Skybolt Aeromotive Corporation v. Milspec Products, Inc. et al

Filing 72

ORDER referring this case to the Federal Aviation Administration. See the Order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens on 6/9/2017. (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
SKYBOLT AEROMOTIVE
CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 5:16-cv-616-Oc-PRL

MILSPEC PRODUCTS, INC. and
JEREMY SUMMERS
Defendants.

ORDER
In this consent case, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants MilSpec
Products, Inc. and Jeremy Summers, who is MilSpec’s president, from selling, as Federal Aviation
Administration approved, fasteners and other products used on airplanes. (Docs. 32, 32-1–32-15,
33, 34). Defendants, of course, oppose the motion. (Docs. 38, 39, 40, 41). Upon a review of
these filings, and after a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion (Docs. 35, 47), the Court asked the parties
to brief the applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine (Doc. 49), as it appears that the Federal
Aviation Administration has regulatory authority over the issues raised. They have now done so
(Docs. 57, 59), and for the reasons that follow, this case is referred to the Federal Aviation
Administration under the primary jurisdiction doctrine for initial consideration of the issues before
the Court.

I.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff and MilSpec compete in the “aerospace fastener industry wherein both parties sell
quarter turn fasteners, panel fasteners, cowling fasteners and captive fasteners which are installed
on general aviation airframes, corporate jet aircraft and commercial airplanes.” (Doc. 32 at p.2).
According to Plaintiff, both of the companies’ fasteners “must meet certain performance standards
prescribed in technical standard order (TSO) C-148 (“TSO-C148”) in order to be sold and installed
on aircraft” and “in order to advertise or promote the fact that one has TSO-C148 approval, one
must submit a TSO application to the F[ederal] A[viation] A[dministration] with drawings,
fastener performance requirements and limitations, TSO Qualification test reports, lot numbers of
qualification parts, raw material heat number or certification numbers and material composition of
the qualification parts.” (Doc. 32 at p.2).
TSO-C148 approval is, as noted above, obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration
(the “FAA”). See infra section III.A. At the heart of the issues before the Court are Plaintiff’s
allegation that MilSpec falsely advertises TSO-C148 production approval for a significant number
of the fasteners it sells.2 (Docs. 1 at ¶32; 32 at p.11).

1

For purposes of this Order, the Court will address only facts that are relevant to the primary
jurisdiction doctrine and its application to this case, but numerous other claims and counter-claims are at
issue. (Docs. 1, 15). As noted supra, in addition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, also
before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Docs. 55, 56), Defendants’ response (Doc. 61, 62, 63,
64, 65) to that motion, and Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 69). The sanctions motion alleges that Defendants
submitted fraudulent documents to the Court. As the filings on sanctions address numerous documents
that are relevant to the applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Court will utilize here these
arguments and filings.
2
Although Plaintiff alleges that MilSpec has made other false advertisements in the past,
MilSpec’s advertisements that it has TSO-C148 approval for its fasteners were the only ongoing
advertisements at issue when Plaintiff filed its motion for entry of a preliminary injunction. (See Docs. 32
at pp.1–2; 38 at pp.1–2).

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Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that MilSpec has TSO-C148 approval for these (and only
these) fasteners: C-SPEC 2600, 2700, and 4002 parts (granted in a FAA letter dated September 9,
2003) and C-SPEC Isolator Platemount Assembly parts (granted in a FAA letter dated April 5,
2016).3 (Docs. 1 at ¶32; 32 at pp.11–12; 32-1; 32-5). Indeed, the parties agree that MilSpec
obtained TSO-C148 approval on September 9, 2003 for its C-SPEC 2600, 2700, and 4002 parts
and approval on April 5, 2016 for its C-SPEC Isolator Platemount Assembly parts as both parties
are in possession of documents purportedly from the FAA that the parties (mostly) agree are
authentic.4 And thus, among other parts, Plaintiff concludes that MilSpec falsely advertises TSOC148 approval for these fasteners: A-SPEC parts, Z-SPEC parts, and C-SPEC 2800, 2000, and
4000 parts. (Doc. 32-15 at p.4).
Plaintiff bases these allegations, in part, on two Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)
requests it placed with the FAA and to which the FAA has responded. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶33–34; 1-1 at
p.66; 32 at ¶¶4–9; 32-5). In short, Plaintiff requested from the FAA any and all correspondences
with MilSpec from September 9, 2003 to March 2, 2017. (Doc. 32 at ¶¶4–9). In response to
these FOIA requests, the FAA provided Plaintiff with documents that fail to show that MilSpec

3

At the time the FAA granted TSO-C148 approval for the C-SPEC 2600, 2700, and 4002 parts in
2003, those parts where known as C-LOCK parts. (Docs. 32 at ¶5; 55-10). And though the current term
that MilSpec uses for these parts is “SPEC” (as in A-SPEC, C-SPEC, and Z-SPEC), many of the documents
at issue here, even recent documents, use the old term “LOCK” (as in A-LOCK, C-LOCK, and Z-LOCK).
4
There are apparently two versions of this September 9, 2003 FAA approval letter in the record
before the Court. (Compare Doc. 55-2 with Doc. 55-10). And Plaintiff does dispute a very narrow
portion of one of these versions. Namely, Plaintiff contends that the version of the letter it received from
the FAA via its FOIA request is the correct version of the September 9, 2003 TSO-C148 approval letter
and that the letter does not grant MilSpec TSC-C148 approval for its “MS-O ( ) S Plush Flush—Extended
Depth” parts. (Doc. 55 at p.7). Another version of the September 9, 2003 TSO-C148 approval letter that
Defendants provided the Court does purport to grant approval for those parts. (Doc. 55-2). According to
Plaintiff, Summers fraudulently inserted the “MS-O ( ) S Plush Flush—Extended Depth” parts approval in
the September 9, 2003 letter. Summers has now admitted that he did alter the September 9, 2003 letter by
adding in the “MS-O ( ) S Plush Flush—Extended Depth” parts and he admits that he submitted that altered
document to the FAA and to this Court. (Docs. 61 at ¶¶18, pp.7–8; 62 at ¶13).

