The Windward on Lake Conway Condominium Association, Inc. v. United National Insurance Company et al
Filing
60
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendant United National Insurance Company's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43 ). See Order for details. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 11/13/2015. (SN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
THE WINDWARD ON LAKE CONWAY
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 6:14-cv-607-Orl-37KRS
UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY; and APPALACHIAN
UNDERWRITERS, INC.
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the following:
1.
Defendant United National Insurance Company’s Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 43), filed March 2, 2015;
2.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant United National
Insurance Company’s Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46),
filed March 16, 2015;
3.
Defendant United National Insurance Company’s Reply Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48), filed March 30,
2015; and
4.
Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing Supplemental Authority (Doc. 52), filed
September 3, 2015.
BACKGROUND
Presently, there are two issues before the Court: (1) first, whether a surplus line
commercial insurance policy on specified buildings in a condominium complex—Policy
No. VB0762792 (“Policy”)—covers losses that the insured suffered when a tornado
struck the complex in March 2013; and (2) second—if the Policy does not cover the
losses—whether the insured is entitled to equitable remedies. (See Doc. 2.) Defendant
United National Insurance Company (“United”) raises these two issues in its Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 43.) The insured—The Windward on Lake Conway
Condominium Association, Inc. (“Windward”)—filed a response (Doc. 46), and United
replied (Doc. 48). Upon consideration, the Court finds that the first issue is due to be
resolved in favor of United as a matter of law, but questions of fact concerning the second
issue cannot be resolved without a bench trial.
THE FACTS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO WINDWARD 1
I.
United’s Issuance of the Policy
Windward owns real and personal property located in Belle Isle, Florida, which it
has developed as a condominium complex. (See Doc. 2, ¶ 2; Doc. 8, ¶ 2.) In the spring
of 2011, Windward engaged the services of Underwood Insurance Agency (“Agent”) to
obtain commercial insurance coverage—including wind coverage—for the complex,
1
In resolving United’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court has construed the
record evidence in the light most favorable to Windward—the non-moving party. See
Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court’s review of the
record evidence was greatly complicated by the parties’ duplicative submissions of
virtually every document at issue. To simplify matters for the reader, the Court selected
one version of each document and endeavored to cite to that document throughout this
Order. Going forward, the parties are directed to cease filing duplicative and poor-quality
documents with the Court.
2
which was vacant at the time. (See Doc. 44-14, 7:23–9:15; Doc. 46, p. 14 (admitting that
“[t]he parties understood, intended and agreed at the initial underwriting in 2011 that the
[premises] were vacant”); see also Doc. 44-1, 17:11–18:2).) In a written application,
Windward’s “primary operations” were described as five “buildings” which were built in
2009 and included twenty-nine condominium “units” (“Premises”). (See Doc. 42-7
(“Application”); Doc. 44-14, 10:6–10:17, 16:15–16:23; see also Doc. 42-19, pp. 2, 16, 17
(listing addresses for each of the five buildings).) The “Property Section” of the Application
further advised that the “units” were “being sold.” (Doc. 42-7, p. 5.)
Agent
submitted
the
Application
to
an
insurance
broker—Appalachian
Underwriters, Inc. (“Broker”)—and Broker submitted the Application to United. (See
Doc. 44-14, 10:6–10:17, 16:15–16:23; see also Doc. 44-1, 9:3–9:19, 13:10–14:6, 15:1–
15:20, 18:16–18:23.) United accepted the Application and issued a “surplus line” quote
(“Quote”). 2 (See Doc. 44-2, pp. 122–25; Doc. 44-1, 19:1–19:2, 144:7–145:3.) Broker
provided the Quote to Agent, who presented the Quote to Windward; Windward accepted
the Quote and its acceptance was relayed to United through Agent and Broker; and
United then issued the Policy for a one-year term from June 16, 2011 through June 16,
2012 (“Initial Coverage Period”). 3 (See Doc. 42-11 (providing a copy of the Policy initially
2
“Surplus-lines insurance is a type of insurance that a potential insured may obtain
when the general-lines insurance market fails to provide a policy to cover the type of risk
involved. See § 626.916(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) (requiring that general-lines agents make
a certified, diligent effort to obtain coverage from the general-lines market before resorting
to the surplus-lines market).” Essex Ins. Co. v. Zota, 985 So. 2d 1036, 1040 n.2
(Fla. 2008). Broker testified that vacant buildings “typically gravitate” to surplus lines
insurance policies due to the high risk involved in insuring unoccupied buildings. (See
Doc. 44-3, 34:3–7.)
