Handlon v.Google, Inc. et al

Filing 5

ORDER dismissing case with prejudice and directing the Clerk to terminate any pending motions, enter judgment accordingly, and close the case. Signed by Judge William F. Jung on 9/28/2023. (CCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
QUINTON PAUL HANDLON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 5:23-cv-499-WFJ-PRL

GOOGLE INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff Quinton Paul Handlon’s Civil Rights
Complaint. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff is federal prisoner and is proceeding pro se.
I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), federal courts are required to conduct an
initial screening of certain civil suits brought by prisoners to determine whether they
should proceed. Upon review, a court is required to dismiss the complaint (or any
portion thereof) under the following circumstances:
(b)

Grounds for Dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint—
(1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or

(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs courts to dismiss actions
which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A
complaint is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or in fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Additionally, the Court must read a plaintiff's pro
se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff has filed suit against Google, Inc. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff contends that
Google allegedly failed to “comply with the intent of a lawfully served subpoena.”
(Doc. 1 at 13–14). Plaintiff states that Google was served a subpoena on April 24,
2013,

“to

collect

personal

information

for

an

email

account

[e-mail].” Id. at 13. Plaintiff claims the subpoena contained a
typographical error; that the correct email account was [e-mail].”
Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that Google did comply with the subpoena as written but
should have “put forth the minor effort to provide the requested electronic documents”
once they were given notice of the typo. Id. at 14. Therefore, Plaintiff claims Google
failed to comply with the “intent” of the subpoena. Id.
On March 6, 2016, Plaintiff requested from Google “the IP Login Report for
dancecheer911.” Id. at 13. Google responded that he would need to either access the
account or serve them a subpoena. Id. Plaintiff did neither. Id. Plaintiff alleges that
Google’s actions violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by not allowing him

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“to confront the witnesses with the evidence” and “he was not able to defend himself
thus was denied a fair trial.” Id.
Plaintiff’s case is due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Defendant
is not a state actor for purposes of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To obtain relief under
§ 1983, [a party] must show that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting
under color of state law.” Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center, 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir.
2000). Only in rare circumstances may a private party be viewed as a state actor for
purposes of liability under § 1983. To hold that private parties are state actors, this
Court must conclude that one of the following conditions is met: (1) the state coerced
or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution (state
compulsion test); (2) the private parties performed a public function that was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state (public function test); or (3) the state
had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private parties
that it was a joint participant in the enterprise (nexus/joint action test). Rayburn ex rel.
Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Even liberally construed, the
allegations in the Complaint do not suggest that Plaintiff could meet any of those tests.
Further, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Because §
1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, claims are “governed by the forum state's
residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years.” City of
Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1103 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Grace v.
Wainwright, 761 F. Supp.0 1520, 1526 (M.D. Fla. 1991). Furthermore, federal law
provides that a claim accrues when “the facts which would support a cause of action
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are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for
his rights.” Borda v. Chase, 630 F. App'x 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
In other words, the statute of limitations begins to run “when a plaintiff knows or
should know that he was injured and who inflicted the injury.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the FBI issued a subpoena with the alleged typo on April 24, 2013, and
Google replied to it on May 2, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 13). Plaintiff claims he “learned of”
the problems with the “FBI Email sting” in January 2016, “but every attempt by mail
to get information from Google Inc., the U.S. Attorneys Office and ‘Handlon’s’ Public
Defenders went unanswered or was give [sic] unreasonable course to obtain this
information.” Id. Plaintiff then contacted Google on March 6, 2016, seeking
information on the correctly spelled email account. Id. Regardless of when Plaintiff
was actually aware of any alleged errors in the subpoena, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff could have discovered the basis for his claim during discovery, pretrial
investigations, trial (October 6–9, 2014), appeal (opinion issued August 10, 2016) or
in his § 2255 proceedings (order denying entered May 2, 2019). See Brown v. Georgia
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the statute
of limitations runs from the date “the facts which would support a cause of action are
apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his
rights.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim accrued, at the latest, by May 2019. Plaintiff’s
Complaint, received in this Court on August 10, 2023, and dated August 4, 2023, was
filed more than four years after the statute of limitations expired. Therefore, the
Complaint is due to be dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Finally, this claim is frivolous. Plaintiff admits that Google complied with the
subpoena. (Doc. 1 at 14). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot sue Google for the alleged failure
“to comply with the intent” of the same subpoena.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice because the Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, is frivolous, and otherwise fails to state a claim.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions, close
this case, and enter judgment accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on September 28, 2023.

Copies furnished to:
Pro Se Plaintiff

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