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has the TSO-C148 approvals it says it has (with the exception, as noted, of the C-SPEC 2600,
2700, and 4002 parts and the C-SPEC Isolator Platemount Assembly parts). (Doc. 32-5).
As discovery has progressed, however, MilSpec and Summers have submitted here various
alleged FAA documents to show the TSO-C148 approvals at issue. (See, e.g., Doc. 39). But
Plaintiff challenges these documents: unlike the September 9, 2003 and April 5, 2016 FAA letters
that the parties agree grant, respectively, MilSpec TSO-C148 approval of its C-SPEC 2600, 2700,
and 4002 parts (with the exception of the “MS-O ( ) S Plush Flush—Extended Depth” parts, which
is in dispute) and its C-SPEC Isolator Platemount Assembly parts, Plaintiff disputes the veracity
of most of these documents. Indeed, as previously noted, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have
implemented a complex fraudulent scheme using numerous forged or otherwise fraudulent
documents to deceive the FAA, this Court, and Plaintiff into believing that MilSpec has TSO-C148
approvals that it does not have. (Doc. 49 at p.2). The Court will now identify these purportedly
fraudulent documents, which are relevant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.5
Defendants have submitted a purported FAA document dated December 23, 2003 or 2008
(the parties disagree what year the document is dated). (Docs. 38 at ¶12; 39 at ¶¶17(a), 18–20
and at p.7). This document purports to be a “response to [Summer’s] letter, dated September 10,
2003, and subsequent letter, dated November 4, 2003, for the Federal Aviation Administration to
grant requested authorization to produce new items on structural panel fasteners approved under
TSO-C148.”

(Doc. 39 at p.7).

The letter further purports to approve MilSpec’s “Quality

Assurance Manual, Revision ‘002,’ dated August 26, 2003” and states that “the articles are
approved for production at the Sorrento, FL facility.” (Doc. 39 at. p.7). But the letter does not

5

Undoubtedly, there are many documents before the Court that are either mentioned in passing or
that are not discussed here—this analysis is restricted to the evidence directly relevant to whether this case
should be referred to the FAA.

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identify any specific parts. Plaintiff asserts that Summers created the document by cutting and
pasting a document that Defendants previously produced to Plaintiff (around seven years ago) in
a prior litigation. (Doc. 55 at ¶29). Summers did contend—at one point in time—that this letter
was a “true and accurate correspondence from the FAA to MilSpec, which w[as] sent to MilSpec
as part of the FAA TSO-C148 production approval process, confirming FAA TSO-C148
production approval.” (Doc. 39 at ¶¶17(a), 18, 19). But now he avers that he does not know “the
origin” of this letter. (Doc. 62 at ¶16).
Defendants have also submitted an alleged FAA document dated December 23, 2009.6
(Doc. 39 at pp. 8–9). This document purports to grant MilSpec TSO-C148 approval for numerous
A-LOCK, Z-LOCK, and C-LOCK parts. Plaintiff has called the veracity of this document into
question on (at least) six separate bases:
1) its experts’ testimony that analyzes the purported signature of Eugene Evans
(Evans is apparently an Associate Manager-Airframe of the Atlanta Aircraft
Certification Office) and concludes that the signature was forged (Docs. 42, 421, 42-2);
2) the lack of technical data in the letter (this argument is based on juxtaposing
this letter with other similar letters—letters which Plaintiff contends are
authentic FAA letters that which refer to technical data in approving other parts
under TSO-C148) (Doc. 55 at pp.14–15);
3) Summers’ statement that he altered the document to reflect approval for
production at his “Sorrento” location (Doc. 62 at ¶16);
4) the concept that at the time of the letter dated 2009, MilSpec did not yet use the
terms “C-SPEC, A-SPEC, and Z-SPEC,” thus the drawings lists that use those

6

There are two versions of this document. The only difference between the two is the production
facility location: one document lists the approved production location as the “Sorrento, FL facility” (Doc.
55-1) and the other lists the approved production location as the “Leesburg, FL facility” (Doc. 55-7).
According to Plaintiff, both versions were created by Summers in Microsoft® Word and then converted
into PDF format. (Doc. 55 at ¶19). Allegedly, the “Sorrento” version was created on March 5, 2017 and
the “Leesburg” version was created on March 28, 2017. (Doc. 55 at ¶22; ¶ 25) (“It is Plaintiff’s position
and the evidence supports the fact that SUMMERS actually created the entire December 23, 2009 letter as
opposed to only changing the location.”). Summers, for his part, asserts that the “Leesburg” version is the
original and that he altered the document by replacing the word “Leesburg” with the word “Sorrento.”
(Docs. 61 at p.9; 62 at ¶16).

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terms and that purport to support this December 23, 2009 TSO-C148 approval
are suspect (Doc. 55 at ¶¶35–36);7
5) CAD drawings that Plaintiff alleges were created after 1999 and modified in
2017 and that MilSpec has submitted as proof of obtaining TSO-C148 approval
from the FAA (Doc. 55 at p.15);8 and
6) metadata that allegedly shows Summers created the December 23, 2009
document in a Microsoft® Word program in March of this year (Docs. 42; 423; 56-2 at ¶¶5–12).
(See generally Docs. 32, 33, 34, 42, 55).9
Defendants have also submitted two documents that Plaintiff does not directly dispute as
true FAA documents. 10 (Doc. 39 at pp.13–15, 16–18). First, Defendants have submitted an
alleged FAA letter dated February 27, 2017, which is an apparent request from the FAA to
Summers asking him to provide the FAA “with a copy of [Milspec’s] complete TSO application
and their FAA TSOAs for project number SP12050AT:”
An internal FAA audit of the FAA’s Certification Project Notification
database, Regulatory Guidance Library, and records archive revealed that the TSO
applications and data your company submitted for the approval of the TSO-C148
fasteners (listed in Table 1, below) under FAA project number SP12050AT are

