Cook v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION: The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Claimant and against the Commissioner, and to close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Kelly on 12/9/2015. (PAB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
KEVIN MATTHEW COOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:14-cv-1508-Orl-GJK
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Kevin Matthew Cook (the “Claimant”) appeals from a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. Doc. No. 1. Claimant alleges an onset of disability as of May 7,
2011, primarily due to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety, depression, and
orthopedic issues. R. 70, 103, 104, 198-199. Claimant argues that the Administrative Law Judge
(the “ALJ”) erred by failing to apply the correct legal standards to the opinions of Claimant’s
treating psychiatrist, Dr. James A. Hunt, by generally giving his medical opinions great weight,
but then failing to account for all the limitations contained within his opinions in the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity assessment (the “RFC”). Doc. No. 15 at 20-23.1 For the reasons that follow,
the Commissioner’s final decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
Claimant also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to: find Claimant’s PTSD and attention deficit disorder to be
severe impairments at step-two of the sequential evaluation process; and articulate explicit and adequate reasons for
finding Claimant’s subjective allegations not credible. Doc. No. 15 at 15-18, 31-33. However, for reasons set forth
below, the ALJ’s handling of Dr. Hunt’s opinions is determinative.
1
I.
THE ALJ’S FIVE-STEP DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS.
Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration has
established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). In Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th
Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit explained the five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:
In order to receive disability benefits, the claimant must prove at
step one that he is not undertaking substantial gainful activity. At
step two, the claimant must prove that he is suffering from a severe
impairment or combination of impairments. At step three, if the
claimant proves that his impairment meets one of the listed
impairments found in Appendix 1, he will be considered disabled
without consideration of age, education, and work experience. If
the claimant cannot prove the existence of a listed impairment, he
must prove at step four that his impairment prevents him from
performing his past relevant work. At the fifth step, the regulations
direct the Commissioner to consider the claimant’s residual
functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience to
determine whether the claimant can perform other work besides his
past relevant work.
Id. at 1278 (citations omitted). The steps are followed in order. If it is determined that the
claimant is not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will not go on to the next
step.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do
more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th
Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937
F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District
Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and
even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision.
Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The
District Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well
as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835,
837 (11th Cir. 1992) (court must scrutinize the entire record to determine reasonableness of factual
findings); Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (court also must consider
evidence detracting from evidence on which Commissioner relied). The District Court “‘may not
decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].’” See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
III.
ANALYSIS.
At the center of this dispute is the ALJ’s handling of the opinion evidence from Claimant’s
treating psychiatrist, Dr. James A. Hunt. Doc. No. 15 at 20-30. The record before the ALJ
contains three (3) medical opinions from Dr. Hunt, who treated Claimant approximately fortythree (43) times from June 10, 2010 through August 16, 2013 (R. 555-72). R. 491-93 (August
21, 2012), 499-501 (June 28, 2013), 580-81 (June 10, 2010). Dr. Hunt’s opinions are the only
medical opinions in the record from a treating or consultative examining physician related to
Claimant’s mental health impairments and limitations. The record does contain a mental residual
functional capacity assessment (“MRFC”) and Psychiatric Review Technique (“PRT”) from Dr.
James Mendelson, a non-examining physician. R. 93-94 (PRT), 98-100 (“MRFC”).2
2
See Shafarz v. Bowen, 825 F.3d 278, 279-80 (11th Cir. 1987) (opinion of a non-examining physician does not
establish the good cause necessary to reject the opinion of a treating physician); Magill v. Commissioner of Social
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Claimant raises two somewhat distinct allegations of error with respect to Dr. Hunt’s
opinions. Doc. No. 15 at 20-23. First, Claimant argues the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal
standards to Dr. Hunt’s opinions by giving them “great weight,” but then failed to account for or
otherwise address portions of those opinions that were more restrictive than the ALJ’s ultimate
RFC. Doc. No. 15 at 21. Thus, although the ALJ generally gave Dr. Hunt’s opinions “great
weight,” Claimant maintains that by failing to address those portions of the opinions that conflict
with the ALJ’s RFC, the ALJ failed to comply with the legal requirement that the ALJ state with
particularity the weight given to medical opinions and the reasons therefor.
Id.
Second,
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred by giving “great weight” to Dr. Mendelson’s opinion and
incorporating the limitations contained therein into the ALJ’s RFC because Dr. Mendelson’s
opinions conflict with Dr. Hunt’s opinions, and the opinions of a non-examining are not good
cause to reject the opinions of a treating physician. Doc. No. 15 at 21-22. Therefore, in short,
Claimant argues the ALJ failed to adequate address conflicts in the medical opinions at issue.
The Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ gave Dr. Hunt’s opinion “great weight,”
and that some of Dr. Hunt’s opinion’s conflict with the ALJ’s ultimate RFC. Doc. No. 15 at 2325. However, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ also “provided reasons for rejecting some
of his opinions,” which the Commissioner contends are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at
25.
The Commissioner also maintains that Dr. Hunt’s opinions do not conflict with Dr.
Mendelson’s opinions. Doc. No. 15 at 30.
Weighing the opinions and findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians
is an integral part of steps four and five of the ALJ’s sequential evaluation process for determining
Security, 147 F. App’x 92, 95 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (same); Spencer ex rel. Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d
1090, 1094 (11th Cir. 1985) (opinions of a non-examining physician do not constitute substantial evidence upon which
to base a decision when standing alone).
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disability.
In cases like this one, involving the ALJ’s handling of such medical opinions,
“substantial-evidence review . . . involves some intricacy.” Gaskin v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 533 F. App’x. 929, 931 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) (unpublished). 3 In Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit held that
whenever a physician offers a statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis; what the claimant can still
do despite his or her impairments, and the claimant’s physical and mental restrictions, the
statement constitutes an opinion, which requires the the ALJ to state with particularity the weight
given to it and the reasons therefor. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2);
Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987)). “‘In the absence of such a statement, it
is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the
claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence.’” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting
Cowart v. Schwieker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). See also MacGregor v. Bowen, 786
F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (failure to state with particularity the weight given to opinions
and the reasons therefor constitutes reversible error).
On June 10, 2010, Dr. Hunt provided a Medical Assessment of Ability to Do Work Related
Activities (Mental). R. 580-81. In it, Dr. Hunt opines that Claimant retains a fair ability to: relate
to co-workers; deal with the public; use judgment; interact with supervisor(s); deal with work
stresses; maintain attention/concentration; behave in an emotionally stable manner; and relate
predictably in social situations. R. 580-81. “Fair” is defined as “ability to function in this area
is seriously limited, but not precluded.” R. 580 (emphasis added). Dr. Hunt bases his opinions
on medical findings that Claimant is emotionally labile and irritable. R. 581. Dr. Hunt opines
3
In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished decisions are not binding, but are persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 362.
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that Claimant retains a good ability to: follow work rules; function independently; demonstrate
reliability. R. 580-81. “Good” is defined as “ability to function in this area is limited by
satisfactory.” R. 580. Dr. Hunt further opines that Claimant is unlimited or has a very good
ability to: understand, remember and carry out complex job instructions; and maintain personal
appearance. R. 581.
On August 21, 2012, Dr. Hunt provided a Treating Source Mental Status Report. R. 49193. Dr. Hunt opines that Claimant’s current mood and affect are: “Bright at times, frustrated at
other times. Easily becomes angry and talks of physical confrontation.” R. 491. Claimant has
organized and relevant thought process with no delusions or hallucinations, but Claimant is
“usually focused on how others have mistreated him.” R. 492. Claimant complains of poor
concentration and memory since a head injury in 2011, but is oriented and there was no evidence
of the same during the evaluation. R. 492. Claimant display anxious behavior and increased
psychomotor movement.
R. 492.
Dr. Hunt diagnosed Claimant with dysthymic disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, attention deficit disorder, and characterizing disorder with
impulsivity and histrionic traits. R 492. Dr. Hunt opines that Claimant’s prognosis is guarded.
R. 492. Claimant is capable of managing his own funds and “can perform activities of daily
living,” but Claimant has had a “multitude of jobs” because he is “unable to keep [them] due to
emotional lability.” R. 493. Dr. Hunt ultimately opines that Claimant is capable of sustaining
work activity for eight hours a day, five days a week, “if no one else is around.” R. 493.
On June 28, 2013, Dr. Hunt provided another Treating Source Mental Status Report. R.
499-501. Dr. Hunt opines that Claimant’s current mood and affect are: “Mood very labile –
Depressions vs agitation. Very angry.” R. 499. Claimant displayed normal thought process,
but his thought content had deteriorated to being unrealistic at times over feelings of unfair
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treatment by the court system. R. 500. Claimant’s concentration was adequate and he was
orientated with no significant loss in memory. R. 500. Claimant’s behavior was greatly agitated.
