Strong v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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ORDER reversing and remanding the decision of the Commissioner and directing the clerk to enter final judgment and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens on 2/1/2017. (CAB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
TIMOTHY STRONG,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 5:15-cv-570-Oc-PRL
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff appeals the administrative decision denying his applications for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).1 Upon a review of the
record, the memoranda, and the applicable law, the Commissioner=s decision is REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
I.
BACKGROUND
In June 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI benefits, alleging disability
beginning June 1, 2008.
(Tr. 141-48).
The claims were denied initially, and upon
reconsideration. At Plaintiff’s request, a hearing was held on January 21, 2013. (Tr. 37-59).
After the hearing, the ALJ obtained treatment records from the Alachua County Jail (Tr. 289-350,
351-95), where Plaintiff had been incarcerated, and ordered a consultative psychological
evaluation and IQ assessment, which was performed by Dr. William E. Benet, Ph.D., Psy.D on
March 6, 2013. (Tr. 397-401). On June 26, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a
notice of unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 22-31). Plaintiff’s request for
1
(Tr. 1).
The Appeals Council granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file an action in Federal Court.
review was denied by the Appeals Council (Tr. 4-6), and Plaintiff initiated this action on November
5, 2015. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, and the final decision of
the Commissioner is ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Based on a review of the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: borderline intellectual functioning and traumatic brain injury. (Tr. 25). The ALJ
found that the Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: the claimant must avoid
climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds and work around workplace hazards such as unprotected
heights and exposed machinery. (Tr. 26). He is limited to work tasks not requiring a production
rate pace, and not requiring a GED or reasoning, math, language skill level of more than 2. (Tr.
26).
Based upon his RFC, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy. (Tr. 30). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s ability to perform work at all
exertional levels has been compromised by exertional limitation, but that they have little or no
effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels. (Tr. 30). She then
applied Section 204.00 of the Medical –Vocational Guidelines and found that Plaintiff was not
disabled. (Tr. 30-31).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits when he or she is unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to either result in death or last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a).
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The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis for evaluating a claim of
disability, which is by now well-known and otherwise set forth in the ALJ’s decision. See 20
CFR §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
The claimant, of course, bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at step five, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987).
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied
the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence.
McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988)(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 390 (1971)). Indeed, the Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla – i.e., the
evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion.
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835,
838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards v.
Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have
reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v.
Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991).
This is clearly a deferential standard.
Nevertheless, “[t]he Secretary's failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court
with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
mandates reversal.” Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
1994).
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III.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Plaintiff raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the
opinion of consultative examiner, Dr. William Benet, Ph.D., Psy.D.; (2) the ALJ improperly relied
on the mechanical application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines; and (3) the ALJ failed to
properly evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility. Because remand is required on the first issue raised in
the case, it is unnecessary to review the other two objections to the ALJ’s decision. Freese v.
Astrue, No.8:06-cv-1839-T-EAJ, 2008 WL 1777722, at *3 (April 18, 2008 M.D. Fla)(citing
Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the full opinion of consultative examiner,
Dr. Benet. The law is clear that generally “the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given
to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631
F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. Jan. 24, 2011). This requirement equally applies to opinion evidence
from examining consulting physicians. See McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 Fed.Appx. 410, 419)(11th
Cir. 2006)(remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to consulting psychologist’s report
or the reasons for discrediting his opinion).
On March 6, 2013, Dr. Benet conducted a psychological evaluation and IQ assessment of
Plaintiff. (Tr. 397-401). IQ testing fell within the borderline range of general intellectual, which
was consistent with Plaintiff’s educational records, clinical history and mental status, all of which
suggested borderline intellectual functioning, as well as a learning disorder in reading and written
language.
Dr. Benet opined that Plaintiff will likely have moderate to marked difficulty
performing work-related mental tasks involving understanding and memory, sustained
concentration and persistence, social interaction and adaptation. He further opined that Plaintiff
will likely require assistance managing his benefits. Dr. Benet diagnosed Plaintiff with Learning
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Disorder-NOS; Borderline Intellectual Functioning; and a Global Assessment of Functioning
(GAF) score of 50-55. He concluded that Plaintiff “should be able to function in an assisted
employment setting, matched with his intellectual ability and functional literacy skills, with
sustained sobriety.” (Tr. 401).
Dr. Benet also completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related
Activities (Mental).
(Tr. 404-05).
He opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations in:
understanding and remembering complex instructions; carrying out complex instructions; the
ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions; and respond appropriately to usual
work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. He also noted that Plaintiff had moderate
limitations in the ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions; and interacting with
the public, supervisors, and co-workers.
Here, the ALJ considered Dr. Benet’s consultative evaluation and assigned Dr. Benet’s
opinion “significant weight” because it was based upon his comprehensive examination of the
claimant and a thorough review of the records, and because his opinions were consistent with other
record evidence. (Tr. 27-8, 29). Without any further discussion of Dr. Benet’s opinion, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff is limited to “work tasks not requiring a production rate pace, and not requiring
a GED or reasoning, math, language skill level of more than 2.” Even assuming that this RFC
adequately accounts for Plaintiff’s marked limitations in understanding, remembering and carrying
out complex instructions, the ALJ failed to incorporate, or discuss why she was not incorporating
in her RFC other significant work-related limitations identified by Dr. Benet – i.e., “moderate to
marked difficulty performing work-related mental tasks involving understanding and memory,
sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction and adaptation” (Tr. 400) and moderate
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limitations in interacting with the public, supervisors, and co-workers and in responding
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 405).
While the ALJ may have had legitimate reasons for not including these limitations in the
RFC, she failed to state such reasons. This error is significant because it is unknown what impact
these additional limitations would have on Plaintiff’s ability to perform work at all exertional
levels, thus calling into question the ALJ’s sole reliance on the grids to find that Plaintiff was not
disabled.
For these reasons, the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment is not supported by substantial
evidence as it is unclear whether the ALJ properly considered the entire opinion of Dr. Benet
regarding Plaintiff’s mental work-related limitations. This error requires reversal. See e.g.,
Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1515-17 (11th Cir. 1984)(declining to affirm an ALJ’s decision
where it was unclear how the ALJ reached his conclusions and concluding it was not proper to
affirm simply because some rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusions); Williams v.
Astrue, 3:10-cv-235-J-JBT, 2011 WL 721501, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2011)(remanding where
ALJ reiterated some of consultative doctor’s findings but failed to address the weight he was giving
them).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the ALJ’S decision is REVERSED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk is
directed to enter final judgment for the Plaintiff and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on February 1, 2017.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
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