Kolodziej v. Mason et al
Filing
102
ORDER granting 72 Defendants James Cheney Mason and J. Cheney Mason, P.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of Defendants, and close this case. Signed by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 1/29/2014. (BGS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
DUSTIN S. KOLODZIEJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:11-cv-859-Orl-36GJK
JAMES CHENEY MASON and J.
CHENEY MASON, P.A.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”)
filed by Defendants James Cheney Mason (“Mason”) and J. Cheney Mason, P.A. (“Mason Law
Firm”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. 72.) Plaintiff Dustin S. Kolodziej (“Kolodziej” or
“Plaintiff”) filed a Response to the Motion (“Response”) (Dkt. 79) and Defendants filed a Reply
to Plaintiff’s Response (“Reply”) (Dkt. 85). Oral argument on the motion was held on September
24, 2013. Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, including deposition transcripts,
affidavits, stipulation of facts, memoranda of counsel and accompanying exhibits, and the oral
argument of counsel, and for the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion will be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Undisputed Facts1
The central issue before this Court is whether a unilateral contract was formed between
Defendants and Plaintiff Kolodziej. This purported contract arose as a result of a capital murder
1
The Court has determined the facts based on the parties’ submissions, including deposition
testimony, affidavits, stipulation of facts, and the exhibits filed with the court.
trial that took place in Bartow, Florida. (Dkt. 89, Joint Final Pretrial Statement (“JFPS”) ¶ 9A;
Dkt. 79-3, Deposition of James Cheney Mason (“Mason Dep.”) 10:23-11:11.) Mason, whose law
firm is J. Cheney Mason, P.A., was one of the attorneys who represented the criminal defendant,
Nelson Serrano (“Mr. Serrano”), in that trial. Id.; Dkt. 72, Ex. 1, Declaration of J. Cheney Mason
(“Mason Aff.”) ¶¶ 2-3. Mr. Serrano was accused of murdering four people in central Florida about
60 miles away from Orlando on December 3, 1997. (JFPS ¶ 9B.) The trial attracted heavy media
interest and, as a consequence, during the trial, NBC News conducted an interview with Mason
regarding the case. (Mason Dep. 21:23-22:2, 22:13-23:2, 33:12-34:2; Mason Aff. ¶ 5; Dkt. 72,
Ex. 2, Declaration of William V. Knight, III (“Knight Aff.”) ¶ 3; JFPS ¶ 9I.) During that interview,
Mason talked about certain aspects of the prosecution’s theory that seemed highly implausible to
him. (Dkt. 76, Stipulation, Jt. Ex. 3, NBC News Mason Interview DVD (“Unedited Mason
Interview”).)
On the day of the murders, Mr. Serrano could be seen on a security camera at a La Quinta
hotel in Atlanta, Georgia several hours before and after the murders had taken place. (JFPS ¶ 9C.)
At his trial, Mr. Serrano alleged that he could not have committed the murders in Florida between
the times that he was seen on the La Quinta hotel security camera in Atlanta. Id. ¶ 9D. The
prosecution’s theory of the case was that: 1) on the morning of December 3, 1997, Mr. Serrano
slipped out of the Atlanta hotel after having been recorded on the security camera there; 2) he flew
by airplane under an assumed name (“Juan Agacio”) from Atlanta to Orlando; 3) he drove from
the Orlando International Airport (“Orlando Airport”) to Bartow where he committed the murders;
4) he subsequently drove from Bartow to the airport in Tampa, Florida; 5) he flew from Tampa
back to Atlanta on Delta flight number 1272 under another assumed name (“John White”) in a
coach seat in Row 30 or 32; and 6) from the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport (“Atlanta
2
Hartsfield Airport”) where his plane landed, returned to his La Quinta hotel that evening where he
once again could be seen on the hotel video camera recording. (Mason Aff. ¶ 3; JFPS ¶¶ 9C, E;
Mason Dep. 37:11-24; Unedited Mason Interview.)
The purported unilateral contract was based on Mason’s comments during the NBC
interview regarding the last part of the prosecution’s theory concerning Mr. Serrano’s purported
travel from the Atlanta Airport back to his La Quinta hotel. See Unedited Mason Interview. The
prosecution’s theory regarding this last leg of the Serrano trip was that Mr. Serrano was able to
travel from the time that his Delta plane landed at the Atlanta Airport (referred to by Defendants
as “wheels down”) to his La Quinta hotel lobby in only 28 minutes. (Mason Aff. ¶¶ 3-4; Mot.
Hr’g Tr. 9, Sept. 24, 2013; Unedited Mason Interview.) Mason commented during his interview
that it was “not possible” for someone to accomplish this trip in the allotted 28 minutes. See
Unedited Mason Interview. Just prior to Mason’s comments regarding this last leg of the trip,
Mason talked about how he believed it was “highly improbable” for Mr. Serrano to have traveled
from the Orlando Airport to the crime scene in Bartow and commit all of the murders within one
hour and thirty minutes as the prosecution theorized. Id. Mason, in general, expressed his disbelief
that anyone could have committed these murders between the two times Serrano was seen on the
La Quinta hotel video camera. Id. It was against this backdrop that Mason commented on the last
leg of the Serrano trip, as follows:2
2
For convenience, the contents of the Unedited Mason Interview included in this opinion have
been taken from the transcript of the interview, which the Court notes does not necessarily reflect
the true punctuation of Mason’s words. See Knight Aff. at 3-6 (“Unedited Interview Transcript”).