R. 500. Dr. Hunt diagnosed Claimant with PTSD secondary to 2011 motorcycle accident;
attention deficit disorder; and character disorder with impulsivity and poor judgment. R. 500.
Dr. Hunt opines that Claimant’s prognosis is guarded. R. 500. Dr. Hunter further opines that
Claimant is capable of managing his own funds, working around the house, and performing
“simple remodeling jobs.” R. 501. With respect to whether Claimant is capable of sustaining
work activity for eight hours a day, five days a week, Dr. Hunt opines that Claimant “has been
unable to keep job [secondary] to interpersonal conflicts.” R. 501.
Dr. Mendelson opined that Claimant is moderately limited in his ability to: interact with
the general public; work in coordination with or in proximity others without being distracted by
them; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and to get along
with coworkers or peers without distracting them or displaying behavioral extremes. R. 79-80.
In sum, Dr. Mendelson opined that Claimant is capable of performing simple, routine tasks with
“limited social interaction.” R. 80.
In the decision, the ALJ found at step-two of the sequential evaluation process that
Claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; degenerative joint
disease; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; depression; and anxiety. R. 110. At step-three,
the ALJ finds that Claimant has mild restrictions in activities of daily living, and moderate
difficulties with social functioning and in concentration, persistence or pace. R. 111. The ALJ
states that the “medical evidence does not indicate that the claimant experiences any marked
limitations in the functional areas.” R. 111.4
With respect to social functioning, the ALJ states:
According to the ALJ, a “marked limitation means more than moderate but less than extreme.” R. 111. As
described by the ALJ, the definition of marked is very similar to Dr. Hunt’s definition of “fair,” which is “ability to
4
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In regards to social interactions, the claimant testified that he had a
fiancé. The claimant also indicated that he went into public at least
once per week during trips to Wal-Mart. The claimant also testified
that he went to church two weeks prior to the hearing; however, he
left before the service ended. These facts show that the claimant
received treatment for mental health impairments and that the
claimant experiences some limitations; however, the evidence does
not indicate that the claimant experience marked functional
limitations.
R. 112. In making this finding and throughout the decision, the ALJ does not address Dr. Hunt’s
2010 medical opinion that Claimant is “seriously limited, but not precluded” in the ability to: relate
to coworkers, deal with the public, use judgment, interact with supervisor(s); deal with work
stresses; behave in an emotionally stable manner; or relate predictably in social situations. R.
580-81.
The ALJ determined that despite his impairments, the Claimant retains the ability to
perform the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the [ALJ] finds that
the claimant has the [RFC] to perform light work . . . except the
claimant is limited to frequent climbing of ramps and stairs,
occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and he should
avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor
ventilation. He is further limited to occupations that require only
the ability to understand and remember simple and more complex
instructions, procedures, and systems; and to sustain attention and
persist at routine repetitive tasks for two hour segments through an
eight hour day for a full workweek. He is able to interact, as
needed, with supervisors and coworkers in a task-orientated setting;
but should interact with the public no more than occasionally. He is
able to adapt to changes in the work schedule or process, if gradually
introduced.
R. 113 (emphasis added). Thus, the ALJ limited Claimant to a reduced range of light work. R.
113. As set forth above, the ALJ found that Claimant is “able to interact, as needed, with
function in this area is seriously limited, but not precluded.” R. 580.
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supervisors and coworkers in a task-orientated setting; but should interact with the public no more
than occasionally.” R. 113. On its face, this portion of the ALJ’s RFC conflicts with Dr. Hunt’s
opinions that: Claimant is capable of working only if no one else is around (R. 493); Claimant has
been unable to maintain employment due to interpersonal conflicts (R. 501); and Claimant is
seriously limited in the ability to interact with supervisors, deal with work stresses, relate to
coworkers, behaving an emotionally stable manners, relate predictable in social situations, and
deal with the public (R. 580-81). Thus, with respect to Claimant’s ability to interact with
supervisors, coworkers, and the public, Dr. Hunt’s opinions are more restrictive than the ALJ’s
RFC. In addition, the ALJ’s finding in the RFC, that Claimant is able to interact with supervisors
and coworkers as needed, but is limited to only occasional interaction with the public, also appears
less restrictive than Dr. Mendelson’s opinions, which also contained moderate limitations with
respect supervisors and coworkers. Compare R. 79-80 with R. 113.
