Cottam v. City of Wildwood et al

Filing 56

ORDER: Defendant City of Wildwood's motion to dismiss 19 is GRANTED: (A) Counts II and IV are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant City of Wildwood, and (B) Counts III and V are DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant City of Wildwood. Defendant Douglas Pelton's motion to dismiss 20 is GRANTED: (A) Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant Douglas Pelton in his official capacity, and (B) Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII are DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant Douglas Pelton in his individual capacity. Defendant Eddie Reeser's motion to Dismiss 21 is GRANTED: (A) Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant Eddie Rees er in his official capacity, and (B) Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant Eddie Reeser in his individual capacity. Defendant Paul Valentino's motion to Dismiss 22 is GRANTED: (A) Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant Paul Valentino in his official capacity, and (B) Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant Paul Valentino in his individual capacity. Defendants Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Brad King, Mark Simpson, Conrad Juergensmeyer, Michelle Seuss, and Thomas Steffan's motion to dismiss 26 is GRANTED: (A) Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant FDLE, and (B) Counts II, III, I V, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendants Steffan, McDonough, King, Seuss, Simpson, and Juergensmeyer in their official and individual capacities. Defendant Ed McDonough's motion to dismiss 30 is GRANTED: (A) Counts II, III, IV , and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant Ed McDonough in his official and individual capacities. Plaintiff John Cottam may file an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of this Order's entry. Failure to file an amended compl aint within the fourteen (14) days will result in this case being closed without further notice. Based on this Court's ruling that Plaintiff has 14 days to file an amended complaint, the Court DENIES Plaintiff John Cottam's motions for lea ve to amend 32 53 as moot. The Court also DENIES Defendants Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Conrad Juergensmeyer, Brad King, Ed McDonough, Mark Simpson, Thomas Steffan, and Michelle Seuss's motion to strike 54 as moot. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 10/6/2016.(LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
JOHN COTTAM,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 5:16-cv-413-Oc-30PRL

CITY OF WILDWOOD, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (FDLE), EDDIE
REESER, PAUL VALENTINO,
DOUGLAS PELTON, BRAD KING,
MARK SIMPSON, CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER, MICHELLE
SUESS, ED MCDONOUGH and
THOMAS STEFFAN,
Defendants.

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on the following Motions and Responses:
• Defendant City of Wildwood’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 19);
• Defendant Douglas Pelton’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 20);
• Defendant Eddie Reeser’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 21);
• Defendant Paul Valentino’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 22);
• Plaintiff John Cottam’s response to Defendants City of Wildwood, Eddie
Reeser, Paul Valentino, and Douglas Pelton’s motions to dismiss (Doc. 23);

• Defendants Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Brad King, Mark
Simpson, Conrad Juergensmeyer, Michelle Seuss, and Thomas Steffan’s motion
to dismiss (Doc. 26);
• Defendant Ed McDonough’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 30);
• Plaintiff John Cottam’s response to Defendants Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, Brad King, Mark Simpson, Conrad Juergensmeyer, Michelle
Seuss, and Thomas Steffan’s motion to dismiss and response to Defendant Ed
McDonough’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 35); and
• Defendants Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Conrad Juergensmeyer,
Brad King, Ed McDonough, Mark Simpson, Thomas Steffan, and Michelle
Seuss’s motion to strike Plaintiff John Cottam’s response to Defendants’
motions to dismiss (Doc. 54).
The Court has considered these filings, the complaint, and the relevant law and concludes
the complaint should be dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case arise from a July 23, 2012 traffic stop of Plaintiff John Cottam
by Wildwood Police Department Officer Douglas Pelton. After Pelton initiated a traffic
stop for speeding, Pelton was hostile, demeaning, and excessively authoritative when he
approached Plaintiff. Pelton issued Plaintiff a speeding citation and arrested Plaintiff for
eluding a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony. Plaintiff was searched and his
vehicle was impounded. Plaintiff insists that the eluding charge was fabricated because he
stopped at the next safe point, and that Pelton lacked probable cause to arrest him.