The Court includes this reproduction of the Unedited Interview Transcript solely as a reference to
the actual words that were used by Mason (as well as by the interviewer and by the other attorney
present), but will refer to the video recording of the interview when analyzing the conduct of the
interview participants as well as the inflection of their words. See Unedited Mason Interview.
3
CHENEY MASON, ESQ.:
. . . And, of course, just as importantly is-- is the business of getting back to Atlanta,
and getting from-- landing in Atlanta and getting to the-- to [the] hotel in 28
minutes.
DENNIS MURPHY3:
Airport hotel.
CHENEY MASON, ESQ.:
Well, no, it’s not at the airport. It’s five miles away. You-- how many times [have]
you gone through the airport in Atlanta?
DENNIS MURPHY:
More than I’d like to think.
CHENEY MASON, ESQ:
I mean you know you’re going to die there. You’re going to be born again and die
at the Atlanta Airport. You have to go through Atlanta to go anywhere, right?
DENNIS MURPHY:
What’s the old joke about going to Heaven.
CHENEY MASON, ESQ:
Yeah. You go through-- through Hartsfield International.
DENNIS MURPHY:
Change at Hartsfield first.
CHENEY MASON, ESQ:
Right. And-- and so we know that when you land and-- and-- in Atlanta, depending
on which concourse you’re landing in, you’re going to have to wait to get off the
airplane. Even if you’re [in] first class. They usually put the thing behind you so
you got to wait till half the plane gets off anyway. You got people boxed in-- the
lady with the kids in the carriage. Or people getting down their bags. Or the fat
one can’t get down the aisle.
I mean, whatever the story is, you’ve got delays in getting off the airplane. So if
you’ve got a landing time, you don’t get off the airplane at that time. When-- when
have you ever gotten off an airplane in Atlanta in less than 10 minutes. It’s not
going to happen. Then what? Then you have to go from whatever gate you are,
3
Dennis Murphy conducted the interview with Mason at NBC News. See Unedited Mason
Interview.
4
down to the middle, to go down the el-- the escalators, to catch the subway train to
the terminal.
Wait for that. Wait while it stops in the meantime. People getting on and off. Get
to that. Go up again, the escalators. Get to where you’re in the terminal, out the
terminal to ground transportation. And from there to be on the videotape in 28
minutes. Not possible. Not possible. I challenge anybody to show me, and guess
what? Did they bring in any evidence to say that somebody made that route, did
so? State’s burden of proof. If they can do it, I’ll challenge ‘em. I’ll pay them a
million dollars if they can do it.
DENNIS MURPHY:
If they can do it in the timeline (or time allotted).
CHENEY MASON, ESQ:
Twenty-eight minutes.
...
Can’t happen. Didn’t happen. So what’s the explanation. Somebody else. Does
that mean necessarily that Mr. Serrano had nothing to do with any of it? Giving
again the argument in the best light of the State and the Jury’s suspicion. Not
necessarily. But did they prove the case they charged-- they proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Absolutely not. Couldn’t have happened in that way.
BOB NORGARD, ESQ4:
All the cameras guys were leaving to go to Hartsfield to try to get to the
(UNINTEL) (CHUCKLES)
CHENEY MASON, ESQ:
Call me when you’re ready for your check.
See Unedited Dateline Transcript.
In October 2006, Mr. Serrano was convicted of the murders and sentenced to death. (JFPS
¶ 9G; Mason Dep. 11:12-16.) Mason’s interview with NBC was not broadcast during the trial.
(Mason Dep. 21:10-13.) After the trial, however, NBC News featured the Serrano case in a
broadcast of its “Dateline” news program (“Dateline Broadcast”). Id. The Dateline Broadcast
4
Bob Norgard is another attorney who was involved in the Serrano case and was present during
Mason’s interview with NBC. See Unedited Mason Interview.
5
included an edited version of Mason’s interview in the program. The unedited interview did not
air at all. (Mason Aff. ¶ 6; Dkt. 76, Stipulation, Jt. Ex. 2, Dateline NBC News Mason Interview
DVD (“Edited Mason Interview”).) Neither Mason nor the Mason Law Firm were involved in
any of the editing or broadcast decisions concerning the Dateline Broadcast. (JFPS ¶ 9M; Mason
Aff. ¶ 6; Mason Dep. 31:14-32:1.) Mason did not see the program when it aired, nor was he aware
that NBC had edited his interview until Kolodziej contacted him to demand payment of one million
dollars for purportedly performing Mason’s “challenge” as presented in the Dateline Broadcast.
(Mason Aff. ¶ 6.) After editing, the portion of the interview concerning the last leg of the Serrano
trip became:5
MURPHY: (Voiceover) And the last part of the time line, the defense argued, was
even more implausible. In less than half an hour, Serrano would have had to get
off a wide-bodied jet, exit Atlanta airport, one of the busiest in the world and arrive
back at his hotel five miles away, all in time to be photographed looking up at the
surveillance camera.
([footage of] [a]irplane; inside airplane; airplane; highway; surveillance videotape
of Serrano at hotel)
Mr. MASON: I challenge anybody to show me—I’ll pay them a million dollars if
they can do it.
