Gaston v. Lake County et al

Filing 16

ORDER dismissing without prejudice certain claims. The claims for First Amendment retaliation against Master Deputy Knight and Deputies Mitchell and Malia remain pending. Plaintiff must complete necessary forms to serve the remaining Defendants. The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff the proper forms and Plaintiff must follow the instructions in the attached order. Plaintiff shall mail the completed forms, along with 3 identical copies of the Amended Complaint to the Clerk's Office within 21 days or this case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute, without further notice. Signed by Judge William F. Jung on 11/22/2024. (CCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
ANGEL E. GASTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 5:23-cv-369-WFJ-PRL

LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Angel E. Gaston’s Amended Civil Rights
Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Doc. 12). 1 Plaintiff,
proceeding pro se, is currently housed in South Florida Reception Center.
I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), federal courts are obligated to conduct an
initial screening of certain civil suits brought by prisoners to determine whether they
should proceed. Upon review, a court is required to dismiss a complaint (or any
portion thereof) in the following circumstances:
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.–On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–

A previous Order dismissed multiple defendants and permitted Plaintiff the opportunity to
cure the deficiencies of his original complaint. See Doc. 8.
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(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs courts to dismiss actions
which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court
must read a plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). Although federal courts give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, courts
“nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Mathew v. Paynter, 752 F. App'x 740, 742 (11th Cir. 2018). There is no
required technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Each separate claim should be presented in a separate
numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The allegations must also “give the
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation omitted) (ellipses in
original).

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With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted,” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), so courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112
F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that
amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. (quotations, alteration, and citation
omitted). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. For Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.
2001) (quotations and citations omitted).
II. Amended Complaint 2
On October 27, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested in Lake County. (Doc. 12 at 11).
He claims that during his entire incarceration at Lake County he was not able to get
in touch with his assigned attorney and he was subjected to “excessive physical abuse
and torture by the detention deputies.” Id. at 12, 13. Plaintiff “wrote multiple
grievances and contacted everyone (jail doctors, mental health department, chaplain,
judges, and my attorneys) that I could to assist me in the abuse I was experiencing at

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains facts and allegations against Defendants that have
been dismissed. Those facts will not be included in this section.
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the hands of the detention deputies.” Id. at 13. Due to an alleged lack results from his
grievances, Plaintiff conducted hunger strikes. Id.
Plaintiff claims that while he was housed at the Lake County Detention Center
(“LCDC”) he was repeatedly denied access to the law library because he had counsel.
Deputy Helton advised Plaintiff that “only pro se detainees were permitted access to
legal materials, printing, and copying; once per week for only one hour.” Id. at 15.
Deputy Helton allegedly told Plaintiff that this policy was put in place by Derick
Shroth, legal counsel for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department, approved by Sheriff
Grinnell, and enforced by Captain Edwards and Lt. Weddle. Id. Due to the policy,
Plaintiff claims he was unable to get the forms needed to dismiss his counsel and
proceed pro se. Deputy Helton eventually provided Plaintiff the requested form. Id. at
16.
In March 2022, Plaintiff dismissed his counsel and proceeded pro se with
standby counsel from the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel. Id.
at 26–27. Plaintiff was then permitted access to the law library consistent with LCDC’s
policy. Id. at 27. In September 2022, Plaintiff “submitted a civil complaint that
involved Lake County and several detention deputies to be copied” and for the first
time, Deputy Mitchell charged him a copy fee of $1.00 per page. Id. at 30. Plaintiff
claims this was in retaliation to him filing a complaint against the conditions of his
confinement. Id. Later, Deputy Malia refused to make copies of his legal documents.
Id.

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In January 2023, Master Deputy Knight “removed my access to legal materials
as punishment for disputing and grieving her refusals to copy and mail out my legal
documents to the Court.” Id. at 31. When Plaintiff grieved this “blatent [sic]
retaliation,” the grievances were declared “invalid” and Deputy Knight’s actions were
supported by Sergeant Dolen and Lieutenant Weddle. Id. at 32.
III. Analysis
“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show
that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state
law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Section 1983
“requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or
omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d
397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1983 claimants must
allege facts to support their claims with some specificity. Wilson v. Strong, 156 F.3d
1131, 1135 (11th Cir. 1998).
A. Defendant Lake County
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Plaintiff sues Lake County, alleging the Lake County court system permitted
his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be violated by his court-appointed
counsel. 3 (Doc. 12 at 33–35). Plaintiff compiles a laundry list of alleged deficient acts
and complaints against these dismissed defendants. See id. at 33–35. As to Lake

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Plaintiff’s claims against his counsel were dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 8 at 7–9).

