Mel Laurn Properties, Inc. et al v. Hancock Bank et al

Filing 4

ORDER dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; denying as moot 2 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; and directing the Clerk to close the file. Signed by Judge John Antoon II on 6/18/2012. (EK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MEL LAURN PROPERTIES, INC., FELIX
LABBAN, and SOOL LABBAN,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Case No. 6:12-cv-912-Orl-28GJK

HANCOCK BANK, JEFFRY R. JONTZ,
JUDGE LISA MUNYON, and HARRY W.
CHAMP,
Defendants.
_____________________________________

ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the Complaint (Docs. 1 & 2), in which
Plaintiffs—appearing pro se1—seek an “Emergency Temporary Restraining Order.”
Although the entire course of events that led to the filing of this lawsuit is unclear, it is
apparent that the case arises from state court mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
A Final Judgment of Foreclosure (“Annex 2” to Doc. 1) was entered by Florida circuit
court judge Lisa Runyon in March 2011, and a foreclosure sale was scheduled for May 13,
2011, though it is not clear from the filings whether that sale was held as scheduled.
Plaintiffs filed this suit on June 18, 2012, and they seek in part to halt the closing of a sale
of the subject property by the foreclosing bank to a third party that is scheduled for June 20,

1

“Mel Laurn Properties, Inc.”—an apparent corporate entity—has not appeared
through counsel as required by Local Rule 2.03(e). The pro se Plaintiffs may not represent
Mel Laurn Properties, Inc. in this Court.

2012. They have named as Defendants the foreclosing bank, the bank’s attorney, the state
court judge, and the listing realtor. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the foreclosure judgment
must be set aside for lack of consideration and that the mortgage was “discharged by
bailout.”
Because Plaintiffs ask this Court to review and set aside the state court’s foreclosure
judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and this case must be dismissed under
the Rooker/Feldman2 doctrine. Under this doctrine, “federal courts—other than the Supreme
Court—do not have subject matter jurisdiction over ‘cases brought by state-court losers [(1)]
complaining of injuries cased by state court judgments rendered before the [federal] district
court proceedings commenced and [(2)] inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.’” Parker v. Potter, 368 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); accord
Mickens v. 10th Judicial Circuit Court, 458 F. App’x 839, 840-41 (11th Cir. 2012).
This case, like other actions in which foreclosure set-aside has been sought, meets
these criteria and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux
City, 74 F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1996); Morris v. Am. Home Mtge. Servicing, Inc., 443 F. App’x 22,
24 (5th Cir. 2011); Thompson v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 03 C 3256, 2003 WL
22012207, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003) (“In essence, Plaintiff’s numerous past filings, as
well as her present action, all endeavor to remedy one injury – foreclosure on her home. .
. . Plaintiff’s complaint asks us to draw a different conclusion than that reached by the [state]

2

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
-2-

Circuit Court. As a consequence, we are without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s
claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.”); Rene v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp. 2d
539, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The claims raised in the plaintiffs’ Complaint implicate the
propriety of the state judgment of foreclosure and eviction—the very issues apparently
decided by the state court. Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine compels a federal court
to give full faith and credit to the judgments of state courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738, this Court
is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.”).3
In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. This case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Plaintiffs’ Request for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is
DENIED as moot.
3. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida this 18th day of June, 2012.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

3

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs are suing the state court judge, that judge enjoys
absolute immunity from suit in any event.
-3-