Young v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
51
OPINION AND ORDER the Florida Attorney General is DISMISSED from this action as a named Respondent; the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition 1 filed by Darryl Maurice Young is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice; Petitioner is DENIED a Certificate of Appealability. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, enter judgment accordingly, and close this case. Signed by Judge Mary S. Scriven on 9/18/2015. (SPB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
DARRYL MAURICE YOUNG,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No: 5:12-cv-400-Oc-35PRL
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
and FLORIDA ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Respondents.1
/
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon a petition for habeas corpus relief filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Darryl Maurice Young (“Petitioner”) (Doc. 1, filed July
16, 2012). Petitioner challenges the findings and sanctions of a disciplinary report for
the infraction of “aggravated battery or attempted battery on an inmate” Log No. 173090032 (Doc. 1, p. 1). Upon consideration of the petition, the Court ordered Respondent
to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. (Doc. 6.)
Thereafter, Respondent filed a response (Doc. 9, filed October 8, 2012) to the writ of
habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a reply to the response2 (Doc. 10-2) and a supplement
to the reply. (See Doc. 44).
1
When a petitioner is incarcerated and challenges his present physical confinement,
“the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not
the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 436 (2004) (citations omitted). In Florida, the proper respondent in this
action is the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. Therefore, the Florida
Attorney General will be dismissed from this action.
2
Petitioner filed two documents titled “Traverse.” (Doc. 10-2; Doc. 12.) After
Petitioner raises four grounds in his petition. After reviewing the pleadings filed in
this case, including documents related to Petitioner's disciplinary hearing, the Court
concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. Because the Court is able to
resolve the entire petition on the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not
warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (if the record refutes the
factual allegations in the petition or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is
not required to hold an evidentiary hearing).
I.
Background and Procedural History
Petitioner is in the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections. On
March 6, 2009, Petitioner was issued a disciplinary report (“DR”) for “aggravated battery
or attempted aggravated battery on an inmate” for an incident that occurred at Wakulla
Work Camp. Fla. Admin. Code. R. 33-601.314 (1-10); (See Doc. 9-1, pp. 1-2.) The
DR provides the following statement of facts:
On March 6, 2009, I, Officer Q. Avant was assigned as
housing officer in S Dormitory. At approximately 4:45pm I
observed inmate Young, Darryl DC# X04261 (S1-145S)
striking inmate Crosson, Charlie DC# 527687 (S1-103S) in
the facial area with closed fists. Inmate Crosson ran out [of]
the dorm for safety. Inmate Young was immediatley [sic]
placed in restraints by A-Team responders. Shift OIC was
notified and authrized [sic] this report. Inmate Young was
advised of his placement in administrative confinement
pending the charge 1-10 battery or attempted battery on an
inmate.
(Doc. 9-1, pp. 1-2.)
reviewing the documents, the Court notes that the documents contain identical
arguments. (Id.) The only difference between the two documents is one is hand written
and the other is typed. (Id.) Therefore, the Court construes Petitioner’s first document
(Doc. 10-2) as a reply to the response and strikes the second document as duplicative
(Doc. 12).
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Petitioner received notice of the DR on March 6, 2009, informing Petitioner of the
charges against him and advising him of his rights during the disciplinary process. (Id.)
During the investigation, Petitioner requested nine witnesses to testify on his behalf. (Id.
at 5-8.) Petitioner did not ask that a staff representative be assigned to assist him,
declined to provide a statement, and declined to request evidence.
(Id.)
The
investigator interviewed all of Petitioner’s requested witnesses. (Id. at 9.)
On March 11, 2009, a disciplinary hearing was conducted.
(Id. at 9-10.)
Petitioner was present at the hearing and pled not guilty. (Id.) Petitioner also provided
a written statement. (Id. at 9-14.) In his written statement, Petitioner asserted as a
defense that he was provoked by inmate Crosson’s alleged sexual advances. (See id.
at 11-14.)
The disciplinary committee determined Petitioner was guilty of the DR
infraction and found as follows:
Inmate Young found guilty based on Officer Avant’s specific
statement “On March 6, 2009, I, Officer Q. Avant was
assigned as housing officer is Dormitory. At approximately
4:45pm I observed inmate Young, Darryl DC#X04261 (S1145S) striking inmate Crosson, Charlie DC# 527687 (S1103S) in the facial area with closed fists. Inmate Crosson ran
out [of] the dorm for safety. Inmate Young was immediatley
[sic] placed in restraints by A-Team responders. Shift OIC
was notified and authrized [sic] this report. Inmate Young
was advised of his placement in administrative confinement
pending the charge 1-10 battery or attempted battery on an
inmate.” Also inmate Young’s written admission that he did
indeed assault inmate Crosson in retaliation for alleged sexual
harrassment [sic].