3 The Policy includes a Surplus Lines License Information page as well as a notice
to Florida policyholders regarding mandatory fees due to the insured’s Surplus Lines
Insurance Agent. (See Doc. 42-11, pp. 3, 11.)
3
issued by United); Doc. 44-1, 19:9–19:24; 44-14, 21:6–21:15; see also Doc. 8, ¶ 5).)
The Policy—which cost Windward approximately $20,000.00 in premiums—
obligated United to “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to” to the Premises “caused
by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.”4 (Doc. 42-19, p. 18.) Through an
endorsement—Form EPB-115—United’s obligation to pay for such loss was conditioned
on the requirement that the Premises remain “vacant” during the Initial Coverage Period
(“Vacancy Requirement”). (See Doc. 42-11, p. 52.) The Vacancy Requirement provides
that United “will not pay for loss or damage at any designated premises that is not vacant
when the loss or damage occurs.” (Id.) For purposes of the Vacancy Requirement, a
building is not “vacant when any portion of it is used for any activity whatsoever except
showing it to prospective buyers or renters for the purpose of selling or leasing it”
(“Vacancy Definition”). (Id.)
Although the Premises were vacant during the initial underwriting in 2011, during
the Initial Coverage Period, Windward sold individual condominium units and provided
documentation of such sales to Broker to transmit to United. (See Doc. 46, pp. 1–2; see
also Doc. 42-2, 199:16–199:24.) Consistent with their practice during the underwriting
process, United and Windward communicated exclusively through Agent and Broker
4
This coverage provision is included in the Building and Personal Property
Coverage Form of the Policy—CP 00 10 (“Property Form”). (Doc. 42-11, p. 19.) “Covered
Property” included “the building(s) or structure(s) described in the Declarations” (id.
at 19), and the Declarations in turn described the Premises (see id. at 3, 7, 17–18).
“Covered Causes of Loss” meant “risks of direct physical loss” not excluded in section B
or limited in section C of the “Causes of Loss - Special Form of the Policy”—CP 10 30.
(See id. at 34; see also Doc. 42-19, pp. 2, 6, 16–18, 33 (providing corresponding policy
terms in Policy issued after renewal).)
4
during and after the Initial Coverage Period. (See Doc. 42-2, 199:16–199:24; Doc. 44-1,
p. 142:19–143:15.)
II.
Renewal of the Policy
Through Agent and Broker, Windward applied for a renewal of the Policy in 2012
and it provided information to Agent concerning occupancy rates at the Premises; based
on that information—which Agent transmitted to Broker—Broker advised United that the
Premises had a thirty-five to forty percent occupancy rate. (See Doc. 44-1, pp. 39–40;
Doc. 44-2, pp. 19–24 (“Second Application”); see also Doc. 46, pp. 2, 14.) In exchange
for another $20,000.00 in premiums from Windward, United issued the Policy for another
one-year term from June 16, 2012 through June 16, 2013 (“Renewal Coverage
Period”). (Doc. 42-19 (providing a copy of the renewed Policy).) Despite apparent
knowledge that the Premises could not satisfy the Vacancy Definition, United did not
remove the Vacancy Requirement when it issued the Policy for the Renewal Coverage
Period. (See id. at 34.)
Windward continued to sell condominium units during the Renewal Coverage
Period, and on March 20, 2013, Agent sent Broker an e-mail advising that: “the buildings
are now occupied and United . . . had them rated as ‘unoccupied’ during” the Renewal
Coverage Period. (Doc. 42-21, p. 1 (“March 2013 E-mail”).) The March 2013 E-mail
further advises that “we will need that revised” and reiterates that the “units are 85%
occupied so no longer considered vacant.” (Id.) The March 2013 E-mail concludes with a
request to “please make sure the applications are updated to reflect this major change in
underwriting as to occupancy code. 100% sprinklered, new construction, now 85%
occupied.” (Id.)
5
III.
The Loss and Claim
Approximately four days after Agent sent Broker the March 2013 E-mail, a tornado
struck the Premises and caused water intrusion and damage to the roof of one of the five
buildings (“Damaged Property”). (Doc. 45, ¶ 11.) Windward ultimately spent more than
$100,000 to repair the Damaged Property (“Loss”), and it submitted a claim to United
for the Loss (“Claim”). (See id.) Initially, United: (1) denied that a tornado was even in
the area at the time Windward claimed; (2) denied that the Loss exceeded the deductible
for the Policy; and (3) asserted that any roof damage was caused by faulty installation.