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County, Plaintiff mere states, “Lake County did not satisfy the dictates of the 6th
Amendment that call for fair court hearings.” Id. at 34. The amended complaint
contains nothing more than a conclusory allegation of Lake County’s involvement in
his criminal court proceedings. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.
2. Access to Courts
Plaintiff sues Lake County, alleging it deprived him of adequate access to the
courts in violation of the 14th Amendment. (Doc. 12 at 35–36). He alleges Lake
County has a policy that only permits pro se detainees access to the law library,
copying, and printing and deprives all others the ability to prepare and file habeas
corpus or civil rights actions.
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 828 (1977). That right may be met “by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828. When
interpreting the right of access to courts outlined in Bounds, the Eleventh Circuit has
held that access to additional legal material is not mandatory where legal counsel is
provided as an alternative. Smith v. Hutchins, 426 F. App'x 785, 789 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (“concluding state
need not provide prisoners assistance of counsel in addition to libraries for purpose of
filing collateral suits, stating, ‘it is noteworthy that Bounds refers to law libraries or
other forms of legal assistance, in the disjunctive, no fewer than five times.’”)); Edwards

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v. United States, 795 F.2d 958, 961, n. 1, 3 (11th Cir. 1986)) (stating that when counsel
is offered, the alternative of other legal assistance is not mandatory, citing Bounds, 430
U.S. at 828); Daker v. Warren, 660 F. App'x 737, 740 (11th Cir. 2016) (reiterating that
under Eleventh Circuit precedent access to a law library is not mandatory for a pro se
defendant when counsel has been offered); Singleton v. FS No. 7084, No. 3:11-cv-70-J12TEM, 2011 WL 617942, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2011) (holding there is no
constitutional right to access legal materials in preparing a pro se defense in a criminal
case when counsel has been offered and the plaintiff has elected to represent himself).
Here the requirements of Bounds were satisfied because Plaintiff had the option
to receive assistance from court-appointed counsel. See Smith, 426 F. App'x at 790 n.5
(“Regardless of whether Bounds applies to pretrial detainees, we conclude in this case
Bounds does not require access to a law library where Smith had the option of
assistance of appointed counsel.”). Plaintiff's allegations show that Plaintiff was
represented by court-appointed counsel in his state court criminal case, but he
dismissed his counsel to represent himself. (Doc. 12 at 26).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff claims Sheriff Grinnell, Derick Shroth, Captain
Edwards, Deputy Helton, and Lieutenant Weddle prevented from pursuing civil rights
and habeas cases, see Doc. 12 at 13–14, 15, 22, 35–36, he has also failed to state a
claim. To state a claim for a denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege an
“actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Barbour v. Haley, 471
F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be established by demonstrating

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that an inmate's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or impeded by
... an official's action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted). The Eleventh
Circuit has held a prisoner asserting an access-to-courts violation must allege the
defendant's conduct interfered with a criminal appeal, a petition for habeas corpus, or
a civil rights action. Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]rison
officials’ actions that allegedly violate an inmate's right of access to the courts must
have impeded the inmate's pursuit of a nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil
rights action.” (quoting Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998))).
Plaintiff failed to plead any facts related to the cases he was prevented from bringing,
let alone establish that they were nonfrivolous.
3. Monell Claims
While the Supreme Court has held that local government entities are “persons”
within the scope of § 1983, and thus subject to liability, Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory
of respondeat superior to hold Lake County liable. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283,
1289 (11th Cir. 2004); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)
(finding that a county does not incur § 1983 liability for injuries caused solely by its
employees). “It is only when the execution of the government's policy or custom ...
inflicts the injury that the [county] may be held liable under § 1983.” City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (omission in original and internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, to impose § 1983 liability on Lake County, Plaintiff must show “(1)
that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or

