Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condominium Assn., Inc.

Filing 161

ORDER denying 139 Motion for Permanent Injunction. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 6/7/2013. (NWH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
AJIT BHOGAITA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:11-cv-1637-Orl-31DAB

ALTAMONTE HEIGHTS CONDOMINIUM
ASSN., INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on a Motion for Permanent Injunction (Doc. 139) filed
by Plaintiff, Ajit Bhogaita; a Reponse (Doc. 150) filed by Defendant, Altamonte Heights
Condominium Association, Inc. (“AHCA”); and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 157).
A jury trial was held in this case on April 15, 2013, resulting in a verdict for the Plaintiff in
the amount $5,000.00. The jury found that AHCA violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601, et. seq., by refusing to allow Plaintiff to keep his dog (“Kane”) in his home.
Plaintiff now moves for the following injunctive relief: a general injunction enjoining Defendant
from discrimination as defined in the FHA; a specific injunction permitting Plaintiff to keep his
dog on the premises; an injunction requiring Defendant to implement a nondiscrimination policy
and to distribute that policy and a copy of the “Fair Housing: Equal Opportunity for All” booklet
published by HUD to its employees; and an injunction requiring all employees and managers of
Defendant to attend annual FHA training for a period of three years. Defendant opposes the
requested relief.

I.

Standard

An injunction is limited to prospective relief. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
485, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) (“Injunctive relief looks to the future.”); Ne. Fla.
Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Amer. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th
Cir. 1990) (Preventing irreparable harm in the future is “the sine qua non of injunctive relief.”
(quoting Frejlach v. Butler, 573 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978))); see also Alabama v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117, 1133 (11th Cir. 2005). To obtain a permanent injunction a
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he has prevailed in establishing the violation of the right
asserted in his complaint; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law for the violation of this right; and
(3) irreparable harm will result if the court does not order injunctive relief. Id. at 1128. However,
because it is an extraordinary remedy, a permanent injunction is “available not simply when the
legal right asserted has been infringed, but only when that legal right has been infringed by an
injury for which there is no adequate legal remedy and which will result in irreparable injury if the
injunction does not issue.” Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506, 79 S. Ct. 948, 3
L. Ed. 2d 988 (1959); see also Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117, 1127-28
(11th Cir. 2005) and Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982). Injunctive relief
is specifically permitted in the FHA under 42 U.S.C. § 3613.
II.

Discussion

Although Plaintiff has succeeded on the merits of his FHA claim, he has not demonstrated
his entitlement to injunctive relief. This is not the type of flagrant violation that, on its own,
justifies permanent injunctive relief. See Sandford v. R. L. Coleman Realty Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 173,
178 (4th Cir. 1978) (injunctive relief justified based on undisputed “coding” of black applicants
followed by the denial of their applications). There is no evidence of a pattern or practice of

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discrimination in this case, no evidence of bad faith, AHCA took no affirmative action to remove
Kane, and it sent a letter several months after the dispute arose, but before this lawsuit was filed,
specifically informing Plaintiff that Kane could stay. Evidence suggests that AHCA attempted to
comply with the law and sought legal advice—which, in hindsight, was poor. This single
violation, combined with a vague assertion that AHCA “refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness
of its conduct,” is insufficient to establish Plaintiff’s entitlement to permanent injunctive relief.
Plaintiff insists that “irreparable injury may be presumed from the fact of discrimination
and violations of fair housing statutes.” Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1423
(11th Cir. 1984). But in Gresham, the court was addressing the irreparable injury required for a
preliminary injunction. It reasoned that, inter alia, “a person who is discriminated against in the
search for housing cannot remain in limbo while a court resolves the matter . . . available housing
where the discrimination is occurring could become filled during the pendency of a lawsuit,
making corrective relief nearly impossible to enter . . . .” Rogers v. Windmill Pointe Vill. Club
Ass’n, Inc., 967 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Gresham, 730 F.2d at 1424). To obtain a
permanent injunction, there must be some cognizable danger of recurrent violations or some
continuing harm for which money damages are insufficient compensation. United States v.
Warwick Mobile Homes Estates, 558 F.2d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 1977). See also, Dombrowski, 380
U.S. at 485; Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Amer., 896 F.2d at 1285. Plaintiff
faces no such harm here and even if a presumption of irreparable injury applies, Defendant has
presented sufficient evidence to rebut it.
It is therefore,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 139) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on June 7, 2013.

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Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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