(Doc. 44-14, 90:2–91:10, 102:10–102:21, 172:3–172:24.) Ultimately, in correspondence
dated April 16, 2013, United relied on the Vacancy Requirement to deny the Claim. (See
Doc. 44-9, pp. 2–4 (“April 2013 Denial”); see also Doc. 8, ¶¶ 15–16, 20–21, 35, 65.)
Several weeks after the April 2013 Denial, Broker requested that United endorse
the Policy to remove the “vacancy clause” and add an occupancy rate of more than 70
percent. 5 (Doc. 42-22.) United issued the requested endorsement—Policy Change
No. 3—which had an effective date of May 1, 2013, and removed: (1) the Vacancy
Requirement; (2) six other forms (CP0450, CP1056, EPA1619, EPB100, EPB102, and
EPB145); and (3) the warranty providing that “Vacant Building is fully locked and secured
to prevent unauthorized entry.” (See Doc. 42-19, p. 3.)
5
Broker testified during deposition that it did not consider Agent’s March 2013
E-mail to be a definitive request to remove the Vacancy Requirement from the Policy
because it was not specific enough to constitute an endorsement request. (See Doc. 42-4
at 54:4–54:22, 55:14–55:23, 56:12–56:15, 60:18–60:22, 64:24–66:7, 72:17–72:22, 76:3–
76:15, 107:11–107:16. 142:11–142:15.)
6
IV.
This Action
Dissatisfied with the denial of its Claim, Windward initiated this action in state court
against United and Broker. (Doc. 2.) On April 17, 2014, the action was removed to this
Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Windward asserts two negligence claims
against Broker (Counts V & VI (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 73–100)), and it asserts four claims against
United for breach of contract (Count I), declaratory judgment as to coverage (Count II),
reformation (Count III), and rescission (Count IV). (id., ¶¶ 8–72.) Broker asserted a
crossclaim seeking contractual and common law indemnification from United for
Windward’s claims (“Crossclaim”). (See Doc. 8, pp. 10–14.) On December 17, 2014, this
Court entered an Order abating the Crossclaim and Windward’s claims against Broker
pending resolution of Windward’s claims against United. (Doc. 39.)
On March 2, 2015, United moved for summary judgment (Doc. 43), Windward
responded (Doc. 46), and United replied (Doc. 48). On September 4, 2015, the parties
appeared before the Court and argued their respective positions, and the Court took the
matter under advisement. (Doc. 53.) As noted above and further explained below,
Defendant has not prevailed entirely on its Motion; thus, the Court will hold a final pretrial
conference on November 16, 2015, and a bench trial is presently set for the December
7, 2015 trial term. (Docs. 54, 57.)
STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A movant carries its burden by showing that there is
an absence of evidence supporting the non-movant’s case. Denney v. City of Albany,
7
247 F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001). The burden then shifts to the non-movant, who
must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show a genuine issue
for trial. Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). A genuine dispute of material
fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” for the
non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Which facts are
material depends on the underlying substantive law. Id. As previously noted (supra
note 1), the Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Battle, 468 F.3d at 759.
However, the Court should not deny summary judgment “when the inferences that are
drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relies, are ‘implausible.’” Mize
v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996).
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Claims
Windward asserts its legal claims against United in Counts I and II of the
Complaint. 6 (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 8–45.) Because the facts concerning Counts I and II are not in
dispute, 7 Windward cannot prevail on either claim unless its interpretation of the Policy—
particularly the Vacancy Requirement—is correct.
6
In Count I, Windward claims that United breached the Policy when it denied the
Claim, and Windward suffered damages as a result of the breach. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 8–30.) In
Count II, Windward seeks several declarations concerning the Policy, including that the
Vacancy Requirement either is invalid and unenforceable or it is ambiguous and must be
construed in favor of Windward. (See id. ¶¶ 37–43.)
7 Specifically, during the Renewal Coverage Period (in March 2013), a building
identified on the Declarations to the Policy—which was not vacant—suffered direct
physical damage (water incursion and roof damage) due to a “Covered Cause of Loss”
(a tornado).
8
Interpretation of insurance policies is a question of law to be resolved by the Court,
who must read the Policy “as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning
and operative effect.” See Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007)); James
River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
Generally, plain meaning controls, and the Court “may resort to construction” only if the
Policy language “in its ordinary meaning is indefinite, ambiguous, or equivocal.” See U.S.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Morejon, 338 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); see also Fayad v.
Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005). Policy language is
ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing
coverage and the [other] limiting coverage.” Westport Ins. Corp. v. VN Hotel Grp., LLC,
513 F. App’x 927, 931 (11th Cir. 2013). Finally, the Court must strictly construe
ambiguous provisions “in favor of coverage”—especially if the ambiguous provision is part
of an exclusionary clause. See Morales, 714 F.3d at 1227 (citing Swire Pac. Holdings,
Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003)); Fayad, 899 So. 2d at 1086 (citing
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000)).
United argues that the Policy is unambiguous, and coverage is excluded when the
plain meaning of the Vacancy Requirement is given effect. (Doc. 43, pp. 9–13.) Windward
counters that the Vacancy Requirement creates a latent ambiguity and should therefore
be interpreted in its favor. (See Doc. 46, p. 4–12.) Only United’s argument is supported
by the crucial language, which is clear on its face and excludes coverage for Windward’s
Loss—United “will not pay” for loss “at any designated premises” if—when the loss
occurs—“any portion” of a building “is used for any activity whatsoever except showing it
9
to prospective buyers or renters for the purpose of selling or leasing it.” 8 (Doc. 42-19,
p. 53.)
Notwithstanding this definite and unequivocal language, Windward contends that
the Vacancy Requirement is subject to a different interpretation—namely that the terms
“designated premises” and “building” refer only to the “common elements” of the
Premises—not the condominium units. (See Doc. 46, p. 8.) Since only the condominium
units were occupied, Windward contends that the Vacancy Requirement would not
exclude coverage as to the “common elements.” (See id.) This interpretation simply is not
supported by the Policy language. The Policy does not reference individual units; rather,
it defines the Covered Property as five individual buildings located at five distinct physical
addresses. (Doc. 42-19, p. 23.) Further, even if the Court were to look only to the common
elements of the building, the record does not support a finding that no portion of the
common elements was used for any activity other “than display to prospective buyers and
renters.” Thus, even under Windward’s alternative reading, the Vacancy Requirement
would still exclude coverage for the Loss. 9
8
E.g., Gas Kwick, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 58 F.3d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1995)
(affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment and construing “no ambiguity in
the language of the vacancy exclusion”), Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co.,
162 So. 3d 183, 188 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (concluding that the vacancy exclusion was
“clear on its face”), Sunrise Sports Cars, Inc. v. Britamco Underwriters, Inc.,
782 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (concluding that “the trial court correctly
found that the building was indeed vacant for purposes of the exclusionary clause of the
policy”).
9 The Court also is not persuaded by Windward’s argument that Florida’s
Condominium Act requires departure from the plain reading of the Policy. Windward
represents that Florida Statutes § 718.103 and § 718.111(1) require that condominium
associations insure only common areas and exclude individually owned units from
association coverage. Id. However, Chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes, which is “aptly
titled the ‘Condominium Act,’” only regulates the insurance obligations of condominium
associations, not insurers,” and is inapplicable here. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. River
10
Finally, the Court also rejects Windward’s argument that the Court must find
coverage under the Policy because: (1) application of the Vacancy Requirement renders
the coverage under the Policy illusory; and (2) the Application irreconcilably conflicts with,
and provides greater coverage than, the Policy. (See Doc. 46, pp. 8–10.) “When
limitations or exclusions completely contradict the insuring provisions” the coverage is
merely illusory. See Interline Brands, Inc. v. Charits Speciality Ins. Co., 749 F.3d 962, 966
(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 698 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla.
2d DCA 1997). Similarly, when the provisions of an application for an insurance policy
and the provisions of the policy “irreconcilably conflict, the policy provision will usually
govern”—unless “reliance on the provisions of the application would result in greater
indemnity.” See Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 273 So.2d 111,
113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
According to Windward, the following provisions of the Application irreconcilably
conflict with the Vacancy Requirement: (1) the description of Windward’s operations as
“residential;” (2) the description of the Premises as “very well maintained;” (3) the
disclosure that units “were being sold by developer;” and (4) the unchecked box next to
the option to attach a “Vacant Building Supplement.” (See Doc. 46, pp. 9–10; Doc. 44-6,
pp. 2–8.) Windward also notes that the buildings are not described as “vacant” in the
Application. (See id.) The Court does not agree that these provisions foreclose the
Vacancy Requirement.
The Policy neither prohibited Windward from maintaining a residential operation,
nor selling individual condominium units. Indeed, the Policy allowed Windward to “[show
Manor Condo. Ass’n, 125 So. 3d 846, 850–51, 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
11
the Premises] to prospective buyers or renters for the purpose of selling or leasing it.”
