Bummer v. New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation

Filing 23

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 7 Motion to Dismiss and setting deadline for filing answer. Signed by Judge John Antoon II on 9/7/2012. (BLA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

PENNY S. BUMMER now known as
PENNY S. JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:11-cv-1851-Orl-28KRS

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE AND
ANNUITY CORPORATION,

Defendant.
___________________________________/
ORDER
This action for breach of contract, conversion, and promissory estoppel is before
the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and the Plaintiff’s Response
(Doc. 8) thereto. Defendant, New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation (“New
York Life”), argues that Plaintiff, Penny S. Jones (“Jones”), has failed to state a claim for
conversion or promissory estoppel. New York Life further seeks leave of the Court to
serve its Answer to Jones’s breach of contract claim within 30 days of the Court’s ruling.
For the reasons stated below, New York Life’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with
respect to Jones’s claim for conversion, and DENIED with respect to Jones’s claim for
promissory estoppel.

I. Background1
This case concerns a dispute over the payment of life insurance proceeds. On
February 27, 2008, New York Life stated in a letter to Jones’s husband that Jones was
the current beneficiary under his life insurance policy.

Five months later, Jones’s

husband died. When Jones made a demand on New York Life for the proceeds owed
to her under the policy, New York Life refused to pay her.
Jones claims that New York Life is liable for breach of contract and conversion
for failing to pay her the money owed under her husband’s policy. Jones alternatively
claims that she relied to her detriment on New York Life’s statement that she was the
beneficiary of her husband’s policy because she otherwise would have obtained life
insurance on her husband through another company.
II. Legal Standard for Motions to Dismiss
“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). “‘[D]etailed factual allegations’” are not required, but “[a] pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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These allegations are taken from the Complaint (Doc. 2) and are accepted as true for the purpose of
ruling on the motion to dismiss.

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III. Discussion
A. Conversion
Under Florida law, conversion is “‘an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over
another’s property inconsistent with his ownership of it.’” Advanced Surgical Techs., Inc.
v. Automated Instruments, Inc., 777 F.2d 1504, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(quoting Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)).
Moreover, “[m]oney may be the subject of a conversion only where ‘it consists of
specific money capable of identification.’” Kee v. Nat’l Reserve Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d
1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Belford, 243 So. 2d at 648). Accordingly, it is
“well-established law in Florida that a simple debt which can be discharged by the
payment of money cannot generally form the basis of a claim for conversion.” Gasparini
v. Pordomingo, 972 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); see also Walker v. Figarola,
59 So. 3d 188, 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Kee, 918 F.2d at 1541 (11th Cir. 1990);
Belford, 243 So. 2d at 648 (“A mere obligation to pay money may not be enforced by a
conversion action.”).
The crux of Jones’s conversion claim is that New York Life “failed to pay to [her]
all proceeds due and owing to her as the beneficiary under the policy of insurance at
issue.” (Doc. 2 ¶ 14). This amounts to a claim for payment of a simple debt, and Jones
has not otherwise alleged any facts to suggest that New York Life owes her specific
money capable of identification.

Jones’s claim for conversion therefore fails under

Florida law.
B. Promissory Estoppel
The Florida Supreme Court has explained:

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The basic elements of promissory estoppel are set forth in
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979), which
states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach
may be limited as justice requires.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1989).
New York Life’s challenge to Jones’s promissory estoppel claim boils down to
three arguments: 1) promissory estoppel is not available when a written contract covers
the disputed promise; 2) the letter naming Jones as the current beneficiary was not a
promise that should reasonably be expected to induce reliance because the policy
owner could change the current beneficiary at any time; and 3) Jones’s decision not to
seek insurance from a different company is insufficient to support detrimental reliance
because she “has failed to allege that any other life insurance was ‘actually available.’”
(Doc. 7).
These arguments, however, all require factual development and are premature at
this stage of the litigation.

Jones is permitted to claim promissory estoppel as an

alternative to her breach of contract claim, see Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc.,
717 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and her Complaint need only contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

As it stands, Jones’s

Complaint alleges grounds for promissory estoppel in a sufficiently plausible manner to
survive the motion to dismiss.

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IV. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. New York Life’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. The motion is GRANTED as to the conversion claim in Count II. The conversion
claim in Count II is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The motion is
DENIED as to the promissory estoppel claim in Count III.
2. New York Life shall file its Answer to Counts I and III of the Complaint on or
before Friday, September 28, 2012.

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 7, 2012.

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