Smith et al v. Confreda et al
Filing
96
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 70 Motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 6/15/2016. (VMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
HAROLD SMITH; LAURA SMITH; and
SHANIKQUA SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 6:14-cv-1704-Orl-37TBS
ALAN J. CONFREDA; WAYNE IVEY,
SHERIFF OF BREVARD COUNTY,
FLORIDA; BRIAN GUILFORD; and
BRIAN STOLL,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the following:
1.
Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law by Defendants
Ivey, Confreda, Guilford and Stoll (Doc. 70), filed February 1, 2016;
2.
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 86), filed February 23, 2016; and
3.
Reply by Defendants Ivey, Confreda, Guilford and Stoll to Plaintiffs’
Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 88), filed
March 8, 2016.
This action arises out of a police task force’s attempt to apprehend a violent
criminal pursuant to an arrest warrant. (See Doc. 1.) Unfortunately, this attempt resulted
in public humiliation and embarrassment for an innocent man and his family when task
force officers briefly detained them based on a surveillance officer’s mistaken report that
he saw the suspect enter the family’s home. (See id.) The innocent man and his family
now challenge their detentions as as violations of state law and their federal civil rights.
(Id.; see also Doc. 29.)
BACKGROUND 1
In July of 2013, the Cocoa Police Department requested the assistance of the
Gang and Major Epidemic of Violence Enforcement Response (GAMEOVER) task force
(“GTF”) 2 to locate and execute arrest warrants for a Mr. Normelus Pierrevilus, Jr.
(“Suspect”) on charges of violent use and possession of a firearm and the sale and
possession of cocaine. (Doc. 71-1, p. 22; Doc. 76, p. 61; Doc. 72, p. 10.) Defendant BCSO
Sergeant Alan Confreda (“Defendant Confreda”) was the GTF supervising sergeant, and
Defendants BCSO Agent Brian Guilford (“Defendant Guilford”) and BCSO Deputy Brian
Stoll (“Defendant Stoll”) were members of GTF. (Doc. 71-1, pp. 11, 15–16, 18–19.) A
sworn affidavit in support of the operative arrest warrant described Suspect as a
160-pound, 5’1 black male. (Doc. 75, pp. 11, 13.)
GTF’s investigation of Suspect revealed: (1) a phone number (“Phone”) for
Suspect; and (2) that Suspect was staying with an unknown female on Palmer Street in
the City of Rockledge. (Doc. 71-1, p. 22.) GTF obtained an order authorizing it to:
1
The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
non-moving parties. See Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006);
see also Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005) (“When conducting
a qualified immunity analysis, district courts must take the facts in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury,” such that the Court “has the plaintiff’s best case before
it.”).
2 GTF is a “cooperation between” the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”)
and police departments from several cities, including Titusville, Cocoa, Melbourne, and
Palm Bay, that tracks down and apprehends gang members and suspects of violent
crimes. (Doc. 71, p. 9.)
2
(1) acquire information about the Phone from the provider, including its geographic
location; and (2) conduct electronic surveillance of the Phone. (Id.; Doc. 74, p. 15.)
On August 22, 2014, GTF monitored the Phone. (Doc. 71-1, p. 23.) “During the
daytime and early evening hours, the [Phone’s] movements were very active, never
staying in one place for more than fifteen minutes.” (Id.) Around 7:00 p.m., GTF located
the Phone on Palmer Street, where it remained during several locator updates. (Id.)
Around 8:00 p.m., an unnamed GTF agent determined that the Phone was located
between 976 and 974 Palmer Street (“Area”). (Id.) Consequently, another unnamed GTF
agent (“Surveillance Officer”) parked in the Area to conduct surveillance. (Id.) That
evening, Surveillance Officer observed a black male—whom he believed to be Suspect—
enter 976 Palmer Street (“Residence”). (Id.) Surveillance Officer is not a party to this
action.
Based on Surveillance Officer’s observations, Defendant Confreda gathered
GTF members—including Defendants Guilford and Stoll—for a briefing (“Briefing”). 3
(Doc. 73, p. 25.) At the Briefing, which lasted about thirty minutes, Defendant Confreda
showed the present GTF members a picture of Suspect, advised the members that they
had warrants for Suspect’s arrest, and articulated his plan for GTF to apprehend Suspect
at the Residence. (Id. at 23, 28.)