MURPHY: If they can do that in the time allotted.
Mr. MASON: Twenty-eight minutes, can’t happen. Didn’t happen.
See Edited Dateline Transcript at 14-15.
5
As noted above, for convenience, the contents of the Edited Mason Interview included in this
opinion have been taken from the transcript of the edited version of Mason’s interview. (Dkt. 72,
Ex. 4 (“Edited Dateline Transcript”).) Again, the Court will refer to the video recording of
Mason’s edited interview when analyzing the conduct of the interview participants as well as the
inflection of their words. See Edited Mason Interview.
6
Meanwhile, in 2007, while a student at the South Texas College of Law, Kolodziej
followed the Serrano trial on television. (Dkt. 79, Ex. A, Oral Deposition of Dustin Kolodziej
(“Kolodziej Dep.”) 8:1-3; 14:16-25; Dkt. 79-2, Declaration of Kolodziej (“Kolodziej Aff.”) ¶ 2.)
At some point, while he was following the trial, Kolodziej saw the Dateline Broadcast, including
the Edited Mason Interview concerning the last leg of the Serrano trip. (Kolodziej Dep. 23:22-25,
25:9-12; Kolodziej ¶ 2.) Kolodziej heard the broadcast but was unable to focus on viewing it in
its entirety at the time as he was also working out. Id. 26:14-18. However, he later ordered and
studied the transcript of this Edited Mason Interview and interpreted it as a serious challenge from
the Defendants to “make it off the plane and back to the hotel within 28 minutes” for one million
dollars, an offer that he feels he accepted when he purportedly performed the challenge. See Edited
Dateline Transcript; Kolodziej Dep. 25:9-15, 31:25-32:3, 32:4-8, 36:4-7; Kolodziej ¶ 2; Tr. 22-23,
28, 34.
The way Kolodziej understood it, in order to accept this “challenge,” he believed he would
have to prove that the prosecution’s theory of the Serrano case was possible and that, to accomplish
this, he would have to “match the prosecution’s . . . timeline.” (Kolodziej Dep. 32:12-23;
Kolodziej ¶ 2.) Kolodziej was unaware at the time that the Unedited Mason Interview had been
edited before it aired on the Dateline Broadcast and that, consequently, the interview that he saw
on the program and the accompanying Edited Dateline Transcript that he ordered was an edited
version of Mason’s actual interview with NBC. (Kolodziej Dep. 27:3-18.)
After he heard and saw parts of the Dateline Broadcast, Kolodziej studied the Edited
Dateline Transcript of Mason’s interview and read news articles concerning the Serrano case. Id.
15:1-16:2. Everything that Kolodziej understood about the details of the flight Mr. Serrano was
alleged to have taken from Tampa to the Atlanta Airport he gleaned or deduced primarily from his
7
study of the Edited Dateline Transcript. Id. 16:14-17, 48:9-12. Kolodziej believed that the terms
of the “challenge” as revealed in the Edited Dateline Transcript were sufficient to allow him to
attempt to perform the “challenge.” Id. 36:8-14.
For instance, Kolodziej did not know the actual landing time of Mr. Serrano’s Delta plane
in Atlanta, nor did he consult any Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) records or other such
information that might have indicated at what time Mr. Serrano’s plane actually landed or arrived
at its gate. Id. 18:4-15, 19:1-20:5; Tr. 7-8. However, based on the information he studied from
the Edited Dateline Transcript, he deduced that “wheels down” had to have been at 9:00 p.m. since
the hotel video showed Mr. Serrano at the hotel at around 9:30 p.m. Id. Similarly, Kolodziej did
not know at which gate, concourse or terminal Mr. Serrano’s Delta plane arrived at the Atlanta
Airport because nothing in the Edited Dateline Transcript revealed such information. (Kolodziej
Dep. 20:6-24, 35:14-19.) However, Kolodziej thought that it was acceptable for purposes of the
“challenge” that his plane arrived at the only terminal that did not require him to take a train in
order to exit the terminal. Id. at 35:17-24. He also did not know in which seat Mr. Serrano sat on
the flight or whether Mr. Serrano traveled by coach or in first-class. Id. 22:1-12. However,
because he understood Mr. Serrano to have been a wealthy individual and a regular business flyer,
Kolodziej believed that Mr. Serrano would have traveled in first-class on the flight. Id. 22:16-23;
Tr. 14. Therefore, Kolodziej flew in the first-class section of his plane. Tr. 8. In actuality, Mr.
Serrano’s Delta plane could unload passengers from a door between the coach section and the
section in front of coach as well as from a door between the cockpit and the first-class section, as
could the Delta flight that Kolodziej flew. Id. 25; JFPS ¶ 9J, K. Kolodziej also did not investigate
how many passengers were on Mr. Serrano’s flight, nor did he know how Mr. Serrano was alleged
to have traveled from the Atlanta Airport back to the La Quinta hotel. (Kolodziej Dep. 22:24-
8
23:6, 18-21.) Although many of the details of Mr. Serrano’s flight were not revealed in the Edited
Dateline Transcript that he ordered, Kolodziej understood that his acceptance of the “challenge”
entailed him replicating the prosecution’s theory of the Serrano case “as best as could be done”
and “as best as [he] could do” based on the Edited Dateline Transcript. Id. 35:11-24.
