Jenkins v. Humphrey Management and Hospitality, Inc.
Filing
56
ORDER granting 47 Defendant's Motion for summary judgment and denying 23 Plaintiff's Motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 8/25/2014. (AHH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
TCHAIVOSKY JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:12-cv-116-Orl-36GJK
HUMPHREY MANAGEMENT AND
HOSPITALITY, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Tchaivosky Jenkins’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Jenkins’ Mot.”) (Doc. 23) and Defendant Humphrey Management and
Hospitality, Inc., d/b/a/ Inn on the Beach’s (“Humphrey”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Humphrey’s Mot.”) (Doc. 47). Each party filed a response to the respective Motions. Doc. 27
(“Humphrey’s Opp.”); Doc. 55 (“Jenkins’ Opp.”).
Upon due consideration of the parties’
submissions, including memoranda of counsel, affidavits, and accompanying exhibits, and for the
reasons that follow, Jenkins’ Motion will be denied and Humphrey’s Motion will be granted.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
This action arises from Humphrey’s termination of Jenkins’ employment, allegedly based
on race, ethnic origin, and age in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (“ADEA”). Doc. 1. Jenkins is an African-American male who was born in 1954 and
whose country of origin is the United States. Doc. 55-1, Affidavit of Tchaivosky Jenkins (“Jenkins
1
The Court has determined the facts based on the parties’ submissions, including the stipulation
of agreed material facts, affidavits, and accompanying exhibits filed with the Court.
Aff.”) ¶ 5. Jenkins was employed by Humphrey in 2002 as a porter, where his responsibilities
included cleaning, assisting with the housekeeping department, and other various duties. Id. ¶¶ 2,
4. In July 2009, Jenkins slipped on the floor and injured his back while on the job. Id. ¶ 9. As a
consequence, he suffered extreme pain in his lower back, and was confined to bed and out of work
for a few days. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. When Jenkins came back to work on or about July 22, 2009, he was
terminated without notice from his employment with Humphrey. Id. ¶¶ 3, 14. At that time, he
was not given a reason for his termination, id. ¶ 14, and in fact, had never been told that there were
any problems with his performance, id. ¶ 6. Jenkins was terminated in the summertime during the
tourism season and was not aware of any business at the Inn slowing down. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
About a week prior to his termination, Jenkins had been asked to train two Caucasian
individuals whom he believed were in their twenties and who had foreign accents. Id. ¶ 16. On
the day Jenkins was terminated, he saw the two individuals whom he had trained programming
televisions, a job he had trained them to do and which was one of his former job duties. Id. ¶ 17.
Additionally, another porter with whom Jenkins had worked, Raymond Jackson, was also let go.
Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Around the time that Jackson was no longer employed, the company employed a
Caucasian male in his early 20’s who did not have a foreign accent. Id. ¶ 26. Jenkins had trained
the individual to perform the same job duties that Jackson had been performing as a porter. Id.
Gulamabbas Abdulhussein, an African American, was President of Humphrey at the time
of Jenkins’ employment and termination.
Doc. 45, Ex. A (“Emp. Aff.”) ¶ 1.
In 2009,
Abdulhussein determined that the Inn had been receiving a lot of complaints, low ratings, and low
revenues. Id. ¶ 4. Abdulhussein further learned that other hotels in the area that had fewer
complaints and higher ratings used employee leasing companies, and that these companies had
various benefits, such as increasing staffing flexibility due to seasonality, decreasing costs relating
2
to holiday and vacation pay, and eliminating worker’s compensation expenses. Id. ¶ 5. Based on
these potential benefits and the poor performance of the Inn, Abdulhussein decided that it would
be in the Inn’s best interest to outsource housekeeping services, as well as several other positions,
to an employee leasing agency. Id. ¶¶ 6, 16. Abdulhussein further felt that using an employee
leasing agency would benefit Humphrey by providing a larger selection of potential employees.
Id. ¶ 7.