In hopes of apprehending Suspect, on the night of August 22, 2013, at the direction
of Defendant Confreda, GTF members—including Defendants Guilford and Stoll—set up
a perimeter around the Residence. (Doc. 72, pp. 23, 3.) Defendant Confreda parked his
3
Surveillance Officer continued surveilling the Residence and was not present at
the Briefing. (Doc. 71, pp. 23–24; Doc. 72, p. 37.)
3
car halfway in the driveway of the Residence and halfway on the street and positioned
himself outside his car at the end of the driveway. (Doc. 71, pp. 20, 28.) Based on
Defendant Confreda’s assignments: (1) Surveillance Officer entered the backyard
curtilage of the Residence (id.); (2) Defendant Guilford positioned himself next to
Defendant Confreda at the end of the driveway (id. at 46); and (3) Defendant Stoll
positioned himself on the curtilage at the front southwest corner of the Residence (id. at
50). Several other GTF members surrounded the Residence and a helicopter hovered
over the vicinity of the Residence. (Id. at 40–51.) All of the GTF members were armed
and had activated their police lights so that “anybody looking out the window would know
that [it was] the police” outside the Residence. (Id. at 83, 101; see also Doc. 80, p. 28.)
Once the GTF members were in position, Defendant Confreda used his vehicle’s
public address system to call for the occupants of the Residence to “come out with [their]
hands up.” (Doc. 80, pp. 30–32; Doc. 71, p. 84.) When Plaintiff Harold Smith (“Mr. Smith”)
exited the Residence, Defendant Confreda ordered him to walk backwards towards
Defendant Guilford. (Doc. 71, pp. 84, 99; Doc. 80, pp. 34–35.) Mr. Smith obliged.
(Doc. 71, p. 99.) As Mr. Smith approached, Defendants Confreda and Guilford recognized
that he was not Suspect. 4 (Doc. 71, p. 84; Doc. 73, p. 45). Nevertheless, Defendant
Guilford secured Mr. Smith in handcuffs and frisked him for weapons, but advised him
that he was not under arrest. (Doc. 73, pp. 45, 56–58; Doc. 71, pp. 97, 101.)
4
Approximately a year before the August 2013 Incident, Defendant Guilford had
been “on scene” during Suspect’s prior arrest and, thus, described Suspect to Defendant
Confreda as “a little fellow,” or “some words to that affect.” (Doc. 73, pp. 13, 22.) Mr. Smith
was taller, older, and heavier than Suspect. (Id. at 13–22, 45.
4
Defendant Confreda subsequently observed Plaintiff Laura Smith (“Mrs. Smith”)
standing at the door of the Residence and called her outside. (Doc. 80, p. 37.) When she
obliged, Defendant Confreda directed her to stand next to Mr. Smith. (Doc. 80, p. 37.)
Mrs. Smith then notified Defendant Confreda that her sixteen-year old daughter,
Shanikqua Smith (“Daughter”), was inside. (Id. at 40.) At Defendant Confreda’s request,
Daughter exited the Residence. (Id. at 40–41.)
When questioned, Daughter and Mrs. Smith told Defendant Confreda that they did
not know Suspect. (Id. at 44–45.) Mr. and Mrs. Smith also permitted GTF members to
enter the Residence to confirm that no one else was inside. (Id. at 45; Doc. 79, p. 28.)
Three GTF members went inside the Residence and, after a few minutes, they exited and
confirmed that no one else was inside. (Doc. 80, p. 46; Doc. 79, pp. 29–30.) At that time,
Defendant Guilford uncuffed Mr. Smith and Defendant Confreda released Plaintiffs from
detention. (Doc. 80, pp. 46, 48; Doc. 79, pp. 29–30.) Mr. Smith was handcuffed for
approximately fifteen to twenty-five minutes. (Doc. 80, p. 47; Doc. 79, p. 35.) Neither
Mrs. Smith nor Daughter were ever handcuffed or frisked. (Doc. 80, pp. 37, 43.)