With that understanding in mind, on December 10, 2007, ten years after the murders
occurred, Kolodziej flew from Tampa to the Atlanta Airport on Delta flight number 618, which
landed at 8:59 p.m. and arrived at the gate at 9:06 p.m. (JFPS ¶ 9N, O;6 Kolodziej ¶¶ 3, 4.)
Kolodziej began recording his performance of the “challenge” with his cellular phone at the point
at which he exited the plane at 9:06 p.m., as opposed to when the airplane landed because he was
not allowed to turn on any sort of electronics at that time. (Tr. 11, 23-24; Kolodziej Dep. 32:2433:4, 34:23-35:4; Kolodziej ¶¶ 5, 6.) From the plane, he arrived at an Econo Lodge hotel at 9:25
p.m., where the recording ended.
(Tr. 11, 23-24; Kolodziej Dep. 32:24-33:4, 34:23-35:4;
Kolodziej ¶¶ 4, 7.) He believed the Econo Lodge was formerly the La Quinta hotel at which Mr.
Serrano stayed. (Kolodziej Dep. 36:17-40:21.) Kolodziej’s belief was based on news articles that
he read, the place where he believed the La Quinta hotel was located, the style of the hotel which
he believed was similar to the style of La Quinta hotels at the time of Mr. Serrano’s stay there, and
conversations with people that he believed were knowledgeable of the area at the time, such as
taxi drivers and current employees of the Econo Lodge. Id. Kolodziej’s recording time totaled 19
minutes. Id. 33:5-11; 50:10-51:3.
6
These paragraph citations have been corrected by the Court in this Opinion because there are two
references to paragraph 9M on page 6 of the Joint Final Pretrial Statement. See Dkt. 89 at 6. The
second reference to paragraph 9M has been changed to 9N, the reference to paragraph 9N has been
changed to 9O, and the reference to paragraph 9O has been changed to 9P.
9
Kolodziej contends that adding the time between when his plane was “wheels down” and
the time that it stopped at the gate as well as the time between when the airplane door opened and
the time it took him to get to the airplane door to exit the plane was within the 28 minute time limit
for the “challenge.” Id. 33:5-11, 34:8-35:10, 50:20-51:3. Therefore, Kolodziej believed that he
had successfully performed the “challenge.” Kolodziej Aff. ¶ 5.
Accordingly, on December 15, 2007, Kolodziej sent a letter to Mason at the Mason Law
Firm informing Mason that he had successfully performed the “challenge” and requesting what he
believed was the promised payment in the amount of one million dollars. (Kolodziej Dep. 49:1119; JFPS ¶ 9P.) On January 2, 2008, Mason responded, also by letter, in which he denied that his
comments during the interview constituted a serious challenge. (Kolodziej Dep. 49:21-23; Dkt.
72, Ex. 1-B, January 2, 2008 Mason Letter to Kolodziej (“Jan. 2008 Mason Letter”); Mason Aff.
¶ 5.) On the contrary, Mason explained in the letter that the comments he made in the interview
were merely intended to be an illustration of “what could and could not be done with respect to
Mr. Serrano’s alibi, and how serious the reasonable doubt was/is.” (Jan. 2008 Mason Letter.) On
that basis, Mason rejected Kolodziej’s demand. Id. Kolodziej replied to Mason’s letter, to which
Mason responded with another letter, dated February 11, 2008, stating that he believed he had
sufficiently explained in his previous letter to Kolodziej why his demand was being rejected, and
that, therefore, he did not wish to have any further communications with Kolodziej. (Kolodziej
Dep. 51:4-7, 12-14, 18-20; Dkt. 79-11, Ex. K, February 11, 2008 Mason Letter to Kolodziej (“Feb.
2008 Mason Letter”).)
B.
Procedural History
Believing he was entitled to one million dollars, Kolodziej filed a lawsuit against Mason
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging breach of a unilateral
contract for Mason’s refusal to pay Kolodziej. See Kolodziej v. Mason, CIV.A. H-09-1889 (S.D.
10
Tex. filed June 17, 2009); Kolodziej Dep. 51:21-25. That case was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. See Kolodziej v. Mason, CIV.A. H-09-1889, 2009 WL 3460238
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2009). It was at that point that Kolodziej became aware of Mason’s unedited
interview with NBC News, that Dateline had been responsible for editing the interview and for
producing the corresponding transcript that Kolodziej had previously ordered, and that neither
Mason nor the Mason Law Firm had anything to do with producing the Dateline Broadcast or any
edits to the broadcast. (Kolodziej Dep. 26:19-27:2.) However, believing that Defendants had
ratified NBC’s editing of Mason’s interview, Kolodziej still decided to file a subsequent lawsuit
in a federal district court in Atlanta. See Kolodziej v. Mason, Case No. 1:10-CV-2012-JEC (N.D.
Ga. filed June 29, 2010); Kolodziej Dep. 56:15-18; 58:10-59:1, 6-9. That case was transferred to
this Court on May 23, 2011. See Kolodziej v. Mason, Case No. 1:10-CV-2012-JEC, 2011 WL
2009467 (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2011); Dkt. 21.