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After his arrest, Plaintiff requested a copy of the video from Pelton’s police cruiser,
but was told no video exists. Plaintiff was also told that there were no audio logs or written
logs showing Pelton followed department procedure of notifying dispatch when a vehicle
fails to pull over.
Assistant State Attorney Ed McDonough, the prosecuting attorney handling
Plaintiff’s case, abandoned the eluding charge and instead pursued a misdemeanor reckless
driving charge. Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants allowed the criminal proceedings to
continue based on the fabricated arrest and that all Defendants supported Pelton’s improper
arrest. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:
• McDonough, State Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit Brad King, and
Assistant State Attorney Michelle Seuss continued with Plaintiff’s prosecution
despite having exculpatory evidence;
• City of Wildwood Police Chief Eddie “E.W.” Reeser and City of Wildwood
Police Captain Paul Valentino declined to conduct an investigation to
corroborate or dispel Pelton and McDonough’s position despite having evidence
refuting Pelton’s allegations;
• Assistant State Attorneys Mark Simpson and Conrad Juergensmeyer declined to
conduct an investigation to corroborate or dispel Pelton and McDonough’s
position despite having exculpatory evidence; and
• Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) Agent Thomas Steffan
declined to conduct an investigation to corroborate or dispel Pelton and
McDonough’s position despite having evidence refuting Pelton’s allegations.

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The state court ultimately dismissed the reckless driving charge against Plaintiff.
Although the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed, Plaintiff alleges that the felony
arrest and subsequent prosecution of the reckless driving charge negatively affected his
reputation as a medical doctor in his community since the arrest is a public record.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action alleging the Defendants conspired to and did deprive him
of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as several
Florida tort claims. (Doc. 1). Specifically, the complaint contains the following counts: 1
• Count I: False Arrest and False Imprisonment against Pelton;
• Count II: Malicious Prosecution against all Defendants;
• Count III: Conspiracy to violate civil rights against all Defendants;
• Count IV: Intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants;
• Count V: Violation of due process against all Defendants;
• Count VI: Battery against Pelton; and
• Count VII: Assault against Pelton.
The Court previously dismissed with prejudice the claims against City of Wildwood Police
Department because it was not a proper Defendant. (Doc. 31).
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to dismiss,

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All non-municipal Defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities.

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courts must limit their consideration to the well-pleaded allegations, documents central to
or referred to in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed. See La Grasta v. First Union
Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); Day v.
Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, they must accept all factual
allegations contained in the complaint as true, and view the facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93–94.
Legal conclusions, however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). In fact, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual
deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must instead contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). This plausibility standard is met when the plaintiff
pleads enough factual content to allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
The eleven remaining Defendants filed six motions to dismiss, raising nine separate
arguments. For the sake of judicial efficiency, the Court will address those arguments as
they pertain to groupings of the Defendants when doing so makes sense.
A. Shotgun Pleading
All Defendants argue that the complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. The
Eleventh Circuit has described the following categories of shotgun pleadings:

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The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple
counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts,
causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count
to be a combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type, at
least as far as our published opinions on the subject reflect, is a complaint
that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is
guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.
The third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not
separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.
Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims
against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim
is brought against. The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun
pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another,
to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015); see
also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1130 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[S]hotgun pleadings wreak
havoc on the judicial system.”). Shotgun complaints should be dismissed without
prejudice, and Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies. See
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991); Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d
1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that it is sufficient to give a plaintiff who has filed
a shotgun pleading one chance to re-plead correctly).
The complaint (Doc. 1) manages to fall into each category of shotgun pleading to
one degree or another. The complaint contains seven counts, and all but Count VII
reincorporate all previous paragraphs. The complaint also alleges conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts which are not obviously related to any count in particular. Count I, which
fails to specify whether it is brought under § 1983 or Florida tort law, potentially contains
two separate causes of action against Pelton. See Mathis v. Coats, 24 So. 3d 1284, 1289

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(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The complaint also broadly asserts Counts II through V against
all Defendants without alleging for which acts or omissions Plaintiff seeks to hold each
Defendant responsible. In total, the Court concludes the complaint fails to put the
Defendants on notice of Plaintiff’s claims against them. Accordingly, the complaint should
be dismissed without prejudice so Plaintiff can correct these pleading deficiencies.
B. Duplicative Counts
Sections 1983 and 1985 claims against state agents in their official capacities
“generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent,” not against the officer individually. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, (1978));
see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 854–55 (11th Cir. 2010). In other words, officialcapacity suits against policymakers are effectively suits against the government entity. See
Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir.
2005). Courts should dismiss official capacity suits when both the officer and entity are
being sued because allowing counts of this kind to remain only creates the possibility of
jury confusion. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 2005).
Defendants, Pelton, Reese, and Valentino (collectively, the “Police Department
Defendants”) all move to dismiss the claims against them in their official capacity because
Plaintiff is suing the City of Wildwood (the “City”). The Court agrees that these counts
against the Police Department Defendants in their official capacities are duplicative and
should be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff will be given leave to adequately plead a cause
of action against the Police Department Defendants in their individual capacities.

