Guertin v. United Rentals Inc. et al

Filing 54

ORDER denying 52 Motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 10/5/2012. (NWH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
BRIAN GUERTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:12-cv-301-Orl-31KRS

UNITED RENTALS, INC., MAGNUM
PRODUCTS, LLC and CEQUENT
PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss a crossclaim (Doc. 52), filed by
Defendant/Cross-Defendant, Cequent Performance Products, Inc., (“Cequent”), and a Response
(Doc. 53) filed by Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff, Magnum Products, LLC (“Magnum”).
I. Background
This is a product liability action filed by Plaintiff on February 23, 2012, after he was
injured by an allegedly defective “mobile light tower” manufactured and distributed by Defendant
Magnum. Plaintiff rented the defective tower at Defendant United Rentals, Inc., and was injured
on July 25, 2009 when one of the winches on the tower malfunctioned, causing the tower to crash
down. As the tower fell, the hand crank attached to the winch “sp[u]n freely under the weight of
the light tower” and struck Plaintiff’s hand, causing serious injury. (Doc. 36 at 4). According to
the Crossclaim, (Doc. 39), Cequent manufactured and sold the allegedly defective winch to
Magnum. Magnum then used the winch as a component in its mobile light tower.

The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 36) asserts two causes of action against three
Defendants: strict products liability against all Defendants (Count I), and negligence against only
Defendant United Rentals (Count II). On June 21, 2012, Magnum filed a crossclaim against
Cequent, (Doc. 39), asserting two claims, common law indemnity (Count I), and contribution
(Count II). Cequent now moves to dismiss both Counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Magnum withdrew Count II in light of the arguments raised by Cequent, (Doc. 53, ¶ 12), thus,
only Count I remains.
II. Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, see, e.g., Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1994), and must limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.
1993). The Court will liberally construe the complaint’s allegations in the Plaintiff’s favor.
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,421 (1969). However, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted
factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
In reviewing a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), “courts must be mindful that the Federal Rules require only that the complaint contain ‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” U.S. v.
Baxter Intern., Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). This is a
liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with particularity every
element of a cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th
Cir. 2001). However, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to

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relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-555 (2007). The
complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” Id. at 555, and cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-1951 (2009).
III. Discussion
Under Florida law, a party must prove three elements to prevail on a claim for common
law indemnity: (1) the party seeking indemnification must be without fault—i.e. “its liability must
be vicarious and solely for the wrong of another;” (2) indemnification can only come from a party
who was at fault; and (3) there must be a “special relationship” between the parties. Dade County
Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 642 (Fla. 1999). Cequent argues that Count I of
the Crossclaim should be dismissed because it fails to allege that Magnum was without fault. It
does allege, however, that Magnum “denies all allegations of wrongdoing,” (Doc. 39, ¶ 8), that
Magnum’s liability is solely “vicarious or derivative,” (Doc. 39, ¶16), and that Cequent “should
bear the complete responsibility . . . [because] . . . Guertin’s alleged injuries are the proximate and
direct result of a defect in the subject winch made by Cequent.” (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 15-16). This is
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Cequent’s remaining argument that Magnum did “little
more than recite the elements” is without merit—as is its request for a more definite statement.1
It is therefore,
ORDERED that Cross-Defendant’s Motion to dismiss (Doc. 52) is DENIED.

1

Cequent does not point out the specific defects or the details it desires. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(e).

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DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 5, 2012.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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