This matter is before the court on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as
Kolodziej is a citizen of Texas, Mason is a Florida citizen, and J. Cheney Mason, P.A. is a Florida
corporation. See Dkt. 1, Compl. In the Complaint, Kolodziej alleges that Defendants breached a
unilateral contract with him when they refused to pay him one million dollars for completing the
“challenge” as presented on the Dateline Broadcast on national television, which he alleges
consisted of someone being able to travel from the Atlanta Airport to a La Quinta hotel location in
Atlanta within 28 minutes. Id. at 2-3, 7-8. The instant motion for summary judgment followed.
In their Motion, Defendants argue that no unilateral contract was formed between them and
Kolodziej. Specifically, Defendants maintain that the “challenge” did not constitute an offer to
contract, but that even if it did, Kolodziej cannot prove that he performed the challenge.
11
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the court is satisfied that “there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” after
reviewing the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits[.]”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Issues of facts are “genuine only if a reasonable jury, considering the
evidence presented, could find for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for its motion and identifying
those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256,
1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). That burden can be discharged if the moving party can show the court
that there is “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.,
344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Choice of Law
Normally, “[t]he rule of decision in a diversity case is a matter of state law selected under
the conflicts of law principles of the state where the district court sits.” New England Merchants
Nat. Bank v. Rosenfield, 679 F.2d 467, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). However, “[w]here . . . the case is transferred to another district
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1404(a) . . ., the transferee court must apply the conflicts principles of the
transferor state unless venue in the transferor state was improper.” New England Merchants, 679
F.2d at 471-72 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964)). Since this case was
12
transferred from the Northern District of Georgia (see Dkt. 21) and venue in Georgia was not
improper (see Dkt. 20 at 14-15), this Court must apply the conflict of law rules of Georgia.
Georgia law provides that:
Except as provided hereafter in this Code section, when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of
this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Failing such agreement this title applies to transactions
bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
Ga. Code Ann. § 11-1-105(1). Here, the purported contract at issue “bears a reasonable relation”
to both Florida and Georgia. The Unedited Mason Interview took place in Florida, but acceptance
of the “contract” would have to be in Georgia as that is where the last leg of the Serrano trip
purportedly occurred. The parties have agreed that Florida “shall govern their rights and duties”
in this matter. (Tr. 14.) Therefore, this Court applies Florida law to this action.
B.
Unilateral Contracts
Whereas a bilateral contract is one in which there is an exchange of promises between two
parties to the contract, a unilateral contract is an exchange of a promise for an act or forbearance.
Ballou v. Campbell, 179 So. 2d 228, 229-30 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1965). Mutual assent, or agreement,
between the parties is necessary for the formation of any contract. Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So. 2d
459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (“Mutual assent is an absolute condition precedent to the formation of [a]
contract. Absent mutual assent, neither the contract nor any of its provisions come into
existence.”). However, it is the expression of mutual assent or apparent assent, and not the mental
assent itself, that is essential to forming a contract. Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384,
1385 (Fla. 1985); see also Med-Star Cent., Inc. v. Psychiatric Hospitals of Hernando Cnty., Inc.,
639 So. 2d 636, 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that the parties’ subjective intent is not material
13
in determining whether a contract was formed). Thus, “an objective test is used to determine
whether a contract is enforceable.” Robbie, 469 So. 2d at 1385. While courts should not
completely ignore the actual and proven assent of either of the parties, the law generally imputes
to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. Royal
Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Trust Co., 215 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1968) (“In the construction of contracts[,] the intention of the parties is to govern. Such intention
is ordinarily deduced from the language employed when the same is without ambiguity.”); see also
Kipp v. Kipp, 844 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“[A]bsent any evidence that the parties
intended to endow a special meaning in the terms used in the agreement, the unambiguous
language is to be given a realistic interpretation based on the plain, everyday meaning conveyed
by the words. [A] court must construe a contract in a manner that accords with reason and
probability; and avoid an absurd construction.”).
Courts determine whether the parties expressed their assent to a contract by analyzing their
agreement process in terms of offer and acceptance. Jackson v. Inv. Corp. of Palm Beach, 585 So.
2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Under an objective test, “the true interpretation of an offer or
acceptance is . . . what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it
meant.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
As noted above, an offer in a unilateral contract calls for acceptance by performance or
forbearance. Southampton Dev. Corp. v. Palmer Realty Group, Inc., 769 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.
2nd DCA 2000). This case deals with a particular type of offer within the unilateral contract
context – a public offer of a reward. In terms of “offers of a reward, . . . [t]he offer is a mere
proposal or conditional promise which, if accepted before it is revoked, creates a binding contract.”
Jackson, 585 So. 2d at 950; see also Slattery v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 366 So. 2d 157,
14
158 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979) (“a reward is contractual in nature, requiring the acceptance of an offer
supported by consideration.”); Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1955) (“Rewards are
contractual.”).
These cases are often referred to as “prove me wrong” cases as they entail an offer of
payment to anyone who can prove the offeror wrong regarding a particular claim. The most
famous of these cases is from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. There, the appellate
court upheld the trial court’s decision that a company advertisement that offered to pay a specified
reward “to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused
by taking cold, after having used the [Carbolic Smoke] ball threes time daily for two weeks,
according to the printed directions supplied with each ball” was a valid offer. Carlill v. Carbolic
Smoke Ball Co., (1983) 1 Q.B. 256 (Court of Appeal). Examples of other notable cases include: 1)
a boast made on national television that the famous outlaw Jesse James had not been killed in 1882,
as most people thought, and that $10,000 would be given “to anyone who could prove me wrong.”