The ALJ states the following with respect to Dr. Hunt’s opinions:
The record shows that the claimant has a history of receiving
treatment for mental health symptoms, including being irritable,
being easily angered, worrying, persistent sadness, prior to the
alleged onset date. The evidence shows that throughout the alleged
period of disability, the claimant has received treatment from James
Hunt, M.D. Dr. Hunt diagnosed the claimant with various mental
health impairments, including dysthymic disorder, attention deficit
disorder, impulsivity and histrionic traits, and PTSD. Additionally,
Dr. Hunt has counseled the claimant regarding multiple
environmental stressors including interpersonal conflicts with
friends and family, job problems, and legal issues.
During treatment, Dr. Hunt expressed multiple opinions regarding
the claimant’s ability to work. Great weight was given to these
opinions. In August 2012, Dr. Hunt noted the claimant complained
of poor concentration and poor memory since his head injury.
Despite these complaints, Dr. Hunt noted that the claimant showed
organized and relevant thought processes with no delusions or
hallucinations. Further, as noted above, a CT scan of the brain in
May 2011, showed no evidence of intracranial abnormality. At this
examination, Dr. Hunt opined that the claimant could perform
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activities of daily living and could perform work if no one else was
around. In June 2013, Dr. Hunt noted that the claimant’s mood was
labile, that the claimant was angry, and that he fluctuated between
depression and agitation. Dr. Hunt noted that the claimant
expressed unrealistic thoughts about the court system and indicated
that he was treated unfairly. Dr. Hunt indicated that the claimant
was unable to keep a job secondary to interpersonal conflict;
however, he also noted that the claimant was able to complete tasks
such as working around the house and completing a remodeling job.
Dr. Hunt also noted that the claimant demonstrated adequate
concentration and intact memory. Finally, in January 2014, Dr.
Hunt opined that claimant demonstrated considerable difficulty in
interpersonal relationships because he is quite emotionally labile,
easily irritated, and reacts inappropriately at times.
The [ALJ] considered the above evidence and incorporated Dr.
Hunt’s opinions by limiting the claimant to a task orientated work
setting with no more than occasional interaction with the public.
Additional limitations were not included because, despite the
claimant’s complaints of difficulty interacting with others, the
records show that he lived with his father and interacted with him
on a regular basis for an extended period and that he maintains a
relationship with a fiancé. The claimant also indicated that he went
into public settings on occasion including going to Wal-Mart and
going to church.
R. 116 (emphasis added). Thus, although the ALJ does not specifically discuss Dr. Hunt’s 2010
opinion (R. 580-81), the ALJ clearly recognized that Dr. Hunt expressed multiple opinions. R.
116. The ALJ gives Dr. Hunt’s opinions great weight, which includes a discussion of Dr. Hunt’s
opinion that Claimant was unable to keep a job secondary to interpersonal conflicts and that
Claimant can work only if no one else is around. R. 116. The ALJ then states that she
“incorporated Dr. Hunt’s opinions by limiting the claimant to a task orientated work setting with
no more than occasional interaction with the public.”
R. 116.
The following limitations
provided by Dr. Hunt are more restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC limitation to a task orientated work
setting with no more than occasional interaction with the public: serious limitation in the ability to
interact with supervisors, relate to coworkers, behave in in an emotionally stable manner, and relate
predictably in social situations (R. 580-81); capable of working eight hours a day, five days a week
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only “if no one else is around” (R. 493); and an inability to keep jobs secondary to interpersonal
conflicts (R. 501). R. 116. In short, the ALJ’s RFC fails to account for Dr. Hunt’s limitations
with respect to Claimant’s ability to interact with supervisors and coworkers.5
The ALJ next states that “[a]dditional limitations were not included because, despite the
claimant’s complaints of difficulty interacting with others, the records show that he lived with his
father and interacted with him on a regular basis for an extended period and that he maintains a
relationship with a fiancé,” and that Claimant was able, on occasion, to go to Walmart and attend
church. R. 116. This statement indicates that the ALJ implicitly gave less than great weight to
Dr. Hunt’s opinions related to Claimant’s ability to relate and interact with supervisors, coworkers,
and the public because Claimant was capable of living with his father, maintain a relationship with
his fiancé, and go to Walmart and attend church on occasion. R. 116.
With respect to Dr. Mendelson’s opinions, the ALJ states:
In formulating the [RFC], the [ALJ] also gave great weight to the
opinions of James Mendelson, Ph.D. Dr. Mendelson opined that
the claimant was capable of comprehending and remembering both
uncomplicated and more complex instructions, procedures and
systems. Dr. Mendelson opined that the claimant’s ability to attend
and persist for two hour intervals while accomplishing job tasks
consisting of straightforward, recurring, and uniform steps was not
seriously limited. Dr. Mendelson opined that the claimant had the
ability to communicate about specific aspects of task-orientated
employment and abide by standards governing basic conduct.
