Martin et al v. Halifax Healthcare Systems, Inc. et al
Filing
101
ORDER granting 52 Motion for summary judgment, directing Clerk to close file. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 4/11/2014. (ED)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
RICHARD MARTIN, JOHN
D’AMBROSIO and YOLANDA
GERVARZES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No: 6:12-cv-1268-Orl-31DAB
HALIFAX HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS,
INC. and HALIFAX COMMUNITY
HEALTH SYSTEMS,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court without a hearing on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 52) filed by the Defendants, Halifax Healthcare Systems, Inc. (“HHSI”) and
Halifax Community Health Systems (“HCHS”), the response in opposition (Doc. 65) filed by the
Plaintiffs, and the reply (Doc. 73) filed by the Defendants.
I.
Background
The Plaintiffs, all Volusia County residents, are deaf and communicate primarily in
American Sign Language (henceforth, “ASL”). All three (separately) had dealings with Halifax
Hospital Medical Center (“Halifax Hospital”), a Volusia County hospital. Richard Martin
(“Martin”) and John D’Ambrosio (“D’Ambrosio”) received treatment at Halifax Hospital after a
fall and a heart attack, respectively; Yolanda Gervarzes (“Gervarzes”) accompanied her pregnant
daughter to Halifax Hospital for the delivery. All three contend that the Defendants failed to
provide live sign language interpreters during at least some portions of their stay, in violation of
Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act (Count I), the Rehabilitation Act (Count II), Title
II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (Count III), and the Florida Civil Rights Act (Count
IV). 1
II.
Legal Standards
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the party can show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Which facts are material depends on the
substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether the moving party has satisfied its burden,
the court considers all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion, and resolves all reasonable doubts against the moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
When a party moving for summary judgment points out an absence of evidence on a
dispositive issue for which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmoving
party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Thereafter, summary
judgment is mandated against the nonmoving party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. The party opposing a motion for summary
judgment must rely on more than conclusory statements or allegations unsupported by facts.
Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“conclusory allegations without
specific supporting facts have no probative value”).
1
Count I is asserted only against HHSI; Count III is asserted only against HCHS.
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The Court must consider all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The Court is not, however, required to
accept all of the non-movant’s factual characterizations and legal arguments. Beal v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 458-59 (11th Cir 1994).
III.
Analysis
A. HHSI
As an initial matter, HHSI contends that it does not own or operate Halifax Hospital and
therefore cannot be held liable for any failure of adequate communication with the Plaintiffs. The
Plaintiffs respond by asserting that HHSI “is a recipient of federal financial assistance by virtue of
its acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid payments and, therefore, a covered entity under the
Rehabilitation Act,” and they further assert that the Defendants “jointly own, operate, and/or
finance” Halifax Hospital. (Doc. 65 at 8). But the Plaintiffs do not point to any record evidence
that would support a finding that HHSI (1) receives federal financial assistance or (2) jointly
owns, operates, or finances Halifax Hospital.
The Plaintiffs note that HHSI has stated that it is “involved in ‘physicians’ billing’” and
state that “Presumably, such billing services serve to finance Halifax Hospital and its operation
through the invoicing and receipt of monies from insurance companies, Medicare, and/or
Medicaid.” (Doc. 65 at 8 n.2). However, no evidence is provided in support of the Plaintiffs’
presumption, and no explanation is offered as to how the provision of billing services would lead
to liability under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
Finally, the Plaintiffs also assert that HHSI “has previously been a party to, and resolved,
similar claims, including claims under the ADA and Rehab Act.” (Doc. 65 at 8 n.2). Again,
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however, the Plaintiffs provide no evidence of HHSI’s alleged participation in such claims, and
there is no explanation as to how this participation might make HHSI liable in the instant case.
HHSI is entitled to the entry of judgment as to all of the claims asserted against it.
B. FCRA
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (henceforth, the “FCRA”) prohibits discrimination at
“public accommodations” and “public food service establishments” on the basis of, inter alia,
physical disability. Fla. Stat. §§ 509.092, 760.11. The Defendants argue that they are entitled to
summary judgment as to the FCRA claim – found in Count IV – because Halifax Hospital is not a
place of public accommodation or a public food service establishment, as those terms are used in
the FCRA. The Plaintiffs agree that hospitals are not places of public accommodation, but argue
that if an entity not otherwise covered by the FCRA (such as a hospital) includes a public food
service establishment within its premises, the otherwise uncovered entity becomes subject to the
FCRA. (Doc. 65 at 15-17). It is undisputed that Halifax Hospital has a cafeteria within its
premises.