(Id. at 10.)
As a result of the disciplinary committee’s decision, Petitioner was assigned 60
days’ disciplinary confinement and a loss of 364 days of earned gain time.
(Id.)
Petitioner employed his administrative remedies and filed two formal grievances and
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three grievance appeals. (Doc. 9-2.) The Petitioner’s first and second grievances were
returned without processing as improperly filed. (Id. 1-8.) One of Petitioner’s grievance
appeals was returned without processing because it was submitted to the wrong
respondent.
(Id. at 9-10.)
Petitioner’s remaining two grievance appeals were
addressed on the merits. (Id. at 11-14.)
On May 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus to the Wakulla
County Circuit Court seeking review of the disciplinary proceedings. (Doc. 9.3.) The
Petition was transferred to Leon County Circuit Court on August 27, 2009. (Docs. 9-4,
9-5.) On March 21, 2011, the state circuit court denied mandamus relief. (Doc. 9-3.)
On April 8, 2011, Young appealed the circuit court’s denial of mandamus relief to the First
District Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9-6.) On February 13, 2012, the state district court per
curium affirmed the circuit court’s order. (Id. at 2.) See Young v. Tucker, 80 So. 3d
1027 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 13, 2012 (Doc. 1).
II.
Standard of Review
A state prisoner who is deprived of gain time as a result of a prison disciplinary
proceeding that allegedly violated due process may seek federal habeas review, but such
review is governed by restrictions set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Medberry v. Crosby,
351 F.3d 1049, 1054 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the deferential review standard, habeas
relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). “This is a
difficult to meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which
demands that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted). See also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786
(2011) (pointing out that “if [§ 2254(d)’s] standard is difficult to meet, that is because it
was meant to be.”).
Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court broadly interpret what is meant
by an “adjudication on the merits.” Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 967-68 (11th Cir.
2011). Thus, a state court’s summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation,
qualifies as an adjudication on the merits that warrants deference by a federal court. Id.;
see also Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “unless the
state court clearly states that its decision was based solely on a state procedural rule [the
Court] will presume that the state court has rendered an adjudication on the merits when
the petitioner’s claim ‘is the same claim rejected’ by the court.” Childers v. Floyd, 642
F.3d at 969 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)).
“A legal principle is ‘clearly established’ within the meaning of this provision only
when it is embodied in a holding of [the United States Supreme] Court.”
Thaler v.
Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173 (2010); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000))(recognizing “[c]learly established
federal law” consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its
decision). “A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law
when it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably
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applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case, or when it unreasonably extends, or
unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new
context.” Ponticelli v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 690 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The “unreasonable application” inquiry
requires the Court to conduct the two-step analysis set forth in Harrington v. Richter, 131
S. Ct. 770. First, the Court determines what arguments or theories support the state
court decision; and second, the Court must determine whether “fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior”
Supreme Court decision. Id. (citations omitted). Whether a court errs in determining
facts “is even more deferential than under a clearly erroneous standard of review.”
Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Court presumes the
findings of fact to be correct, and Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption
by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The Supreme Court has held that review “is limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
Thus, the Court is limited to reviewing only the record that was before the state court at
the time it rendered its order. Id.
The Court recognizes that prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and therefore the full panoply of rights that are due a defendant in a criminal
proceeding does not apply. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation
omitted). “In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.” Id.
In Wolff, the United States Supreme Court held that when a liberty interest is at
stake “written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in
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order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a
defense.” Id. at 564. Further, the Court held that “[a]t least a brief period of time after
the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the
appearance before the [disciplinary committee].” Id. The Court further explained “there
must be a ‘written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons’
for the disciplinary action.” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
The Court also noted “the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when
permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals.”
Id. at 566.
An inmate facing a disciplinary charge, however, has no
constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses furnishing
evidence against him at the disciplinary hearing. Id. at 567. The Court left this matter
to the sound discretion of the officials of the state prisons. Id. at 569. Finally, the
disciplinary hearing committee must be sufficiently impartial in that it must not present “a
hazard of arbitrary decision making.” Id. at 571.
III.
