Burrows v. The College of Central Florida

Filing 60

ORDER denying 57 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 9/9/2015. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

BARBARA BURROWS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 5:14-cv-197-Oc-30PRL

THE COLLEGE OF CENTRAL
FLORIDA,
Defendant.
________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. 57) and Defendant’s response in opposition thereto (Doc. 59). For the foregoing
reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Barbara Burrows is a former employee of Defendant. Following her
termination of employment with Defendant, Plaintiff initiated this action in Fifth Judicial
Circuit in and for Marion County, Florida, on November 22, 2013, asserting the following
claims against Defendant: (1) gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat.
§§ 760.01-.11 (“FCRA”); (2) religious discrimination under Title VII and the FCRA; (3)
martial status discrimination under the FCRA; (4) gender stereotype discrimination under

Title VII; and (5) retaliation under Title VII and the FCRA. (Doc. 2). On April 1, 2014,
Defendant removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1).
Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for religious discrimination and
marital status discrimination. (Doc. 5). The Court granted Defendant’s motion in part,
dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for religious discrimination for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. (Doc. 27). Defendant then moved for summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (Doc. 43). The Court granted Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment in its entirety, finding that Plaintiff failed to present a genuine issue of
material fact as to any of her claims and therefore Defendant was entitled to summary
judgment. (Doc. 51).
Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of Defendant arguing that the Court’s order did not consider the record taken as a
whole. (Doc. 57). Plaintiff also requests that the Court reconsider its decision in light of
the opinion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued on July 15, 2015,
in EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015), which found that discrimination based
on sexual orientation is an actionable form of sex discrimination.
DISCUSSION
Motions for reconsideration are permitted when there is (1) an intervening change
in controlling law; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or
manifest injustice. Tristar Lodging, Inc. v. Arch Speciality Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1286,
1301 (M.D. Fla. 2006) aff’d sub nom. by Tristar Lodging, Inc. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.,
215 Fed. App’x. 879 (11th Cir. 2007). A motion for reconsideration must demonstrate
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why the court should reconsider its prior decision and “set forth facts or law of a strongly
convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to re-litigate old matters,
raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment. See Parker v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (M.D.
Fla. 2012); see also Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). “The decision
to alter or amend a judgment is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Tristar Lodging, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 2d at 1301.
Plaintiff first contends that the EEOC’s recent decision constitutes an intervening
change in controlling law and that it supports Plaintiff’s position that discrimination based
on her attraction to women is sufficient to state a claim for discrimination based on sex or
gender stereotype discrimination. The EEOC held that “sexual orientation is inherently a
‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation
is necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”
In granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for sexual
stereotype discrimination, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim was merely a
repackaged claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation, which was not recognized
under federal law as a class protected by Title VII. 1 Although the EEOC’s decision is
relevant and would be considered persuasive authority, it is not controlling. See Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds as

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The Court also found that even if Plaintiff stated a cognizable claim for gender stereotype
discrimination, her claim failed because she failed to establish pretext.

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recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1983). Until the Supreme
Court or Eleventh Circuit recognizes the opinion expressed in the EEOC’s decision as the
prevailing legal opinion, the Court declines to reconsider in light of the EEOC’s decision.
Next, Plaintiff contends that the Court failed to consider the totality of the
circumstances in considering whether Plaintiff established pretext. The Court stands by its
analysis of the evidence presented by Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff also argues that
the Court unduly emphasized Plaintiff’s failure to present evidence of comparators.
However, Plaintiff misunderstands the Court’s discussion. The Court did not find that
Plaintiff was required to present evidence of comparators; rather the Court noted that the
treatment of similarly-situated individuals is one method by which a plaintiff can establish
disparate treatment. In light of the fact that Plaintiff was unable to present any other
evidence of disparate treatment, the lack of similarly-situated individuals was probative of
Plaintiff’s claims for disparate treatment.
Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with the Court’s interpretation of the evidence
regarding whether any positions were available as an adjunct for Plaintiff to fill. Plaintiff
simply rehashes arguments previously made and that the Court considered. Such an
argument is not a proper basis for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff has not raised a meritorious basis for reconsideration, the Court
concludes that her motion should be denied.
Accordingly, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 57) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 9th day of September, 2015.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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