Therefore, in June and July 2009, Abdulhussein used an employee leasing agency to
provide employees for the positions he anticipated eliminating. Id. ¶ 8. He first used the agency
to evaluate the performance of the current staff in order to determine whether he should eliminate
all of the positions or whether he should merely restructure the business. Id. ¶ 9. Abdulhussein
also instructed the General Manager to begin transitioning employees to the leasing agency. Id. ¶
10. In June and August 2009, the General Manager terminated the entire housekeeping staff as
well as a few other employees. Id. ¶ 11. Several Caucasian men and women were among those
whose positions were eliminated. Id. ¶ 12. In August 2009, Abdulhussein hired Efrain Silva as
General Manager, who posted a “Help Wanted” sign for approximately one week to fill vacant
positions that were not being leased out. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14; Doc. 47, Ex. B (“Silva Aff.”) ¶¶ 3, 7.
Neither Abdulhussein nor Silva prevented any terminated employee from seeking re-employment
through the employee leasing agency. Emp. Aff. ¶ 15; Silva Aff. ¶ 8.
Jenkins subsequently filed a Complaint against Humphrey alleging that his employment
had been terminated in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. Doc. 1. The instant motions for
summary judgment followed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the court is satisfied that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”
3
after reviewing the “materials in the record, including documents . . . affidavits or declarations,
stipulations . . . admissions . . . or other materials[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(2). Issues of facts
are genuine only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material”
if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. The moving party bears the initial
burden of stating the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating
the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24
(1986); Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). That burden
can be discharged if the moving party can show the court that there is “an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. In determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).
“Cross motions for summary judgment do not change the standard.” Perez-Santiago v.
Volusia Cnty., No. 6:08-cv-1868-Orl-28KRS, 2010 WL 917872, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010)
(internal citations omitted). “‘Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately;
the denial of one does not require the grant of another.’” Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “Even where the parties file cross motions pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is
inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts.” Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Counts I & II: Termination Based Upon Race and Ethnic Origin
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prove discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
4
establish that he was a qualified member of a protected class and was subject to an adverse
employment action in contrast to similarly situated employees outside of the protected class.
Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)).
In employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against him, a burden that remains at all times with the plaintiff. Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Further, to prevail on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d
977, 980–981 (11th Cir. 1989); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir.
1983)).
Such discriminatory intent may be established either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence meeting the three step procedure set out for Title VII cases in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561–
62 (11th Cir. 1997); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination by either: (1) showing direct
evidence of discrimination; (2) satisfying the scheme for circumstantial evidence of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas; or (3) by demonstrating, through statistics, a pattern of discrimination.
Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir. 1991).
Because direct evidence of discrimination is seldom available, a plaintiff typically relies
on circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent, using the burden-shifting framework
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1561–62; Combs v. Plantation Patterns,
106 F.3d 1519, 1527–1528 (11th Cir.1997). Under this framework, a plaintiff is first required to
create an inference of discriminatory intent, and thus carries the initial burden of establishing a
5
prima facie case of intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also
Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1310, reh’g denied and opinion
superseded in part, 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir.1998); Combs, 106 F.3d at 1527. If the plaintiff meets
this burden, there is a presumption that intentional discrimination has occurred. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254 n.7; Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 745 F.2d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir. 1984).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to
“articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Jones, 137 F.3d at 1310. If the defendant articulates one or
more such reasons, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted and the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the reasons offered by the defendant are a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805; Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012,
1024-25 (11th Cir. 2000). “Although the intermediate burdens of production shift back and forth,
the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated
against the employee remains at all times with the plaintiff.” EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, 296
F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003).
1.
No Prima Facie Case of Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Jenkins alleges in his Complaint that Humphrey violated Title VII by terminating his
employment based on race and/or national origin. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15, 28. Jenkins has presented no
direct or statistical evidence of race or national origin discrimination, so the Court evaluates his
claims based on circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell-Douglas framework. Under this
framework, to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, Jenkins must
demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment
action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) he was replaced by a member outside of his
6
protected class. See Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006);
Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. 2 “Demonstrating a prima facie case is not onerous; it requires only
that the plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination.” Jones, 137
F.3d at 1310–1311; Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562; see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253–54. By establishing
a prima facie case, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the challenged action was
motivated by a discriminatory intent. Joe’s Stone Crabs, 296 F.3d at 1272.
Jenkins contends that he has demonstrated a prima facie case of disparate treatment
discrimination based on his race and/or national origin. Jenkins’ Mot. at 1-3. Specifically, with
regard to his racial discrimination claim, he states that he is a member of a protected class because
he is African-American, he was terminated from his employment for no reason, and he was
replaced by a Caucasian individual.
