Stevens v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium
Filing
10
OPINION AND ORDER dismissing 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus as an improper filing under § 2241. The Clerk shall enter judgment against petitioner and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 3/31/2014. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
JULIUS STEVENS,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No: 5:13-cv-161-Oc-29PRL
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - MEDIUM,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court upon review of Petitioner Julius
Stevens’ (“Petitioner’s”) habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1).
the
Federal
Petitioner is an inmate currently
confined
at
Correctional
Institution
in
Coleman,
Florida.
Petitioner brings this action to challenge the 262-month
sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida on his conviction for conspiracy to possess with
the intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana.
After
reviewing
Petitioner's
the
underlying
pleadings
criminal
filed
case,
the
in
this
Court
case
and
dismisses
in
the
petition as an improper filing under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
I.
Background
In 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) (SDFL Case No. 1:99-cr-63-WPD-14 at
docket entry 562).1
The offense involved at least 50 grams, but less
than 150 grams, of cocaine base (Cr. D.E. 1403); Stevens v. United
States, 466 F. App’x 789 (11th Cir. 2012).
Petitioner was sentenced
as a career offender under United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1(b) to a term of 262 months in prison and five
years of supervised release (Cr. D.E. 571); Stevens, 466 F. App’x at
790.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed on the
ground that his plea agreement included a valid and enforceable
appeal waiver (Cr. D.E. 976).
Subsequently, Petitioner filed a
motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he argued that he
was
actually
innocent
of
being
a
career
offender
because
his
underlying Florida conviction for possession of cannabis no longer
qualified as a controlled substance offense for enhancement purposes
(Cr. D.E. 1499); Stevens, 466 F. App’x at 790.
The district court
acknowledged that Petitioner's prior conviction might no longer
support the career-offender designation, but found that Petitioner
had procedurally defaulted the claim by failing to raise it at
sentencing or by timely filing his § 2255 motion (Cr. D.E. 1511).
The court noted that Salinas v. United States, the case relied upon
by Petitioner to support his § 2255 motion, had not been given
retroactive effect; that the Eleventh Circuit had yet to hold that
1
References to docket entries in Petitioner's underlying
criminal case (SDFL Case No. 1:99-cr-630WPD-14) will be cited as
(Cr. D.E. _____).
- 2 -
an “actual innocence” argument could apply to a career-offender
designation;
equitable
and
that
tolling
Accordingly,
the
of
Petitioner
the
motion
§
had
2255
was
not
statute
dismissed
alleged
of
as
grounds
for
limitations.
Id.
time-barred.
Id.
Petitioner appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that
the “actual innocence of sentence exception” to excuse procedural
deficiencies
was
inapplicable
in
Petitioner’s
case
because
Petitioner's arguments centered only on the legal classification of
his underlying offense. Stevens, 466 F. App’x at 792 (citing McKay
v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on March 29, 2013 (Doc. 1).
Petitioner argues
that the enhanced sentence he received under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 is
unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court’s
holdings in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), Johnson
v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Salinas v. United States,
547 U.S. 188 (2006) (Doc. 1 at 2-3). Specifically, Petitioner asserts
that
the
court
erroneously
relied
upon
conviction for enhancement. Id. at 3.
a
non-qualifying
prior
Petitioner asks this Court
to vacate his sentence and order the case back to the district court
for resentencing. Id. at 25.
Respondent contends that this Court should not consider the
petition because Petitioner was previously denied habeas relief on
the same grounds (Doc. 5 at 3).
Respondent also contends that this
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Court lacks jurisdiction to address Petitioner's claims on the merits
because Petitioner was not sentenced in excess of the statutory
maximum for his crime of conviction. Id. at 5-6.
II.
Analysis
Petitioner has styled this action as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides a
means for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence.
Here, however, Petitioner challenges the validity of his sentence
because he claims that it was improperly enhanced.
Ordinarily, an
action in which an individual seeks to collaterally attack his
conviction or sentence should be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the
district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Sawyer v. Holder, 326
F.3d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003).
However, because Petitioner's
previous § 2255 motion was denied by the court that imposed his
sentence, Petitioner may not file another § 2255 motion without first
receiving permission from the appropriate United States Court of
Appeals, which Petitioner has failed to do. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h);
Darby v. Hawk–Sawyer, 405 F.3d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[w]hen a
prisoner has previously filed a § 2255 motion to vacate, he must
apply for and receive permission . . . before filing a successive §
2255 motion").
Because Petitioner is barred from filing another § 2255 motion,
he filed this petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)(the “savings clause”) expressly
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limits the circumstances under which a § 2241 motion may be filed.
However, Petitioner asserts that he properly filed this motion under
§ 2241 because he disagrees with Eleventh Circuit precedent requiring
him to meet certain conditions before this Court has jurisdiction to
consider the merits of sentencing claims filed under the savings
clause (Doc. 1 at 4-8).
a.