7

To clarify, Defendants submitted to Plaintiff and the Court a “Drawing Master List” that purports
to have received TSO minor change acceptances from the Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office on April 4,
2017. (Doc. 39 at pp.66–69). The Drawing Master Lists states the words “FAA project number
SP12050AT” and includes apparent drawings for certain C-LOCK, Z-SPEC, and A-SPEC parts (and other
parts). (Doc. 39 at pp. 66–67).
8
Although Plaintiff’s briefing and the affidavit of its expert Richard Connor assert that these
drawings were created after 1999 (Docs. 55 at p.15; 56-2 at ¶¶13–14), it is apparent that Plaintiff meant to
assert that the drawings were created after 2009—i.e., created after the supposed December 23, 2009
approval. (See Doc. 61 at p.8) (“As to the CAD drawings, Mr. Summers explains that it is MilSpec’s
company policy to save over earlier versions of the drawings once they are revised. Thus, the electronic
CAD files reflect modified dates after 2009.”). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have violated 14 C.F.R.
§ 21.137(k) by modifying the CAD drawings. (Doc. 69 at ¶21); 14 C.F.R. § 21.137(k) (“A production
approval holder must retain these records for at least 5 years for the products and articles manufactured
under the approval and at least 10 years for critical components identified under § 45.15(c) of this chapter.”).
9
Plaintiff further alleges that MilSpec falsely advertises TSO-C148 approval for over four-hundred
parts that are not included in the September 9, 2003, December 23, 2009, and April 5, 2016 FAA letters.
(Docs. 49 at n.1; 57 at n.3). As of Plaintiff’s latest filing, it appears that MilSpec has taken down any
reference to TSO-C148 from its website. (Doc. 69 at n.2).
10
That is, Plaintiff does not argue that these documents are forgeries. Defendants have also
submitted numerous email correspondence between Summers and FAA officials that date from March 28,
2017 to April 5, 2017. (Doc. 39). Plaintiff does not allege that these emails are forgeries.

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missing from our records. MilSpec Products submitted those TSO applications and
data in accordance with 14 CFR 21.603(a) on or about September 10, 2009, and
November 4, 2009. The Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) issued the TSO
Approvals (TSOA) on or about December 3, 2009, and December 21, 2009.
(Doc. 39 at pp.13–15). The letter expounds, “To rectify this situation, we request your assistance
in providing us with a copy of your complete TSO applications and their FAA TSOAs for project
number SP12050AT.” (Doc. 39 at p.13). This document contains a table titled “TSO C148
fasteners authorized through FAA project number SP12050AT” and that table includes numerous
C-LOCK, Z-LOCK, and A-LOCK parts that are at issue here. (Doc. 39 at pp.13–15).
Second, Defendants have submitted an alleged FAA letter dated March 30, 2017. This
letter appears to be intended to correct a “TSOA letter, dated December 23, 2009, which incorrectly
referenced the production facility as Leesburg, FL, instead of Sorrento, FL.” (Doc. 39 at p.16).
The letter purports to also be a “response to [Summer’s] letter, dated September 10, 2009, and
subsequent letter, dated November 4, 2009, for the Federal Aviation Administration to grant
requested authorization to produce new items on structural panel fasteners approved under TSOCl48” and states that “[w]e find your statement of conformance and MilSpec, Inc. Quality
Assurance Manual, Revision ‘003,’ dated March 03, 2011, acceptable and the articles below are
approved for production at the Sorrento, FL facility.” (Doc. 39 at p.16). Then the letter goes on
to list numerous C-LOCK, Z-LOCK, and A-LOCK parts that are at issue here. (Doc. 39 at pp.16–
18).
Plaintiff does not directly challenge the validity of the February 27, 2017 and March 30,
2017 letters but, instead, implies that Defendants improperly obtained these letters from the FAA
by their duplicity, which includes the forged December 23, 2009 letter and other malfeasance.
(See Doc. 55 at p.16) (“What Defendants provided to the FAA were falsified and fabricated
documents that were created and modified after 2009 in order to prove up an approval that was

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allegedly submitted in 2009.”); (Doc. 55 at p.18) (“Defendants fabricated the December 23, 2009
document and the December 23, 2003 document; altered the September 9, 2003 document; and
modified all of its drawings and MDL’s before providing them to the FAA, Plaintiff and this Court
claiming that such documents were originally sent to the FAA in 2009 when in fact they were
not.”). In sum, Plaintiff—at least implicitly—challenges whether the FAA properly granted
MilSpec TSO-C148 approval in the alleged FAA letter dated March 30, 2017.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, a court of competent jurisdiction may stay an
action pending resolution of an issue that falls within the special competence of an administrative
agency.” Beach TV Cable Co. v. Comcast of Florida/Georgia, LLC, 808 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th
Cir. 2015). Even when a “court is authorized to adjudicate the claim before it, the primary
jurisdiction doctrine ‘comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its views.”’ Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1312 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956)).
“The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a flexible tool that is designed to allocate efficiently
fact finding between the federal courts and administrative agencies.” Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty.
Council of Volusia Cty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (J. Roney, dissenting). Put
differently, “[t]he primary jurisdiction doctrine is thus no more than recognition of the fact that the
compelling necessity for regulatory uniformity and consistency, coupled with the almost infinite
variety of administrative rules and regulations which affect or may affect a particular dispute,
initially require administrative rather than judicial fact-finding and rule-applying expertise.”

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Taylor Cty. Sand Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 446 F.2d 853, 854 (5th Cir. 1971).11
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction may justify staying a case “which raise issues of fact
not within the conventional experience of judges or which require the exercise of administrative
discretion.” Sunbird Air Serv., Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Kan.
1992); see Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574–75 (1952). “The doctrine
functions not to determine whether the court or agency will finally decide an issue; rather it serves
to delay the judicial decision until the court can take advantage of the agency’s expertise.” Id.
The two main justifications for invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine are the need for agency
expertise and the need for uniform interpretation of a statute or regulation. Boyes v. Shell Oil
Prod. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000).
The doctrine is inapplicable when the Court is faced with a question of law. Georgia
Power Co. v. Baker, 591 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (M.D. Ga. 1984) (citing Great Northern Railway
Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 294 (1922)). But “[t]he doctrine recognizes that if
‘the inquiry is one of fact and of discretion in technical matters,’ then resolution of the inquiry by
the court ‘is tantamount to engaging in judicial guesswork.”’ Gamble v. PinnOak Res., LLC, 511
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59,
66, 68 (1956)) (citations omitted).
“[I]n determining whether to exercise its discretion [in invoking the primary jurisdiction
doctrine], the district court must first be satisfied that the particular agency has jurisdiction over
the issue presented.” Id. at 1127. If it does, the court will then “consider four factors when
applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: (1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been

11

Decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981 are binding precedent on this Court.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc).