Mrs. Smith and Daughter subsequently returned to the Residence while Mr. Smith
stayed outside and spoke with neighbors who had witnessed the encounter. (Doc. 79,
pp. 32–34.) GTF then turned its attention to the residence located at 974 Palmer Street
and told Mr. Smith that he was free to go. (Id. at 36.) The entire encounter—from the time
Mrs. Smith first observed the police lights outside the Residence to the time GTF moved
to
974
Palmer
Street—lasted
about
(“August 2013 Incident”). (Id. at 35.)
5
forty-fives
minutes
to
an
hour
That evening, GTF obtained and executed a warrant to search 974 Palmer Street,
but they did not locate Suspect. 5 (Doc. 73, p. 66; Doc. 71-1, p. 23.) Suspect was ultimately
apprehended in October of 2013 and is currently in prison. (Doc. 72, pp. 17, 30.)
On October 20, 2014, Mr. and Mrs. Smith and Daughter (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
initiated this federal action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida state law. (Doc. 1.)
The operative fourteen-count Complaint asserts ten federal civil rights claims against
Defendants Confreda, Guilford, and Stoll (collectively, “Defendant Officers”) for alleged
violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment constitutional rights and four state law claims
against BSCO Sherrif Wayne Ivey (“Defendant Ivey”) based on the Defendant Officers’
actions during the August 2013 Incident. (Doc. 29.) Defendants move for summary
judgment as to all claims. (Doc. 70.) Plaintiffs responded (Doc. 86), Defendants replied
(Doc. 88), and the matter is ripe for adjudication.
STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
As to issues for which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the “movant
must affirmatively show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and support its
motion with credible evidence demonstrating that no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party on all of the essential elements of its case.” Landolfi v. City of
5
It was GTF’s standard procedure to first attempt to call suspects out of a
residence. (Doc. 75, pp. 36, 38.) If the occupants did not respond, GTF officers would
then apply for a warrant to search the location where they believed a suspect was located.
(Id. at 36–37.)
6
Melbourne, Fla., 515 F. App’x 832, 834 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993)). As to issues for which the non-movant would
bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant has two options: (1) the movant may simply
point out an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case; or (2) the
movant may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be
unable to prove its case at trial.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. in Green &
Tuscaloosa Ctys., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
325).
“The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must go beyond the
pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists.” Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Fitzpatrick, 2 F.2d
at 1115–17). “A factual dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Battle v. Bd. of Regents,
468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006). However, “[a] court need not permit a case to go to a
jury . . . when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the nonmovant relies, are ‘implausible.’” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743
(11th Cir. 1996).
7
DISCUSSION
I.
Section 1983 Claims and Qualified Immunity
The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is that Defendant Officers violated
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
by calling Plaintiffs out of their home and handcuffing and conducting a patdown frisk of
Mr. Smith. 6 (See Doc. 29.) Defendant Officers move for summary judgment as to the
§ 1983 claims on the ground that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 70, pp. 12–
22.)
Section 1983 provides aggrieved persons with a procedural mechanism to seek
redress for constitutional violations that are committed while a defendant is acting under
color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Acts performed by law enforcement officers—even
if illegal or unauthorized—are considered to have been performed under color of state
law so long as the acts are done in the defendant’s capacity as a law enforcement officer.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988). To avoid an individual liability claim under
§ 1983, law enforcement officers may invoke the defense of qualified immunity, which
protects “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating federal law.”
See Depalis-Lachaud v. Noel, 505 F. App’x 864, 867 (11th Cir. 2013). Qualified immunity
6
Mr. Smith asserts a § 1983 claim against Defendants Confreda and Guilford
based on his temporary detention, handcuffing, and frisk. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 80–86 (Count I);
id. ¶¶ 87–92 (Count II).) Mrs. Smith and Daughter each assert a § 1983 claim against
Defendant Confreda based on their temporary detention (Id. ¶¶ 93–97 (Count III); id.
¶¶ 98–102 (Count IV).) Each Plaintiff asserts a claim against: (1) Defendant Stoll for
entering the curtilage of the Residence in an alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights (id. ¶¶ 103–07 (Count V); id. ¶¶ 108–112 (Count VI); id. ¶¶ 113–17 (Count VII));
and (2) Defendant Confreda for supervisory liability based on his role as supervisor of the
GTF members during the August 2013 Incident (id. ¶¶ 118–22 (Count VIII); ¶¶ 123–27
(Count IX); ¶¶ 128–32 (Count X)).