James v. Turilli, 473 S.W. 2d 757, 758-59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). On appeal, the court held that a
valid contract formed when the plaintiffs demonstrated, at trial, that James had been killed in 1882,
id. at 761; 2) the Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of a district court’s decision that a tax protestor’s
assertion on a television news program that “[i]f anybody calls this show . . . and cites any section
of this [tax] Code that says an individual is required to file a tax return, I’ll pay them $100,000”
was a valid offer. Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 461-63, 466 (8th Cir. 1985); and 3) a statement
before a state gambling commission regarding punchboard legitimacy by the vice president of a
corporation that distributed punchboards that he would “put a hundred thousand dollars to anyone
to find a crooked board.” Barnes v. Treece, 15 Wash. App. 437, 438 (1976). He went on to state,
“[i]f they find it, I’ll pay it.” Id. The court found this to be a valid offer for a unilateral contract
15
even though his statement elicited laughter from the audience that was present during the
proceedings. Id.
Defendants’ argument that no unilateral contract ever formed between them and Kolodziej
rests on several grounds. The Court will address each of these grounds in turn.
1.
No Unilateral Contract Formed Because Kolodziej Was Unaware of The
Unedited Mason Interview at the Time He Attempted to Perform the
“Challenge”
Defendants’ first contention for why no unilateral contract was formed between them and
Kolodziej is that, at the time Kolodziej attempted to perform the “challenge,” he had only seen and
heard the Edited Mason Interview and was unaware that there was an unedited version. (Mot. at
8-9; Reply at 4 n. 1; Tr. 5, 12-13; Kolodziej Dep. 25:9-15, 26:14-15, 27:3-18, 32:4-8, 36:4-7.) It
is undisputed that Kolodziej learned of the unedited version after October 2009, when his first
lawsuit against Defendants in a Texas federal district court was dismissed. (Tr. 12-13; Kolodziej
Dep. 51:21-25, 56:15-18; 58:10-59:1, 6-9.)
Defendants contend that they cannot be held
responsible for the Edited Mason Interview that Kolodziej heard because they had nothing to do
with the way NBC edited Mason’s actual interview or with the decision to produce that edited
version on television, which Kolodziej acknowledged. (Mot. at 9-11; JFPS ¶ 9M; Mason Aff. ¶ 6;
Kolodziej Dep. 26:19-27:2.) Accordingly, Defendants argue, Kolodziej performed a “challenge”
that cannot be attributed to them. (Mot. at 9-11.)
Kolodziej originally argued that, by remaining silent, Defendants ratified the “challenge”
as aired on the Dateline Broadcast because they should have had NBC issue a retraction.
(Kolodziej Dep. 61:21-64:3.) However, Kolodziej abandoned this argument when faced with
Mason’s declaration, attached to the Motion, wherein Mason stated that he was unaware NBC had
even edited his interview, that he did not see the broadcast when it aired, and that he had only
become aware of this edited version when Kolodziej contacted him to demand payment. (Mason
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Aff. ¶ 6; Tr. 4, 17.) In his Complaint, Kolodziej set forth two grounds for breach of contract: 1)
the “challenge” as presented in the broadcast, and 2) the “challenge” as presented in the unedited
interview. See Compl. ¶ 16; Tr. 11:02, 5-8; 11:03, 22-24. Kolodziej now maintains that “his claim
is limited to Mason’s challenge in the raw interview transcript.” (Resp. at 3 n. 19 (citing Compl.
¶ 15).)
However, Kolodziej cannot rely on the “challenge” as presented in the Unedited Mason
Interview in order to form a unilateral contract. “The law is well settled in this state that before a
reward is entitled to be collected, the offeree must have knowledge of the existence of the offer of
reward.” Slattery, 366 So. 2d at 159. See also Nabry v. MV Transp, Inc., 07-CV-0124 PJS/JJG,
2007 WL 4373107, *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2007) (citing Feges v. Perkins Rests., Inc., 483
N.W.2d 701, 707 (Minn. 1992) (“[F]or a unilateral contract to be formed the offer must be
communicated to the offeree.”)(emphasis in original); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512
So. 2d 725, 734 (Ala. 1987) (“an offer must be communicated before it may be accepted.”);
Netbula, LLC v. BindView Dev. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Mutual
assent is accomplished when a specific offer is communicated to the offeree, and an acceptance is
subsequently communicated to the offeror.”); Foster v. Udall, 335 F.2d 828, 831-32 (10th Cir.
1964) (“In ordinary usage in the law of contracts the proposal by the offeror is not effective and is
not an offer until it is made known to the party who thereby is in the position to accept or to reject
the offer.”). In Zemke v. City of Chicago, the plaintiff “claim[ed] that the ‘Notice of Job Offer’
was a written offer, which he accepted.” 100 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 1996). The court noted that
“[a]lthough the notice was signed by the appropriate city officials and was, undeniably, an offer,
it was never, for unexplained reasons, communicated to [the plaintiff]. The undated document was
simply placed in [the plaintiff’s] personnel file. He did not learn of it until nearly three years after
17
it was apparently prepared.” Id. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “[i]t follows, then,
that [the plaintiff] never accepted the offer—he did not even know it existed.” Id.
