Martin et al v. Halifax Healthcare Systems, Inc. et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 10 Motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 10/18/2012. (NWH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
RICHARD MARTIN, JOHN
DAMBROSIO and YOLANDA
GERVARZES,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 6:12-cv-1268-Orl-31DAB

HALIFAX HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS,
INC. and HALIFAX COMMUNITY
HEALTH SYSTEMS,
Defendants.

ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) filed by Defendant,
Halifax Community Health Systems (“Halifax Community”); and a Response (Doc. 11) filed by
Plaintiffs.
I.

Background

Plaintiffs filed this suit on August 16, 2012, alleging that Defendants failed to provide sign
language interpreters as required under the Rehabilitation Act, 29, U.S.C. § 794, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), §
760.02, Fla. Stat. As a “special taxing district” created by the Florida Legislature, Halifax
Community now moves to dismiss Count IV (the FCRA claim) pursuant to Florida’s Sovereign
Immunity Statute, § 768.28, Fla. Stat. Specifically, Halifax Community argues that it cannot be
held liable for punitive damages under the statute, and that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the
applicable notice requirements.

II.

Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, see, e.g., Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1994), and must limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.
1993). The Court will liberally construe the complaint’s allegations in the Plaintiff’s favor.
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,421 (1969).

However, “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
In reviewing a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), “courts must be mindful that the Federal Rules require only that the complaint
contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”
U.S. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
This is a liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with
particularity every element of a cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.for Choice, Inc.,
253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001). However, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds
for his or her entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 554-555 (2007). The complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level,” Id. at 555, and cross “the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-1951 (2009).

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III.

Discussion

Even assuming that Halifax Community is entitled to sovereign immunity as it contends—
and this Court has previously found that it is not, see U.S. ex rel. Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr.,
6:09-CV-1002-ORL-31, 2011 WL 2269968 at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2011)—the notice provision
it cites is inapplicable to this case. Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, provides a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity for tort claims, but requires, inter alia, compliance with special notice
provisions. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6). In Maggio v. Florida Dept. of Labor & Employment Sec.
however, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the notice requirements of section 768.28(6) are
inapplicable in tort actions brought under the FCRA. 899 So. 2d 1074, 1080 (Fla. 2005). Halifax
Community argues that Maggio does not control in this case because of Section 189.443, Florida
Statutes. That Section states “[a]ny suit or action brought or maintained against the authority for
damages arising out of tort are subject to the limitations provided in s. 768.28, and any claim must
be presented in writing to the board.” Fla. Stat. § 189.443 (emphasis added).
On its face, Section 189.443 does not apply to Halifax Community because it is not “an
authority” as defined in the statute.1 Halifax Hospital Medical Center was created by statute in
1979, reenacted in 2003 under Chapter 2003-374, Laws of Florida. It was established pursuant to
statutory authority in Fla. Stat. § 189.404, which provides for the creation of “independent special
districts” under the “Uniform Special District Accountability Act of 1989,” Fla. Stat. §§ 189.401
et seq. (the “USDAA”).The statute Halifax Community seeks to invoke—Section 189.443—is not
contained within the USDAA, but under the “Community Improvement Authority Act”, Fla. Stat.
§ 189.430 et seq. (the “CIAA”). Section 189.432 defines the term “authority” as “an authority
1

In light of the plain wording of the statute and this Court’s prior rulings,—neither of
which are addressed in the Motion—Halifax Community’s argument borders on frivolous. See Lee
v. Mid-State Land & Timber Co., Inc., 285 F. App’x. 601, 608 (11th Cir.2008); U.S. ex rel. Kunz,
2011 WL 2269968 at *6.

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created under this act”—i.e. an authority created under the CIAA. Halifax Community has not
argued that it constitutes such an “authority.” Therefore, its Motion will be denied.
It is unnecessary to address Halifax Community’s other argument because Plaintiffs do not
seek punitive damages against Halifax Community. (Doc. 1 at 22). Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Defendant Halifax Community’s Motion (Doc. 10) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 18, 2012.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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