Finally, Dr. Mendelson opined that the claimant did not have
limitations in his capacity to appreciate occupational safety
guidelines, secure transportation job site, and do basic planning for
work activities. The [RFC] has accounted for these opinions as
well.
R. 117. Thus, the ALJ also gave great weight to Dr. Mendelson’s opinions, but the ALJ did not
specifically address Dr. Mendelson’s opinions that Claimant has moderate limitations in his ability
5
There is also some question as to how a limitation to occasional interaction with the public accounts for Dr. Hunt’s
opinions that Claimant ability to interact with the public is seriously limited.
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to relate to and interact with supervisors and coworkers, nor did the ALJ specifically address Dr.
Mendelson’s ultimate opinion that Claimant is limited in his social interaction abilities. Compare
R. 79-80 with R. 117.
As set forth above, the ALJ’s RFC fails to account for Dr. Hunt’s opinions that Claimant
is seriously limited in his ability to relate to and interact with supervisors and coworkers, and the
ALJ fails to discuss similar limitations contained in Dr. Mendelson’s opinion. The ALJ’s stated
reasons for implicitly giving those particular opinions less than great weight are that they conflict
with Claimant’s activities of daily living, i.e., that Claimant was able to live with and interact with
his father on a regular basis for extended periods, maintain a relationship with his fiancé, and go
to Walmart and attend church on occasion. R. 116. It is unclear how an ability to live with his
father, maintain a relationship with his fiancé, and go to Walmart and church on occasion conflict
with or have any meaningful bearing on the opinions of Claimant’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Hunt,
and the non-examining psychologist, Dr. Mendelson, that Claimant is seriously limited in his
ability to relate to and interact with supervisors and coworkers.6 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
has stated that “participation in everyday activities of short duration, such as housework or fishing,
[does not disqualify] a claimant from disability.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th
Cir. 1997). Thus, without further articulation by the ALJ and reference to supporting evidence in
the record beyond the generalized reference to minimal activities of daily living noted by the ALJ,
the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision to implicitly give less than great weight to the
6
The ALJ’s statements with respect to Claimant’s father do not appear wholly accurate. The ALJ states that
Claimant lives with his father and has interacted with him on a regular basis for an extended period. R. 116.
In
his function report, Claimant states that he has problems getting along with his father. R. 261. The third-party
function report states that Claimant lives with his fiancé in a house owned by his father (R. 314), and Dr. Mendelson’s
report states that Claimant is upset with his father because he does not give Claimant enough money to live on (R.
93). At the hearing, Claimant testified that he lives with his fiancé. R. 50-51. Thus, it is unclear how ALJ
determined that Claimant lives with his father and is able interact with him on a regular basis for extended periods.
R. 116.
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opinions of Dr. Hunt, Claimant’s long-term treating psychiatrist, concerning Claimant’s serious
limitations in the ability to relate to and interact with supervisors and coworkers is supported by
substantial evidence. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (“[W]ithout clearly articulated grounds for
such a rejection, we cannot determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were rational and supported
by substantial evidence.”). The ALJ’s error is further highlighted by the fact that Dr. Mendelson
provided similar opinions with respect to Claimant’s limitations in relating to and interacting with
supervisors and coworkers, which the ALJ’s decision does not specifically address. R. 79-80,
117.7
IV.
CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that:
1.
The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED the for
further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of Section 405(g); and
2.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Claimant and against the
Commissioner, and to close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on December 9, 2015.
Because the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards to Dr. Hunt’s opinions, the case must be remanded for
further proceedings. Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine whether the ALJ also erred by implicitly giving greater
weight to the opinion of non-examining physician (Dr. Mendelson) over the opinions of Dr. Hunt, or to address the
Claimant’s other allegations of error (see supra n.1). See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (on
remand the ALJ must reassess the entire record).
7
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Copies furnished to:
Presiding District Judge
Counsel of Record
The Court Requests the Clerk
Mail or Deliver Copies of the Report and Recommendation to:
The Honorable Bonnie Kittinger
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
SSA ODAR Hearing Office
Desoto Bldg, Suite 400
8880 Freedom Xing Trl
Jacksonville, FL 32256-1224
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