Here, Kolodziej has abandoned his attempts to hold Defendants responsible for the NBC
Edited Mason Interview that aired and of which he was aware. Kolodziej cannot now rely on the
Unedited Mason Interview as there cannot be any mutual assent where an individual “accepts” an
offer of which he was unaware at the time of his “performance.” Therefore, as a matter of law, no
unilateral contract formed between Defendants and Kolodziej under these circumstances.
2.
No Unilateral Contract Formed Because The “Challenges” In The Edited
and Unedited Versions of Mason’s Interview Are Not The Same In
Substance
To the extent that Kolodziej is still relying on the “challenge” in Mason’s edited interview
because of his belief that this version is the same in substance as the “challenge” in the unedited
version, this contention also fails as a matter of law. (Resp. at 3 n. 19; Tr. 15; Kolodziej Dep.
32:4-8; Compl. ¶ 16 (“even if Mason’s version is the unedited statement, it contains in substance
the same challenge as broadcast on Dateline. Mason’s version still contains what a reasonable
viewer would interpret is a promise to pay one million dollars if the last leg of the trip was made
within 28 minutes.”).) Defendants argue that the Edited Mason Interview is a misrepresentation
of what Mason actually said in his unedited interview. (Mot. at 9-11.) The Court agrees.
Kolodziej argues that the “challenge” as presented in both Mason’s edited and unedited
interview versions do not have to contain the exact same words to be the same “offer” in substance,
but that the terms of the challenge in both the broadcast and the unbroadcast versions were, in
essence, that Mason would pay one million dollars to anyone who made a trip from an airplane
landing at the Atlanta Airport to the location of Mr. Serrano’s hotel in 28 minutes. (Resp. at 16;
Tr. 22-23, 28, 34.) Kolodziej contends that is what distinguishes this case from a situation where
18
the individual has performed an act without knowing anything about the offer and then
subsequently argues that he accepted the offer by his actions. (Tr. 31-32.)
Here, no rational juror could find that a reasonable person could conclude that the
“challenge” in the edited and unedited versions of the Mason interview are in substance the same,
regardless of whether either version of the “challenge” can be said to constitute an offer. First, it
is clear that, in the Edited Mason Interview, when Mason’s “challenge” is edited to “I challenge
anybody to show me—I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it,” the words “them” and
“they” refer to the word “anybody.” Thus, in that version, the “promise” to pay a million dollars
to perform the “challenge” is clearly directed towards anyone and, therefore, is open to anyone.
By adding Mason’s omitted words back in between “show me” and “I’ll pay them” in the actual
Unedited Mason Interview, the “challenge” becomes:
I challenge anybody to show me, and guess what? Did they bring in any evidence
to say that somebody made that route, did so? State’s burden of proof. If they can
do it, I’ll challenge ‘em. I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it.
No reasonable person could hear and view the totality of that excerpt and conclude that the words
“them” and “they” in the last sentence refer to the word “anybody” in the first sentence, as
Kolodziej argues. See Resp. at 8 (Kolodziej argues that, under the objective test standard, a rational
juror could find that a reasonable person who heard the “challenge” could have concluded that
Mason’s “offer” was addressed to the general public, instead of just to the prosecutors).
Kolodziej further argues that whether Mason’s communication was made to the
prosecution or to the general public is a contract term that can be seen as an ambiguous fact issue.
(Tr. 20.) The Court disagrees. “Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract . . . is a question of
law.” Smith v. Shelton, 970 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “Where the wording of an
19
agreement is ambiguous, its interpretation involves questions of fact, precluding summary
disposition. Whether a document is ambiguous depends upon whether it is reasonably susceptible
to more than one interpretation. However, a true ambiguity does not exist merely because a
document can possibly be interpreted in more than one manner.” Id. Here, the Unedited Mason
Interview is not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Therefore, no ambiguity
exists. Read, seen and heard in context, the above-noted excerpt from Mason’s unedited interview
can only lead a reasonable person to but one understanding, that the words “them” and “they” as
used throughout the entire excerpt now refers to the state prosecution. See Leonard v. Pepsico, 88
F. Supp. 2d 116, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d 210 F.3d 988 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[w]hether there was an
offer to enter into a contract requires the Court to determine how a reasonable, objective person
would have understood the defendant’s communication, an inquiry that is commonly performed
by courts on a motion for summary judgment.”).
The inclusion of Mason’s omitted words does not create a parenthetical thought, as
Kolodziej argues. See Resp. at 9; Tr. 32-33. On the contrary, whereas Mason starts off by
challenging “anybody” to show him something, he then goes on to say, “and guess what?.” He is
now transitioning into a whole new thought, as becomes evident as the remainder of the section is
read and heard. Mason says: “and guess what? Did they bring in any evidence to say that
somebody made that route, did so?” The word “they” in this context clearly cannot refer to
“anybody” because “anybody” cannot bring in evidence. The next sentence, “State’s burden of
proof,” confirms that “they” refers to the state prosecution, which makes sense because state
prosecutors can bring in evidence.
