Allied Veterans of the World, Inc.: Affiliate 67 et al v. Seminole County, Florida

Filing 173

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 140 Motion for reconsideration re 133 Order on motion to compel and on motion for protective order. Signed by Judge John Antoon II on 12/14/2012. (BLA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
PHONE-SWEEPS, LLC, HASSAN
SALEM MALIH d/b/a EMPIRE
PHONESWEEP, JACK’S BUSINESS
CENTERS, LLC, and DARRELL
AGOSTINO,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 6:11-cv-155-Orl-28GJK

SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, and
DONALD F. ESLINGER, in his official
capacity as SHERIFF OF SEMINOLE
COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Intervenors’ Objections to and Motion for
Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge’s Discovery Order of May 2, 2012 (Doc. 140) and
Seminole County’s (“Defendant”) Response (Doc. 149).

Intervenors make four

objections to the May 2 Discovery Order (Doc. 133): (1) that a clerical error was made
with respect to the ruling on Document Request No. 40 (“Objection One”); (2) that the
ruling on Intervenors’ Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 109) failed to place a clear
prohibition on disclosure of protected information during the five-day response period
(“Objection Two”); (3) that the magistrate judge improperly found that Intervenors
partially waived their objections to certain discovery requests (“Objection Three”); and
(4) that the Order incorrectly required Intervenors to produce financial documents
(“Objection Four”).

Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, within ten days after
receiving a nondispositive order issued by a magistrate judge, a party may file
objections to the order. The district court must consider the objections and “modify or
set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (providing that a district judge may
reconsider a pretrial matter decided by a magistrate judge “where it has been shown
that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law”). A finding is
clearly erroneous “when the reviewing court, after assessing the evidence in its entirety,
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Krys v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1523 (11th Cir. 1997).

“[A]n order is

contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of
procedure.” Tolz v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 08-80663, 2010 WL 384745, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 27, 2010).
With respect to Objections Three and Four, the Court concludes that the rulings
objected to are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Intervenors’ Motion for

Reconsideration is therefore DENIED with respect to Objections Three and Four.
Intervenors’ first two objections, however, are well-taken.

Defendant has

conceded that the part of the Order requiring Intervenors to produce documents in
response to Request No. 40 appears to be a clerical error. (Doc. 149 at 11-12). The
Order states that Request No. 40 was “overly broad and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” (Order at 22), and that “the motion[] to
compel as to . . . Intervenors’ Request Nos. 15, 17, 24, 38, and 40 [is] DENIED.” (Id. at
18 n.11). However, the list of specific relief granted at the end of the Order mistakenly

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states that the Defendant’s Motion to Compel is granted with respect to Request No. 40.
(Id. at 33). The Court hereby clarifies that the Motion to Compel (Doc. 109) is DENIED
with respect to Request No. 40.
Defendant also concedes that it does not read the Order as permitting disclosure
of information under the Public Records Act during the required five-day response
period. (Doc. 149 at 12). The Order states that “[u]pon receiving a public records
request seeking information subject to this protective order, Seminole County shall
immediately serve . . . Intervenors with a copy of the request and . . . Intervenors shall
have five (5) days to either permit or object to the disclosure, seeking relief from a Court
if necessary.” (Id.). Intervenors argue that the Order should be modified to make
explicit that Seminole County may not disclose protected information within the five-day
response period. The Court hereby clarifies that Seminole County may not disclose
information subject to the Court’s protective order during the five-day response period.
In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJDUGED that
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 140) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. The motion is GRANTED with respect to correcting the magistrate judge’s ruling
on Request No. 40 and with respect to clarifying that Seminole County may not disclose
information subject to the Court’s protective order during the five-day response period.
The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on December 14, 2012.

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Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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