8
is a question of law to be decided by the Court, and it is evaluated under an
“objective-reasonableness” standard. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1486–87
(11th Cir. 1991).
“In order to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]he burden [then]
shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Id.; see also Terrell
v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). To do so, the plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the facts of the case make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the putative misconduct. 7 See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
It is undisputed that Defendant Officers were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority during the August 2013 Incident. See Gray ex rel. Alexander v.
Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Bouye v. Marshall,
102 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (finding that an off-duty security officer was
acting under color of state law because he was in his police officer attire, he bore his
police officer gear, he was performing a police function in patrolling an apartment and
investigating suspicious behavior, and he used his authority to detain and search the
plaintiff). Thus, to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs must show that Defendant Officers
violated Plaintiffs’ clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights during the August 2013
7
The Court may address the prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry in any order.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. However, the United States Supreme Court encourages courts
to address the constitutional violation prong first so as to develop a body of clearly
established law on the often fact-specific inquiries that arise in the context of § 1983
claims. See id.
9
Incident. See Terrell, 668 F.2d at 1250; see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012,
2023 (2014). The Court must conduct a separate analysis for each Defendant. See
Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1035 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Young v. Eslinger,
244 F. App’x 278, 279 (11th Cir. 2007).
a.
Defendants Confreda and Guilford
Defendants concede that Plaintiffs were briefly seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 8 (See Doc. 70, p. 14.) An officer may seize a person if he has a reasonable
suspicion—based on “specific, articulable facts”—that the person is, or is about to be,
involved in criminal activity; this sort of constitutionally permissible seizure is known as a
temporary investigative stop. Fertil v. Guzman, No. 14-60494, 2014 WL 5522889, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2014); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)
(indicating that officers can conduct an investigative stop based on a reasonable
suspicion that the person is wanted in connection with a completed felony). 9 “The
8
Indeed, based on the significant police presence around the perimeter of the
Residence and Defendant Confreda’s call for Plaintiffs to exit the Residence, there is no
question that Plaintiffs were seized. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating that
there is a seizure “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away”).
9 “[T]he foundation required to jutisfy a detention differs depending on the nature
of the detention.” Fertil, 2014 WL 5522889, at *4. As a matter of law, the Court finds that
Mr. Smith’s detention was a temporary investigative stop, not an arrest. See id. (indicating
that whether a seizure constitutes an investigative stop or an arrest is a question of law).
This finding is compelled by the fact that: (1) Mr. Smith was handcuffed and seized for
less than an hour (Doc. 79, p. 35); (2) Defendant Guilford released Mr. Smith once he
learned that Suspect was not in the Residence (Doc. 80, p. 46; Doc. 79, pp. 29–30);
(3) neither Defendant Confreda nor Defendant Guilford used force to detain or handcuff
Mr. Smith (see Doc. 73, pp. 45–46); and (4) the seizure occurred in conjunction with
Defendant Officers’ attempt to apprehend a violent convicted felon with an outstanding
warrant for his arrest (see Doc. 71-1, pp. 22–24). See Fertil, 2014 WL 5522889 at *4
(concluding, for similar reasons, that the nature of a detention constituted a temporary
investigative stop rather than an arrest). Indeed, “the detention was an investigative stop
meant to expeditiously confirm or dispel the [Defendant Officers’] suspicions” that Suspect
10
existence of a reasonable suspicion is a question of law determined by reference to the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1280
(11th Cir. 2005)). “The question turns on whether [Defendants Confreda and Guilford’s]
actions were objectively reasonable under the facts and circumstances as they existed at
the relevant time.” Bouye, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. The reasonableness of a Fourth
Amendment seizure is evaluated using a two-step inquiry: (1) first, the Court must
determine whether the seizure was justified at its inception; and (2) second, the Court
must determine whether the seizure as actually conducted was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 20.
Under the first prong, the Court must determine whether Defendant Confreda had
a reasonable basis for calling Plaintiffs out of the Residence. See Gray, 458 F.3d at 1305.
