Hancock Bank v. Bright Lake Estates, L.L.C. et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 16 Plaintiff Hancock Bank's Motion to Strike Defendants Randall B. Langley's and Matthew A. Seibel's Jury Trial Demand. Signed by Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens on 4/15/2013. (AR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
HANCOCK BANK, a Mississippi
banking corporation
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No:5:12-CV-649-Oc-10PRL

BRIGHT LAKE ESTATES, L.L.C.,
RANDALL B. LANGLEY, MATTHEW
A. SEIBEL, KNIGHT ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS, INC. and
CLEARWATER RESERVE HOME
OWNERS ASSOCIATION INC.
Defendants.

ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Hancock Bank’s Motion to Strike Defendants
Randall B. Langley’s and Matthew A. Seibel’s Jury Trial Demand (Doc. 16) filed on January 28,
2013. Defendants have not filed a response to the Motion and their time for doing so has
passed.. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 16) is due to be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND & FACTS
Defendant, Bright Lake Estates, L.L.C. (“Bright Lake”) owns real property in Lake
County, Florida subject to Plaintiff, Hancock Bank’s mortgage. Co-defendants, Randall B.
Langley and Matthew A. Seibel, both members of Bright Lake, executed separate continuing
guaranty agreements on behalf of Bright Lake to secure the various notes. In the six-count
Complaint (Doc. 1), Hancock Bank seeks inter alia to foreclose the mortgage and to enforce the
terms of the guaranty agreements.

In each of their Answers, Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel demand a jury trial (Docs. 9 & 14).
Hancock Bank argues that the demands for jury trial should be stricken because Mr. Langley and
Mr. Seibel both expressly waived any right to a jury trial in their guaranty agreements. Neither
Mr. Langley nor Mr. Seibel has offered any argument in opposition.
II. DISCUSSION
It is well settled that the right to a jury trial in federal courts is to be determined by
federal law in diversity actions. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963)("Only through a
holding that the jury trial right is to be determined according to federal law can the uniformity in
its exercise which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be achieved.")1 The question of
whether the right has been waived is likewise governed by federal law. Martorella v. Deutsche
Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 12-80372-CIV, 2013 WL 1136444, at *1 (S.D. Fla. March 18, 2013);.
The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that waivers of valid jury demands are not to be
lightly inferred and “should be scrutinized with utmost care.” Haynes v. W.C. Caye & Co., Inc.,
52 F.3d 928, 930 (11th Cir. 1995). However, when a jury trial is validly waived, courts regularly
mandate the enforcement of the waiver. See e.g., Bakrac, Inc. v. Villager Franchise Sys., Inc.,
164 F. App’x 820, 823-24 (11th Cir. 2006); Martorella, 2013 WL 1136444, at *1-4; Anderson v.
Apex Fin. Group, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-949-T-30MSS, 2008 WL 2782684, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. July
16, 2008).
A party may waive his right to a jury trial, so long as the waiver is knowing and
voluntary. Bakrac, Inc., 164 F. App’x at 823-24. In determining whether a waiver was entered
into knowingly and voluntarily, courts consider the conspicuousness of the waiver provision, the

1

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts supporting its claim that diversity jurisdiction exists. (Doc. 1 at
¶9).
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parties’ relative bargaining power, the sophistication of the party challenging the waiver, and
whether the terms of the contract were negotiable. Id. No single factor is conclusive; rather, the
Court asks whether, “in light of all the circumstances, the Court finds the waiver to be
unconscionable, contrary to public policy, or simply unfair.” Allyn v. Western United Life Assur.
Co., 374 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
Here, the record demonstrates that the right to a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily
waived by Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel. . As an initial matter, the jury trial waivers contained in
the guaranties were completely conspicuous. The signature page of the guaranties bears the
following clause which is set forth in its own paragraph in uppercase font (unlike the remainder
of the text):
Waiver of Trial by Jury THE PARTIES HEREBY MUTUALLY AGREE THAT
NEITHER PARTY NOR ANY ASSIGNEE SUCCESSOR HEIR OR LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PARTIES (ALL OF WHOM ARE HERINAFTER
REFERRED TO AS THE PARTIES) SHALL SEEKA JURY TRIAL IN ANY
LAWSUIT PROCEEDING COUNTERCLAIM, OR ANY OTHER LITIGATION
PROCEDURE BASED UPON OR ARISING OUT OF THIS GUARANTY OR THE
LOAN DOCUMENTS OR ANY INSTRUMENT EVIDENCING SECURING OR
RELATING TO THE INDEBTEDNESS AND ANY OTHER OBLIGATIONS
EVIDENCED HEREBY, ANY RELATED AGREEMENT OR INSTRUMENT, ANY
OTHER COLLATERAL FOR THE INDEBTEDNESS EVIDENCED HEREBY OR
THE DEALINGS OR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OR AMOUNG THE
PARTIES, OR ANY OF THEM. NONE OF THE PARTIES WILL SEEK TO
CONSOLIDATE ANY SUCH ACTION, IN WHICH A JURY TRIAL HAS BEEN
WAIVED WITH ANY OTHER ACTION IN WHICH A JURY TRIAL HAS NOT
BEEN WAIVED. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PARAGRAPH HAVE BEEN FULLY
NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES. THE WAIVER CONTAINED HEREIN IS
IRREVOCABLE, CONSTITUTES A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER AND
SHALL BE SUBJECT TO NO EXCEPTIONS. BANK HAS IN NO WAY AGREED
WITH OR REPRESENTED TO GUARANTOR OR ANY OTHER PARTY THAT THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS PARAGRAPH WILL NOT BE FULLY ENFORCED IN ALL
INSTANCES.
Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel each inserted their signature just inches below this provision.

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Therefore, the waiver provisions at issue were not buried in the text of the documents
which they executed. Nor were the provisions cryptic or ambiguous in nature. Rather, the
waiver provisions were sufficiently straightforward, understandable, and conspicuous as to allow
Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel to be aware of them, to read them, and to appreciate their meaning.
See Murphy v. Cimarron Mortg. Co., No. 8:06-cv-2142-T-24TBM, 2007 WL 294229, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2007); Allyn v. Western United Life Assurance Co., 347 F.Supp.2d 1246,
1252-53 (M.D. Fla. 2004).

Moreover, Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel each executed three

successive guaranty agreements,2 all of which contained the same jury waiver provision.
In the absence of any response filed by either of these Defendants, the Court lacks any
information regarding the sophistication of Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel and their relative
bargaining power. Even assuming Mr. Langley and Mr. Seibel were unsophisticated – which is
inconsistent with the fact that they were guarantying such substantial loans --they were under no
obligation to seek financing from the lender in this case. Collins v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2010)(“a term in a contract waiving a party’s right to
a jury trial is not unenforceable even though one party to a contract is a large corporation and the
other party is simply an individual who is in need of the corporation’s services”). Moreover,
there is nothing in the record suggesting that the waive provisions were unconscionable, contrary
to public policy, or simply unfair.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, upon due consideration of the factors noted above, as well as the totality of
the circumstances, Plaintiff Hancock Bank’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 16) is GRANTED. The

2

The Langley Guaranties are attached to the Complaint as Composite Exhibit “U”. The Seibel
Guaranties are attached to the Complaint as Composite Exhibit “V”
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demands for jury tria in Mr. Sei
al
ibel’s Answ (Doc.9) a Mr. Lan
wer
and
ngley’s Answ (Doc. 14) are
wer
4
STRICK
KEN.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Flo
D
O
orida on Apr 15, 2013.
ril
.

Copies fu
urnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepres
sented Partie
es

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