The savings clause provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) has limited application to claims
of sentencing error
Under § 2255(e)'s savings clause, a prisoner may file a § 2241
petition if an otherwise available remedy under § 2255 is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Specifically,
§ 2255(e) provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply
for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the
applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or
that such court has denied him relief, unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added).
Where, as here, a petitioner challenges only a “fundamental
defect in sentencing,” he must show the following before he may
invoke § 2255(e)’s saving clause: (1) throughout his sentencing,
direct appeal, and first § 2255 proceeding, his claim was squarely
foreclosed by circuit precedent; (2) subsequent to his first § 2255
proceeding,
a
United
States
Supreme
- 5 -
Court
decision
overturned
circuit precedent; (3) the new rule announced by the Supreme Court
is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; and (4)
his
enhanced
sentence
exceeds
the
authorized
statutory
maximum
penalty for his offense. Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman, 738 F.3d
1253, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013) (synthesizing the savings clause tests
discussed in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999);
Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011); and
Williams v. Warden, Federal Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1343
(11th Cir. 2013)).
This threshold showing is a jurisdictional
requirement, and where it is absent, federal courts lack authority
to consider the merits of a petitioner's § 2241 claims.
Williams,
713 F.3d at 1338; Daniels v. Warden, FCC Coleman, 538 F. App’x 850
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] petitioner may not argue the merits of his
claim until he has ‘open[ed] the portal’ to a § 2241 proceeding by
demonstrating that the savings clause applies to his claim.”).
Applying the Bryant factors to Petitioner’s claim, this Court
concludes that he has not met the threshold requirements for opening
a portal to § 2241 review. Specifically, Petitioner was not sentenced
in excess of the statutory maximum for the crime of which he was
convicted.
b.
Petitioner was not sentenced in excess of
the statutory maximum for his crime of
conviction
In Gilbert v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit defined the
“statutory maximum sentence” as the “punishment ceiling beyond which
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no defendant convicted for committing that particular crime may be
sentenced regardless of the circumstances of the crime, regardless
of
the
defendant's
history,
and
guidelines.” 640 F.3d at 1306.
regardless
of
the
sentencing
In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that there is a “significant distinction” between a
sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum and a sentence that,
“although
enhanced
by
application
of
mandatory
sentencing
guidelines, remains within the permitted statutory maximum penalty.”
738 F.3d at 1284.
The court concluded that statutory maximum
sentences “take precedent” over sentences set forth in the sentencing
guidelines because they are “more bedrock, fundamental features of
sentences.” Id. at 1285.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
846 and 841(a)(1).
Although Petitioner now argues that he was
sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum because the indictment
did
not
charge
a
specific
drug
quantity,
his
Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) indicated that the offense involved at
least fifty grams of cocaine (Doc. 1 at 21).
object to the PSR on this basis (Cr. D.E. 548).
Petitioner did not
Moreover, in his
motion to reduce sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, Petitioner
conceded that the offense involved at least 50 grams, but less than
150 grams, of cocaine base (Cr. D.E. 1403); Stevens v. United States,
466 F. App’x 789(11th Cir. 2012).
Finally, in its affirmance of the
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sentencing court’s denial of Petitioner's 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
motion, the Eleventh Circuit noted:
Stevens pled guilty in 1999 to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Stevens was held accountable for at least 50
grams of crack cocaine, which set his base
offense level at 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
His qualification as a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, however, elevated his base
offense level to 37 and his criminal history
category to VI. After subtracting three levels
for acceptance of responsibility and timely
notification of his intention to plead guilty,
Stevens's total offense level was 34 and his
sentencing range was 262 to 327 months of
imprisonment. The court sentenced him to the
low-end range of 262 months in prison.
United States v. Stevens, 324 F. App’x 816, 816 (2009).
At the time
of Petitioner's sentencing, the statutory maximum sentence for a
conviction under § 841(a)(1) involving at least fifty grams of a
substance containing cocaine base was life in prison. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(iii).2
Because Petitioner received a sentence of 262 months for his
conviction under § 841(a)(1), he was not sentenced in excess of the
statutory maximum and cannot bring this claim under the savings
clause. See Gilbert 640 F.3d at 1323 (“[T]he savings clause does not
authorize a federal prisoner to bring in a § 2241 petition a claim
2
Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) was amended in 2010 to increase, to
280 grams, the quantity of cocaine base necessary to warrant the
life maximum. The current statutory maximum for a crime involving at
least fifty grams of cocaine base is now forty years in prison. See
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2014).
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. . . that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied in a way that
resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the statutory maximum.”;
Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1288 (“[A]ny challenge to a sentence that is
already below the statutory maximum could not open the § 2255(e)
portal.”) (emphasis in original).
III. Conclusion
Because Petitioner was not sentenced in excess of the statutory
maximum for his crime of conviction, he cannot bring this claim under
the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), and this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) petition filed by Julius
Stevens is DISMISSED as an improper filing under § 2241; and
2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Stevens,
terminate any pending motions, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of March, 2014.
SA: OrlP-4 3/31/14
Copies: Julius Stevens
Counsel of Record
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31st
day
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