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Although not raised by Steffan, the Court concludes the same reasoning is
applicable to him as an agent of Defendant FDLE. Accordingly, the claims against Steffan
in his official capacity are also dismissed with prejudice.
C. Qualified Immunity
The Police Department Defendants and Defendant Stefan also raise the defense of
qualified immunity. “To receive qualified immunity, ‘the public official must first prove
that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred.’ ” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir.
2004). Once a defendant demonstrates he was acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority, “the burden then shift[s] to the [plaintiff] to show that qualified immunity should
not apply because: (1) the [official] violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was
clearly established at the time of the incident.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158,
1166 (11th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff withstands a motion to dismiss predicated on qualified
immunity by alleging “sufficient facts to support a finding of a constitutional violation of
a clearly established law.” Chandler v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198
(11th Cir.2012) (citing Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009)); see
also Andreu v. Sapp, 919 F.2d 637, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to
dismissal when the plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a clearly established right.”).
The Court concludes Stefan is entitled to qualified immunity, but the Police
Department Defendants are not. Plaintiff only alleges Stefan failed to investigate Pelton’s
position and does not allege Stefan participated in framing Plaintiff. Given that the
Eleventh Circuit has held an investigating officer is entitled to qualified immunity even if

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he fails to intervene and stop another officer from fabricating evidence, Jones v. Cannon,
174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999), this Court concludes an officer who does not even
investigate allegations of fabricating evidence would also be entitled to immunity.
Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Stefan in his individual capacity are dismissed
with prejudice.
As to the Police Department Defendants, it is too soon for the Court to rule whether
qualified immunity is appropriate based on the unclear allegations in the complaint. The
Court notes, however, that Plaintiff must allege more than vicarious liability as to Reeser
and Valentino. West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). Rather,
“[t]o state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege
(1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional
rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an
inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed
to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on
notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct.
Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Tillman, 496 F.3d at 1328–29).
For now, though, this defense is denied without prejudice as to the Police Department
Defendants to raise if Plaintiff amends his complaint.
D. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff alleges McDonough continued to prosecute him despite knowing of the
evidence fabricated by Pelton, namely, the falsity of his statements. Plaintiff also alleges
King and Seuss, with McDonough, continued to prosecute him despite having exculpatory
evidence. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Simpson and Juergensmeyer declined to investigate
Pelton despite having exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff does not allege McDonough, King,

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Seuss, Simpson, or Juergensmeyer (collectively, the “State Attorney Defendants”)
personally fabricated any evidence. As explained below, the State Attorney Defendants are
entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained,
A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while
performing his function as an advocate for the government. The prosecutorial
function includes the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, and all
appearances before the court, including examining witnesses and presenting
evidence. Under these principles, it is clear that, even if [a prosecutor]
knowingly proffered perjured testimony and fabricated exhibits at trial, he is
entitled to absolute immunity from liability for doing so.
Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal
citations omitted); see also Barr, 437 F. App'x at 876.
Plaintiff has not alleged that he is seeking to hold the State Attorney Defendants
responsible for any acts not within the scope of their prosecutorial function. Instead,
Plaintiff alleges the State Attorney Defendants prosecuted Plaintiff with knowingly false
evidence or failed to investigate Pelton for providing fabricated evidence—all of which fall
within their prosecutorial function. Accordingly, the claims against the State Attorney
Defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed with prejudice.
E. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
FDLE argues it has immunity from prosecution under the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff does not address this argument in his response to FDLE’s motion to dismiss. The
Court agrees with the various district courts that have recognized FDLE’s right to immunity
in § 1983 and § 1985 claims. See e.g. Desravines v. Florida Dep't of Fin. Servs., No. 6:11CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2292180, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2011), report and

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recommendation adopted, No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2222170 (M.D. Fla. June
8, 2011); Emerson v. Bailey, No. 208-CV-560-FTM-29SPC, 2009 WL 1930188, at *4–5
(M.D. Fla. June 30, 2009); Irwin v. Miami-Dade Cty. Pub. Sch., No. 06-23029-CIV, 2009
WL 465038, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2009), aff'd, 398 F. App'x 503 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also Cuyler v. Scriven, No. 6:11-CV-00087-MEF, 2011 WL 861709, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
9, 2011) (explaining Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to § 1985 claims). Therefore,
the claims against FDLE must be dismissed with prejudice.
The Court concludes the same result should be reached for the State Attorney
Defendants in their official capacities. The State Attorney’s Office is an “arm of the state,”
and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Hatten v. Decopai, No. 2:13-CV-829FTM-29, 2013 WL 6231256, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013); Cyber Zone E-Cafe, Inc. v.
King, 782 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Rich v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:09CV-454-J-34MCR, 2010 WL 4403095, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2010); Perez v. State
Attorney's Office, No. 608CV-1199-ORL-31KRS, 2008 WL 4539430, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 8, 2008). Accordingly, the claims against the State Attorney Defendants in their
official capacity are also dismissed with prejudice.
F. Sovereign Immunity
Defendants Steffan and the State Attorney Defendants, in their official capacities;
the City; and FDLE all claim they have sovereign immunity against Plaintiff’s claims for
malicious prosecution (Count II) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count
IV). The Court agrees. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1330 (holding claims against municipality
for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotion distress are barred by