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placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority
(3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory scheme
that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.”12 Herazo v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.,
No. 14-61909-CIV, 2015 WL 4514510, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2015). Finally, where “the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies, the court has discretion either to stay the case and retain
jurisdiction or to dismiss the case without prejudice if the Parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged.” Greenfield v. Yucatan Foods, L.P., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
III.

DISCUSSION

For the reasons that follow, this case should be referred to the FAA for consideration of
the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1), its motions (Docs. 32, 55), and its other
filings (Docs. 33, 34, 42, 56, 69). In short, the factual issues before the Court are within the FAA’s
jurisdiction and regulatory authority, require the FAA’s expertise, and require regulatory
uniformity. Further, given the numerous other claims and counter-claims at issue, this case is
stayed pending the outcome of the FAA’s decision.
A. The FAA has the jurisdiction and the regulatory authority to address TSOC148 approval
The parties do not dispute that the FAA can properly address MilSpec’s purported TSOC148 approval or lack thereof. (Docs. 57 at pp.1–2; Doc. 59). Without a doubt, through
Congress, the FAA has expansive authority to “promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce

12

Put another way, “[u]nder the doctrine, the following four factors are relevant to a court’s
determination of whether to defer to an agency’s primary jurisdiction: ‘(1) whether the question at issue is
within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations
within the agency’s particular field of expertise; (2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the
agency’s discretion; (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a
prior application to the agency has been made.”’ Functional Pathways of Tennessee, LLC v. Cross, No.
15-CV-616000-WPD, 2016 WL 6902363, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2016) (quoting Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n,
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1995)).

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by prescribing,” among other things, “minimum standards required in the interest of safety for
appliances and for the design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft.”
49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1). Under this congressional power, the FAA has issued regulations that
allow it to set “minimum performance standard for specified articles used on civil aircraft.” 14
C.F.R. § 21.601(b)(1); see §§ 21.601–21.621.
1. Technical Standing Orders
These minimum performance standards are known as Technical Standard Order or TSOs.
14 C.F.R. § 21.601(a)–(b). If a specified article meets a TSO, the FAA will issue a “TSO
authorization,” which “is an FAA design and production approval issued to the manufacturer of
an article that has been found to meet a specific TSO.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.601(b)(2).13 “A TSO
authorization or letter of TSO design approval is effective until surrendered, withdrawn, or
otherwise terminated by the FAA.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.601(a).
In order to obtain a letter of TSO design approval, the applicant must “apply to the
appropriate aircraft certification office in the form and manner prescribed by the FAA” and provide
the following documents: “(1) A statement of conformance certifying that the applicant has met
the requirements of this subpart and that the article concerned meets the applicable TSO that is
effective on the date of application for that article” and “(2) One copy of the technical data required

13

See also § 21.611 (“If the FAA finds that the applicant complies with the requirements of this
subchapter, the FAA issues a TSO authorization to the applicant (including all TSO deviations granted to
the applicant).”); § 21.1(a), (b)(4) (noting that the Code of Federal Regulations Title 14, Chapter I, Part 21,
prescribes the procedural requirements for issuing and changing design, production, and airworthiness
approvals, including TSO authorizations).

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in the applicable TSO.” 14 14 C.F.R. § 21.603(a)(1–2). “If the application is deficient, the
applicant must, when requested by the FAA, provide any additional information necessary to show
compliance with this part. If the applicant fails to provide the additional information within 30
days after the FAA’s request, the FAA denies the application and notifies the applicant.” 14
C.F.R. § 21.603(c). In the alternative, the applicant may also apply for approval of a deviation
“from any performance standard of a TSO [and] must show that factors or design features
providing an equivalent level of safety compensate for the standards from which a deviation is
requested.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.618(a); § 21.618(b).
“After the issuance of a TSO authorization—(a) Each change to the quality system is
subject to review by the FAA; and (b) The holder of the TSO authorization must immediately
notify the FAA, in writing, of any change that may affect the inspection, conformity, or
airworthiness of its article.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.620. Also, a manufacturer who holds a TSO

14

Though the parties do not provide the Court with a copy of TSO-C148, the Court has found a
version dated September 26, 1997 from the FAA website, which appears to be the current version. See
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/0/ad05ba590f484d1a86256dac0068f6a6/
$FILE/C148.pdf. According to this version, TSO-C148 “prescribes the minimum performance standards
that aircraft mechanical fasteners must meet to be identified with the applicable TSO marking.”
TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER, TSO-C148, Aircraft Mechanical Fasteners, at 1 (September 26, 1997); see
also (Doc. 1-1 at pp.59–62) (an undated “Proposed” version of TSO-C148). An application for TSO-C148
approval shall include:
(1) Part drawing and applicable part specification(s) necessary to define the design,
minimum performance, and metallurgy for each fastener part number. (2) Manufacturer’s
TSO qualification test report in accordance with the test procedures specified in Appendix
1. (3) Inspection lot number(s) of qualification parts. (4) Raw material heat (lot) or
certification number for each qualification lot(s) of fasteners.
Id. at 5(a). TSO-C148 includes a single appendix, which includes “Aircraft Mechanical Fastener Property
Test Requirements.” Id. at Appendix 1. This appendix includes a Table that “specifies fastener property
test requirements for each fastener type, as defined on the manufacturers drawing(s) and/or specification(s).
The specific material, dimension(s), and heat treat form the basis of the fastener’s design; the specific values
for tensile, shear, torque, fatigue, and preload form the basis of the fastener’s ‘minimum performance;’ and
metallurgy and discontinuity are the fastener’s metallurgical properties.” Id. at Appendix 1.