The FCRA’s definition of “public accommodations” includes the following: “Any
establishment which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise
covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically located any such
covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered
establishment.” Fla. Stat. § 760.02(11)(d) (emphasis added). The Defendants argue that there
is no evidence that Halifax Hospital holds itself out as serving patrons of its onsite cafeteria. In
addition, the Defendants point out that the statutory definition of “public food service
establishment,” found at Fla. Stat. § 509.013(5)(b)(4) excludes eating places that are maintained
by a facility certified or licensed and regulated by the Agency for Health Care Administration
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(henceforth, the “AHCA”), which licenses Halifax Hospital. (Doc. 52 at 21). In response, the
Plaintiffs cite to cases under federal law in which the existence of hospital cafeterias turned
hospitals into places of public accommodation, but fail to point to any evidence supporting the
same result in this case or offer any argument that would overcome the exclusion, under Florida
law, for eateries operated by AHCA-licensed entities. Summary judgment will be entered in
favor of the Defendants as to Count IV.
C. The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
To prevail under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he or she is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he or she was excluded from participation in or ...
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise
discriminated [against] by such entity; and (3) that this exclusion, denial or discrimination was
done because of the disability.” See. e.g., Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir.2001).
To prevail under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff “generally has the burden of proving: (1) that
[he] is an individual with a disability; (2) that defendant is a place of public accommodation; (3)
that defendant denied [him] full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities or privileges
offered by defendant (4) on the basis of [his] disability.” Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 358
F.Supp.2d 1161, 1165 (M.D.Fla.2005). To recover compensatory damages under the
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional discrimination or bad faith.” Wood
v. President & Trs. of Spring Hill Coll. in City of Mobile, 978 F.2d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir.1992).
In other words, “good faith attempts to pursue legitimate ends are not sufficient to support an
award of compensatory damages under [the Rehabilitation Act].” Id. With the exception of its
federal funding requirement, the Rehabilitation Act uses the same standards as the ADA, and
therefore, cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable. Badillo v. Thorpe, 158
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Fed. Appx. 208, 214 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 & n. 2 (11th
Cir.2000)).
There is no dispute in this case that the Plaintiffs are qualified individuals with a
disability. Setting aside for the moment the question of whether either Defendant might qualify
as a “place of public accommodation,” the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that, on the basis of their
disability, they were (1) excluded from participation in -- or denied the benefits of -- the services,
programs, or activities at Halifax Hospital or otherwise discriminated against or (2) denied the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities or privileges offered by the Defendants.
The Defendants contend that there is no evidence to support such allegations. Upon review, the
Court agrees with the Defendants.
All three Plaintiffs are completely deaf, and the primary mode of communication for each
of them is American Sign Language. (Doc. 62 at 3). Each Plaintiff requested that Halifax
Hospital provide a live interpreter to assist their communication with hospital staff. (Doc. 62 at
3). Martin, who was brought in for treatment of what turned out to be a relatively minor head
injury, was never provided a live interpreter. (Doc. 62 at 7). Gervarzes, whose pregnant
daughter was at Halifax Hospital to deliver her baby, was provided an interpreter on some
occasions but testified that “”[o]n many occasions, no interpreter was present”. (Doc. 66-3 at 2).
D’Ambrosio was brought into the emergency room in the throes of a serious heart attack. As
with Gervarzes, D’Ambrosio was provided with an interpreter on some occasions, but on others –
including when D’Ambrosio first arrived, and had to undergo an emergency cardiac
catheterization – no interpreter was present. (Doc. 66-1 at 2). On those occasions when no
interpreter was present, hospital personnel communicated with the Plaintiffs by other means,
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including written notes, gestures, and in some instances “Lifelinks,” a video relay interpreting
service.
The Plaintiffs argue that “anything aside from an ASL interpreter was inappropriate for
treatment or a hospitalization involving complicated medical procedures and terminology.” (Doc.
62 at 14). However, the Plaintiffs have not cited, and this Court has not uncovered, any precedent
obligating a hospital to provide a live ASL interpreter on every occasion when medical personnel
wish to communicate with a deaf person. Turning to the specifics of this case, the Plaintiffs have
not provided any evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude that any one of them was
excluded from participating in any service, program, or activity, or denied the benefits thereof, or
otherwise discriminated against. For instance, there is no evidence that the alternative methods of
communication employed by Halifax Hospital were insufficient to allow any Plaintiff to
understand their circumstances and treatment as well as they would have understood them if a live
ASL interpreter had been utilized. Similarly, there is no testimony or other evidence that any
Plaintiff would have reached a different decision about treatment options or reached a more
beneficial result if the medical providers had only communicated via a live ASL interpreter.
The Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any violation of the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, and Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on
those counts.
IV.
Conclusion
In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 55) is GRANTED, as set forth
above. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the
Plaintiffs on all counts, and to close the file.
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DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on April 11, 2014.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party
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