See id.
Likewise, with regard to his national origin
discrimination claim, he states that he is a member of a protected class because his country of
origin is the United States, he was terminated for no reason, and he was replaced by employees
with foreign accents. See id.
Humphrey does not dispute that, as an African-American whose national origin is the
United States, Jenkins is a member of a protected class for purposes of both his race and national
origin discrimination claims. Humphrey’s Opp. at 3; Humphrey’s Mot. at 4. Humphrey likewise
2
Jenkins is apparently also alleging a class-wide disparate treatment claim. See Jenkins’ Mot. at
2-4. In an action alleging class-wide disparate treatment, a plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company’s standard operating
procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice. Dorsey v. Froonjian, 8:10-CV-1895-T30AEP, 2011 WL 1466273, *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2011), report and recommendation adopted,
8:10-CV-1895-T-30AEP, 2011 WL 1465459 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2011) (citing Kilgo v. Bowman
Transp., Inc. 789 F.2d 859, 874 (11th Cir. 1986)). Jenkins’ contention that “Defendant . . .
terminated other African-American males in Defendant’s maintenance department replacing them
with Caucasian employees[],” Jenkins’ Mot. at 4, fails to demonstrate any type of “practice” on
the part of Humphrey. Thus, Jenkins’ attempt to establish such a claim is without merit.
7
concedes that Jenkins suffered an adverse employment action when he was terminated. Id.
Humphrey argues, however, that Jenkins has failed to establish that he was qualified for his job,
or that an individual outside of Jenkins’ protected class was hired to replace him. Humphrey’s
Opp. at 3; Humphrey’s Mot. at 4-5.
For the purpose of employment discrimination cases, an employee is considered to be
“qualified” for a position if he or she meets the criteria that the employer has articulated for the
position. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1300 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly,
Jenkins must set forth evidence that shows that he was meeting Humphrey’s legitimate
performance expectations at the time of his discharge. See Ferrell v. Masland Carpets, Inc., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (S.D. Ala. 2000).
The Court finds that Jenkins has set forth evidence sufficient to establish that he was
qualified to perform his job. In the seven and a half years that Jenkins had been working for
Humphrey, he was never told that there were any problems with his job performance, and he was
never reprimanded or counseled. Jenkins’ Opp. at 4. Further, Humphrey sets forth only general
claims regarding the Inn’s service and low ratings without regard to what service was poor, whether
such service had anything to do with Jenkins, or the cause of the low ratings. Id. at 4-5. Although
at least one court in this Circuit has held that lack of criticism alone is insufficient for establishing
that a plaintiff was qualified to perform his or her job, Ferrell, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1124, the Eleventh
Circuit has held that if a plaintiff has enjoyed a long tenure at a certain position, it can be inferred
that he or she was qualified to hold that particular position, see Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets
of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Jenkins had been employed at the
Inn as a porter for seven and a half years prior to his termination, a sufficiently long period of time.
Jenkins’ lengthy employment, coupled with the absence of reprimands and problems with his
8
employment, supports the inference that he was qualified for his position.
With respect to the final element, however, Jenkins has not sufficiently established that a
member outside of his protected class was hired for his position as a porter. With regard to his
racial discrimination claim, Jenkins states only that he saw two Caucasian individuals whom he
had trained programming televisions, which was one of his job duties. Jenkins Aff. ¶ 17. Likewise,
the only indicia of national origin is Jenkins’ statement that these two Caucasian individuals had
foreign accents. Id. ¶ 16. These statements, even if true, are plainly inadequate to establish that a
member outside of his protected class was hired to replace him. The Caucasian individuals have
not been identified, and no records, documents, affidavits or depositions indicate their positions at
the Inn or their national origins. It is unknown if these Caucasian employees with foreign accents
replaced Jackson. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Jenkins has failed to establish a prima facie
case of racial or national origin discrimination.
2.
Humphrey’s
Legitimate,
Nondiscriminatory
Reason
for
Jenkins’
Termination
Assuming, arguendo, that Jenkins has established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the burden shifts to Humphrey to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for terminating Jenkins. To satisfy this requirement, the defendant must articulate a clear and
reasonably specific factual basis upon which it based its subjective opinion for an employment
action. See Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003). Further, the evidence
must include facts that show what the decisionmaker knew at the time he or she made the decision.