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authorization may make minor design changes without FAA approval, but “[b]efore making a
major change,” which is defined as “[a]ny design change by the manufacturer extensive enough to
require a substantially complete investigation to determine compliance with a TSO is a major
change,” “the manufacturer must assign a new type or model designation to the article and apply
for an authorization under 14 C.F.R. § 21.603.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.619(a–b).
To ensure compliance, an applicant “must allow the FAA to inspect its quality system,
facilities, technical data, and any manufactured articles and witness any tests, including any
inspections or tests at a supplier facility.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.610.15 Further, “[e]ach applicant for
or holder of a TSO authorization must provide the FAA with a document—(1) Describing how its
organization will ensure compliance with the provisions of this subpart; (2) Describing assigned
responsibilities, delegated authorities, and the functional relationship of those responsible for
quality to management and other organizational components; and (3) Identifying an accountable
manager.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.605(a)(1–3). And an applicant’s designated “accountable manager”
“must be responsible within the applicant’s or production approval holder’s organization for, and
have authority over, all production operations conducted under th[e approved] part;” “must
confirm that the procedures described in the quality manual required by [14 C.F.R.] § 21.608 are
in place and that the production approval holder satisfies the requirements of the applicable
regulations of subchapter C, Aircraft;” and “must serve as the primary contact with the FAA.” 14

15

“Each applicant for or holder of a production certificate must establish and describe in writing a
quality system that ensures that each product and article conforms to its approved design and is in a
condition for safe operation.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.137; § 21.607; see also § 21.608 (noting that each applicant
must provide the FAA with a quality manual “describing its quality system to the FAA for approval,” which
is “in the English language and retrievable in a form acceptable to the FAA”). As stated supra in note 8,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have violated 14 C.F.R. § 21.137(k) by modifying CAD drawings. (Doc.
69 at ¶21; 14 C.F.R. § 21.137(k) (“A production approval holder must retain these records for at least 5
years for the products and articles manufactured under the approval and at least 10 years for critical
components identified under § 45.15(c) of this chapter.”).

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C.F.R. § 21.605(b).

Once TSO authorization is obtained, the holder then has numerous

responsibilities.16
With all this said, it is clear that “the role of the FAA in granting TSO authorizations
involves considerable latitude for policy judgment and discretion:”
The role of the FAA in issuing TSO authorizations involves a balancing of a myriad
of factors. The administrator must first evaluate the applicant’s quality control
system; he must analyze the inspection and test procedures used to ensure that each
article conforms to the type design, and is in a condition for safe operation; and he
must also inspect all subsidiary manufacturers who are involved in the assembly of
the product, and for whom the prime manufacturer is responsible. When the
administrator has completed this preliminary analysis, he may then either approve
the application or request additional information to assist him in his
determination. The administrator, if he so decides, may personally inspect the
articles manufactured, the manufacturing facilities, the quality inspections and
tests, and the technical data files.
Takacs v. Jump Shack, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 76, 78, 79 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (page number omitted).
2. FAA Enforcement Authority Applicable to TSOs
The FAA’s regulatory authority over TSO applications does not end with grants and
denials—it also includes enforcement powers. For instance, under 14 C.F.R. § 21.2(a), applicants
are prohibited from making false applications to the FAA for approval, which, under

16

14 C.F.R. § 616 (cataloging these duties to include the following: “(a) Amend the document
required by § 21.605 as necessary to reflect changes in the organization and provide these amendments to
the FAA; (b) Maintain a quality system in compliance with the data and procedures approved for the TSO
authorization; (c) Ensure that each manufactured article conforms to its approved design, is in a condition
for safe operation, and meets the applicable TSO; (d) Mark the TSO article for which an approval has been
issued. Marking must be in accordance with part 45 of this chapter, including any critical parts; (e) Identify
any portion of the TSO article (e.g., sub-assemblies, component parts, or replacement articles) that leave
the manufacturer’s facility as FAA approved with the manufacturer’s part number and name, trademark,
symbol, or other FAA approved manufacturer’s identification; (f) Have access to design data necessary to
determine conformity and airworthiness for each article produced under the TSO authorization. The
manufacturer must retain this data until it no longer manufactures the article. At that time, copies of the
data must be sent to the FAA; (g) Retain its TSO authorization and make it available to the FAA upon
request; and (h) Make available to the FAA information regarding all delegation of authority to suppliers”).

- 14 -

§§ 21.1(a),(b)(4), includes “TSO authorization, letter of TSO design approval, or other approved
design:”
A person may not make or cause to be made—(1) Any fraudulent, intentionally
false, or misleading statement on any application for . . . approval under this part;
(2) Any fraudulent, intentionally false, or misleading statement in any record or
report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance with any requirement of this
part; (3) Any reproduction for a fraudulent purpose of any . . . approval issued under
this part[; or] (4) Any alteration of any . . . approval issued under this part.
If a person performs one of those prohibited acts or acts, the act “is a basis for—(1) Denying
issuance of any . . . approval under this part; and (2) Suspending or revoking any . . . approval
issued under this part and held by that person.” 14 C.F.R. § 21.2(b)(1–2).
What is more, it is undisputed that the FAA has an expansive mechanism for addressing
and remedying violations of the Federal Aviation Act and its regulations thereunder. When the
FAA determines, for example, that a person “has engaged, or is about to engage, in any act or
practice constituting a violation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, or any regulation or order
issued under it for which the FAA exercises enforcement responsibility, . . . the [FAA’s] Chief
Counsel, [or other proper FAA authority] . . . , may request the United States Attorney General, or
the delegate of the Attorney General, to bring an action in the appropriate United States District
Court for such relief as is necessary or appropriate, including mandatory or prohibitive injunctive
relief.” 14 C.F.R. § 13.25(a) (emphasis added). And as Plaintiff itself states, “the FAA may
choose to impose civil penalties on Defendants, as well as enter orders of compliance, cease and
desist orders, injunctions and provide for criminal penalties of fines and imprisonment.” (Doc.
57 at p. 9) (footnotes omitted) (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.14, 13.15, 13.16, 13.20, 13.23, 13.25).
Therefore the FAA is capable of obtaining injunctive relief (and other relief) against persons and
entities that violate FAA regulations.

