Young v. United States of America et al
Filing
16
OPINION AND ORDER denying 12 Motion for waiver of prepayment; denying as premature 13 Motion for summary judgment; denying as premature 15 Motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal BOP are dismissed as defendants. The Clerk shall correct the caption accordingly. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 10/17/2014. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
JAMES R. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 5:14-cv-62-Oc-29PRL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, S. LEE, M.D., R.
LI, M.D., R. CARVER, M.D.,
J. CACHO, MLP, M. RAMOS,
MLP, S. BUGGS, RN AHSA, FNU
PIERCE, Therapy Specialist,
and
BEN
L.
CHIANG,
Orthopedic Surgeon,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
I.
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the file.
Plaintiff James R. Young, a federal prisoner incarcerated at FCCColeman, initiated this action proceeding pro se by filing a “Civil
Rights Complaint Form” (Doc. #1).
Plaintiff is now proceeding on
his Amended Complaint (Doc. #8, Amended Complaint).
Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.
See Doc. #10.
Based on the reasons that follow, the Court finds
that United States Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons
are
Additionally,
subject
to
considering
dismissal
service
has
as
yet
named
to
be
defendants.
executed
on
defendants, Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment are premature
and
are
due
to
be
denied
accordingly.
See
Docs.
#13,
#15.
Plaintiff’s motion for waiver of prepayment of service fees is
also denied as unnecessary.
See Doc. #12.
By separate order, the
Magistrate Judge will direct the United States Marshals to serve
the remaining defendants.
II.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that the Court
review all complaints filed by prisoners against a governmental
entity to determine whether the action is “frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1), (b)(2).
In essence,
§ 1915A is a screening process to be applied sua sponte and at any
time during the proceedings.
In reviewing a complaint, however,
the Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true, Boxer
X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), and applies the
long established rule that pro se complaints are to be liberally
construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citations omitted).
Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court “shall” dismiss the complaint,
if, inter alia, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
See also § 1915(e)(2).
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The standards that apply to a
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) apply to a dismissal under
§1915A.
Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th
Cir. 2001).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court views all allegations
in the Complaint as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff.
1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282,
The standard governing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissals apply to dismissals under §
1915(e)(2)(ii).
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.
2008); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the screening language
of § 1915A. 2
Thus, a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure
to state a claim if the facts as plead do not state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Conclusory
allegations,
presumption of truth.
however,
are
not
entitled
to
a
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)(discussing a 12(b)(6) dismissal); Marsh v. Butler County,
Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001).
A claim is
plausible where the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the
misconduct
alleged.”
Ashcroft,
2Plaintiff,
556
U.S.
at
678.
The
who is a prisoner, sought leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in this action. Thus, the Complaint is also subject to
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient
facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” that supports the plaintiff’s claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556.
Specifically, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6)
motion
to
dismiss
does
not
need
detailed
factual
allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.”
Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
Thus,
“the-defendant-unlawfully harmed me accusation” is insufficient.
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 678. “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
(citation
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Id.
Instead,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.
The Amended Complaint alleges a deliberate indifference to a
serious
medical
condition
claim
under
the
Eighth
Amendment.
Specifically, Plaintiff files this action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and Bivens 1 stemming from lack of treatment of various
injuries he sustained when he slipped and fell on water outside of
the
shower
at
FCC-Coleman.
Plaintiff
1Bivens
names
the
following
v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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Defendants:
the
United
States
of
America;
the
United
States
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Prisons; S. Lee, M.D.;
R. Li, M.D.; R. Carver, M.D.; J. Cacho, MLP; M. Ramos, MLP; S.
Buggs, RN AHSA; Mr. Pierce, Therapy Specialist; and Mr. Chiang,
M.D. Orthopedic Surgeon.
Amended Complaint at 1.
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)
“It is well settled that sovereign immunity bars suit against
the United States except to the extent that it consents to be
sued.” Means v. United States, 176 F.3d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir.
1999). The FTCA provides a “limited waiver” of this sovereign
immunity, “making the United States liable for ‘injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting
within
the
scope
of
his
office
of
employment.’”