See id.
Humphrey’s professed legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Jenkins is that
Humphrey decided to outsource its staffing needs for a variety of business purposes, including:
9
increased staffing flexibility based on seasonality; decreased costs; decreased costs related to
holiday and vacation pay; no workers’ compensation expenses; and providing a larger selection of
potential employees. Humphrey’s Mot. at 5-6; Emp. Aff. ¶¶ 5, 7. Humphrey avers that, in 2009,
it determined that the Inn was receiving numerous complaints, low ratings, and low revenues, and
learned that other successful hotels in the area, with higher ratings and fewer complaints, utilized
employee leasing companies. Emp. Aff. ¶¶ 4, 5. Accordingly, Humphrey had the employment
leasing agency evaluate the performance of its current staff. Id. ¶ 9. Humphrey ultimately decided
that it would be in its best interests to eliminate all of the housekeeping staff, as well as other
positions, and replace them through an employee leasing agency. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8-9, 11. Humphrey
states that it did not in any way prevent any of the terminated employees from seeking reemployment through the leasing agency. Id. ¶ 15; Silva Aff. ¶ 8. Humphrey further adds that the
purpose of the “Help Wanted” sign, posted shortly after the housekeeping staff was terminated,
was to fill positions not being leased out. Emp. Aff. ¶ 14; Silva Aff. ¶ 7.
As many other courts have found, the Court finds that Humphrey’s proffered reason for its
decision to terminate Jenkins—outsourcing to save costs—is legitimate and nondiscriminatory. 3
See, e.g., Cashman v. Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees, 260 F. App’x 216, 217 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding as legitimate and nondiscriminatory the defendants’ proffered reason for terminating the
plaintiff—that they wanted to outsource her interior design duties to an outside contractor in order
3
Humphrey also appears to suggest that Jenkins was fired for failing to return to work following
his work-related injury. Humphrey’s Opp. at 4. However, the date of Jenkins’ termination for
failure to return to work is internally contradicted—Humphrey’s General Manager avers that
Jenkins was not terminated until June 2010, but Humphrey’s President avers that Jenkins was
terminated in either June, July, or August 2009. Compare Silva Aff. ¶ 6 with Emp. Aff. ¶ 11. In
light of this glaring contradiction, the Court does not credit this as a legitimate reason for
Jenkins’ termination. Nevertheless, Humphrey’s business decision to outsource its labor costs,
standing alone, is a sufficient legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Jenkins’ termination.
10
to save costs and achieve standardization across the campus); Felder v. Nortel Networks Corp.,
187 Fed. App’x 586, 588, 592-93 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding as legitimate and nondiscriminatory the
defendant’s decision to outsource the accounting function in which the plaintiff worked in order
to reduce costs as part of a massive, company-wide restructuring); see also Paulk v. Housing
Authority of City of Douglas, No. CV506-118, 2007 WL 3511443, *1, *5 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 14,
2007); Martin v. Housing Authority of City of Douglas, No. CV506-116, 2007 WL 3511300, *1,
*4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2007); Wilson v. Housing Authority of City of Douglas, No. CV506-117,
2007 WL 3511337, *1, *4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2007).
3.
Jenkins’ Argument Regarding Pretext
To rebut an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse action, the
employee must produce evidence that directly establishes discrimination or that permits the jury
to reasonably disbelieve the employer’s proffered reason. Steger, 318 F.3d at 1076. Specifically,
a plaintiff can either demonstrate directly that a discriminatory reason more likely than not
motivated the employer, or indirectly show that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence. See Jackson v. Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir.
2005). Simply quarreling with the employer’s legitimate reason, however, is not sufficient to rebut
the proffered reason; rather, the reason must be met head on with some evidence of pretext. Wilson
v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the plaintiff must
demonstrate weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action, such that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir.1994).
11
Jenkins argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons
Humphrey proffers for his termination are truthful. Jenkins’ Opp. at 9-10. Specifically, Jenkins
points out that, just one week after he and other employees were terminated, Humphrey posted a
“Help Wanted” sign outside of the Inn, but did not call him or any of the other plaintiffs back to
work. Id.; Jenkins Mot. at 3. Jenkins further adds that, although Humphrey claims to have
terminated all employees in the service department and replaced them with leased employees, it
did not terminate three Caucasian housekeepers. Jenkins’ Opp. at 10; Jenkins’ Mot. at 3. Jenkins
finally contends that all of the employees supposedly selected by Humphrey through the leasing
agency were Caucasian and had foreign accents. Jenkins’ Opp. at 10.