- 15 -

Lastly, the FAA has contemplated the scenario where, as here, a private citizen suspects
that violations of FAA regulations have occurred. The FAA expects private citizens, like Plaintiff
and its administrators, to report known and suspected violations of its regulations through a
remedial administrative process: “Any person who knows of a violation of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 . . . or any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, should report it to appropriate
personnel of any FAA regional or district office.”17 14 C.F.R. § 13.1(a).
Indeed, the public may report suspected unapproved parts, even anonymously, through the
FAA’s Suspected Unapproved Parts Program (SUP Program). See FAA ORDER 8120.16A,
Suspected

Unapproved

Parts

Program,

at

3-1

(June

3,

2016)

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8120_16A.pdf).

(available
18

at
As

described, the purpose of the SUP program is to ensure the safety of the aviation community
through “aggressive and consistent investigative and corrective actions.”19 The FAA “aims” to
prevent unapproved parts that have entered the market from being installed and, if they do enter
the market, purge them.20 Further, the SUP program explicitly covers “[p]arts offered as having
been produced under an FAA production approval, where no such FAA approval was issued.” Id.
at Appendix D, v.(5).

17

Similarly, as discussed infra Part IV, the FAA has provided for a “Formal Complaint” process
in which “[a]ny person may file a complaint with the Administrator with respect to anything done or omitted
to be done by any person in contravention of any provision of any Act or of any regulation or order issued
under it, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the Administrator.” 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(a).
18
Order 8120.16A “describes responsibilities, policies and procedures for coordinating,
investigating, and processing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) suspected unapproved parts (SUP)
reports.” Id. at 1-1.
19
“The objective of the SUP Program is to mitigate the potential safety threat to the aviation
community posed by ‘unapproved parts’” and the program “seeks to prevent unapproved parts from
entering the system by aggressive and consistent investigative and corrective actions when detected.” Id.
at 2-1.
20
“If unapproved parts have already entered inventories, the program aims to prevent such parts
from being installed on aircraft and are then purged from the system as soon as practicable.” Id. at 2-1.

- 16 -

B. The FAA should address this case
1.

The parties agree that factual issues are before the Court. They disagree, however, on

what type of factual issues are at stake.
According to Plaintiff, who would prefer that this case remain here, mere historical issues
are before the Court. See In re Colgate-Palmolive Softsoap Antibacterial Hand Soap Mktg. &
Sales Practices Litig., No. 12-MD-2320-PB, 2013 WL 1124081, at *7 (D.N.H. Mar. 18, 2013)
(noting that the type of “historical fact finding [at issue wa]s well within the competence of a court
to conduct” and declining to refer the case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine). Plaintiff
asserts that this case “is not about whether or not FAA approval was properly granted [to
Defendants] or not—[the issue] is simply whether the approval(s) existed at the time Defendants
were advertising to the public that they had FAA approval.”21 (Doc. 57 at p.9). In other words,
Plaintiff says that the issues before the Court are merely the historical questions of whether
MilSpec has (or had) the approvals that it says it does have (or did have) and whether Defendants
have engaged in litigation misconduct by committing fraud on the Court. Plaintiff contends that
these factual issues are well within the Court’s conventional competence.22
In contrast, Defendants contend, “the issues the Court should refer to the FAA for
determination are: should MilSpec have TSO-C148 approval for its fasteners and products
produced for aircraft use and, if so, when did the FAA grant such approval.” (Doc. 59 at p.9).

21

(Doc. 57 at p.2) (“[T]his case is not about the technicalities of TSO-C148 approval; it is about
whether or not MILSPEC and SUMMERS falsified, fabricated and forged documents to support ‘approval’
of Defendants’ previously advertised products.”) (emphasis in the original).
22
(Doc. 57 at p.6) (“[I]t is Plaintiff’s position that although the primary jurisdiction doctrine might
be relevant to some of the issues; it should not be invoked because this Court, with the assistance of experts,
can and should determine whether or not Defendants have committed litigation misconduct, which will in
turn determine whether or not Defendants have the approvals they claim they have—and that is the heart
of Plaintiff’s false and misleading advertising claims.”).

- 17 -

Put differently, Defendants say that the issues before the Court are the technical questions of
whether they properly obtained the TSO-C148 approvals they say they have, and, assuming they
did properly obtain the approvals, when did they obtain them.
The Court submits that, in addition to historical questions, there are also technical questions
at issue here, as well as issues of regulatory consistency and uniformity, all of which the agency is
best suited to answer first.
2.

To be sure, the issues before the Court were—at one point in time—simply the historical

questions of whether MilSpec falsely advertised TSO-C148 approval for parts other than its CSPEC 2600, 2700, and 4002 series and its C-SPEC Isolator Platemount Assembly. To answer
these questions, the only evidence the Court needed to consider was (1) the unchallenged
September 9, 2003 and April 5, 2016 FAA letters that granted MilSpec TSO-C148 approvals for,
respectively, the C-SPEC 2600, 2700, and 4002 parts (excluding, of course, the disputed “MS-O (
) S Plush Flush—Extended Depth” parts) and the C-SPEC Isolator Platemount Assembly and (2)
the list of parts that MilSpec advertises TSO-C148 approval for. (Docs. 1 at ¶¶27–39; 39 at
pp.11–12). So, if this case had remained in stasis and all that the Court had to answer was whether
MilSpec advertises (or advertised) TSO-C148 approvals not contained in the undisputed versions
of the September 9, 2003 and April 5, 2016 FAA letters, then solely historical questions would
still be before it.
But now, as this case has progressed, there is certainly a question here as to whether
Defendants have forged purported FAA documents, submitted those documents to the FAA, and
in doing so conned the FAA into granting TSO-C148 approvals—approvals that Defendants,
perhaps, should not otherwise have. Simply put, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have committed
fraud on the FAA in order to obtain TSO-C148 approvals. (See Doc. 55 at ¶37) (noting the “clear