Analysis
Petitioner contends: (1) that he did not receive proper notice regarding the
disciplinary investigation; (2) the “some” evidence standard is inapplicable in Florida; (3)
Petitioner was prevented from earning 60 days of future gain time without notice; (4)
Petitioner was prevented from earning an additional 10 days of future gain time without
notice; and (6) the disciplinary hearing team failed to award Petitioner with time served
for the time he spent in administrative confinement. (Id. at 6-28.) As relief, Petitioner
seeks (1) restoration of forfeited earned gain time; (2) restoration of unearned gain time;
(3) a case management order for discovery; (4) the disciplinary report to be expunged
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due to alleged due process and equal protection violations; and (5) a custody status
reduction. (Id. at 29-32.)
Respondent filed a response opposing the petition and attached supporting
exhibits (Docs. 9, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-4, 9-5, 9-6). Respondent argues that the Petition is
due to be denied because Petitioner’s claims do not implicate federal law and are
otherwise without merit or are improperly filed in a habeas proceeding. Specifically,
Respondent argues that the due process protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) and Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) were not violated
because the evidence was “adequate to support the determination that Petitioner
committed the prohibited act as charged.”
In his reply, Petitioner contends that the court should review the facts of this case
de novo because the response implicates constitutional issues.
(Doc. 10-2, ¶ 4.)
Petitioner further argues that the disciplinary report does not support charges of both
aggravated battery and attempted aggravated battery. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Petitioner also
asserts that the facts required to address the constitutional issues in this case were not
developed in the state court proceedings. (Id. ¶ 8.) In his supplement to the reply,
Petitioner argues that the Court should apply the Florida Evidence Code because the
finding of the disciplinary board failed to meet the evidentiary standards of state law.
(Doc. 33.)
A. Ground One
In Ground One, Petitioner asserts the DR described more than one violation
through the use of the word “or.” (Doc. 1, pp. 6-10.) Specifically, Petitioner’s first claim
is based on a state administrative rule 33-601.304(1) Florida Administrative Code which
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specifies that “only one violation shall be included in each disciplinary report.” (Id.)
According to Petitioner, the DR does not conform to this rule because it includes
“aggravated battery or attempted aggravated battery.” 3 (Id.) Petitioner submits that
because of the numerous violations contained in the DR, he was substantively prejudiced
because the advance written notice was vague and ambiguous and contrary to the “ruleone” offense. (Id.)
As set forth above, Petitioner’s alleged due process claims must be measured
according to the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell. It is not a question of whether state law or an administrative departmental
policy was violated, but rather the inquiry concerns whether Petitioner's allegations rise
to the level of a federal constitutional violation and whether the procedural deficiencies
are ones that violate Petitioner’s due process rights guaranteed to him pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
3
Petitioner also alleges the DR contained “four offenses” namely “battery and
attempted battery” and “aggravated battery or attempted aggravated battery.” (Id.)
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s “four violations claim” is unexhausted because
Petitioner failed to raise it during the administrative grievance procedure. (Doc. 9, pp.
14-15.) The Court agrees. A petitioner, when asserting grounds that warrant review by
a federal court under § 2254, must have first raised such grounds before the state courts,
thereby giving the state courts the initial opportunity to address the federal issues. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The record shows Petitioner failed to adequately raise this claim
in a properly filed administrative grievance prior to seeking mandamus relief in state court.
(See Doc. 9-2, pp. 1-6.) Therefore, the claim is unexhausted and procedurally barred
from review by this Court absent an exception to the procedural default bar. Petitioner
does not show cause for his default or resulting prejudice, and he does not demonstrate
that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies. Accordingly, Petitioner’s
‘four violations claim’ is dismissed as unexhausted and procedurally barred. Even
assuming arguendo that Petitioner exhausted this claim, he is not entitled to the federal
habeas relief he seeks for the reasons discussed herein. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)
(application may be denied on the merits even when applicant fails to exhaust state
remedies).
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The Court finds that Petitioner was provided with all the due process to which he
was entitled pursuant to Wolff. The facts set forth in the record show that Petitioner was
provided with written notice of the charge five days before the disciplinary hearings.
Petitioner’s lack of notice claim is based on a state administrative rule that does not
implicate federal due process. Hildebrandt v. Butts, 550 F. App'x 697, 700 (11th Cir.
2013) (“Federal due process does not require that state prison officials strictly comply
with administrative regulations governing disciplinary hearings in the prison setting.”).