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sovereign immunity under Florida law). As such, Counts II and IV must be dismissed with
prejudice against these Defendants.
G. Municipal Liability
The City argues the claims against it must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to
plead a plausible basis for municipal liability. A municipality can be held liable under §
1983 if it has “a policy, custom, or practice” that causes a constitutional deprivation.
Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff’s conclusory
or “naked allegations” are insufficient; instead a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a
liability theory “that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1280. Municipal liability cannot be
based on vicarious liability or respondeat superior in § 1983 or §1985 claims. Id. at 1279;
see also Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1145 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694–95); Zherka v. City of New York, 459 F. App'x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff failed to allege any basis by which to hold the City liable for the actions of
any of the Police Department Defendants, and the claims against the City should be
dismissed. Because the complaint is unclear for what acts or omissions Plaintiff seeks to
hold the Police Department Defendants liable in Counts II–V, however, the Court cannot
say Plaintiff cannot possibly plead a plausible basis for municipal liability. As such, the
claims against the City should be dismissed without prejudice so Plaintiff has a chance to
correct the pleading deficiencies, if he can.

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H. Failure to State a Claim under § 1985
The State Attorney Defendants, FDLE, Steffan, and the Police Department
Defendants all argue Plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1985. To state a claim, a
plaintiff must allege the following:
(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property
or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Trawinski v. United Techs., 313 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit
has explained that § 1985 was meant “to stifle the serious class-based deprivation of
constitutional rights by private parties….” Id. As such, “the second element requires a
showing of ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators’ action.’” Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954
F.2d 624, 628 (11th Cir. 1992).
The Court concludes the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1985. Plaintiff did
not plead any facts indicating that the alleged conspiracy to prosecute him was in any way
motivated by race, class, or another invidiously discriminatory animus. Accordingly, the
Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim without prejudice.
I. Punitive Damages
The City moves to preemptively dismiss any potential claim of punitive damages
against it since Plaintiff pled he intends to seek punitive damages in the future. This issue
is not yet ripe since no claim for punitive damages has been made against any Defendant.
The Court notes, however, that the City is correct that municipalities are immune from

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punitive damage for actions arising under § 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Plaintiff will
be permitted to file an amended complaint for those claims not dismissed with prejudice
by this Order.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Defendant City of Wildwood’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED.
A. Counts II and IV are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against Defendant
City of Wildwood.
B. Counts III and V are DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant
City of Wildwood.

2.

Defendant Douglas Pelton’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) is GRANTED.
A. Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
against Defendant Douglas Pelton in his official capacity.
B. Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII are DISMISSED without prejudice
against Defendant Douglas Pelton in his individual capacity.

3.

Defendant Eddie Reeser’s motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) is GRANTED.
A. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against
Defendant Eddie Reeser in his official capacity.
B. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED without prejudice against
Defendant Eddie Reeser in his individual capacity.

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4.

Defendant Paul Valentino’s motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) is GRANTED.
A. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against
Defendant Paul Valentino in his official capacity.
B. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED without prejudice against
Defendant Paul Valentino in his individual capacity.

5.

Defendants Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Brad King, Mark
Simpson, Conrad Juergensmeyer, Michelle Seuss, and Thomas Steffan’s
motion to dismiss (Doc. 26) is GRANTED.
A. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against
Defendant FDLE.
B. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against
Defendants

Steffan,

McDonough,

King,

Seuss,

Simpson,

and

Juergensmeyer in their official and individual capacities.
6.

Defendant Ed McDonough’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) is GRANTED.
A. Counts II, III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against
Defendant Ed McDonough in his official and individual capacities.

7.

Plaintiff John Cottam may file an amended complaint within fourteen (14)
days of this Order’s entry. Failure to file an amended complaint within the
fourteen (14) days will result in this case being closed without further notice.

8.

Based on this Court’s ruling that Plaintiff has 14 days to file an amended
complaint, the Court DENIES Plaintiff John Cottam’s motions for leave to
amend (Docs. 32 and 53) as moot.

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9.

The Court also DENIES Defendants Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, Conrad Juergensmeyer, Brad King, Ed McDonough, Mark
Simpson, Thomas Steffan, and Michelle Seuss’s motion to strike (Doc. 54)
as moot.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 6th day of October, 2016.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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