Bruni v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying the Petition; a certificate of appealability will not issue; the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any deadlines and close the case. Signed by Judge Paul A. Magnuson on 11/14/2016. (JEB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
Jason Bruni,
Case No. 5:14-cv-203-OC-WTH-PRL
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Secretary, Department of
Corrections, Florida Attorney
General,
Respondents.
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, the Petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
In February 2007, a jury convicted Petitioner Jason Bruni of second-degree
murder with a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with a 25-year
mandatory minimum sentence. Bruni appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
which affirmed per curium on February 1, 2008. Bruni v. State, 972 So. 2d 198 (table)
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
In December 2009, Bruni filed his first postconviction relief motion pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.
The postconviction court denied the motion. Bruni appealed that motion and filed a
second Rule 3.850 motion while that appeal was still pending. Bruni v. State, 81 So. 3d
433 (table) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Bruni’s second Rule 3.850 motion claimed that the jury instruction for
manslaughter by act was fundamentally erroneous pursuant to the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). In August 2010, the
postconviction court denied that motion, concluding that Montgomery did not apply
retroactively, and therefore Bruni was not entitled to relief. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed per curium. Bruni v. State, 58 So. 3d 273 (table) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
In April 2013, Bruni filed a third Rule 3.850 motion claiming erroneous and
prejudicial jury instructions pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Haygood
v. State, 109 So. 3d 735 (Fla. 2013). The postconviction court denied Bruni’s motion and
distinguished Haygood by finding sufficient evidence in the record that there was
culpable negligence and determining that there was therefore no prejudice from the
challenged jury instructions. The court also noted that the petition was arguably untimely
and successive. (App’x File 1 (Docket No. 7-25) at 67. 1) Bruni appealed to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal, which affirmed per curium. Bruni v. State, 145 So. 3d 114
(table) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). In February 2014, Bruni appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court, which dismissed the case. Bruni v. Crews, 135 So. 3d 285 (table) (Fla.
2014).
1
The Court’s citations to Respondents’ Appendix are to the page numbers on the Court’s
electronic docket.
2
In April 2014, Bruni filed the instant Petition claiming erroneous jury instructions
pursuant to the holdings in Montgomery and Haygood. (Pet. (Docket No. 1) at 7).
DISCUSSION
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28
U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., a federal court’s “review is greatly circumscribed and is highly
deferential to the state courts.” Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002).
Indeed, AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner
applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 693 (2002) (citation omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which applies to persons in
custody pursuant to a state-court judgment, provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Furthermore, § 2254 states that “a determination of a factual issue
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Id. § 2254(e)(1). The burden is
on the petitioner to “rebut[] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id.
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A.
Timeliness
A federal habeas petition must be filed within one year, or 365 days, of the
petitioner’s conviction becoming final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of
limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”). This limitation period runs from “the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review,” id. § 2241(d)(1)(A), or from the date on which the
constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, “if the right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.” Id. § 2241(d)(1)(C).
Bruni asserts that Montgomery renewed the tolling for manslaughter-instruction
claims, and that Haygood further renewed the tolling period by distinguishing the prior
holding. But this is true only if these holdings apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(C). Montgomery and Haygood can only be applied
prospectively to cases not yet final on direct appeal. Dorvil v. Sec’y, No. 1:13cv21145,
2016 WL 6090852, at *7 (11th Cir. 2016). Bruni’s conviction became final in 2008, two
years before the Florida Supreme Court decided Montgomery. (Resp.’s Mem. (Docket
No. 6) at 10.) Under federal precedent, Bruni is not entitled to retroactive relief.
Once the judgment is final and the statute of limitations begins to run, the
limitations period may be tolled where a prisoner properly files an “application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute is also subject to equitable tolling where a
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petitioner shows “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and . . . that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bruni has not demonstrated that any extraordinary circumstance prevented him
from timely filing. Because the one-year limitations period expired long before Bruni’s
first postconviction motion and neither Montgomery nor Haygood renewed the tolling
period, the present Petition is both untimely and procedurally barred.
B.
Certificate of Appealability
Bruni is required to secure a Certificate of Appealability before appealing the
dismissal of his habeas corpus action. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P.
22(b)(1). This Court cannot grant a Certificate of Appealability unless the prisoner “has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason
could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). The prisoner must
establish that the resolution of his constitutional claims “was debatable among jurists of
reason.” Lott v. Att’y Gen., 594 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010).
Bruni has not demonstrated that his claims are debatable or that they “deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. The Court will therefore
not grant a Certificate of Appealability on any of Bruni’s claims.
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CONCLUSION
Bruni has not established that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 1) is DENIED;
2.
A Certificate of Appealability will NOT issue; and
3.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate all remaining
deadlines as moot, and close the file.
Dated: November 14, 2016
s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge
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