Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance et al v. School Board of Lake County, Florida

Filing 119

ORDER granting 106 Plaintiffs' Motion for Appellate Attorney's Fees and Litigation Expenses; 111 Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Litigation Costs. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Carver Mid dle School Gay-Straight Alliance and H.F. and against Defendant School Board of Lake County, Florida in the amount of $215,081.34. Once judgment has been entered, the Clerk shall close the file. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 1/17/2018. (SEJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
CARVER MIDDLE SCHOOL GAYSTRAIGHT ALLIANCE, an
unincorporated association and H.F., a
minor by and through parent Janine
Faughnan,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 5:13-cv-623-Oc-32PRL

SCHOOL BOARD OF LAKE COUNTY,
FLORIDA,
Defendant.

ORDER
Defendant School Board of Lake County, Florida has conceded Plaintiffs Carver
Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance and H.F.’s (“Plaintiffs”) entitlement to trial and
appellate attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses awardable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.1
The remaining disagreement is over the amount of those fees and expenses. The
parties have filed voluminous papers addressing this issue (Docs. 106, 111, 113, 116
and 118), including briefing, billing records, and expert opinions. In summary,
Plaintiffs seek $225,704 in trial and appellate attorneys’ fees and $6,600.73 in
litigation expenses for a total award of $232,304.73, plus taxable costs. (Doc. 118 at

The Eleventh Circuit transferred the motion for appellate fees (Doc. 106) to
this Court for decision (Doc. 105).
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27). Defendant (somewhat confusingly) argues that “a reasonable attorney’s fee award
would range between $98,100 and $135,250, and any award in excess of $128,500
would be unreasonable and excessive.” (Doc. 113 at 7).
While the Court’s Order will be relatively brief, the Court assures the parties it
has given the matter careful attention.
I.

RATES CHARGED
In determining the reasonable hourly rate, the court
considers “the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman v.
Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.
1988). “The relevant legal community” is generally the place
where the case is filed. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v.
Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999). In determining
if the requested rate is reasonable, the court may consider
the applicable Johnson factors and may rely on its own
knowledge and experience. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299-1300,
1303 (“The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert
on the question and may consider its own knowledge and
experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may
form an independent judgment either with or without the
aid of witnesses as to value.” (quotations omitted)); see
Johnson [v. Ga. Hwy. Express, Inc.], 488 F.2d [714,] 717-19
[(5th Cir. 1974)]. “The applicant bears the burden of
producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in
line with prevailing market rates,” which must be more
than just “the affidavit of the attorney performing the
work.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (citations omitted).
Instead, satisfactory evidence may be opinion evidence or
the charges of lawyers in similar circumstances. Id. “The
weight to be given to opinion evidence of course will be
affected by the detail contained in the testimony on matters
such as similarity of skill, reputation, experience, similarity
of case and client, and breadth of the sample of which the
expert has knowledge.” Id.

Church of Our Savior v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 108 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1271 (M.D.
Fla. 2015).
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Applying these principles, the Court, while recognizing the skill and experience
of the Plaintiffs’ lawyers and that their proposed hourly rates may be appropriate in
other jurisdictions, nevertheless finds that a reduction in the proposed rates is
required to arrive at the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience and
reputation.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court will therefore reduce the hourly rate for
attorney Leslie Cooper from $450 an hour to $400 an hour; for Benjamin Stevenson
from $400 an hour to $350 an hour; and for Daniel Tilley from $350 an hour to $300
an hour.
II.

HOURS EXPENDED
According to Plaintiffs, they expended 867.7 hours in the district court and the

court of appeals. (Doc. 118 at 6). However, Plaintiffs have exercised billing judgment
and request compensation for 584 hours - a roughly 33% reduction from the 867.7
hours spent.2 (Id.). While Defendant argues for further reductions of these hours, the
Court, after reviewing the history of the case, including preliminary injunction
practice, motion practice, discovery, the conduct of a trial, a successful appeal and
post-appeal work, determines that Plaintiffs’ total requested hours are appropriate
given the nature of the litigation. Thus, the Court finds that Ms. Cooper’s 24.9 hours,

Plaintiffs request compensation for 584 hours, based on their calculations in
Doc. 118-1. However, the calculations in the spreadsheet are slightly inaccurate, and
they should have requested compensation for 584.1 hours. The Court uses 584.1 in its
calculations to ensure accuracy. See infra note 3.
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Mr. Stevenson’s 301.2 hours, and Mr. Tilley’s 266.4 hours are reasonable and
compensable.3 (Doc. 118-1).
III.

THE FEE AWARD
Multiplying Ms. Cooper’s hourly rate of $400 x 24.9 hours = $9,960; multiplying

Mr. Stevenson’s hourly rate of $350 x 301.2 hours = $105,420; and multiplying Mr.
Tilley’s hourly rate of $300 x 266.4 hours = $79,920, which equals a total trial and
appellate fee award of $195,300.
IV.

LITIGATION EXPENSES
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court awards $6,600.73 in non-taxable litigation

expenses in both the district and appellate court.4 (Doc. 118 at 27).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Appellate Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Expenses

(Doc. 106) and Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Costs (Doc. 111) are
GRANTED as stated herein. The Court hereby awards Plaintiffs $195,300 in
attorneys’ fees, $6,600.73 in litigation expenses, and $13,180.61 in taxable costs, for a
total award of $215,081.34.

The total compensable hours of 592.5 represent Plaintiffs’ initial request of
584.1 hours (representing the 33% reduction based on billing judgment) minus 7.9
hours of agreed additional reduction based on Defendant’s response (Docs. 118-1), plus
18.1 hours for time spent seeking fees and expenses (Doc. 118 at 25-26; Doc. 118-1),
and minus the 1.8 hours attorney Nancy Abudu spent on the case, which Plaintiffs
agreed not to seek (Doc. 111 at 9).
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The Court has already awarded appellate costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of
$505. (Doc. 115). The parties have agreed that the Court may bill taxable costs in the
district court in the amount of $13,180.61. (Doc. 117).
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2.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Carver Middle

School Gay-Straight Alliance, an unincorporated association, and H.F., a minor by and
through parent Janine Faughnan and against Defendant School Board of Lake
County, Florida in the amount of $215,081.34.
3.

Once judgment has been entered, the Clerk shall close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida the 17th day of January,
2018.

sj
Copies:
Counsel of record

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