The Court finds that these facts alone, even if true, are insufficient for establishing pretext.
Critically, there is no actual evidence that the three Caucasian individuals who remained in
Humphrey’s employ were not terminated and re-hired through the leasing agency. There is also
no evidence as to how the replacement employees were selected or their qualifications, or that their
selection did not meet the legitimate purpose of improving the motel’s ratings, decreasing costs,
and increasing staffing flexibility. There is no evidence as to their national origins. No application
or employment records have been produced. There is no evidence to indicate that the “Help
Wanted” sign was placed to fill Jenkins’ position. There is no evidence to indicate that none of the
terminated African-American employees of United States origin were called back to work. Jenkins
has failed to show that any discriminatory animus motivated Humphrey to outsource his position
on the basis of race or national origin.
Although a plaintiff may survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment if there is
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
truth of the employer’s proffered reason for its actions, Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529, Jenkins has
12
failed to provide such evidence. Therefore, Humphrey’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be
granted as to Counts I and II of the Complaint, and Jenkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to
those counts will be denied.
B.
Count III: Termination Based Upon Age
The ADEA prohibits employers from taking an adverse employment action against an
employee who is at least 40 years of age because of that employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a),
631(a). In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing
a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action. 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). A
plaintiff can establish age discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Sims v.
MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, Jenkins relies on circumstantial evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit evaluates ADEA claims based on circumstantial evidence under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Mitchell v. City of LaFayette, 504 Fed.
App’x 867, 869 (11th Cir. 2013); Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2013).
Under this framework, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of ADEA discrimination by
showing that: (1) he was in a protected age group; (2) he was adversely affected by an employment
decision; (3) he was qualified for his current position; and (4) he was replaced by a younger
individual. Mitchell, 504 Fed. App’x at 870. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age
discrimination, the employer may rebut the resulting presumption of discrimination by articulating
at least one legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. Upon this showing, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination. Id. Importantly, though, as with race discrimination claims, “the burden of
persuasion always remains on the plaintiff in an ADEA case to proffer evidence sufficient to permit
13
a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the discriminatory animus was the ‘but-for’ cause of the
adverse employment action.” Sims, 704 F.3d at 1332.
Humphrey does not dispute that Jenkins, who was 54 years old at the time of his
termination, was in a protected age group under the ADEA, or that he suffered an adverse
employment action—specifically, the termination of his employment. Humphrey’s Opp. at 5.
Further, the Court has already concluded that Jenkins’ long tenure with Humphrey—seven and a
half years—with no evidence of any problems supports the inference that he was qualified for the
position of porter. See Section III.A, supra.
As with his Title VII claim, however, Jenkins has failed to establish the fourth element—
that he was replaced by a younger individual. Jenkins states only that on the day he was terminated,
he saw two individuals “whom he believed to be in their 20’s” performing one of his job duties.
Jenkins’ Aff. ¶¶ 16, 17. This statement, without more, is insufficient to support an inference that
Jenkins was replaced by a younger individual. The individuals who are allegedly in their twenties
have not been identified, and no records, documents, affidavits or depositions indicate their
positions at the Inn. There is simply no evidence to indicate that these individuals replaced Jenkins,
much less that they were even the age that Jenkins believed them to be. Accordingly, Jenkins has
failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Assuming, arguendo, that Jenkins has established a prima facie case of age discrimination,
the burden shifts to Humphrey to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
him. For the reasons discussed in Section III.A, supra, as with the Title VII claim, Humphrey has
proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of Jackson, and Jenkins has
not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this reason is pretextual. Therefore,
14
Humphrey’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to Count III of the Complaint and
Jenkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied as to that count.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Jenkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied,
and Humphrey’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. No genuine issues of material
fact exist for determination by a jury and Humphrey is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter
of law.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff Tchaivosky Jenkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is
DENIED.
2.
Defendant Humphrey Management and Hospitality, Inc., d/b/a Inn on the Beach’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is GRANTED.
3.
The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of
Defendant, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 25, 2014.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?