JBP
Acquisitions, L.P. v. United States ex rel. FDIC, 224 F.3d 1260,
1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). FTCA
liability attaches “under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
The United States is the only permissible defendant in an
FTCA action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)(stating that the FTCA
remedy against the United States “is exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same
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subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim”); United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166–67
& n.9 (1991)(noting that § 2679(b)(2) provides two exceptions to
the exclusive remedy provision, allowing injured plaintiffs to
obtain “remedy for torts committed by Government employees in the
scope of their employment” under Bivens or “under a federal statute
that
authorizes
recovery
against
a
Government
employee”).
Therefore, a plaintiff may proceed against the United States, as
the sole permissible defendant under the FTCA, and against a
federal employee, under Bivens, and he may do so in the same civil
action.
See Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1336 (11th
Cir. 2009)(noting that “[a]s co-extensive causes of action, Bivens
and FTCA claims necessarily arise from the same wrongful acts or
omissions of a government official[,]” and analyzing viability of
both sets of claims)(quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20
(1980), for proposition that “plaintiffs, ‘[i]n the absence of a
contrary expression from Congress, . . . shall have an action under
FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against
the
individual
officials
alleged
to
have
infringed
their
constitutional rights’”).
Bivens
To state a claim for relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents, a plaintiff must allege that a federal agent, by act or
omission under color of federal authority, deprived him of a right,
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privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States. See Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990).
A plaintiff may bring a Bivens action against a federal officer in
his individual capacity; however, a plaintiff may not bring a
Bivens action against a federal agency or federal officer in his
official capacity. See Solliday v. Fed. Officers, 413 F. App’x
206, 209-210 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Corr. Sevs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61, 71, 122 S. Ct. 515, 521-22, 151 L. Ed. 2d 456
(2001)(holding that Bivens is only concerned with deterring the
unconstitutional acts of individual officers). The only remedy
available in a Bivens action is an award for monetary damages from
defendants in their individual capacities. Higazy v. Templeton,
505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Polanco v. United States
DEA, 158 F.3d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1998)).
The Eleventh Circuit has incorporated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 law
into analogous Bivens actions.
Id. at 209.
To state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) defendants
deprived
him
of
a
right
secured
under
the
United
States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law.
Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d
1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
Supervisory officials in a Bivens claim are not liable for
the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates simply on the basis
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of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
Solliday v. Fed.
Officers, 413 F. App’x 206 at 209 (citing Gonzalez v. Reno, 325
F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)). “Supervisors can be held liable
under
[Bivens]
when
a
reasonable
person
in
the
supervisor’s
position would have known that his conduct infringed upon the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, and his conduct was
causally related to the constitutional violation committed by his
subordinate.”
Id. (citing Greason v. Kemp, 891 F. 2d 829, 836
(11th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To
sustain
a
Bivens
action,
the
plaintiff
must
first
demonstrate that his or her constitutional right was violated.
Id. (citing Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.
1990)).
“However,
as
long
as
the
conditions
or
degree
of
confinement to which the prisoner is subjected are within the
sentence imposed and not otherwise violative of the Constitution,
the Due Process Clause does not subject an inmate’s treatment by
prison authorities to judicial oversight.”
Id. at 209 (citing
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (internal quotations
omitted)). Finally, the Court has refused to extend Bivens action
to a private corporation.
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
61 (2001).
Dismissal of Defendants
The Court finds the United States Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Prisons are subject to dismissal.
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As stated
above, under the FTCA, only the United States is properly named as
a defendant.
Thus, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim against the
Federal Bureau of Prisons or the United States Department of
Justice under the FTCA.
To the extent Plaintiff intended to pursue
a Bivens action against the Department of Justice or the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Bivens does not extend to federal agencies.
Nalls v. Coleman Low Federal Inst., 307 F. App’x 296, 298 (11th
Cir. 2009).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment (Docs. #13, #15)
are DENIED as premature.
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion Request for Waiver of Prepayment (Doc.
#12) is DENIED.
3.
The United States Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Prisons are DISMISSED as named defendants.
4.
The Clerk of Court shall correct the docket and caption
of the case accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of October, 2014.
SA: alr
Copies: All Parties of Record
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17th
day
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