Surveillance Officer’s identification of Suspect [albeit mistaken] coupled with the fact that
Suspect’s Phone was tracked at one of two homes in the Area, including the Residence,
was sufficient evidence to give Defendant Confreda a reasonable suspicion that Suspect
was at the Residence and permit him to conduct an “investigatory stop.” See United
States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Fields, 178 F. App’x 890, 893 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Reasonable suspicion need not be based
off an officer’s personal observations, but rather may be based on information supplied
by another person, so long as the information bears sufficient indicia of reliability.”). Based
on the circumstances—namely that Defendant Confreda believed Suspect to be in the
was in the Residence. See id. Defendant Guilford’s handcuffing of Mr. Smith does not
automatically convert the seizure of Mr. Smith into an arrest. Id.
11
Residence, did not know who else was in the Residence, knew Suspect had commited
violent crimes, and needed to protect himself and others involved in the
August 2013 Incident—it was not unreasonable for Defendant Confreda to call for the
occupants to exit the Residence. See Blackman, 66 F.3d at 1576. 10 Thus, the seizure of
Plaintiffs at its inception was constitutionally permissible.
As for the second prong of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether the
subsequent handcuffing and frisk of Mr. Smith and detention of Mrs. Smith and Daughter
was “reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.” Gray, 458 F.3d at 1305. “A seizure will be permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the seizure and not
excessively intrusive.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the scope of their seizure
was not justified given that Defendants Confreda and Guilford knew that Mr. Smith was
not Suspect. (Doc. 86, p. 21.)
Although Defendants Confreda and Guilford recognized when Mr. Smith exited the
Residence that he was not Suspect (Doc. 71, p. 84; Doc. 73, p. 45), their belief that
Suspect may have still been in the Residence was not yet dispelled (Doc. 73, p. 45). It
was objectively reasonable for Defendants Confreda and Guilford to conclusively
determine whether Suspect was present in the Residence because: (1) the tracking
10
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the Blackman court concluded that the agents’
initial detention of defendants—calling defendents out of an apartment and handcuffing
them once they were out the doors—was a constitutionally permissible investigatory stop
based on the following facts: (1) there were four adult male suspects involved; (2) the
agents had a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the apartment were the persons
suspected of committing violent armed robberies; (3) the agents did not know how many
people lived in the apartment; and (4) in light of the foregoing, the agents needed to
protect themselves. See 66 F.3d at 1576–77.
12
results indicated that Suspect was in one of two houses, including the Residence; and
(2) Surveillance Officer reported that he saw Suspect enter the Residence. (See
Doc. 71-1, p. 23.) As such, the continued detention of Plaintiffs was reasonably related to
the circumstances that justified calling Plaintiffs out of the Residence in the first place—
to determine whether Suspect was in the house. See Gray, 458 F.3d at 1305. This finding
is further compelled by the fact that, once GTF members searched the Residence and
eliminated any suspicion that Suspect was inside the Residence, Defendant Guilford
uncuffed Mr. Smith and Plaintiffs were released. (See Doc. 80, pp. 46, 48; Doc. 79,
pp. 29–30); see also Kapila v. Jenkins, No. 07-61895-CIV, 2009 WL 1288233, at *7
(S.D. Fla. May 7, 2009) (explaining that an investigative stop “must be made for
investigative purposes only, and its duration must be limited to the time needed for such
investigation of possible criminal activity”). Thus, Defendants Confreda and Guilford’s act
of seizing Plaintiffs, despite their recognition that Mr. Smith was not Suspect, was
objectively reasonable. As this is the extent of Defendant Confreda’s actions as they
relate to the seizure of Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Defendant Confreda is entitled to
qualified immunity as to each of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment temporary detention claims.
The analysis of Defendant Guilford’s handcuffing and search of Mr. Smith turns on
the second prong of the inquiry. A police officer may properly handcuff a suspect during
an investigative stop to ensure safety, to prevent flight, or to maintain the status quo. See
Gray, 458 F.3d at 1305–06; Fields, 178 F. App’x at 893–94. “The use of handcuffs without
anything more than a suspicion that criminal activity has occurred—unaccompanied by
safety concerns or a flight risk—can turn an otherwise legal stop into an unreasonable
seizure.” Fertil, 2014 WL 5522889, at *6 (citing Gray, 458 F3d at 1305–06)). Moreover,
13
an officer may conduct a patdown search only for safety purposes based on a belief that
the person is armed or dangerous. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979); United States
v. Bonds, 829 F.2d 1072, 1074 (11th Cir. 1987).
