Norris v. Lake Conway Landscaping Of Orlando, Inc. et al

Filing 19

ORDER denying 17 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 10/22/2014. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
WILLIAM NORRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:14-cv-1512-Orl-37KRS

LAKE CONWAY LANDSCAPING OF
ORLANDO; BILL PRIEST; and KEVIN
CARMEAN,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the following:
1.

Notice of Removal of Action (Doc. 1), filed September 16, 2014;

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and Supporting Memorandum of Law
(Doc. 17), filed October 7, 2014; and

3.

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand (Doc. 18), filed October 14, 2014.

Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants Lake Conway Landscaping of
Orlando, Bill Priest, and Kevin Carmean, in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit
in and for Orange County, Florida. (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable to
him for: (1) terminating his employment in violation Florida’s Private Sector Whistle
Blower Act, § 448.102 (“Count One”); (2) retaliating against him in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”) (“Count Two”); (3) failing

to pay Plaintiff overtime wages in violation of the FLSA (“Count Three”); and (4) breaching
an oral employment contract by failing to pay Plaintiff wages due to him (“Count Four”).
(Id.) Arguing that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Counts Two and Three
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and over Counts One and
Four pursuant to § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction), Defendants filed a Notice of Removal
in this Court on September 16, 2014. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff moved to remand his state law
claims (Doc. 17), and Defendants opposed (Doc. 18). The motion is now ripe for
adjudication.
STANDARDS
Federal law authorizes defendants to remove a state court action to a federal court
if the action includes federal question claims that are joined with state law claims even if
the state law claims are not subject to removal based on supplemental jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. '' 1441(c); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). If the Court finds that it cannot
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that were removed with a federal claim,
then the Court must sever the non-federal claim and “remand the severed claims to the
State court from which the action was removed.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1441(c)(2). The plaintiff may
move for such relief, see 28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c), and the removing party has the burden to
establish the Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Russell Corp.
v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). All uncertainties
concerning jurisdiction are resolved in favor of remand. See id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not dispute that this Court may exercise federal question jurisdiction
over his FLSA claims (Counts Two and Three). (Doc. 17.) Nonetheless, he argues that

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the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his breach of contract
claim because: (1) it does not arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts with his
FLSA claims; and (2) it will predominate over the FLSA claims. (Id.) Although Plaintiff
concedes that his whistleblower claim is similar to his FLSA retaliation claim, he argues
that differences concerning damages and causation provide “a basis for this Court not to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff concludes that remanding his state
law claims will reduce delay and jury confusion that would result if his four claims were
tried together. (Id. at 7.) Defendants counter that the Court should deny the Motion
because Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims arise out of a common nucleus of
operative facts, and the “traditional rationales for pendent jurisdiction” weigh in favor of
trying Plaintiff’s claims together. (Doc. 18.)
The Court agrees with Defendants. Based on the allegations of fact set forth in the
Complaint, it appears that all of Plaintiff’s claims arise from a common nucleus of facts
concerning his employment, his entitlement to certain wages, and Defendants’
termination of his employment. (Doc. 1.) Further, Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court
that his state law claims raise novel or complex issues of state law or predominate over
the FLSA claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors,
Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743–44 (11th Cir. 2006). Finally, the Court finds that convenience,
fairness, and judicial economy would be disserved if the parties were required to litigate
Plaintiff’s claims before two different courts. See Parker, 468 F.3d at 745–46 (holding that
district court abused its discretion when it dismissed supplemental jurisdiction claim
absent a persuasive showing under § 1367(c)).

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 17) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on October 22, 2014.

Copies:
Counsel of Record

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