The adoption of procedural guidelines does not automatically give rise to a liberty interest;
thus, the failure to follow a prison directive or regulation does not give rise to a federal
claim if constitutional minima are met. See Sharma v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 511
F. App’x 898 (11th Cir. 2013) (even where a governmental entity fails to follows its own
regulations providing for procedural safeguards, it is not a denial of due process if the
individual was provided with adequate notice such that his rights were not prejudiced);
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751–52 (1979) (mere violations of agency
regulations do not raise constitutional questions). In addition, Petitioner has failed to
allege any prejudice that resulted from the timing of the notice provided to him. The
Court finds that the written notice provided to Petitioner contained sufficient information
for the Petitioner to be informed of the charges against him as required under Wolff v.
McDonnell.
Furthermore, the Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to submit a witness
statement, call witnesses, and request evidence. The Petitioner declined to provide a
statement or request evidence, but he did request and receive the testimony of nine
witnesses. The disciplinary hearing concluded, and Petitioner was provided a written
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statement detailing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Specifically, the disciplinary board stated that it relied on the statement by the witnessing
officer and Petitioner’s own “written admission that he did indeed assault inmate Crosson
in retaliation for alleged sexual harassment.” (Doc. 9-1, p. 10.) The Court finds the
evidence relied on by the disciplinary board was sufficient to meet the “some evidence”
standard. To the extent Petitioner argues that the standard of proof in prison disciplinary
proceedings is less or greater than “some evidence,” such argument is not supported by
relevant case law. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ground
One fails to state a due process claim.
B.
Ground Two and Ground Three
In Ground Two Petitioner alleges that he was unable to earn gain time for six
months after he was released from disciplinary confinement in violation of the constitution.
(Doc. 1, pp. 13-15.) In Ground Three, Petitioner further alleges that he was unable to
earn gain time while in disciplinary confinement, effectively lengthening his sentence.
(Id. at 17-18.) The Eleventh Circuit has held that the loss of eligibility to earn incentive
gain time under Fla. Admin. Code § 33–601.101(5)(a) does not give rise to a liberty
interest that triggers due process protections. Hartley v. Warden, 352 F. App'x 368, 2009
WL 3738508 (11th Cir. 2009). See, e.g, Hartley v. Ellis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74917,
2009 WL 564663 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (concluding petitioner had no liberty interest in eligibility
to earn incentive gain time); Jones v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 4:14CV489-MW/GRJ,
2015 WL 3952690, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2015). Accordingly, the Court finds that
Grounds Two and Three fail to state due process claims because Petitioner has no
constitutional right to earn gain time.
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C. Ground Four
Finally, in Ground Four, Petitioner alleges his constitutional rights were violated
when the disciplinary hearing team failed to award him with time served in administrative
confinement to reduce the amount of time served in disciplinary confinement. (Doc. 1,
pp. 21-23.)
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court determined that a
prisoner’s discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at
486-487; see also Rogers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998)(concluding
two months in administrative confinement did not constitute deprivation of a protected
liberty
interest);
Matthews
v.
Moss,
506
F.
App’x
981,
983
(11th
Cir.
2013)(unpublished)(affirming district court’s decision dismissing a plaintiff’s procedural
due process claim because the complaint did not allege a deprivation of a protected liberty
interest and noting that the complaint did not allege any facts showing that the inmate
was confined in harsher conditions than inmates in administrative confinement).
Petitioner argues that the total time he spent in disciplinary and administrative
confinement “exceeded the maximum penalty” allowed for a disciplinary infraction under
the Florida Administrative Code. (Doc. 1, pp. 22-23.) Time served in administrative or
disciplinary confinement does not implicate a liberty interests protected by the due
process clause. To the extent Petitioner claims that the disciplinary board violated an
administrative rule, such argument does not implicate a constitutional issue. Violations
of agency regulations do not raise constitutional questions. United States v. Caceres,
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440 U.S. at 751–52. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ground Four of the Petition does
not raise a claim for relief under federal habeas corpus law.
The Petitioner has failed to present a liberty or property interest that would trigger
the protections of due process and, therefore, he fails to state a cognizable constitutional
claim for habeas relief. Any of Petitioner's allegations not specifically addressed herein
have been found to be without merit
IV.
Certificate of Appealability
Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a writ
of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of
appealability (“COA”).
“A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make such a showing, Petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the
district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)),
or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.’” Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 335–36. Petitioner has not made the requisite showing
in these circumstances.
Because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled
to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.
The Florida Attorney General is DISMISSED from this action as a named
Respondent;
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2.
The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition filed by Darryl Maurice Young is
DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice;
3.
4.
Petitioner is DENIED a Certificate of Appealability; and
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, enter
judgment accordingly, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this 18th day of September, 2015.
SA: FTMP-2
Copies: Darryl Maurice Young
Counsel of Record
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