Defendant Guilford testified that he handcuffed and frisked Mr. Smith for safety
reasons based on his concern that Suspect was still inside the Residence. (Doc. 73,
p. 45.) This subjective concern is insufficient absent evidence that would permit a
reasonable officer to consider Mr. Smith a potential threat to safety, a flight risk, disruptive,
or noncooperative. No such evidence exists here; rather, the evidence reveals just the
opposite—that Mr. Smith was cooperative, benign, and a “real nice guy,” that he and
Defendant Guilford had a “real good encounter,” and that Defendant Guilford did not
believe Mr. Smith had engaged in criminal activity or was armed or dangerous. (Id. at 45–
46, 60–61, 63.) Defendant Guilford’s handcuffing and searching of Mr. Smith, therefore,
was excessively intrusive and unreasonable. See Gray, 458 F.3d at 1306 (finding an
officer’s handcuffing of a student to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment because “it
was not done to protect anyone’s safety”).
Although the Court finds a constitutional violation, Defendant Guilford is still
entitled to qualified immunity unless the law at the time of the August 2013 Incident
“clearly established” the unreasonableness of Defendant Guilford’s actions; the Court
must determine whether, at the time of the August 2013 Incident, “it would have been
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Gray, 458 F3d at 1305.
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to
say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
14
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but
it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness
must be apparent.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citations omitted). Clearly established law
includes controlling, materially similar case law and precedent that establishes a broader
constitutional principle that is clearly applicable to the facts present. See Morton v.
Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff did not provide, nor did the Court itself locate, case law establishing a
bright line rule regarding the use of handcuffs or a frisk during an investigatory stop that
would put Defendant on notice that the unreasonableness of his conduct was clearly
established. See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000) (“If case law, in
factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects
the defendant.”). Nor did Plaintiffs meet their burden to identify materially similar case law
that would have put Defendant Guilford on notice that his handcuffing and frisk of
Mr. Smith in connection with the attempted apprehension of a violent suspect was
objectively unreasonable in light of his belief that the violent suspect may still have been
in Mr. Smith’s residence.
“Even in the absence of factually similar case law, an official can have fair warning
that his conduct is unconstitutional when the constitutional violation is obvious.” Gray,
458 F.3d at 1307 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). As the “Fourth
Amendment’s general proscription against [unreasonable] seizures seldom puts officers
on notice that certain conduct is unlawful under precise circumstances,” the obviousness
standard is satisfied only in the “rare” cases where an officer’s conduct “was well beyond
the ‘hazy border’ that sometimes separates lawful conduct from unlawful conduct, such
15
that every objectively reasonable officer would have known that the conduct was
unlawful.” Id. (quoting Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (en
banc)).
The Court finds that Defendant Confreda’s conduct was not such an obvious
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant Guilford handcuffed Mr. Smith without
force for a relatively short period of time during the course of an investigative stop in which
Defendants were attempting to apprehend a violent suspect whom they believed could
have been in the Residence. (See Doc. 71-1, pp. 22–24.) Additionally, Defendant Guilford
briefly frisked Mr. Smith for weapons for safety purposes per his standard procedure.
(Doc. 73, p. 56.) While the minimally intrusive handcuffing and frisk may have been
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it did not fall outside the “hazy border”
separating lawful and unlawful conduct. See Fertil, 2014 WL 5522889 at *7–8 (finding
that an officer who handcuffed a suspect during a search for a missing phone was entitled
to qualified immunity because, even though the handcuffing was unreasonable, it was
done without force and for a limited time, such that it was not “so obviously at the very
core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was
readily apparent”). While it is true that Defendant Confreda did not believe that Mr. Smith
was a safety concern or flight risk, nonetheless, the line establishing the boundary
between lawful and unlawful use of handcuffs during an investigatory stop is cloudy at
best. Binding authority from the U.S. Supreme Court and Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit describes scenarios in which the use of handcuffs during an investigatory
stop was approved. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (permitting officers to
handcuff occupants of a residence during an investigatory stop in “inherently dangerous”
16
situations to “minimize[] the risk of harm to both officers and [the] occupants”); Blackman,
66 F.3d at 1576 (condoning the use of handcuffs during an investigatory stop so the
agents could protect themselves in light of the violent nature of the suspects inside the
residence). Therefore, Defendant Guilford enjoys qualified immunity from Mr. Smith’s
§ 1983 claim.
b.
