PNC Bank National Association v. Wilnic Properties, LLC et al

Filing 63

ORDER granting 56 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs to the extent stated in this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens on 3/13/2017. (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
PNC BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, a national banking
association, successor-by-merger with
RBC Bank (USA), a North Carolina statechartered bank, successor-by merger with
Florida Choice Bank, a Florida statechartered bank
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 5:16-cv-66-Oc-PRL

WILNIC PROPERTIES, LLC,
NICHOLAS PRZYSTAWSKI,
SUZANNE L. PRZYSTAWSKI and
CENTRAL FLORIDA FOOT CARE,
P.A.
Defendants.

ORDER
After prevailing on its motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff PNC Bank National
Association filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees and costs against Defendants Wilnic
Properties, LLC, Suzanne Przystawski, and Nicholas Przystawski. (Doc. 56). For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is due to be granted in its entirety.
I.

BACKGROUND

This is a breach of contract and foreclosure case. Last fall, Plaintiff moved for partial
summary judgment, seeking redress on only Counts I and II, in which Plaintiff requested judgment
on Count I for breach of a promissory note against Wilnic and judgment on Count II for breach of
a guarantee of that note against Suzanne and Nicholas. (Doc. 47). I then granted Plaintiff’s

motion and the clerk entered final judgment on Counts I and II. (Docs. 49, 53). Plaintiff has
now moved for attorney’s fees and costs as to only those two counts (Doc. 56), and none of the
Defendants have opposed the motion. Lastly, I note that the parties have stipulated to dismissal
of the remaining counts in this case. (Docs. 60, 61).
II.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute here that Plaintiff, the prevailing party as to
Counts I and II, is entitled to both attorney’s fees and costs. Indeed, Defendants conceded the
issue of entitlement at the February 22, 2017 hearing held before me (Doc. 59) and the contracts
at issue entitle Plaintiff to both fees and costs. (Docs. 1-1, at p.4; 1-2 at p.49).
In determining reasonable attorney’s fees, the Court applies the federal lodestar approach,
by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly
rate for the services provided by counsel for the prevailing party. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d
776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing
entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Once the court has determined the lodestar, it
may adjust the amount upward or downward based upon a number of factors, including the results
obtained. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Montgomery, 836 F. 2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir.
1988).
“Ultimately, the computation of a fee award is necessarily an exercise of judgment, because
‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.’” Villano v. City of
Boynton Beach, 254 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).
Additionally, the Court is ‘“an expert on the question [of attorneys’ fees] and may consider its own
knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent

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judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”’ Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1303
(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)).
A.

Reasonableness of Hours Expended

In support of Plaintiff’s requested fees, it has attached itemized billing records. (Doc. 561). Those unrebutted records show that Plaintiff’s counsel spent a total of 132.80 hours on this
case. (Doc. 56-1 at 16). The records further show that Mrs. Catherine S. Hester spent 116 hours
on this case and Mrs. Erin S. Brown spent 16.8 hours. Also attached to Plaintiff’s motion for fees
is the affidavit of Attorney Brown, who avers that she has been practicing law for twenty years,
has experience in representing lenders in commercial litigation, and that her law firm almost
exclusively represents lenders in commercial transactions.

(Doc. 56-1 at 3).

Absent any

objection, and given this case’s post-partial-summary-judgment posture (along with Plaintiff’s
success on Counts I and II), I find that in my experience the requested number of hours is
reasonable.
B.

Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.”
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299.

The trial court, itself, is an expert on the question of the

reasonableness of fees and may consider its own knowledge and experience. Id. at 1303. Here,
Defendants do no dispute and I agree that the requested $175 per hour (from November 9, 2015 to
December 31, 2016) and the $210 per hour (from January 1, 2017 to February 2, 2017) for Mrs.
Catherine S. Hester and Mrs. Erin S. Brown are reasonable and consistent with market rates in the
Ocala Division. See Doc. 56-1 at 6; Am. Home Assurance Co. Weaver Aggregate Transp., Inc. v.
Manzo, No. 5:10-CV-329-OC-10PRL, 2015 WL 12830413, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015), report

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and recommendation adopted sub nom. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Weaver Aggregate Transp.,
Inc., No. 5:10-CV-329-OC-10PRL, 2015 WL 12850589 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2015) (awarding
similar hourly rates in a breach of contract action).
C.

Summary

In summary, I find that a reasonable lodestar for Attorney Brown is 111.2 hours at $175
per hour ($19,460.00) and 4.8 hours at $210 per hour ($1,008.00)—for a total fee award of
$20,468.00 for Mrs. Brown. And for Attorney Hester, 14.5 hours at $175 per hour ($2,537.50)
and 2.3 hours at $210 per hour ($483.00)—for a total fee award of $3,020.50 for Mrs. Hester. In
sum, the total fee award is $23,488.50.1
III.

COSTS

Plaintiff seeks costs as a prevailing party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
(Doc. 56-1 at p.17). Specifically, Plaintiff requests an amount of $940.20, which includes: (1)
$400.00 for the filing fee; (2) $21.00 in recording fees of lis pendens in Lake County; (3) $440.00
in service of process fees; and (4) $79.20 in copy charges for the process server.
Rule 54(d) provides that “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the
prevailing party.” And § 1920 enumerates expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under
the authority in Rule 54(d), including inter alia: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees for
printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses; and (4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.

1

Plaintiff requests a total fee amount of $23,562.00, but under the Court’s calculations (and absent
Plaintiff’s own explanation of how it reached its requested amount), the Court will use the amount that it
calculated.
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Defendants have raised no objection to the requested costs here and I find them to be
permissible under § 1920. See PNC Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Orchid Grp. Investments, L.L.C., No.
2:13-CV-12-FTM-38CM, 2014 WL 4954779, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (awarding costs under
28 U.S.C. § 1920 including filing fees, lis pendens recording fees, service of process fees, and
copy charges).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 56) is GRANTED to extent that the Clerk is
directed to enter an attorney’s fee judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Wilnic
Properties, LLC, Suzanne Przystawski, and Nicholas Przystawski in the amount of $23,488.50 and
a cost judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Wilnic Properties, LLC, Suzanne
Przystawski, and Nicholas Przystawski in the amount of $940.20.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on March 13, 2017.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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