Smith v. Southern Jet Center, LLC et al

Filing 87

ORDER denying 56 Motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 9/21/2011. (ED)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
O RLANDO D IVISION
MARISELA TORRES SMITH, as
Administrator of the Estate of
ALEXANDER JOSE NUNEZ
GONZALEZ,,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 6:10-cv-274-Orl-31KRS

CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court without a hearing on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 56) filed by the Defendant, Cessna Aircraft Company (“Cessna”), the response
(Doc. 71) filed by the Plaintiff, Marisela Torres Smith, and the reply (Doc. 100) filed by Cessna.
The Plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Alexander Jose Nuñez Gonzalez, who was
killed in the crash of a Cessna Citation III on February 18, 2008. The Plaintiff contends that the
crash was caused in part by the plane’s Actuator Control Unit (“ACU”). More particularly, the
ACU includes a monitor intended to detect wear in another component, known as the “no-back
brake,” which was part of the plane’s Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Assembly. The Plaintiff asserts
that the monitor in the ACU failed to detect wear in the no-back brake, which eventually failed,
causing the nose of the aircraft to pitch down, resulting in a crash.

Cessna seeks summary judgment based upon the eighteen-year statute of repose contained
in the General Aviation Revitalization Act (“GARA”)1. Subject to certain exceptions not
applicable here, GARA provides that
no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property
arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought
against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component,
system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft in its capacity as manufacturer if
the accident occurred –
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on –
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee,
if delivered directly from the manufacturer.
GARA § 2(a).
It is undisputed that the Citation III at issue in this case was a “general aviation aircraft” for
purposes of GARA, and that Cessna manufactured it and delivered it to its first owner in
November 1987 – more than twenty years prior to the crash. GARA’s limitation period for
general aviation aircraft is eighteen years.
However, GARA’s eighteen-year limitation period “rolls over” – or recommences – as to
“any new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component,
system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is
alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage”. GARA § 2(a)(2). It is undisputed that the
owner of the Cessna replaced the plane’s original ACU with one of a new design on July 26, 2006.

1

Pub.L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994), as amended by Pub.L. No. 105-102, § 3(e), 111
Stat. 2215 (1997) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (1997)).
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It is this replacement ACU that, according to the Plaintiff, was one of the causes of the crash in
February 2008.
The parties agree that the replacement ACU was designed and manufactured by KGS
Electronics, a third party. The Plaintiff asserts that Cessna was a co-designer of the replacement
ACU and that such design is part of the manufacturing process, making Cessna a co-manufacturer
of the allegedly defective part. The parties sharply disagree as to Cessna’s involvement in the
design process, and the legal consequences of that involvement.
But the Plaintiff also alleges that Cessna should be held liable in this case because on July
24, 2006 it sold the replacement ACU to Southern Jet Center LLC (“Southern Jet”), which
installed it on the Citation III two days later. Cessna does not dispute the contention that it sold
the new ACU to Southern Jet, or that the Plaintiff has asserted a strict liability claim against it on
the basis of this sale. But Cessna argues that GARA still protects it. In support of this contention,
Cessna relies on the following passage from the House Judiciary Committee notes on GARA:
For example, in the event a party who happened to be a manufacturer committed
some negligent act as a mechanic of an aircraft or as a pilot, and such act was a
proximate cause of an accident, the victims would not be barred from bringing a
civil suit for damages against that party in its capacity as a mechanic.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-5625(II), at 6 (1994). Cessna argues that this passage shows that Congress
intended that GARA “should still shield manufacturers when they are sued in an incidental role
that created no additional risk.” (Doc. 83 at 7). Cessna argues that its sale of the part created no
additional risk, and therefore it should be shielded from liability. There are several problems with
Cessna’s argument, however. First, as to the replacement ACU, Cessna insists that it was not the
manufacturer. (As noted above, if Cessna manufactured the replacement ACU, then GARA’s

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limitation period would have restarted when it was installed.) Thus, even if Congress intended
that GARA “shield manufacturers when they are sued in an incidental role,” it would not have
intended to shield this Defendant with regard to this new part.
More to the point, the quoted text does not at all suggest that Congress intended to shield
manufacturers facing liability for doing something other than manufacturing the aircraft or part at
issue. It suggests the opposite – i.e., that GARA only protects manufacturers when they are sued
in that role. This is also clear from the plain language of the act, which prohibits claims “against
the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly,
or other part of the aircraft in its capacity as manufacturer”. GARA § 2(a) (emphasis added).
Here, Cessna is being sued in its capacity as seller of the new part, and therefore GARA does not
bar this suit.
In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 100) is
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on September 19, 2011.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

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