(Doc. 42-19, p. 53 (emphasis added).) Further, because the Policy lists five separate
buildings in its schedule of covered premises, (Doc. 42-19, p. 17; see also id. pp. 2, 16),
the Court is persuaded by United’s argument that the sale and occupancy of units in one
building did not exclude coverage on other buildings. (Doc. 48, p. 3.) As such, the
Application and the Policy do not irreconcilably conflict, and the Policy is not illusory. 10
Because the Vacancy Requirement is unambiguous and the parties do not dispute
that the Damaged Building was not “vacant” at the time of the Loss, Windward cannot
prevail on Counts I or II as a matter of law, and United’s Motion is due to be granted as
to these legal claims. 11
II.
Equitable Claims
In Counts III and IV, Windward asserts claims in equity for reformation and
rescission. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 46–72.) Under Florida law, “[r]eformation of a contract is proper if
the plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the contract is the product
of (1) the parties’ mutual mistake, or (2) a mistake on the part of one party coupled with
the inequitable conduct on the part of the other party.” Bone & Joint Treatment Ctrs. of
Am. v. HealthTronics Surgical Servs, Inc., 114 So. 3d 363, 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). The
equitable remedy of rescission is available “upon satisfactory proof of a mistake or other
10
Windward argues that “United’s interpretation of the [Vacancy Requirement]
would permit the developer to show units to potential buyers, but would void all insurance
if the developer actually followed through after a showing to complete a sale.” (Doc. 46,
p. 11.) The Court again declines to “add meaning that is not present” to the Policy. See
Taurus, 913 So. 2d at 532.
11 United offers two alternative arguments in the event that “the Court determines
that there is any degree of coverage under the 2012–2013 Policy for Windward’s [L]oss.”
(Doc. 43, p. 22–24.) Because the Court determines there is no coverage for Windward’s
Loss under the Policy, it declines to address these alternative arguments.
12
ground upon which relief can be granted.” Flynt v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,
980 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Rescission may be granted if a contract is
entered based on a mutual mistake that goes to “the essence of the contract.” See
Keystone Creations, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 890 So. 2d 1119, 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA
2004). Additionally, “Florida law permits a party to rescind a contract based on unilateral
mistake unless the mistake results from an inexcusable lack of due care or unless the
other party has so detrimentally relied on the contract it would be inequitable to order
rescission.” Flynt, 980 So.2d at 1219.
United moves for summary judgment on Windward’s equitable claims on the
ground that: (1) first, Windward has not met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, the existence of mutual mistake and/or unilateral mistake coupled with
inequitable conduct that would warrant reformation; and (2) second, Windward has not
shown any requisite ground to support rescission. (See Doc. 43, pp. 14, 22.) Windward
counters that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment
on its equitable claims. (Doc. 46, pp. 14, 18) The Court agrees with Windward.
Construed in the light most favorable to Windward, the record reveals that when
United issued the Policy, it knew the Policy should not have included the Vacancy
Requirement. (See Doc. 44-1, 79:10–13, 8:11–19, 106:20–25.) Additionally, Agent
testified that the March 2013 E-mail to Broker was an explicit request for immediate
removal of the Vacancy Requirement from the Policy. (Doc. 44-14, 71:20–72:4, 82:11–
84:7.) United’s arguments to the contrary12 raise questions of fact that cannot be resolved
12
For instance, United maintains that it received neither written notification that the
Premises were occupied nor instruction to remove the Vacancy Requirement until after
the Loss. (Doc. 44-8, 87:8–25). Further, Broker testified that the March 2013 E-mail was
13
by the Court on summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As such, United’s motion
for summary judgment on Windward’s equitable claims is due to be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
Defendant United National Insurance Company’s Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART.
a.
The Motion is GRANTED as to Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
b.
2.
In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Clerk is DIRECTED
to enter judgment in favor of Defendant United National Insurance Company
and against Plaintiff The Windward on Lake Conway Condominium
Association, Inc. on Counts I and II of the Complaint (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 8–45.)
3.
The Court will conduct a bench trial on Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. The Court will set a date certain for the bench trial at the Final
Pretrial Conference.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on November 13, 2015.
not sufficiently specific to constitute a request for removal of the Vacancy Requirement.
(Doc. 42-4 at 54:4–54:22, 55:14–55:23, 56:12–56:15, 60:18–60:22, 64:24–66:7, 72:17–
72:22, 76:3–76:15, 107:11–107:16. 142:11–142:15.)
14
Copies:
Counsel of Record
15
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