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policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that
the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1289. To
successfully prove a policy or custom, it is generally necessary for a plaintiff to
demonstrate “a persistent and wide-spread practice.” Id. at 1290. This threshold
burden “prevents the imposition of liability based upon an isolated incident.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff claims his access to court rights were violated due to Lake
County’s failure “to act and evaluate its plan to ascertain compliance with
constitutional standards against a custom and culture of direct and/or indirect
deliberate indifference to the detainees ineffective assistance in preparation and filing
of meaningful legal documents” and its failure “act against Mr. Grinnell’s and Mr.
Shroth’s policies of preventing access to the courts.” (Doc. 12 at 36). He further claims
that “Lake County failed to train county policymakers to establish policies and
procedures that would ensure the rights of detainees to access the courts and have
adequate access to effective and competent legal representation.” Id. at 37. Because
Plaintiff has failed to state a constitution violation regarding his ineffective assistance
and access to court claims, his Monell claims similarly fail.
B. Detention Deputies 4
1. Retaliation
Prison officials violate a prisoner's “First Amendment rights to free speech and
to petition the government” by punishing that prisoner “for filing a grievance
Master Deputy Knight, Deputy Malia, Deputy Mitchell and Unknown Deputy #1. See
Doc. 12 at 37.

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concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321
(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006)). To
prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: “first, that his speech
or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant's retaliatory conduct
adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection
between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Id. (quoting Bennett
v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff alleges that Unknown Deputy #1 retaliated against him by depriving
him “of my right to attend first appearance and then gave false statements and
documentation to the Court stating that I refused to participate in the proceeding.”
(Doc. 12 at 37). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of retaliation because he has fails
to allege that this action by Unknown Deputy #1 was related to any protected speech
or act.
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Mitchell and Deputy Malia retaliated against him
in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Doc. 12 at 37). He states that prior to
September 9, 2022, he had never been charged for making copies of legal documents.
Id. However, after he submitted a civil rights complaint against several detention
deputies, Deputy Mitchell retaliated by charging him one dollar per page to copy the
78-page complaint. Id. Roughly a month later, Deputy Malia refused to make copies
of Plaintiff’s legal documents. Id. at 30, 37–38. Plaintiff claims these acts were in
retaliation to him naming LCDC staff members in a lawsuit. Id. Next, Plaintiff claims

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Master Deputy Knight retaliated against him due him filing a grievance against her.
Id. at 38. Knight “remov[ed] my access to legal materials and research.” Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Master Deputy Knight and Deputies Mitchell and
Malia, accepted as true, state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment.
2. Conspiracy
Plaintiff merely speculates about the existence of a conspiracy. He fails to assert
that the alleged conspirators made and shared a single plan to deprive him of a federal
right or that the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
which caused an injury to Plaintiff. See Burge v. Ferguson, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1237
(M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding to properly state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, with specificity, that the defendants agreed to deny the plaintiff
his constitutional rights, and that defendants did, in fact, violate plaintiff's
constitutional rights); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (A
court may properly dismiss a conspiracy claim if it includes only conclusory
allegations and does not contain specific facts to inform the defendant “of the nature
of the conspiracy alleged.”); Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff claiming a § 1983 conspiracy must prove the defendants
‘reached an understanding’ to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”); Bailey v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he
linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, which presupposes communication.”). And his
vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be
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supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,”
not merely a “possible” one). This claim is due to be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
3. Negligence
Negligence claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the law
is well-settled that the Constitution is not implicated by a defendant's negligent acts.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether
procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison
officials.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is due to be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Lake County, Sheriff Peyton
C. Grinnell, Derick Shroth, Captain Edwards, Lieutenant Weddle,
Deputy Helton, and Unknown Deputy #1 are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
2. The claims for First Amendment retaliation against Master Deputy
Knight and Deputies Mitchell and Malia remain pending.

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3. To continue the prosecution of this case, Plaintiff must complete the

necessary forms and submit service copies of his Amended Complaint
(Doc. 12) with all attachments in order to serve the remaining
Defendants.
4. The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff blank summons forms and blank USM285 (“Process Receipt and Return”) forms. Plaintiff must submit a completed
copy of each of the enclosed forms for each Defendant. Plaintiff is required to
fill in the name and street address of each Defendant in the appropriate spaces
on the summons and USM-285 forms. Plaintiff shall fill in 60 days as the
number of days allowed to answer. Plaintiff must sign the USM-285 form.

5. Plaintiff shall mail the completed forms, along with 3 identical copies of the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) to the Clerk's Office within 21 DAYS from the
date of this Order. Failure to return the completed forms and service copies
within this time period will result in dismissal for failure to prosecute, without
further notice.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on November 22, 2024.

Copies furnished to:
Pro Se Party

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