Seoanes v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A.
Filing
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ORDER granting 16 Plaintiff's Motion for Remand. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 12/4/2013. (RTH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
OLGA SEOANES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 6:13-cv-1568-Orl-37GJK
CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA) N.A.,
Defendant.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the following:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand and Incorporated Memorandum of Law
(Doc. 16), filed November 8, 2013; and
2.
Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
(Doc. 19), filed November 22, 2013.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for remand is due to be
granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially brought this action in state court, alleging that Defendant, in an
effort to collect a $439 debt, falsely reported to consumer reporting agencies that
Plaintiff was deceased. (See Doc. 2, ¶¶ 6–27.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s
collection practices violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”),
Fla. Stat. § 559.72, and amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion
of privacy, and slander of credit. (Id. ¶¶ 28–55.) Plaintiff claims to have sustained
damages including “economic damages, mental pain and suffering, emotional distress,
mental anguish, inconvenience, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life.” (Id. ¶ 48.)
The Complaint requests, inter alia, statutory damages, actual damages, and attorney’s
fees. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff sent Defendant a demand letter offering to settle this case for $70,000
plus satisfaction of the $439 debt. (See Doc. 1-3, p. 2.) The demand letter indicated that
Plaintiff “firmly believe[d] [$70,000] is well below what a jury will award” and that Plaintiff
intended to seek punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees. (Id.) Defendant permitted
the settlement offer to expire and then requested Plaintiff to stipulate that damages in
this action will not exceed $75,000. (See Doc. 1-3, pp. 2–6.) Plaintiff declined to
respond to Defendant’s stipulation request. (See id.)
Defendant removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (See
Doc. 1.) Plaintiff moves to remand to state court, arguing that the amount in controversy
does not exceed $75,000. (See Doc. 14.) Defendant opposes. (See Doc. 22.) This
matter is now ripe for the Court’s adjudication.
STANDARDS
Removal jurisdiction exists where a state-court claim could have been brought
originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In diversity cases, district courts have
original jurisdiction over actions in which the parties are completely diverse and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The removing party
bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). Where removal is premised on diversity jurisdiction
and a complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages, the removing party “must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional requirement [of $75,000].” Allen v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 155
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F. App’x 480, 481 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319). Uncertainties
concerning jurisdiction are resolved in favor of remand. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co.,
31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
The court may look to the complaint, notice of removal, and any other relevant
papers revealing that the amount in controversy is satisfied. See Pretka v. Kolter City
Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 755 (11th Cir. 2010). Settlement offers or demand letters
qualify as other relevant papers. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1213
n.62 (11th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that complete diversity exists in this action: Plaintiff is a Florida
citizen and Defendant is a national banking association organized and headquartered in
Virginia. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 4–6; Doc. 16, p. 1.) Thus, the sole question for the purpose of
this motion is whether the Defendant has established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Williams, 239 F.3d at
1319. Defendant contends that “the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, combined with
Plaintiff’s settlement demand and refusal to stipulate that the amount in controversy
does not exceed $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs, and later withdrawal of the
settlement demand on the grounds that it had expired[,] demonstrate that it is more
likely than not that the minimum amount in controversy is present.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 9.) The
Court disagrees.
First, Defendant overemphasizes the significance of Plaintiff’s settlement offer.
“Settlement offers commonly reflect puffing and posturing,” especially where they lack
“specific information to support the plaintiff’s claim for damages.” Diaz v. Big Lots
Stores, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-319-Oc-32HBT, 2010 WL 6793850, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5,
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2010) (quoting Jackson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281
(S.D. Ala. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such threadbare offers are entitled
to little weight when determining the amount in controversy because the Court cannot
determine whether they represent “reasonable assessment[s] of the value of [a
plaintiff’s] claim.”
Id. Here, Plaintiff’s demand letter contains a wholly unsupported
settlement offer, in which Plaintiff offers to settle this action for $70,000 based solely on
her “firm belief” that the request is reasonable. (See Doc. 1-3, p. 2.) The Court does not
share plaintiff’s counsel’s “firm belief.” Significantly, the demand letter does not include
any indication of how Plaintiff reached the $70,000 figure. (See id. at 2) In fact, aside
from a single reference to a “debt” between the parties, the demand letter never
addresses the nature of the Plaintiff’s claims, nor does it provide any factual information
in support of her alleged damages. (See id.) Without more, the Court cannot determine
whether the jurisdictional threshold has been met. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1215
(noting that courts should not speculate as to whether the amount-in-controversy
requirement has been met and that “the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined
by looking into the stars”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s bare-boned, unspecific settlement
offer is entitled to little weight in the Court’s amount-in-controversy calculation.
Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s “withdrawal of the settlement demand
on the grounds that it had expired” indicates that the actual amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 9.) To the contrary, the email
exchange attached to Defendant’s Notice of Removal indicates that Plaintiff continually
attempted to elicit settlement offers from Defendant after Plaintiff’s offer had expired.
(See Doc. 1-3, p. 4.) Moreover, by this stage of the discussions, Plaintiff’s counsel had
conceded that this case should settle for less than the original $70,000 settlement offer.
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(See id. at 2, 4 (communicating to counsel for Defendant that “this case would settle for
less than $70k and you know it”).) Thus, in contrast to Defendant’s contentions,
Plaintiff’s conduct following expiration of the original settlement offer suggests that the
amount in controversy falls below this Court’s jurisdictional threshold.
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s refusal to stipulate that the amount in
controversy does not exceed $75,000 further evinces that the jurisdictional requirement
has been met in this case. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17–18.) Indeed, “a plaintiff’s refusal to
stipulate or admit that she is not seeking damages in excess of the requisite amount
should be considered when assessing the amount in controversy.” Devore v.
Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court takes a dim view of the transparent
retreat from the valuation of the amount in controversy by the plaintiff to avoid the
federal forum, “[t]here are several reasons why a plaintiff would not so stipulate, and a
refusal to stipulate standing alone does not satisfy [Defendant’s] burden of proof on the
jurisdictional issue.” Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320. Here, Plaintiff simply avoided the
question, not a laudable practice, but not illuminating on the amount in controversy
issue. (See Doc. 1-3, p. 4 (showing that Plaintiff’s counsel responded to Defendant’s
final request to stipulate to damages by sending a one-line email asking, “Why won’t
your client make an offer to settle?”).) In this context, Plaintiff’s failure to stipulate to
damages does not support a finding that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional requirement, especially given Plaintiff’s demonstrated willingness to
resolve this case for less than the original $70,000 demand.
Finally, Defendant has not provided objective evidence from which the Court can
determine whether the specific allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint gave rise to injuries
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sufficient to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court can employ its
“judicial experience and common sense” to assess the value of Plaintiff’s claim. See
Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1062 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this
assessment, the amount in controversy is not established.
In summary, having considered the totality of the circumstances in this case, the
Court concludes that Defendant has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. This case
is therefore due to be remanded.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand (Doc. 16) is GRANTED.
2. This action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial
Circuit in and for Seminole County, Florida.
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on December 4, 2013.
Copies:
Counsel of Record
The Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Seminole County, Florida
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