Hall v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 32

ORDER granting 31 Michael A. Steinberg, Esq.'s, Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 USC 406(b). Signed by Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens on 11/22/2024. (AR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
LINNETTE HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 5:21-cv-193-PRL

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael A.
Steinberg, for authorization to charge a reasonable fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §406(b) in the
amount of $5,611.04. (Doc. 31). In support of the motion, Attorney Steinberg has filed a
signed fee agreement in which Plaintiff acknowledges a twenty-five percent fee award of past
due benefits. (Doc. 31-1). Attorney Steinberg represents that the Commissioner has no
objection to the requested fees.
I.

Background

On July 21, 2022, this Court reversed and remanded the case to the Social Security
Administration for further proceedings. (Doc. 26). On October 2, 2022, the Court awarded
attorney’s fees to Mr. Culbertson under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in the sum
of $3,150.01, for time spent representing Plaintiff before this Court. (Doc. 29). Subsequently,
on remand, Plaintiff was awarded past due benefits in the amount of $22,444.18. (Doc. 31-2).
Pursuant to the fee agreement, the attorney fee payable to Attorney Steinberg is $5,611.04,
which is twenty-five percent of the past due benefits.

II.

Discussion

An attorney, as here, who successfully represents a Social Security claimant in court
may be awarded as part of the judgment Aa reasonable fee ... not in excess of 25 percent of
the ... past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1)(A). The fee is payable
out of, and not in addition to, the amount of [the] past-due benefits. Id. As required by
Gisbrecht v. Barnhardt, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002), courts should approach contingent-fee
determinations by first looking to the agreement between the attorney and the client, and then
testing that agreement for reasonableness. When called upon to assess the reasonableness of
the award, a court should balance the interest in protecting claimants from inordinately large
fees against the interest in ensuring that attorneys are adequately compensate so that they
continue to represent clients in disability benefits cases. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 805. In making
this reasonableness determination, the Gisbrecht court highlighted several important factors
including: (1) whether the requested fee is out of line with the character of the representation
and the results the representation achieved; (2) whether the attorney unreasonably delayed
the proceedings in an attempt to increase the accumulation of benefits and thereby increase
his own fee; and (3) whether the benefits awarded are large in comparison to the amount of
time counsel spent on the case, the so-called windfall factor. Id. at 808. In these instances, a
downward reduction may be in order.
Here, the Court finds that the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable. The requested
fee will not result in a windfall for counsel –i.e., that counsel is receiving compensation he is
not entitled to, and that payment of the compensation would be unfair or detrimental to
Plaintiff. In this regard, Attorney Steinberg has submitted a signed fee agreement in which
Plaintiff acknowledged that counsel would receive 25% of all past due benefits awarded on

-2-

appeal. (Doc. 31-1). Moreover, Attorney Steinberg submitted records showing that he spent
at least 14.4 hours on this case in federal court. (Doc. 31-3).
Accordingly, for these reasons, and in the absence of any objection by the
Commissioner, Attorney Steinberg’s motion for authorization to charge a reasonable fee
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 406(b) (Doc. 31) is due to be GRANTED. Section 406(b) fees are
approved for Attorney Steinberg in the sum of $5,611.04. Attorney Steinberg shall promptly
pay to Plaintiff the previously awarded EAJA fee in the amount of $3,150.01.1
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on November 22, 2024.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

Normally, any award under Section 406(b) must be offset by the EAJA award. See Gisbrecht
v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (finding that fee awards may be made under both 42 U.S.C. §
406(b) and the EAJA but that the claimant's attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the
smaller fee); Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1566 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985). Such offset may be
achieved by counsel's payment to the claimant of the amount of the EAJA award or by a reduction
of the Section 406(b) fee request in the amount of the EAJA fee award. Jackson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
601 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, Attorney Steinberg requests that he be directed to
refund to Plaintiff the amount of the EAJA award. (Doc. 31 at 8).
1

-3-