is well established that a
defendant will not receive a double credit for his detention time.
(1992)(reviewing authority and procedures the BOP when calculating
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585:
Commencement of Sentence - A
imprisonment commences on the
received in custody awaiting
arrives voluntarily to commence
the official detention facility
to be served.
Credit for Prior Custody - A defendant shall be given
credit towards the service of a term of imprisonment for
any time he has spent in official detention prior to the
date the sentence commences (1)
sentence to a term of
date the defendant is
transportation to, or
service of sentence at,
at which the sentence is
as a result of the offense for which the sentence
was imposed, or
as a result of any other charge for which the
defendant was arrested after the commission of the
offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
Id.; see also Att. 10, BOP Program Statement 5880.28.
There is an exception to the prohibition against receiving
“double credit” on a sentence known as the “Willis” credit.
Willis exception applies “when an inmate serving concurrent federal
and state terms with a state full-term date that is equal to or
less than the federal full-term date, he is entitled to receive
credit toward his federal sentence for all pre-sentence, nonfederal custody that occurs on or after the date of the federal
offense until the date that the first (state or federal) sentence
See Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.
By definition, the Willis credit only applies when an
inmate is serving concurrent federal and state terms.
Willis credit is inapplicable to the instant Petition.
Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the BOP calculated
Petitioner’s sentence in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
properly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to prior custody
credit from July 22, 2009, because July 22, 2009 through September 19,
2009 was already credited toward his state sentence. See generally Att.
5; Rey v. Warden, FCC, Coleman-Low, 359 F. App’x 88, 90 (11th Cir.
2009)(unpublished)(affirming district court’s denial of petition seeking
To the extent Petitioner faults the BOP for relying on
the “State-docket Master” rather than the sentencing transcript itself,
see Petition at 4, the Court is not persuaded.
sufficient evidence establishing the State court sentence of time
Att. 5; see also Att. 6.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1) is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions, enter
judgment accordingly, and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, on this
Copies: All Parties of Record
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