- 18 -

attempt on MILSPEC’s part to create favorable evidence for its case, defraud this Court and the
FAA”); (Doc. 55 at p.18) (“Defendants fabricated the December 23, 2009 document and the
December 23, 2003 document; altered the September 9, 2003 document; and modified all of its
drawings and M[aster ]D[rawing ]L[ists]’s before providing them to the FAA, Plaintiff and this
Court claiming that such documents were originally sent to the FAA in 2009 when in fact they
were not.”). Such misrepresentations, and agency action they influenced, can be the basis of the
Court’s exercise of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which could afford the agency an opportunity
to consider and remedy the action. See, e.g., Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F.
Supp. 1387, 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies even where a central issue is whether misrepresentations to an administrative
agency resulted in rate increases.”).
And, here, Defendants’ own evidence supports the assertion that they made
misrepresentations to the FAA: Summers admits that he has submitted at least one altered
document—on behalf of MilSpec and in support of MilSpec’s recently obtained TSO-C148 March
30, 2017 approval letter—to the FAA.23 In addition, if the Court adopts Plaintiff’s position that
Defendants have indeed forged the December 23, 2009 FAA letter, then it appears that Defendants
have submitted that falsified letter to the FAA too. To explain, Defendants submitted a February

23

(Doc. 62 at ¶13) (“When I produced documents to the FAA in March of this year, I mistakenly
sent the September 9, 2003 letter I had altered with a reference to the extended depth grommets. I then
attached the correspondence to the FAA (with attachments) to my previous affidavit. I had no idea that I
had done that when I attested to the documents as being true and correct. I had no idea that I had done that
when I attested that the attachments were not fabricated. I meant to send the FAA the original September
9, 2003 letter.”). To be sure, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants have committed fraud upon the Court
are not taken lightly; especially given Summers’ admission that he has submitted to the Court at least two
altered documents. (Doc. 62 at ¶¶11, 15–16). But though the Court can competently determine whether
MilSpec and Summers committed fraud in this proceeding, that determination would not be dispositive as
to whether the FAA has properly granted MilSpec TSO-C148 approvals. See subsection III.B.3.

- 19 -

27, 2017 FAA document that states that “[a]n internal FAA audit of the FAA’s Certification Project
Notification database, Regulatory Guidance Library, and records archive revealed that the TSO
applications and data your company submitted for the approval of the TSO-C148 fasteners (listed
in Table 1, below) under FAA project number SP12050AT are missing from our records.” (Doc.
39 at p.13). The Table listed in this FAA letter identifies numerous fasteners that are at issue here.
(Doc. 39 at pp.13–15).
Then, from what the Court can garner from the record, it appears that based on this
February 27, 2017 FAA letter MilSpec (through Summers) and the FAA (through its officials)
exchanged various emails that reference “project number SP12050AT” and for which Summers
provided the FAA with evidence that supported TSO-C148 approvals for MilSpec’s C-LOCK, ZLOCK, and A-LOCK parts. (See generally Doc. 39 at pp.13–72). Next, assumedly based on
submissions from Summers to the FAA, the FAA granted MilSpec TSO-C148 approval for
numerous C-LOCK, Z-LOCK, and A-LOCK parts in a March 30, 2017 letter. And that letter
references “project number SP12050AT” and states the following: “This is to correct TSOA letter,
dated December 23, 2009, which incorrectly referenced the production facility as Leesburg, FL,
instead of Sorrento, FL. Please find the corrected letter below.” (Doc. 39 at pp.16–18) (emphasis
added).
It appears that this March 30, 2017 letter purports to correct—and perhaps relies on or even
adopts—the very December 23, 2009 letter that Defendants base TSO-C148 approval of numerous
A-LOCK, Z-LOCK, and C-LOCK parts on and the very letter that Plaintiff intensely insists is a
fraud. Lastly, as an important aside, to the extent that the FAA has already considered the
allegedly fraudulent December 23, 2009 letter and, more broadly MilSpec’s TSO-C148 approvals
in general, the FAA has already begun to address the issues before the Court. See Functional

- 20 -

Pathways of Tennessee, LLC, 2016 WL 6902363 at *3 (noting that when the agency has already
begun to review an issue before a court, the court runs the risk of creating “inconsistent rulings,
potentially resulting in even more litigation” by attempting to resolve the issue itself).
3.

Notably, even if the Court found that all of the documents that Plaintiff alleges are

fraudulent are so,24 the Court cannot say whether the FAA, in its discretion, properly granted (or
would have granted) MilSpec TSO-C148 approval in the March 30, 2017 letter—the Court does
not know the universe of documents the FAA considered in issuing such approval on March 30,
2017 or what discretion it exercised. And the parties have not helped the Court solve this
quandary: though both parties have each submitted numerous affidavits to assist the Court in
determining whether MilSpec has the TSO-C148 approvals at issue, (Docs. 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42,
62, 63, 64, 65), there is no testimony or affidavit before the Court from the FAA officials assigned
to MilSpec’s TSO-C148 applications. Only the FAA knows the basis for its most recent March
30, 2017 TSO-C148 approval granted to MilSpec—the Court can only speculate about the FAA’s
grounds for that approbation.
And whether MilSpec should have TSO-C148 approvals is surely a technical question for
the FAA to decide in its judgment and discretion. Takacs, 546 F. Supp. at 78, 79 (noting that TSO
approval involves both policy and discretionary FAA judgments). It is a question that the agency
should answer. Gamble, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (noting that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
applies to discretionary, technical matters that the court can resolve only through guesswork).
If Defendants have fraudulently obtained FAA TSO-C148 approval and sell (or have sold)
aircraft fasteners under this false guise, then the FAA (not this Court) is the appropriate body to

24

Namely, the allegedly altered September 9, 2003 letter, the purportedly forged December 23,
2003 (or 2008) letter, the purportedly forged December 23, 2009 letters (both the “Sorrento” and the
“Leesburg” versions), and the allegedly improperly modified CAD drawings and Master Drawing Lists.