Viewing this excerpt in the context of the entire interview further supports the Court’s
conclusion.
Mason’s entire interview with NBC concerns the Serrano trial.
20
The Court’s
conclusion that “they” refers to the state prosecutors from the Serrano trial can be gleaned from
the context of the entire Unedited Mason Interview. Thus, within that broader context, the “State’s
burden of proof” specifically refers to the state prosecutors in the Serrano trial.
After asking whether the state prosecutors had brought in evidence that anybody could
make the last leg of the Serrano trip as he had, Mason goes on to say: “If they can do it, I’ll
challenge ‘em. I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it.” Again, as read and heard in the
interview, these last sentences naturally flow from the previous sentences as a continuation of the
same thought – that Mason believed the state prosecutors could not prove their theory that Mr.
Serrano traveled from his plane’s landing time at Atlanta Airport to his La Quinta hotel in 28
minutes. Mason was challenging “them” – the state prosecutors – to prove their theory. This is
the same theme that he had spoken about just prior to his discussion concerning the last leg of the
Serrano trip with regard to the amount of time it purportedly took Mr. Serrano to travel from the
Orlando Airport to the crime scene in Bartow and commit all of the murders within one hour and
thirty minutes. Mason talked about how he believed this timeline was “highly improbable.”
Furthermore, Mason’s comments regarding the Bartow timeline were said within the context of
Mason’s overarching argument, which was that it was impossible for anyone to have committed
the murders between the time Mr. Serrano was first seen on the La Quinta hotel video camera in
the morning of the day of the murders and the time that he was again seen on that camera in the
evening. That was his main argument regarding the prosecution’s theory during the entire
interview.
“It is basic contract law that one cannot suppose, believe, suspect, imagine or hope that an
offer has been made.” Trefsgar v. Contributors to Pennsylvania Hospital, CIV.A. 97-488, 1997
WL 214803 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1997); see also Nooruddin v. Comerica Inc., 11-1188-EFM, 2012
21
WL 1154497, *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2012) (A communicated offer creates a power to accept only
the offer that is made.). Kolodziej heard one “challenge” that was open to anybody, which
therefore included him. However, the actual “challenge” was not open to anybody, and that
conclusively forecloses any opportunity Kolodziej has to now argue that the “challenge” somehow
constituted a valid offer and that he accepted that offer by his performance. Kolodziej cannot
proceed with his claim for one million dollars by supposing, believing, imagining or hoping that
an offer was made to him that simply was not.
Kolodziej argued that attorney Bob Norgard’s joke that “All the cameras guys were
leaving to go to Hartsfield to try to get to the . . .,” eliciting laughter, and Mason’s response,
“Call me when you’re ready for your check,” indicates that those present during the live
interview believed that the “challenge” was open to anyone, which Kolodziej claims supports
his contention that that is what a reasonable person would have understood. (Resp. at 9-10,
12.) First, it is unclear whether the cameramen were actually attempting to leave to complete
the “challenge,” albeit in jest, or whether Mr. Norgard just made up that scenario on his own
in order to make a joke. Nevertheless, in other situations where an “offer” has elicited laughter
or where there was some other indicia of jest or pure puffery, courts have found that a
reasonable reaction from the individual who heard and saw this apparent jest would be to seek
some sort of validation that the communication was a serious offer. For instance, the plaintiff in
Barnes had seen the vice president’s statement on television that “I’ll put a hundred thousand
dollars to anyone to find a crooked board. If they find it, I’ll pay it,” a statement that elicited
laughter from the audience members who were present at the proceedings. 15 Wash. App. at 438.
Under these circumstances, the court found that the plaintiff had acted as a reasonably prudent
person would when he contacted the defendant to ensure that the offer was serious, which gave
22
the defendant the opportunity to confirm that the offer was, in fact, serious and that the offered
payment was safely being held in escrow. Id. at 442, 439. Essentially, courts have viewed such
indicia of jest or hyperbole as providing a reason for an individual to doubt that an “offer” was
serious. Thus, once Kolodziej, as a reasonable person, viewed the Unedited Mason Interview and
became aware of this Bob Norgard “joke,” that should have given him some reason to doubt that
the “offer” was serious. Such indicia would have given any reasonable person pause, considering
all of the attendant circumstances in this case.
The Court finds that no reasonable person could conclude that the substance of Mason’s
“challenge” in the edited and unedited versions of his NBC interview are the same. Thus,
Kolodziej’s argument here fails as a matter of law.
3.
Defendants’ Remaining Arguments As To Why No Unilateral Contract
Was Formed
The Court has determined that no unilateral contract was formed between Defendants and
Kolodziej because Kolodziej was unaware of the “challenge” in the Unedited Mason Interview at
the time he attempted to perform it and because the Edited Mason Interview that he did hear was
not the same in substance as the unedited version he did not hear. Therefore, the Court need not
address Defendants’ remaining arguments – that Mason’s communication did not constitute an
offer and that, in any event, Kolodziej did not adequately perform the “challenge.”
IV.
CONCLUSION
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). For the
aforementioned reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. No
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genuine issues of material fact exist for determination by a jury and Defendants are entitled to
judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
Defendants James Cheney Mason and J. Cheney Mason, P.A.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 72) is GRANTED.
2.
The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of
Defendants, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on January 29, 2014.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
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