Defendant Stoll
Defendant Stoll, who was an assisting officer during the August 2013 Incident, is
entitled to qualified immunity. Assisting officers are “entitled to qualified immunity when
there is no indication that they acted unreasonably in following the lead of a primary officer
or that they knew or should have known that their conduct might result in a [constitutional]
violation, even when the primary officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Shepard v.
Hallandale Beach Police Dep’t, 398 F. App’x 480, 483 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Brent v.
Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that defendant officers who
accompanied a deputy that performed an unauthorized search were entitled to qualified
immunity because the record lacked evidence supporting the conclusion that defendants
acted unreasonably or had reason to suspect that the plaintiff’s rights were being
violated).
Here, Defendant Stoll followed the direction of his supervising agent, Defendant
Confreda, when he positioned himself on the curtilage of the Residence. Cf. O’Rourke v.
Hayes, 388 F.3d 1201, 1210 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the outcome may be
different when an officer acts on his own accord rather than at the direction of a superior).
Plaintiffs do not provide evidence that Defendant Stoll saw Mr. Smith prior to his detention,
knew that Mr. Smith was not Suspect, or was personally involved in the temporary
17
detention of any Plaintiff. Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, Defendant Stoll did not act unreasonably in following Defendant Confreda’s
orders because he had no reason to believe that Suspect was not at the Residence or
that he would be violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hartsfield v. Lemacks,
50 F.3d 950, 965 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that two officers were entitled to qualified
immunity because “nothing in the record indicate[d] that [they] acted unreasonably in
following [a superior officer’s] lead, or that they knew or should have known that their
conduct might result in a violation of [plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights”); see also
Blackman, 66 F.3d at 1576; Fields, 178 F. App’x at 893. Indeed, Defendant Stoll only
knew that Suspect had used a cellphone around the Residence and that Surveillance
Officer believed he saw Suspect entering the Residence. Thus, Defendant Stoll is entitled
to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims. 11
II.
State Law Claims
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims, see
28 U.S.C. 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, 12 see
28 U.S.C. § 1367. Because summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of
11
Consequently, Defendant Confreda is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability claims, which are predicated on Defendant Confreda’s
direction that Defendant Stoll and other unnamed assisting GTF officers enter the
curtilage of the Residence during the August 2013 Incident. See Gish v. Thomas,
516 F.3d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 2008) (granting summary judgment on a supervisory liability
claim when the Court found that “there was no underlying constitutional violation”).
12 Mr. Smith asserts a false arrest or, alternatively, a false imprisonment claim
against Defendant Ivey, which is predicated on his temporary detention by Defendants
Confreda and Guilford. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 133–39 (Count XI).) Additionally, each Plaintiff
asserts a claim for invasion of privacy against Defendant Ivey based on the
GTF members’ entrance onto the curtilage of the Residence and use of force and
intimidation to coerce Plaintiffs out of the Residence. (Id. ¶¶ 140–50 (Count XII); ¶¶ 151–
61 (Count XIII); ¶¶ 162–72 (Count XIV).)
18
Defendants as to each of the federal § 1983 claims, the Court declines to continue to
exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. 13 See Mauhgon v. City of Covington,
505 F. App’x 818, 823 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1988) for the proposition that a district court does not abuse its
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant as to each of the federal claims).
Consequently, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are due to be dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.
Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law by Defendants
Ivey, Confreda, Guilford and Stoll (Doc. 70) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART.
a.
To the extent that Defendants seek summary judgment on the
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, the motion is GRANTED.
b.
2.
In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and
against Plaintiffs on Counts I–X (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 80–132).
3.
The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. As such, the Clerk is DIRECTED to DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts XI–XIV (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 133–172).
4.
The Pretrial Conference scheduled for Thursday, June 16, 2016, is
13
The Court notes that the statute of limitations for the state law claims has not yet
run. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(o) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for claims of
false arrest, false imprisonment claims, and other intentional torts).
19
CANCELLED.
5.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate all pending deadlines and close the
file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on June 15, 2016.
Copies:
Counsel of Record
20
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