- 21 -

take whatever regulatory actions it deems necessary, in the first instance, to promote the safety of
all aircraft flying with those parts. The FAA is in the position to revoke any TSO approvals that
MilSpec may have, 14 C.F.R. § 21.2(b)(1–2), and then—in its discretion—administer a uniform
solution notifying all parties who may possess unapproved MilSpec fasteners. Certainly, the
FAA, as the SUP Program reveals, has numerous mechanisms to ensure that parts that do not meet
FAA regulatory requirements are addressed. See, e.g., FAA Order 8120.16A at 4-4. Further, it
is clear that Plaintiff believes that the sale of unapproved fasteners is a safety concern to the public,
(Doc. 1 at ¶36; 32 at p.3, 23) (“In the instant case, the evidence shows that Defendants are selling
A-SPEC and Z-SPEC parts that are unapproved by the FAA and some C-SPEC parts that are also
unapproved which is putting anyone that flies in an airplane with a MILSPEC part installed in
immediate danger, which is an important public safety concern.”) and that Plaintiff asks this Court
to force Defendants to notify their customers about the alleged unapproved parts, (Doc. 32 at pp.24,
25; 32-15 at ¶¶H–J).
The Court therefore finds that “the interests of uniformity and consistency in the aviation
field would be promoted by the FAA’s resolution of these issues.” Commander Properties Corp.
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 745 F. Supp. 650, 652 & n.1 (D. Kan. 1990) (referring a case to the FAA
when the plaintiff asserted that the defendant’s wing design was defective and not “airworthy”).
Whether MilSpec has TSO-C148 approvals and, if so, whether the FAA properly granted those
TSO-C148 approvals are technical issues best left to the agency that is alleged to have been
defrauded, the agency with authority to enforce its regulations and to do so uniformly. Indeed, it

- 22 -

is the agency that, in the first instance, can best determine the fraud committed against it, if any,
and take the necessary corrective action.25
IV.

REFERRAL

Due to the seriousness of Plaintiff’s fraud allegations, and the potential that unapproved
fasteners and other parts may have entered the aviation marketplace, the Court finds that directing
Plaintiff to file a Formal Complaint under 14 C.F.R. § 13.5 with the FAA is appropriate. See
Commander Properties Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 652. This method of referral will allow Plaintiff,
Defendants, and the Court to provide the FAA with a complete evidentiary record of this case and
obtain a sufficient resolution of the factual issues at hand.26
Under 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(a), the FAA regulations allow for the filing of a Formal
Complaint—“Any person may file a complaint with the Administrator with respect to anything
done or omitted to be done by any person in contravention of any provision of any Act or of any
regulation or order issued under it, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the Administrator.”
Formal Complaints filed under § 13.5 must meet certain strictures, which include the following:
[A Formal Complaint] must—
(1) Be submitted in writing and identified as a complaint filed for the purpose of
seeking an appropriate order or other enforcement action;

25

Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, to which Defendants responded, and
Plaintiff replied. (Docs. 55, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69). But inherent in the agency’s consideration of
what approvals the Defendants do or do not have will be an assessment of whether documents submitted to
it are fraudulent or otherwise misleading. To avoid an inconsistent ruling between this Court’s
consideration of the matter and the agency’s, the Court will defer any ruling on Plaintiff’s request for
sanctions and terminate it without prejudice so Plaintiff may seek that relief again in light of the agency’s
findings. Having the benefit of the agency’s findings will also help the Court better fashion a sanction, if
appropriate.
26
Though Plaintiff opposes referral (and notes the potential length of time the Formal Complaint
process may take), referral through 14 C.F.R. § 13.5 is Plaintiff’s proposed method. (Doc. 57 at pp.8–9).
Defendants, both of whom request referral, do not offer an opinion on how the case should be referred.
(Doc. 59).

- 23 -

(2) Be submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Attention: Enforcement Docket (AGC–10), 800 Independence Avenue,
S.W., Washington, DC 20591;
(3) Set forth the name and address, if known, of each person who is the subject of
the complaint and, with respect to each person, the specific provisions of the Act or
regulation or order that the complainant believes were violated;
(4) Contain a concise but complete statement of the facts relied upon to substantiate
each allegation;
(5) State the name, address and telephone number of the person filing the
complaint; and
(6) Be signed by the person filing the complaint or a duly authorized representative.
14 C.F.R. § 13.5(b). A properly submitted Formal Complaint “will be docketed and a copy
mailed to each person named in the complaint” and “[t]he person named in the complaint shall file
an answer within 20 days after service of a copy of the complaint.”27 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(d), (f).
Once a Formal Complaint “has been answered or after the allotted time in which to file an
answer has expired, the [FAA] Administrator shall determine if there are reasonable grounds for
investigating the complaint,” and, if such grounds do exist, “an informal investigation may be
initiated or an order of investigation may be issued in accordance with subpart F of this part, or
both.” 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(g),(i). “If the investigation substantiates the allegations set forth in the
complaint, a notice of proposed order may be issued or other enforcement action taken in
accordance with [the FAA’s investigative and enforcements procedures].” 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(j).

27

“The complaint and other pleadings and official FAA records relating to the disposition of the
complaint are maintained in current docket form in the Enforcement Docket (AGC–10), Office of the Chief
Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S. W., Washington, D. C. 20591.”
14 C.F.R. § 13.5(k). Further, “[a]ny interested person may examine any docketed material at that office,
at any time after the docket is established, except material that is ordered withheld from the public under
applicable law or regulations, and may obtain a photostatic or duplicate copy upon paying the cost of the
copy.” Id.

- 24 -

V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and upon due consideration, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Skybolt Aeromotive Corporation SHALL FILE, consistent with the requirements
of 14 C.F.R. § 13.5, a Formal Complaint against MilSpec Products, Inc., with the
Federal Aviation Administration.
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order, the Complaint (Doc. 1), and
each document referenced herein (Docs. 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 55, 56,
57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69), along with any attachments, to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20591.
3. MilSpec Products, Inc., SHALL—as it has already promised to do, (see Doc. 61 at
p.12)—preserve any and all hard drives and other electronic storage medium (or
copies thereof) with information relevant to this case.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to administratively close this case and TERMINATE
all pending motions as moot.
5. Once the Federal Aviation Administration has taken final action, Skybolt
Aeromotive Corporation SHALL, within fourteen days of that action, file a motion
asking the Court to reopen this case (a notice will be insufficient to reopen the case).
6. The parties SHALL FILE, jointly or separately, a status update with the Court
every three months hereafter.

- 25 -

7. The Federal Aviation Administration is invited to share with the Court its findings
and decision.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on June 9, 2017.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

- 26 -